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India has faced the challenge of religious terrorism for almost three decades. This 
phenomenon – in-spite of the Indian government’s comprehensive effort to contain it – has 
been spreading its vicious influence and expanding its support base among the conflicting 
religious communities in many parts of the country. The existing views, in regard to the rise 
of religious terrorism, suggest that economic, socio-political or geo-political issues (that 
cropped up during the post-partition period) are responsible for the birth of the problem.  
However, so far no study is done collectively on the four (Sikh, Kashmiri Muslim, Hindu and 
Naga Christian) religious communities to explain the cause of the problem. Therefore, this 
thesis studies these four religious traditions together to further investigate the main cause of 
this problem. In this regard the first six chapters examine: the historical background of 
religious antagonism and religious ideological basis (religious texts and symbols); the 
significance of religion in the Indian society and the relationship between the sacred and 
secular; the effects of the partition of India and socio-political developments (following the 
partition till the late 1970s) on the aggravation of the communal problem; and the impact of 
the worldwide religious resurgence on galvanization of religious and ethno-religious 
nationalism, communalism and religious violence. In doing so the thesis argues that, in 
contrast to the existing explanations, religion (religious ideologies) and historical and socio-
political factors are intensely interconnected for the rise of the problem. Finally, the thesis 
proposes that rebuilding of the communal harmony, by utilising the interconnecting social 
threads of the coexisting sections of the Indian society, is essential for the deconstruction of 
the religious terror in India. 
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
Introduction 
For many centuries India has been the abode of the people of diverse religious cultures and 
traditions; and both persecuted (Persians or Zoroastrians) and persecutors (Muslims) found 
home in this land. Religious plurality seems to have strengthened (in the past) each religious 
community within the plurality – this might be the reason why most of the existing religious 
communities in the Indian society could preserve their original and unique religious values 
and norms intact up to the present time.1 Moreover, until the middle of the nineteenth century 
there appeared to be no incidence of serious communal problem that would divide the Indian 
society in the communal line and would give rise to religious conflict. However, from the 
1870s Hindu socio-religious movements (mainly the Arya Samaj) began to provoke Hindus 
against the Muslims, Christians and Sikhs by organizing the cow protection societies and by 
introducing Suddhi (purification-ritual) and Sangathana (organization) systems – to reconvert 
those Hindus who became Christian, Muslim or Sikh, and to cultivate a militant spirit, 
manliness and self-respect among the Hindus.2 At the same time, the Sikh religious 
community started the Singh Sabha movement to defend Sikhism from the Arya Samaj and 
Christian missionaries. Apparently, owing to the activities of the Hindu and the Sikh socio-
religious organizations, religious resentment began, mainly between Hindu and 
Muslim/Christian/Sikh communities.  
The religious hostility that germinated in the nineteenth century appeared to have deepened 
from the early twentieth century mainly due to the demand for separate electorates for the 
                                                          
1 See Maurice Bloomfield, The Religion of the Veda: The Ancient Religion of India (London: Adamant Media 
Corporation, 2005), 10f. 
 





Muslims (which generated fear among the Hindus that the minorities might indulge in 
separatism),3 mobilization of masculine/aggressive form of Hinduism against the minorities 
(particularly Muslims) and reconstructed Hindu history that projected the Hindu culture and 
civilization as superior to all other cultures and civilizations.4  Within the first quarter of the 
twentieth century several other religio-political organizations – such as the Muslim League 
(founded in 1906), the Hindu Mahasabha (1915), the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS – 
founded in 1925), the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC – 1920) and the 
Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD – 1920) – came into existence and some of these organizations 
incited communalism and communal violence in several parts of India. In the meantime, 
Hindu-Muslim communal division became obvious in the Kashmiri society from the early 
1930s due to the oppressive Dogra rule, the influence of radical Islamic religious ideologies 
propagated by puritanical theologians5 and the incidence of Muslim riots in Jammu and 
Kashmir in 1931. The Hindu-Muslim religious hostility gradually spread in many parts of the 
British India, and this could be one of the major concerns that became the cause of the 
partition of India in 1947.  
Meanwhile, from the late 1920s the Nagas had perceived an impending danger to their 
collective ethno-religious identity and their freedom when they learned that the British were 
planning to make a series of political reforms in India in view of the rising anti-colonial 
                                                          
3 See Christophe Jaffrelot, “Hindu nationalism, Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building,” Paper prepared for 
presentation at the Conference of the British Association for South Asian Studies, (Birmingham: 10-12 April, 
1992), 12. 
 
4 See Herald Fischer-Tini, “Inventing a National Past: The Case of Ramdev’s Bharatvars Ka Itihas (1910-14),” 
in Hinduism in Public and Private: Reform, Hindutva, Gender and Sampraday, edited by Antony Copley (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 112. 
 
5 See Chitralekha Zutshi, Language of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir (London: 




mobilization. Therefore, in 1929 the Naga Club submitted a memorandum6 demanding their 
land be excluded from the proposed reform scheme and be kept under direct British 
administration; and to give them freedom (or revert to their earlier status) when the British 
would leave India.7 However, the second aspiration of the Nagas was not fulfilled; instead 
their territory was made a part (as an autonomous district) of the state of Assam when India 
got independence. Hence, the political outcome, after the British left India, further 
strengthened the above-mentioned apprehension of the Nagas. 
Furthermore, the socio-religious fears and concerns that evolved in the pre-independent era 
began to intensify in the post-independent period due to various unfavourable (to Hindu, Sikh, 
Kashmiri Muslim and Naga Christian communities) socio-political happenings – such as 
minorities’ movements for geo-political and linguistic demands, failure of the religio-
nationalist Hindus to make India a Hindu state, granting of equal religious rights and 
privileges to the minorities in the Indian Constitution, assertion of the majoritarian right of the 
Hindus and military repressive measures of the Indian state to suppress minorities concerns 
and demands. Seemingly these events reinforced the communal division between the Hindu 
majority and the given minority religious communities, and further promoted communal 
conflict or violence.  However, until the 1970s the communal problem – in-spite of 
occurrence of communal violence (occasionally) in various parts of the country – did not take 
the form of religious terror; most probably, because of the strong Congress (secular) 
government in the Centre and, at the same time, religion was not used by secular political 
parties/leaders for their political goal. Nevertheless, from the late 1970s detrimental 
                                                          
6 See Sanjiv Baruah, “Confronting Constructionism: Ending India’s Naga War,” in Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 40, No. 3 (May, 2003), 328. 
 




communal and political developments began to take place due to the decline of the popularity 
of the Congress Party and the occurrence of religious reawakening in many parts of the world 
– particularly Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. From this time leaders of the secular parties 
(mainly the Congress Party) started to manage religion for their political gain, on the one 
hand, and an unrestrained communalisation of politics (e.g. Hindu nationalist political parties 
– mainly the Bharatiya Janata Party – promoted Hindu communal agenda [particularly 
Hindutva/Hinduness ideology] for their political gain, and threatened to undermine the Indian 
secular democracy by attempting to do away with the constitutional rights and privileges of 
religious minorities granted in the Indian Constitution) and politicization of religion (e.g. 
religious symbols – such as Ramjanmabhoomi, Babri Mosque and weapons of gods – were 
mobilized to achieve political goal)  began in full force, on the other. Thenceforth, religious 
specialists and religio-nationalist or ethno-religio-nationalist actors of the conflicting religious 
communities, to achieve their religio-political objectives, started to devise radical religious 
ideologies (basing on the select religious teachings and symbols, such as miri (spiritual) and 
piri (temporal), five Sikh symbols, battle between good and evil mentioned in The Ramayana 
and The Mahabharata and jihad/religious war) to motivate and mobilize the concerned 
religious constituency/constituencies for brutal form of religious violence against the 
perceived enemies. Thus, from the early 1980s modern religious terrorism – Sikh religious 
terrorism, Islamic religious terrorism in Kashmir and Hindu religious extremism/terrorism – 
took birth in the Indian soil and, since then, its number (number of terrorist groups or 
organizations – such as, Dashmesh Regiment, Babbar Khalsa, Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Bajrang Dal and Abhinav Bharat) and capability 
(capability to strike any target in any part of India) have grown rapidly. Although the Indian 
state has been (from the very beginning) trying to defeat this force with the use of military and 
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political tactics, this phenomenon has been persistently expanding its support base and 
activities. This violent force poses a grave threat to the existing socio-political system of the 
Indian nation and society. Therefore, an enhanced knowledge of the cause of the rise of 
religious terrorism in India is indispensable to find a suitable and practicable solution to 
contain the problem.  
Hence, this thesis will attempt to present better understanding of the emergence of religious 
terrorism in India by critically analysing how important religion is to the given societies and 
in what way religious ideologies and symbols could be manipulated by religious authorities to 
legitimize religious violence of extreme form. Further, this research will investigate how 
intensely historical and socio-political contexts and religion are interconnected to explain how 
and why the given four traditions could possibly give rise to the problem. In the meantime, 
the study intends to fill the gap left in the discourse of religious terrorism in India. 
The Research Problem   
Although numerous studies have been done by various scholars on Sikh militancy, Kashmiri 
militancy, Naga insurgency and Hindu communalism or communal violence, so far no study 
is done collectively and uniformly on all four religious traditions to explain the cause of 
religious terrorism in India. In the meantime, the existing scholarly arguments are based on 
the socio-economic and political issues and developments of the post-independent period. 
Besides, importance of religion and religious ideologies has not been given a sufficient 
amount of consideration in the discourse for the rise of these militancy/insurgency 
movements. The rising trend of communal conflicts in India, according to Atul Kohli, is due 
to political problems, mainly disintegration and decline of major political institutions of 
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India.8 J. W. Bjorkman and his colleagues/co-authors contend that socio-political factors are 
involved in giving rise to communal/religious violence in South Asia. “Socio-political truths,” 
they argue, are veiled or hidden by invocation of “fundamentalism”9 and religious 
“revivals;”10 – i.e. mainly for political purposes religion and religious imageries are 
frequently used (by social and political elites) in India.11 Likewise, Joyce Pettigrew, Sumit 
                                                          
8 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability, reprint (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
 
9 According to Robert Frykenberg, “the terms ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘fundamentalism’ came from the name for a 
series of books which were published [between 1910 to 1915] in defence of ‘the faith.’ These works constituted 
an attack upon what were considered to be the excesses and foibles of higher criticism (upon Scripture), of 
modern science (in evolutionism and scientism), and of ‘liberal’ or anti-theistic theology. The books condemned 
any public practice or preaching which might be seen as a hidden danger or an overt threat to that popular 
American culture which was by then so often described as ‘the faith once delivered to the saints,’ a phrase lifted 
out of the Epistle of Jude (1:3), the context of the which was warning for believers to beware of apostasy, an 
exhortation for them to ‘earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints’ [...] The concept 
has served ever since as a neat, although somewhat simplistic instrument of social analysis. Indeed, in the course 
of time, the term has come into common (and even popular) usage. It has been applied more generally to other 
social phenomena and to ideological, political, religious, or social movements in every corner of the world. As 
such, the term itself has become widely if inexactly used for assessing, naming, and measuring all sorts of 
movements [...] Just as fascinating is the relationship of this term to that of revivalism, a concept which also has 
roots in radical conversion movements and in their periodic ... reawakening.” Robert Eric Frykenberg, 
“Fundamentalism and Revivalism in South Asia,” in Fundamentalism, Revivalists and Violence in South Asia, 
edited by James Warner Bjorkman (Riverdale: The Riverdale Company, 1988), 21 & 22. 
 
10  “The origin of the term [revival] and its use in modern times can be traced back into the evangelical ‘revivals’ 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From these came the Great Awakening in America, the Evangelical 
Awakening in Britain, and the Methodist revivals which periodically thereafter have swept various parts of the 
English-speaking (and European) world – and which still continue so to do.” Frykenberg, “Fundamentalism and 
Revivalism in South Asia,” 22; also see F. Ernest Stoeffler, The Rise of Evangelical Pietism (Leiden: Brill, 
1965); F. Ernest Stoeffler, German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1973). During the late 
eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, under the label of Hinduism, there emerged “an almost entirely new 
religious system within the context of indigenous cultures” in India. According to Frykenberg, “Perhaps the 
earliest glimmerings of what may be called ‘Hindu fundamentalism’ are those which were stimulated by 
fundamentalistic missionaries at Serempore. It is this kind of phenomena, as epitomized in such terms as ‘Arya 
Dharm’ and ‘Sanathana Dharm’ and as organized by such fundamentalist movements and parties as the Vibuthi 
Sanga, the Arya Samaj, the Nagari Pracharini Sabha, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Rashriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS), and the Jana Sangh .... In Similar fashion, the explosive new forms of ... Sikhism, and Islam which 
have arisen in South Asia ... as epitomized in such revitalized agencies as the ... Singh Sabha ..., and the 
Jama’at-i-Islami ....” Frykenberg, “Fundamentalism and Revivalism in South Asia,” 27. 
 
11 “Except for Jawaharlal Nehru, most of the pre-eminent leaders of the independence movements in India ... 
maintained prominent religious profiles in public and made frequent use of religious imagery [...] for political 
ends. Unfortunately, such public displays of religious faith produced divisive as well as integrative results. Fears 
of domination, submergence, and assimilation appeared; and charges of obstinacy, self-centerdness, and 
exploitation were heard. In the pre-British era, politicians ... have succumbed to the easy alternative of 
mobilizing support  along religious lines and have thoroughly mixed religion and politics. Whereas political 
leaders during the pre-independence era had usually used religious imagery and metaphors only to establish 
rapport with the masses, their post-independence successors have regularly used religion to rouse communal 
passions and thereby bargain with other centers of political power.” James Warner Bjorkman, “The Dark Side of 
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Ganguly, Ashutosh Varshney, Maya Chadda, Reeta Chowdhari Trembley, Riyaz Punjabi, 
Ashis Nandy, T. N. Madan and host of other scholars take into account socio-economic 
issues, geo-political factors, ethnic-nationalism, Hindu nationalism and identity issues to 
explain the rise of militancy/insurgency or occurrence of communal problem in India.12 In all 
the above arguments the relationship between religion and the given religious communities in 
India is not explored deeply. Religion is, rather, seen as a mask that is used to conceal social, 
political or economic motives. Moreover, most of the scholars seem to have a tendency to 
categorize any form of Hindu religious violence against minorities as communal conflict or 
riot.  
Therefore, this thesis (for the first time) makes an effort to study the four religious traditions 
together to further investigate the main motivating cause/causes for the rise and persistence of 
religious terrorism in India. The main argument of the thesis, in contrast to the existing 
standpoints, is that religion and religious ideologies, (reconstructed and factual) historical 
contexts, socio-political grievances and experiences are proficiently fused together by 
religious and religio-nationalist leaders for motivation and mobilization of the conflicting 
religious constituencies for religious terrorism, with an aim of attaining their religious and 
political goals (i.e. Hindu religio-nationalists aim to convert India into a Hindu 
Rashtra/nation, which will be ruled by Hindu religious principles; Sikh religio-nationalists 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Force: Notes on Religion and Politics,” in Bjorkman (ed.), Fundamentalism, Revivalists and Violence in 
South Asia, 10 & 11. 
 
12 See Joyce J.M. Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence (London: 
Ned Books Ltd., 1995); Peter Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994); Gurharpal Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case Study of Punjab (New 
York: Palgrave, 200); Paul R. Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2003); Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu 
Nationalism in Modern India (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999); Raju G. C. Thomas(ed.),  
Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder: Westview, 1992); V. Das (ed.), Mirrors 
of Violence, Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia (Delhi: 1990);  S. Kaviraj (ed.), Politics in India 
(New Delhi: 1997); B. B. Kumar (ed.), The Problems of Ethnicity in the North-East India (Delhi: Astha Bharati, 




attempt to establish an independent Sikh homeland or Khalistan, which will be governed by 
Khalsa Sikh norms; and Kashmiri Muslim religio-nationalists seek to separate Kashmir from 
India and establish Islamic law in the united Kashmir). 
The Research Questions  
There are two sets of questions – primary and secondary – that have to be taken into 
consideration in this research. Following are the primary questions. Do Hinduism, Sikhism, 
Islam and Christianity justify violence? Why and when do these religions sanction 
holy/religious war? On what basis are radical religious ideologies formulated by radical 
religious actors of these religious traditions to motivate and mobilize their concerned religious 
constituencies for religious violence/terrorism? What is/are the main objective/objectives of 
religious terrorism in India? What is the role of communalism and communal conflict in the 
rise of the problem?  Though India has been experiencing violence of various types, for the 
last thirty years it has been struggling with religious terrorism that is threatening to divide the 
Indian society politically on religious lines. Is there any possibility for the Hindu, Muslim, 
Sikh and Christian religious traditions to work together for a stronger secular India in which 
all people can practice the religion of their own choice without any restriction and where 
people will feel secure?  
 
The secondary questions are as follows. How does the Indian state manage communal and 
religious problems?  Sometimes due to the lack of the central government’s attention (or 
indifference) a religio-political grievance might take a serious turn and erupt in the form of a 
religious violence. How does the Indian government respond to such volatile situations? Is 
there any possibility that a ruling political party in the Centre could create a rift or further 
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widen an already existing gap between majority and minority communities for the party’s 
political gain?  
Scope of the Research  
The research will be focused on the study of religious terrorism in the four major religious 
traditions – Sikhism, Islam, Hinduism and Christianity – in India. Although India is the home 
of multi-religious traditions, seemingly only the above-mentioned four religious traditions 
have so far nurtured religious insurgency/extremism/terrorism that has been seriously 
challenging the socio-political integrity of the Indian state since the early 1980s.  Sikh 
religious terrorism rocked Punjab and some other North Indian states from the early 1980s 
until it was crushed by the Indian military force in 1993. However, there remain a handful of 
Sikh terrorist groups – among them the Babar Khalsa International (BKI) is the prominent 
one, which could rise as a potential threat to the Indian state in near future. Islamic terrorism 
took birth in Kashmir in the late 1980s. Since then this terrorism has been accounted for 
several destructive and violent acts in many parts of India. Ethno-Christian militancy began in 
North-east India, particularly in Nagaland and Mizoram states, from the early 1950s and 
1960s. But, the first extremist group (known as National Council of Nagaland [NCN] – which 
began guerrilla activities in Nagaland in 1956) of Nagaland and the Mizo National Front 
(MNF) signed peace Accord with the central government in the 1970s and in the 1980s 
respectively and gave up their extremist movement.13 However, in the early 1980s a fraction 
of the Naga extremists who were against the peace treaty (known as Shillong Accord) formed 
two extremist groups – National Socialist Council of Nagaland ([NSCN] Isak-Moivah) and 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland ([NSCN] Khaplang). They are well organised, well 
trained and well equipped extremist groups in the North-east India. Presently NSCN (Isak-
                                                          
13 See Jyotirindra Dasgupta, “Community, Authenticity, and Autonomy: Insurgence and Institutional 
Development in India’s Northeast”, in The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 56, no. 2 (May, 1997), 367. 
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Moivah) and NSCN (Khaplang) groups are in ceasefire agreement with the Indian 
government. Besides the above-stated extremist/terrorist groups there are other religious 
terrorist organisations which are nurtured by Hindu religious tradition. The Hindu terrorist 
organizations mainly kill or terrorise the members of Muslim and Christian minority religious 
communities in the Hindu dominated regions. 
 
Methodology  
Historical and Sociological methods with a theological approach will be applied to do the 
research. These methods – without referring to any specific historical method or social 
method or theological approach – will be used in broader/general sense to identify historical, 
social and theological factors that inform religious related violence/terrorism in India. 
Historical method, firstly, will study the historical background of: the Sikh religious symbols 
(for example, miri-piri, institution of Khalsa Community and the five Sikh symbols) on the 
basis of which radical religious ideology could be formulated to justify religious war against 
the conceived enemies of the Sikhs; the modern Sikh religious movements (the Singh Sabha 
and the Gurdwara reformation movements) to assess the Sikh ethno-religious identity 
concerns, the Sikh religious  and socio-political grievances and bitterness (during the pre-
independent era) that could have caused communal cleavage between the Sikhs and Hindus in 
the Punjab; and the post-partition period Sikh socio-religious, linguistic and geo-political 
issues and demands to understand why radicalised Sikhs could have  perceived the Hindus as 
enemies of the Sikh faith and Sikh community. Secondly, this method will help to trace back 
the root of the present Kashmir problem. In relation to this it will review: the socio-political 
and religio-cultural state of the Kashmiri Muslims during the Dogra period; entry and 
influence of puritanical Islamic theological ideologies from the early twentieth century; the 
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Muslim uprising in the Kashmir Valley in 1931; the partition of Kashmir and the betrayal of 
the Kashmiri people by their last Hindu Maharajah; and socio-political developments in the 
post-independent India. Thirdly, it will study the modern Hindu socio-religious and religio-
nationalist movements, their religio-nationalist ideology, their anti-minority activities and 
ground of their religio-nationalist ideology. This will help us to determine when Hindu 
religious hostility against the given minorities took birth and how this antagonism gradually 
intensified in the later period and took the form of religious violence/terrorism.  Lastly, 
historical factors will assist to establish the fact that the Nagas’ ethno-religious identity and 
their freedom have been the main concerns that led to the present crisis in Nagaland.  In this 
regard the historical background of the Nagas and their geo-political territory, construction of 
their modern collective ethno-religious identity, their ethno-religious and political 
apprehension before and after the Indian independence and political happenings in the post-
independent period will be assessed. Hence, historical method will make an attempt to trace 
the historical sources of: socio-religious resentments (of the conflicting communities); and the 
religious ideologies that motivate religious violence/terrorism in the present time. 
In addition to the historical context we have to study the importance and function of religion 
in the present Sikh, Muslim, Hindu and Christian societies to understand how certain religious 
ideologies and symbols could influence or impact the life of an individual member of these 
societies. At the same time, we have to critically analyse whether and how the given historical 
context could be exploited by radical religious leaders and preachers of the Sikh, Kashmiri 
Muslim, Hindu and Naga Christian religious societies for the motivation of religious 
violence/terrorism or insurgency.  
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Therefore, sociological method will study: the relationship between religion and the Sikh, 
Muslim, Hindu and Christian societies, and the function of religion in shaping and developing 
the culture of love and hatred in these religious communities; how religion provides the basis 
of coherence and the sense of identity to these communities; in what way religious (both 
sacred and profane) symbols function as binding force to bind all individuals as one body 
within the community; on what ground communal division is created between “us” and 
“others”. Furthermore, it will investigate how some of the religious symbols could be stage-
managed (by religious or religio-nationalist actors) to instigate and mobilize the given 
societies for communal violence/riots and religious terrorism. 
 
Besides historical and sociological methods, theological approach is essential in the study of 
religious terrorism in India. Theological approach is an integral approach to the study of 
religion and religious experience of a given community. In theological approach emphasis is 
laid on the essential object of a given faith – Allah/Guru/God (theos), which is the centre and 
unity of theological debate,14 and a given religious community’s perception-of and constant 
relationship-with this essential entity. In the meantime, this approach analyses religious (both 
bitter and cherished) experiences in relation to socio-economic and political experiences 
undergone by each of the conflicting religious community in its history (both factual and 
perceived history). Furthermore, theological approach investigates the significance of values 
and meanings/interpretations of certain religious texts and symbols (of a given religious 
tradition) that could be used to justify religious violence and terrorism in a given socio-
political context.  
                                                          




In the modern days the main focus of radical preachers and teachers of Hindu, Muslim, Sikh 
or Christian religious community is “our experience” (i.e. experience of the Hindu community 
during Muslim and British rule; experience of the Muslim, Sikh or Christian community 
under the Hindu domination) – religious, socio-economic, political and historical. On the 
basis of the experience/experiences, selected religious texts and symbols are interpreted to 
seek/attain ethno-religious and socio-political justice/goals. That is, these religious leaders or 
preachers believe that what they express is justified by the socio-political and historical 
contexts, therefore, their religious confession and religious interpretations are absolutely 
valid. In this regard the theology becomes “contextual” or “confessional” theology – basing 
on the concrete experience of the religious or ethno-religious community, and might “override 
any cross-historical or cross-cultural principles.”15 This contextual or confessional theology 
could be responsible factor in giving birth to religious violence or terrorism in India.  
In India, in the four religious traditions in particular, we have to seriously take into account 
the function of religious leaders, and the propensity of radical religious specialists to exploit 
certain religious texts and symbols to justify religious violence for religious or religio-
political goals. In this regard the religious specialists may interpret certain select texts or 
symbols to suit their religio-political purposes. In the meantime, they might make use of the 
given religious society’s socio-economic and religio-political unfavourable experiences of the 
past and present (under other religio-political community/communities) in support of their 
interpretations or religious expressions. Moreover, these religious interpretations or meanings 
could be claimed as Divine/God (theos) inspired, therefore, they are authoritative and 
obligatory. Hence, the selected religious texts and symbols could be managed for the 
                                                          
15 Max L. Stackhouse, “Torture, Terrorism and Theology: The Need for a Universal Ethic,” in Return to 
Religion- Online (October 8, 1986) [Article online]; available from http://www.religion-
online.org/showarticle.asp?title=117; Internet accessed: 2 March 2011. 
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development of imposing religious ideology/ideologies for socio-cultural, economic or 
religio-political purposes. Therefore, theological approach is essential to study how religious 
texts and symbols are manipulated to devise radical religious ideologies for justification 
religious violence/terrorism. 
Sources of Research  
Mostly the printed materials, primary and secondary, will be utilized for the research. The 
following libraries will be accessed to find books and journals: Birmingham University 
Libraries, National Library of Wales, Cambridge University Library, British Library, Oxford 
Indian Institute library and Oxford Bodleian Library. Library Websites will be used to get 
articles, etc. Also national libraries in Delhi, Kolkata and Guwahati may be accessed to obtain 






1. Disproportionate Religious Demography  
India is the home of 1.21 billion people, or about 17% of the total population of the world.1 
Moreover, it is the birth place of four of the world religions – Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism 
and Sikhism; and abode of one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, a significant 
Christian minority and several tribal religious (animist) groups. However, the religious 
diversity, in India, is hugely unbalanced – according to the 2001 census, more than four-fifth 
(80.5%) of the total population is Hindu, 13.4% Muslim, 2.3% Christian, 1.9% Sikh and less 
than 2% others (Buddhist, Jain, and tribal and other religious groups).2 Hindus are numerous 
in all states and Union Territories, except Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), Punjab, Nagaland, 
Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Lakshadweep.3 Muslims are dominant majority 
in J&K (66.97% - whereas more than 95% of the population of the Kashmir Valley is 
Muslim) and Lakshadweep (95.47%); more than four-fifth of the total population of Nagaland 
(89.97%) and Mizoram (86.97%), and two-third of Meghalaya (70.25%) is Christian;4 Sikhs 
make up approximately 61% of the total population of the Punjab.5 Except some variation in 
                                                          
1 Matt Rosenberg, “India’s Population,” in Geography (1 April, 2011), available from 
http://geography.about.com/od/obtainpopulationdata/a/indiapopulation.htm; Internet accessed: 06/05/2012; 
“Indian Census: Pupulation goes up to 1.21 bn,” in News South Asia (31 March, 2011), available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12916888; Internet accessed: 07/05/2012. 
 
2 See http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/religion.aspx; Internet accessed: 
03/05/2012. 
 
3 Available from http://censusindia.gov.in/Census-And-You/religion.aspx; Internet accessed: 03/05/2012. 
 




5 See “The Largest Sikh Communities,” [Internet Article], available from 
http://www.adherents.com/largecom/com_sikh.html; Internet accessed: 03/05/2012.  
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percentage,6 such disproportionate religious demography (without considering the region wise 
religious demography) has been a continuous phenomenon for a long period of time.  
2. Religiosity of the Indian Society  
Meanwhile, the Indian society is deeply religious;7 religiosity of the Indian society can be 
frequently noticed in both private and public realms.8 Temples, mosques, gurdwaras and 
churches (particularly in Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and southern states) are filled with 
devotees in every religious service or occasion; any activity whether religious or secular (such 
as educational, political, economic and agricultural undertakings, and matters related to 
employment) are initiated with religious rites, rituals or prayers; celebration of a success is 
commenced with religious performances or prayers;9 political leaders and government 
officials frequently visit gurus, sadhus and babas (holy men) to seek their blessings;10 
                                                          
6 On Hindu-Muslim demographic difference during the 19th and 20th centuries  see R.B. Bhagat and Purujit 
Praharaj, “Hindu-Muslim Fertility Differentials,” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No.5 (29 Jan. – 4 
Feb., 2005) 311-418; K. Balasubramaniam, “Hindu-Muslim Differentials in Fertility and Population Growth in 
India: Role of Proximate Variables,” in Athavijnana (26 Sept., 1984), available from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12340174; Internet accessed: 06/05/2012; A.P Joshi, M.D. Srinivas and 
J.K. Bajaj, Religious Demography of India (Chennai: Centre for Policy Studies, 2005), 9ff. 
 
7 “In India religion is a way of life. It is an integral part of the entire Indian culture and permeates every aspect of 
life.” “India – Reflections on Life, Culture, and Religion,” internet article, available from http://www.sights-and-
culture.com/India/India-reflections.html; Internet accessed: 03/05/2012; “Religious practices are central in the 
life of every Indian ....” “Indian Culture, Religion and Social Life,” [Internet Article – January 14, 2011], 
available from http://www.articlesdot.net/all/book-reviews/multicultural/india-culture-religion-social-life.html; 
Internet accessed: 03/05/2012; Religious beliefs and practice “have a large impact on the personal lives of most 
Indians and influence public life on a daily basis.” “Religions of India,” [Internet Article], available from 
http://www.photius.com/religion/india_religious_life.html; Internet accessed: 03/05/2012. 
 
8 Religious beliefs and practice “have a large impact on the personal lives of most Indians and influence public 
life on a daily basis.” “Religions of India,” available from 
http://www.photius.com/religion/india_religious_life.html; Internet accessed: 03/05/2012. 
 
9 See Maurice Bloomfield, The Religion of the Veda: The Ancient Religion, first published in 1908 by G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons (New York: Adamant Media Corporation, 2005), 3. 
 
10 M.N. Samdani writes, “The line of VVIPs queuing up to prostrate before controversial godman Ramaduta 
Swamy at his ashram near Chevur village,” in Andhra Pradesh. M.N. Samdani reports, “VVIPs come Calling on 
Controversial Godman,” in The Times of India (Hyderabad: 9 October 2011), available from 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-10-09/hyderabad/30259784_1_godman-ashram-vvips; Internet 
accessed: 04/05/2012;  “Heads of states, royalty from India and abroad, corporate bigwigs, stalwarts of science, 
renowned sportsmen and artists” were among the faithful ones of Sathya Sai Baba. K. Prithik, “A Last Tribute to 
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religious processions or gatherings are organized in almost every local area during important 
religious festivals (e.g. Durga Puja, Kali Puja, Id, Muharam, Baisakhi, Diwali, Christmas and 
Easter)11 and the people of the locality or area, with religious passion (exhibited through 
singing hymns, chanting mantras or magical formulas, playing musical instruments, dancing, 
etc.), join the procession or gathering often leaving their other important business/jobs;12 and 
during these important religious celebrations public places (like streets, clubs, play grounds, 
river banks, school buildings, bus stations and government office buildings/compounds) are 
used for religious celebrations. Pilgrimage to holy places (which include birth places of god-
men like Rama, Krishna and Buddha; tomb of Muslim saints - like Dargah of Pir, in Ajmer; 
Churches – e.g., St. Mary’s Basilica in Bengalore – that are known for granting miraculous 
healing and other wishes of the devotees; and birth places of living or dead saints) are 
important part of religious life of the people, therefore, all known holy places are frequently 
crowded with devotees from all walks of life. This is why Bloomfield says: “India is the land 
of religions,” and in no other place the structure or essence of life is “so much impregnated 
with religious convictions and practices.”13 According to Meera Nanda: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Sathya Sai Baba –Peace,” in UNP News (27 April 2011), [internet Article], available from 
http://www.unp.me/f46/a-last-tribute-to-sai-baba-peace-149171/; Internet accessed: 04/05/2012. 
 
11 “Festivals are an intrinsic part of the Indian way of life, a golden thread that runs through its cultural fabric. 
Given the size of India, the vast diversity of its people, religions, cultures, languages and terrain, it is not 
surprising that there are a variety of festivals being celebrated all the year round.” “Fairs & Festivals of India,” 
internet article (3 May, 2012), available from http://www.visit-india.com/indian-festivals.html; Internet 
accessed: 03/05/2012; “Culture, Festivals of India,” internet article, available from 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/southasia/Culture/Festivals/Festiv.html, Internet accessed: 3/05/2012; “Festivals of 
Goa,” available from, http://www.indiamile.com/india/goa-f23/festival-of-goa-saints-procession-t160891, 
Internet accessed: 03/05/2012; also see Gooptu, “The Urban Poor and Militant Hinduism in Early Twentieth-
Century Uttar Prades,” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No 4 (October, 1997),” 879. 
 
12 For example, famous Bollywood film actors and actresses, and government civil servants participate in yatras 
and gatherings organized by Brahma Kumaris. See Media Wing: Brahma Kumaris (10 February 2010), available 
from http://bkmedia.net/news/10feb.htm; Internet accessed: 04/05/2012; also see “Christmas in India,” in 
Happywink.Org [Internet Article], available from  http://www.happywink.org/christmas-day/christmas-in-
india.html; Internet accessed: 04/05/2012. 
 




The demand for religious services – from worship ceremonies at home in public, 
visits to temples, pilgrimages, etc. – is growing, especially among the urban, 
educated, and largely Hindu middle classes .... 14 
 
Moreover, in the Indian society religion is not just a part of life of a person, rather religion is 
the obligatory or the most important part of life of every individual of the given religious 
community because he/she is born and brought up in it. Every member of the concerned 
religious group is expected (rather obliged) to fulfil specified religious duties and 
responsibilities of the society, because the individual is inseparable part of the whole 
community. In case anybody disregards his/her religious duties and responsibilities, then, the 
person can become pariah to his/her family and society. So, even highly educated (such as 
scientists, medical doctors and engineers) and wealthy people are loyal to their respective 
religious faiths and responsibilities. The strangest thing about the Indian society, as per the 
observation of Angela Saini, is that, “these days among those showing the most religious 
fervour and throwing the most money at temples like Akshardham are smart young 
Urbanites.”15 In the view of Sanal Edamaruku, a rationalist,    
There seems to have been a spiritual resurgence among India’s youth, making 
celebrities out of gurus. They are the educated faithful; the temple-going university 
graduates.16 
 
3. Secularization versus Religious Life of the Indian Society 
Apparently the religiosity of the Indian society was un-effected despite secularist leaders’ 
attempt to make Indian society a secular one so that religion would be confined to private 
                                                          
14 Meera Nanda, The God Market: How Globalization is Making India More Hindu (Random House Publishers 
India Private Limited, 2009, 2011), xvi.  
 
15 Angela Saini, “The God Confusion,” in New Humanist, Vol. 126, Issue 2 (March/April, 2011), available from 
http://newhumanist.org.uk/2500/the-god-confusion; Internet accessed: 04/05/2012. 
 
16 See Angela Saini, “The God Confusion.” 
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sphere;17 instead, the process of secularization and rapid modernization might have helped, to 
a certain extent, religious reawakening in India as in other parts of the world from the late 
1970s.18  In the meantime, although India was made a secular democracy as per the 
Constitution adopted in 1950, the Indian government could not make a resolute effort, from 
the very beginning, to wholly separate religion from the state most probably on account of the 
influence of certain prominent religious-nationalist leaders both from within and outside the 
Indian National Congress Party19 (the secular party which governed India without a break till 
1977). Nevertheless, from the early 1950s to the first half of the 1970s religion, in a restricted 
sense, appeared to be a private business (more) than a public affair even though religious-
nationalists regularly pressurised the Indian state for the fulfilment of their religio-political 
demands. During this period communal violence (mainly between Hindus and Muslims), 
which became one of the major problems for the Indian state from the beginning of its 
independence, had continued to occur in several parts of India; but those communal conflicts 
did not take a form of religious terrorism, because the Indian government (under the 
leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and his immediate successors) managed to maintain neutrality 
on religious matters in-spite of the pressure of religious-nationalists. However, the socio-
political atmosphere began to change from the second half of the 1970s due to the adverse 
political developments: decline of the popularity of the Congress Party; and manipulation of 
religion by the leaders of the secular parties for their political design.20 Owing to the new 
                                                          
17 “Despite being gloriously nerdy and science-obsessed,” India “remains among the most religious and 
superstitious country on earth. Atheists still have not managed to crack a double digit proportion of the 
population ....” Saini, “The God Confusion.”  
 
18 See Nanda, The God Market, xv. 
 
19 See B.D.Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya 
Jana Sangh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 
 
20 See Atul Kohli, “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-
Determination Movements in India,” in The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 56, no. 2 (May, 1997), 332. 
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political happenings the Muslim, Sikh and Christian minorities seemed to have lost whatever 
hopes and expectations they had on the secular Indian state till then; at the same time, 
relationship gap between the Hindu majority and the minorities was widened further.  
4. Religious Reawakening and Rise of Religious Terrorism 
Moreover, from the late 1970s there began to flow a strong wave of religious reawakening 
affecting many parts of the world (for further explanation on religious resurgence see 
Appendix 1), including India. In spite of predictions of imminent demise of religion by many 
Western social scientists and intellectuals21 – e.g. Auguste Comte,22 Sigmund Freud,23 
Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, Voltaire,24 Max Muller,25 Sabino 
Acquaviva26 and Peter Berger,27 the world saw the return of religion to public life. In 1979 
the Iranian Islamic Revolution (ref. Appendix 2 for explanation on Islamic Revolution in Iran) 
took the Western world and secular thinkers by utter surprise forcing them to re-evaluate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
21 See Pippa Noris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secualr: Religion and Politics Worldwide, second edition 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4. 
 
22 In the view of Auguste Comte modernization would make humanity leave behind the “theological stage” and 
new age would dawn in which science of sociology, replacing religion, would be the basis of moral judgments. 
Rodney Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.,” in Sociology of Religion, vol. 60, no.3 (Autumn, 1999), 250. 
 
23 Sigmund Freud assured, “this greatest of all neurotic illusions [religion] would die upon the therapist’s couch, 
they too would be no more specific than ‘soon’.” Stark, “Secualarization, R.I.P.”(1999), 250. 
 
24 According to the speculation of Voltaire, the end of religion would come within the next 50 years. Stark, 
“Secualarization, R.I.P.”(1999), 249. 
 
25 Max Muller, in 1878, noted his complain that the most widely read journals of that time would compete with 
each other almost in every circulation in reporting that the era of religion was past, “that the faith is a 
hallucination or an infantile disease, that the gods have at last been found out and exploded.” Stark, 
“Secularization, R.I.P.” (1999), 250. 
 
26 “From the religious point of view, humanity has entered a long night that will become darker and darker with 
passing of the generations, and of which no end can yet be seen,” wrote Sabino Acquaviva. Quoted in Harvey 
Cox, Religion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), 
11. 
 
27 Peter Berger in 1968 “told the New York Times that by ‘the 21st century religious believers are likely to be 
found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture’.” Quoted in Stark, 
“Secularization, R.I.P.” (1999), 59. 
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“their assumptions concerning the role of religion in the modern world.”28  According to 
Harvey Cox, it was an age “of religious revival and the return of the sacral” rather than 
religious decline.29  Since then “religion manifested itself repeatedly in the public realm,” all 
over the world30 – including India – often to the surprise or consternation to the Western 
(secular) world and to the delight to Hindu, Muslim and Sikh religious nationalists. In India 
secularism is receding, as in other parts of the world – according to Nanda, “the ‘gods are 
back’ in ever greater force in the private and public spheres....”31 So, religious revival seems 
to have boosted the morals of radical religious specialists and religious-nationalist or ethno-
religious-nationalist actors and led to the rise of militant Sikh, Hindu and Islamic religious or 
ethno-religious-nationalism.   
Since religion has both peaceful and violent tendencies,32 it has enormous potential for 
creating and directing both peace and violence; therefore, resurgent religion was exploited by 
communalists, fundamentalists and extremists in India for the achievement of their set religio-
political goal. On the one hand, religion has been very effective in peace building among 
different ethnic communities or groups of people in various parts of the world, including India 
                                                          
 
28 Richard T. Antoun and Mary Eliane Hegland, eds., Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, 
Christianity and Judaism, 1st edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), vii.  
 
29 Harvey Cox, Religion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
Inc., 1984), 20. 
 
30 David Little and Scott Appleby, “A Moment of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious Peacebuilding in an 
Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict,” Religion and Peacebuilding, edited by Harold and Gordon Smith 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 1. 
 
31 Nanda, The God Market, xv. 
 
32 Jonathon Fox, “Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-Religious Conflict,” in Nations and Nationalism, vol. 5, 




– for example, in Northeast India,33 Mozambique, South Africa and Rwanda church 
organizations, religious leaders and religious practitioners contributed significantly toward 
peace building during and after ethnic conflicts and civil wars;34 on the other, religion has 
been used to justify all forms of religious violence against perceived enemies, particularly by 
Hindu, Islamic and Sikh religious extremists, therefore, there has been increase of religious 
violence in India from the time religion manifested its come back in the public arena. 
The return of religion in the public realm appears to have encouraged concerned radical 
religious specialists and religious-nationalists of each of the conflicting religious 
communities; thus, they (with greater confidence) began religionization of politics and vice-
versa to re-assert the central position of religion in the public life of the Indian society. At the 
same time, the concerned religious specialists tactically fused together religion and historical-
social-economical-political factors, and gave religious implication to these secular aspects. 
Thenceforth, Hindu religio-nationalists started all-out campaign to achieve their religio-
political objective of making India a Hindu nation, which would be governed by Hindu 
precepts – because from the beginning of Indian independence the religio-nationalist Hindus 
have been attempting to make India a Hindu state. In the meantime, the Sikh, Muslim and 
Christian ethno-religious-nationalist groups, too, with reinforced effort re-launched ethno-
religious-nationalist movements to attain their religio-political goals. These ethno-religious 
                                                          
33 According to Hrilrokhum Thiek, several church organizations and many church leaders took special initiative 
to end ethnic conflict between Dimasa Kachari and Hmar tribal groups in the beginning of the 21st century. 
Personal interview with Hrilrokhum Thiek (retired Minister of Presbyterian Church in India) over the phone on 
30th September 2011, at 12 noon. Thiek lives in Mulhoi village in Haflong, in North Cachar Hills District, in 
Assam. 
 
34 Helena Cobban, on a peace building role of religion, writes: “In Mozambique leaders and practitioners in the 
indigenous and Christian religious traditions contributed greatly to peacebuilding during and after the 1977-1992 
civil war. In South Africa religious concepts and religious leadership were both central to the success of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In Rwanda, where many religious institutions were badly compromised 
by their actions during the 1994 genocide, other religious institutions have played a notable role in promoting 
social healing in recent years.” Helena Cobban, “Religion and Violence,” in Journal of the American Academy of 




minorities dared to attack the “religious wall” of Hindus by demanding independence or 
autonomy for the ethno-religious minority dominated regions. The “religious wall” of the 
Hindus clearly defines that the whole of India is punya bhumi (holy land) and pitri bhumi 
(ancestral land) of the Hindus, so, the land belongs to the Hindus; whereas the non-Hindus 
either have to denounce their religion and be Hindu, leave the country and settle somewhere 
else or accept a subservient position without demanding any right and privilege, even the right 
of citizenship.35 Thus, the geo-political demands of the ethno-religious minorities further 
infuriated the Hindu community that had, from the second half of the nineteenth century, 
begun to develop anti-minority (particularly Christian, Muslim and Sikh religious minorities) 
stance due to socio-historical (including the reconstructed historical) factors, such as centuries 
of Muslim and Christian rule and their missionary activities, partition of India on religious 
ground, failure to make India Hindu nation, and the rights and privileges granted to the 
religious minorities in the Indian Constitution. So, the Muslim, Christian and Sikh ethno-
religious minorities are perceived by the Hindu majority as serious threat to the survival of 
both Hindu dharma (Hindu culture and religion) and Hindu community (Hindu race). At the 
same time, the secular government (specifically the Congress government) is considered as 
the greatest enemy of Hinduism by the Hindu religious and religio-nationalist actors, because 
the secular government, according to them, supports and protects these religious minorities at 
all cost.36 Actually, the bitter enmity between the secular parties (mainly the Congress and 
Communist parties) and Hindu religio-nationalists developed from the time the Constituent 
Assembly adopted secular Constitution, which made India a secular democracy and granted 
equal rights and privileges to the religious minorities. Thus, the Hindu religio-nationalists 
                                                          
35 See Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 78 & 79. 
 
36 See Yogendra K.Malik and Dhirnedra K. Vajpeyi, “The Rise of Hindu Militancy: India’s Secular Democracy 
at Risk,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 3 (March, 1989), 317. 
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started dharma yudh (religious/holy war) to get rid of the enemies of Hindu dharma-and-race 
from the time religious reawakening occurred in Indian society.  
Likewise, from the dawn of Indian independence the Muslim, Sikh and Christian ethno-
religious minorities have been seriously concerned about the survival of their ethno-religious 
and cultural identity on account of: overwhelming Hindu majority and anti-minority 
perspective of militant Hindu organizations; the fear of Indian state politics being managed 
and dictated by the Hindu majority. Therefore, right after the Indian independence Sikhs and 
Nagas launched movements demanding separate state for Sikhs of the Punjab and 
independence of Naga inhabited region respectively. Seemingly the main objective behind 
these geo-political demands was the protection of the ethno-religious and cultural identity 
from being submerged into the ocean of Hinduism. Whereas, the Kashmiri Muslims were 
suppressed for almost a century by Hindu rulers before the Indian independence, and after the 
independence they seemed to have experienced political deception under the Hindu 
dominated Indian secular-government. Besides, communal clashes occurred sporadically 
between the Hindus and Muslims in the Jammu region owing to the growing anti-Muslim 
temperament among Hindus of Jammu and other parts of India. Meanwhile, on several 
occasions the Indian state failed to protect the constitutional rights of the religious minorities 
from the aggressive Hinduism. Failure of the state to protect their constitutional rights might 
have further affirmed these religious minorities’ conception that the Hindu dominated secular 
India state functioned for the well-being of the Hindus only. Thus, the religious antagonism of 
the ethno-religious minorities against the Hindu majority and the Hindu dominated Indian 
state began to intensify from the late 1970s.  
25 
 
Thus, in the given socio-historical context and prevailing socio-religio-political environment 
radical religious specialists and religious-nationalists of each conflicting religious tradition 
seem to have motivated and mobilized their religious constituencies for religious terrorism by 
innovating religious ideologies basing on select religious texts and symbols for justification of 
any form of religious violence against, so-called, “Others”37 because, the “Others” are 
conceived as forces of evil that is after the destruction of the religion revealed and sanctified 
by the Ultimate Reality; therefore, these “Others” have become the enemies of the Divine 
Reality and they have forfeited the right of existence within the divine created or sanctified 
territory – India, Punjab or Kashmir.  Apparently, religious justification of violence and the 
perspective that “Others” are forces of evil make religious terrorism a serious threat to the 
existing socio-political setup of the Indian nation. 
In India religious terrorism – to fulfil its purpose and to attain its religio-political goal – uses 
various strategies including the modern weapons and technology. Religious terrorist 
organizations can carry out their subversive activities in any part of India and cross any limit 
of brutality.  According to the experts on terrorism, religious terrorism has a “tendency to seek 
the elimination of broadly defined categories of enemies,” which means religious terrorists 
“are more inclined than many secular groups to risk large-scale violence as a necessary 




                                                          
37 Those who do not conform to the set religious norms of a given religious group are considered as “Others”.  
 
38 Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, Carnegie (Lanham: 




5. Meaning and Definition of (Religious) Terrorism 
Literally the word terrorism (originally derived from Latin root “terrere”) means to cause 
“extreme fear”, “to terrorize” or “to terrify”.39  “Terrorism,” according to David C. Rapoport, 
“is an activity that has probably characterized modern civilization from its inception”.40 In 
general understanding, “terrorism” means a kind of “violent activity” that is planned to terrify 
people; it also “may mean, on the one hand, the psychic state – extreme fear – and, on the 
other hand, the thing that terrifies – the violent event that produces the psychic state.”41 
According to John Ayto, “Terrorism and terrorists were coined in French in 1790s to denote 
the activities of revolutionary government during the ‘Terror’ where thousands of its 
opponents were put to death.”42  “The trembling that terrorism effects”, says Mark 
Juergensmeyer, “is part of the meaning of the term.”43 
There are various definitions of terrorism postulated by experts (Bruce Hoffman, Martha 
Crenshaw, Lee Griffith, Walter Reich, Paul Johnson, Mark Juergensmeyer and host of others) 
and government agencies. Though there are multiple definitions, no definition attains the 
mark of accuracy as once Laqueur commented, “Terrorism is like pornography. No one can 
                                                          
39 Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1987); The New 
Oxford Illustrated Dictionary, 2nd ed., (Bay books in Association with Oxford University Press, 1978); The 
Concise  Oxford Dictionary of Current English, edited by R.E. Allen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); John 
Ayto, Dictionary of Word Origins (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 1999). 
 
40 David C, Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions”, in The American Political 
Science Review, vol. 78, No. 3 (September 1984), 658. Hereafter Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling.” 
 
41 Eugene Victor Walter, Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence with Case Studies of Some 
Primitive African Communities (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 5. Henceforth Walter, Terror and 
Resistance. 
 
42 Ayto, Dictionary of Word Origins, 525. 
 
43 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, reprint (London: University of California Press, 2003), 5. 




really define it, but everyone recognizes it when they see it.”44 Lee Griffith thinks that only a 
victim of the act of terrorism can define terrorism properly.45 Griffith may be right to some 
extent because the victim’s knowledge comes through his/her own personal or firsthand 
experience.  However, the definition of the victims of two different acts of terrorism also is 
sure to vary because one act of terrorism could be different from another act of terrorism in 
many ways – for example the experience of the victims of terrorist act on 9 September 2001 
in New York might be different from the experience of the victims of bomb blasts in London 
on 7 July 2005 and recent bombing and shooting in Mumbai in November, 2008. 
Furthermore, sometimes the victim may have prejudices against a group of people, a religious 
community, a political party or a state government; in such a case the victim’s description can 
be biased or judgemental one. 
In defining terrorism there can be less argument, but “there may be less agreement as to who 
precisely is a ‘terrorist’ and what is a ‘terrorist organization,’ since the weapon of terrorism is 
used by many, some for only a short while or to a particular end.”46 At the same time, 
terrorism can be manipulated by political parties and their agents, governments and law 
enforcing agencies to fulfil their political agenda. Walter says, “Ever since the French 
Revolution, ‘terrorist’ has been an epithet to fasten on a political enemy.”47 On the other 
hand, “revolutionary radicals have tended to think of terror as a defensive maneuver against 
counterrevolutionary forces.”48 During French revolution the revolutionaries openly with 
                                                          
44 Lee Griffith, The War on Terrorism and the Terror of God ( Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2000), 8. Henceforth Griffith, The War on Terrorism. 
 
45Griffith, The War on Terrorism, 8. 
 
46 Edgar Ballance, Terrorism in the 1980s (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989), 10. 
 
47 Walter, Terror and Resistance, 4. 
 
48 Walter, Terror and Resistance, 4. 
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pride wore the label Terroriste49 to prove that they were the revolutionaries who terrorise 
their political foes. But, at present terrorists do not identify themselves as such. Those who are 
involved in modern terrorist activities often disguise themselves as either freedom fighters or 
holy warriors of God or liberators.  The subject becomes more complicated when every 
terrorist assumes the guise of somebody’s freedom fighter or holy warrior or liberator; as the 
maxim goes “someone’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.”50  
 
Terrorism, contends Bruce Hoffman, deliberately creates violence to cause intense fear in the 
heart of immediate “target audience” for wider repercussion – the intention is to make 
political change. This wider target “might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire 
country, a national government or political party,”51 or entire public. It aims to create 
authority where there is a power vacuum, and where there is less power it aims to consolidate 
power.52 According to this definition, the ultimate purpose of terrorism is political one, i.e., to 
gain political power by all means. This definition leaves out an unspecified inner motivation 
that inspires many young, wealthy and highly qualified people, to involve themselves in 
terrorist activities and die a martyr’s death. 
Martha Crenshaw thinks that terrorism “is not a neutral descriptive term,” and any politically 
motivated definition of terrorism is subjective one. According to her, “in contemporary 
politics, calling adversaries ‘terrorists’ is a way of depicting them as fanatic and irrational so 
as to foreclose the possibility of compromise, draw attention to the real or imagined threat to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
49 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., unabridged ( Random House Inc., 1987). 
 
50 Griffith, The War on Terrorism, x. 
 
51 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Indigo, 1998), 15, cited by David J. Whittaker, The Terrorism 
Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 10. 
 




security, and promote solidarity among the threatened.”53 Therefore, in Crenshaw’s 
understanding, “‘terrorism’ is a political label,” which “is useful shorthand, combining 
descriptive, evocative, and symbolic elements, but its meanings are inherently flexible and 
ambiguous,” and “may even be contradictory.” 54 It is true that any politically motivated 
definition of terrorism could be subjective, biased, limited or imperfect; however, in every 
definition we can see a picture, though in imperfect or incomplete form, of terrorism and can 
figure out what terrorism really is.  
In the opinion of Lee Griffith, “Terrorism is the intentional effort to generate fear through 
violence or the threat of violence and the further effort to harness these fears in pursuit of 
some goal.”55 He further thinks that, besides political target there is also the possibility of 
religious or economic objectives being commingled with political uses in motivating an act of 
terrorism. Hence, he suggests defining terrorism “by what is done and not by who does it,” 
then there is possibility that “charges of ‘terrorism’ may function as something other than 
mere propaganda.”56 This definition appears rather superficial, because Griffith suggests to 
leave out the main actor/s in defining terrorism – such definition can only present a vague 
picture of terrorism, particularly religious terrorism. An act of violence and the perpetrator/s 
of the act are inseparable from each other, and we could only understand terrorism in better 
way when both are taken into account.  
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54 Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 10, 
cited by David J. Whittaker, The Terrorism Reader (London: Routledge, 2001), 13. 
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Terrorism, according to Walter Reich, is “a strategy of violence designed to promote desired 
outcomes by instilling fear in the public at large”.57 Likewise, in the opinion of David 
Whittaker, terrorism “is a premeditated threat or use of violence intended to intimidate.”58 
These definitions are, to some extent, similar to Hoffman’s definition mentioned earlier.   
Paul Johnson defines terrorism as “The deliberate, systematic murder, maiming, and 
menacing of the innocent to inspire fear in order to gain political ends. […] Terrorism […] is 
intrinsically evil, necessarily evil, and wholly evil”.59 For two reasons this sounds like purely 
judgemental, one-sided and incomplete definition – first, the main objective of terrorism is an 
attainment of a political goal and, second, terrorism is utterly evil. The first opinion leaves out 
religious terrorism and its main objective (which might not be just political one) and the 
second one makes a subjective judgement without taking into consideration the people 
(religious community, ethnic group or a society) who support terrorist groups explicitly or 
implicitly, due to a certain religious or political reason, and those (ethnic, political or 
communal) forces that compel people (minority religious, ethnic or social group) to follow a 
path of terrorism. 
“Terrorism,” according to Juergensmeyer, “is meant to terrify.” It is public act “of destruction, 
committed without a clear military objective, that arouse a widespread sense of fear.”60 “This 
fear”, Juergensmeyer says,  
often turns to anger when we discover the other characteristic that frequently attends 
these acts of public violence: their justification by religion. Most people feel that 
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religion should provide tranquillity and peace, not terror. Yet in many of these cases 
religion has supplied not only the ideology but also the motivation and the 
organizational structure for the perpetrators.61  
It is true that every religion has both non-violent (like love and peace) and violent (like 
sacrifice – which involves killing of a victim) symbols, but it all depends upon the concerned 
religious authorities/leaders to determine whether the symbols (both violent and non-violent) 
be used for peace-building or to justify an act of violence. At the same time, both types of 
symbols can be managed for good as well as destructive purposes – for example, a non-
violent symbol can be manipulated to justify an act of violence, so also a violent symbol can 
be used for peace-building. So, religious authorities play the vital role in the management of 
religious symbols.  
In addition to the individual thinkers’ definitions, discussed above, I also would like to review 
in brief the definitions of the USA and the United Kingdom governments.   The US 
Department of Defence defines terrorism as  
The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to 
coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally 
political, religious or ideological.62  
Similarly, the United Kingdom government defines terrorism as “The use of threat, for the 
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which involves 
serious violence against any person or property”.63 In both the definitions the objectives of 
terrorism may not be specifically an attainment of political end, as Hoffman and Johnson 
think, but may be an achievement of religio-political, religious or ideological goals. My main 
concern here is that these definitions leave out state governments or government agencies that 
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were/are involved in training and funding certain terrorist groups. For example, Saudi Arabia 
and the USA, through Pakistan government, funded and trained Taleban extremists in 1980s 
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.64 Many of the arms supplied to the Taleban 
extremists later on were diverted to other terrorist groups. Likewise the Pakistan government 
is openly accused by India for training and supporting some of the Kashmiri terrorist groups 
like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). 65 Thus, these are one-sided, inadequate and restricted definitions 
of terrorism. 
To sum up the above definitions: terrorism is an extreme form of violence committed against 
people and property aiming to achieve certain political, religio-political, ideological or 
theological goals. Religious terrorism is terrorism that claims – basing its ideology of violence 
on the given religious conviction, selected religious texts/teachings and symbols, and the 
given historical and socio-political context – to fight divinely sanctioned battles or holy wars, 
whereas religious terrorists aim to achieve specific political or religio-political goals here and 
now. Since this terrorism relies on a given religion to justify its act of violence, all those who 
do not conform to the given ideological claims of this terrorism are considered to be the 
forces of evil and they are to be terrorised and destroyed using all forms of violence.  In some 
cases religious terrorists may begin their terrorist activities due to socio-political factors 
against a government, majority or minority community or another ethnic group and afterwards 
                                                          
64 “During the Afghan struggle against Soviet Union, Pakistan played the role of a broker to serve the interest of 
both Saudi Arabia and USA and got billions of dollars from them.” The fund was spent to produce Jihadi 
elements.  Available from http://www.southasiaanalysis.Org/%5Cpapers32%5Cpaper3136.html; Internet 
accessed: 9 February 2011. 
 
65 According to Rajghatta, Vince Canni Straro, a former CIA Chief of counter-terrorism operations, testified 
before the House of International Relations Committee that, Pakistan had “also used its position and support to 
the Taliban to establish within Afghanistan a series of training camps for Kashmiri terrorists. ISI personnel” 
were “present, in Mufti, to conduct the training.” Chidanand Rajghatta, “US Continues to Shield Pakistan on 
Terrorism,” in The Times of India, Internet Edition (5 October, 2001); available from 
http://www.timesofindia.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=405772599;  Internet accessed: 9 February 2011. 
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manipulate religious ideology to justify their act of violence to gain sympathy and the support 
of their wider religious community to strengthen and sustain the given terrorist organization.  
Religious terrorism functions in two different forms – the “technically organized” form and 
the “religio-politically motivated” form. The first category is a systematically organized form 
(similar to a military establishment) of religious terrorist group that uses latest technology and 
weapons of mass destruction against a government, governments or people. Every active 
member of this terrorist organization is trained and armed to do or die to achieve the goal of 
the organization. In the meantime, terrorist activities of the technically organized terrorist 
groups do not conform to a particular geo-political boundary.    
The second category is a religious organization that terrorises and destroys life and property 
of the people belonging to other religious (particularly minority) communities to achieve its 
given religio-political goals. This form of terrorist organization may or may not use latest 
technology and weapons of mass destruction. Such groups’ terrorist activities are mostly 
motivated and sustained by religio-political organizations or parties, and they mostly function 
within a limited geo-political boundary.  In India, particularly, the distinction of these two 
types of religious terrorism is obvious.66 These two types of religious terrorism will be further 
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6. Why and When Religion sanctions Violence?  
Several questions arise when we think of religious terrorism. How can violence and religion, 
which often preaches divine love, peace and brotherhood, go together? Does the divine 
authorize its devotees to commit violent acts of terrorism to destroy human lives and 
property? What is the basis for the terrorising group that claim to be faithful devotees of a 
particular faith that, it is the divine sanction that they should eliminate those who do not 
conform to their religious belief?  
The Latin root religare, which means ‘to bind’, is the appropriate term to define religion in 
one word.67 This binding requires blood as cementing element, and to shed blood ‘violence’ 
needs to be committed in the name of sacred/holy. Violence is physical act of inflicting 
physical as well mental injury or destruction of life – life of a person or surrogate victim – and 
property. One of the Latin roots from which the word comes is violare, meaning ‘to violate’. 
“Whatever ‘violates’ another, in the sense of infringing upon or disregarding or abusing or 
denying that other, whether physical harm is involved or not, can be understood as an act of 
violence.”68 
 
In the meantime, religion is the embodiment of both violent (e.g. sacrificial ritual/rituals, war 
between good and evil, weapons of divinities, divine victory over evil and destruction of 
forces of evil) and non-violent (such as renunciation, self-sacrifice, cross – which can be non-
                                                          
67 Religion binds an individual member to the concerned religious community/group and also it establishes bond 
between the community/group and the other-worldly Reality/realities. Thus the given religious community exists 
simultaneously in two different worlds, the world of mortals and the world of spiritual or divine being/beings or 
seen and unseen worlds. Robert McAfee Brown tries to define religion, rather vague, in the following words: 
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which repeats itself, in the sense of a verdict to which we return again and again. The cumulative ingredients of 
these Latin terms, then, are the notion of a binding constraint from which we cannot escape, and to which we feel 
deeply committed.” Robert McAfee Brown, Religion and Violence: A Primer for White Americans 
(Philadelphia: the Westminster Press, 1973), 3. 
 
68 Brown, Religion and Violence (1973), 7. 
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violent as well as violent symbol, holy martyr – can be non-violent as well as violent symbol, 
and divine love to humanity) teachings and symbols; however, both types of symbols can be 
manipulated theologically, either to justify violent acts or to build peace, by religious 
authorities. So, religion can play both roles of peace building and supplying ideology for the 
justification of acts of terrorism. This dual nature of religion R. Scott Appleby calls “the 
ambivalence of the sacred.”69 
 
6.1. Two Dimensions of Religion 
Religion – considering mainly in this context Hinduism, Christianity, Islam and Sikhism – 
matters both ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ dimensions. The terms “sacred” and “profane” are used 
by Mircea Eliade to define divine/spiritual/holy cosmos and 
desacralized/imperfect/unholy/temporal/unspiritual world respectively. According to Eliade:  
The first possible definition of the sacred is that it is the opposite of the profane [...] 
Man becomes aware of the sacred because it manifests itself, shows itself, as 
something wholly different from the profane [...] it could be said that the history of 
religions – from the most primitive to the most highly developed – is constituted by a 
great number of hierophanies [i.e. manifestation of sacred], by manifestations of 
sacred realities. From the most elementary hierophany – e.g. manifestation of the 
sacred in some ordinary object, a stone or a tree – to the supreme hierophany (which, 
for a Christian, is the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ) there is no solution of 
continuity. In each case we are confronted by the same mysterious act – the 
manifestation of something of a wholly different order, a reality that does not belong 
to our world, in objects that are an integral part of our natural ‘profane’ world [...] 
The polarity sacred-profane is often expressed as an opposition between real and 
unreal or pseudoreal [...] Thus it is easy to understand that religious man deeply 
desires to be, to participate in reality, to be saturated with power.70 
Hence, to a religious person, sacred is holy, infallible, unquestionable, and obligatory; the 
profane, on the other hand, is unholy, immoral, unacceptable, contaminable, and dangerous – 
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70 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion, translated by Willard R. Trask (New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961), 10-13; also see Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (New 
York: Sheed & Ward, 1958), 7ff. 
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profane therefore is anathema to religious fanatics.71 These contradictions in religious 
teachings have been there since the beginning of the existence of religion – the dichotomy of 
sacred and profane, or light and darkness is found in all religions. The sacred is to be 
preserved and protected at all cost, constantly nurtured with undefiled faith and ritual 
practices, and no contradictory and opposing elements are to be tolerated. However, religious 
demarcation line between sacred and profane and righteous and evil appears to be very 
narrow and often misinterpreted and manipulated by radical religious authorities to justify 
religious violence/terrorism. 
 
Furthermore, the idea of sacred and profane also demarcates territorial boundary, as sacred 
land and profane land. The sacred land is to be inhabited and ruled by the people of the given 
faith community only. For Hindus, India is the Holy Land, because it is god given land (deva-
nirmita bhumi) to the Hindus. According to Manu, great Hindu Law giver, beyond the 
boundary of India is Melechchhadesh,72 the land of barbarians; therefore, the land beyond 
Indian border is profane or unholy.73 Since India is god-given land to the Hindus the 
sacredness of every holy place is to be protected by all means. Similarly, Punjab is the land of 
Sikh Gurus, so it is holy land for the Sikhs; Kashmir is dominated by Muslims, therefore, the 
land should be the “house of Islam”; and Naga dominated region is divine given land for the 
Naga Christians. Thus, the understanding of sacred and profane is mixed with violence and 
                                                          
71 In Arabia Umar, the second khalifa (634-644 CE), established a rule, “that none except Muslims might remain 
in Arabia. So the Jews and Christians who would not accept Islam had to leave the country.” It is because the 
land comprises the two most Holy places of Islam “Mecca and Medina, which are called haramain, or ‘the two 
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action), and punya bhumi (land of merit); hence it is the holy land. Since, it is holy land only the people, who 
obey, follow and practice its sacred history and sacred precepts are worthy to inhabit it in true sense. 
 
72 Manu-Smriti 2:23. 
 
73 This was why Hindus were prohibited to travel beyond Indian boarders. 
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non-violence. A sacred territory of a given religion has to be protected from profane by the 
adherents of the concerned religion by any means and, if there arises any threat to the sacred 
territory it is an obligatory duty of every follower of the given religion to take up arms in the 
name of the holy and fight against the profane or evil force.  
 
6.2. Sacred Symbols and Holy Violence 
 
Meanwhile, the above-given religions embody various symbols – tangible or conceptual – and 
these symbols are often as sacred as the sacred itself. Such symbols have sacred history and 
social significance to the given society; therefore, the symbols are embodiment of profound 
theological paradigm.  These religious symbols seem to function like constantly connecting 
threads to interconnect Hindu, Sikh, Islamic and Naga Christian religious societies with their 
ancestors, both sacred and secular history and divinity. Indeed, symbols play very important 
role, therefore, many devout followers of the given religions wear symbols (such as five Ks, 
trident or marks on the forehead, cross and crescent) as their ethno-religious identity and as 
constant reminder towards their religious duties and convictions. At the same time, holy 
places, like birth places of saints and god-men, are very important sacred symbols. To Peter 
Van Der Veer, sacred places  
are the foci of religious identity. They are the places on the surface of the earth that 
express most clearly a relation between cosmology and private experience. A journey 
to one of these centers is a discovery of one’s identity in relation to the other world 
and to the community of believers – a ritual construction of self that not only 
integrates the believers but also places a symbolic boundary between them and 
“outsiders”.74 
 
To a believing religious community sacred symbols are holy and should not be reviled by 
anybody. Ayodhya/Babri Masjid75 issue is one of the most volatile religious issues which can 
                                                          
74 Peter Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Barkley: University of California 
Press, 1994), 11. 
 
75 Babri Masque in Ayodhya. 
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flare up religious violence in India.76 For the Hindus Ayodhya is a sacred symbol because it is 
the birth place of Rama; hence, reclaiming of the sacred symbol is like re-enactment of 
pristine glory of ancient India ruled by divine and righteous king Rama who destroyed the 
forces of Ravana,77 the king of demons (rakshashas/danavas). Likewise, the mosque is 
important sacred symbol for the Muslims. In the same way, the Golden Temple is one of the 
most sacred symbols for the Sikhs. Thus, sacred symbols mean much to the believing 
religious community and to protect the sacred symbols holy violence/terrorism might be 
inevitable. 
7. Importance of This Research  
Even though a lot of studies have been done by various intellectuals on Sikh terrorism, Naga 
militancy, Hindu communalism and Islamic militancy in Kashmir, further investigation is 
necessary to comprehend what is/are important motivating factor/factors in the rise of 
militancy/extremism/terrorism nurtured by Sikh, Islamic, Hindu and Christian religious 
traditions in India. Besides the term terrorism, I have used extremism, militancy and 
insurgency in this thesis. Militancy is a self-justified act of aggression or violence to achieve 
political, religio-political or theological goal; extremism advocates political or religious 
radicalism and extreme ideas and actions that are not reasonable and not acceptable to any 
normal society; whereas, insurgency is an armed movement which seeks 
independence/separation/autonomy of a geo-political region/territory, e.g. Nagaland, Punjab 
or Jammu and Kashmir. Although violence is integral part of militancy, extremism and 
insurgency, it is not necessary that militancy, extremism or insurgency should lead to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
76 Violence in India, from the late 1980s, can be termed as holy violence. 
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terrorism. However, it is obvious that the violent activities – such as violence against Muslims 
in Gujarat in 2002, violence against Christians in Orissa in 2007-8, killing of innocent Hindus 
and Nirankaris in Punjab from the early 1980s, and violence against the Hindu minorities 
(Kashmiri Pundits) in Kashmir from the early 1990s – of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim extremist 
organisations characterize acts of religious terrorism. Apparently the above given examples of 
the acts of violence denote that the purpose of the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim extremism is to 
terrorize perceived enemies (e.g. Hindu majority considers Muslim and Christian 
communities enemies of Hinduism, and to Khalsa Sikh and Kashmiri Muslim communities 
Hindu majority is a serious threat to the survival of their ethno-religious identity) and to 
destroy the lives and property of the, so-called, enemies. Therefore, Hindu, Sikh and Muslim 
extremists use all forms of violent methods to destroy the lives of targeted victims; 
meanwhile, the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim extremists cross all limits of human brutality to 
perform acts of religious violence. Therefore, in the case studies I have used the terms 
extremism and terrorism for the Sikh, Hindu and Kashmiri Muslim religious violence. In 
regard to the Naga armed movement I used the words militancy and insurgency because the 
Naga militancy/insurgency does not seem to come under the category of terrorism or religious 
terrorism. Apparently the Naga insurgency is an armed rebellion against the Indian state; thus, 
the main target of the insurgency is the state machinery (mostly military, Para-military and 
police personnel and suspected informers). Apparently the chief goal of this insurgency is 
geo-political one, i.e. to achieve independence of the Naga inhabited territory/territories. 
Moreover, the Naga armed militancy does not appear to have religious/holy war ideology (as 
Sikh, Hindu and Islamic terrorism) even though Christianity is the vital part of Naga ethnicity 
and identity; therefore, it does not target or terrorise any religious community/group/sect in 
the name or for the sake of the Naga Christianity.  
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In this study I attempt to establish, in contrast to the prevailing arguments, that radical 
religious ideology, on the basis of historical and prevailing socio-political contexts, is the 
main motivating factor for the birth of religious terrorism in India. Hence, it is imperative to 
assess how the socio-religious-political environment from the pre-independent period 
produced negative impact among the above-given religious communities and how this 
negative effect turned into religious bitterness and communal conflict. Meanwhile, in the 
post-independent period how various socio-cultural and political grievances further 
aggravated this religious antagonism and transformed it into religious extremism/terrorism in 
the early 1980s. Moreover, the problem of religious terrorism is most likely to get further 
intensification if any of the conflicting communities attempt to manipulate religious and 
socio-historical-political ground, the common ground that seems to be accountable for the rise 
and nurture of religious terrorism in India. In the meantime, this study endeavours to explore 
possible solutions for the deconstruction of religious terror for communal harmony in the 
Indian society and geo-political integrity of the Indian state. 
8. Arrangement of the Chapters 
This thesis, besides introduction and conclusion, consists of seven chapters. First chapter 
analyses: the problem of Indian secularism; manipulation of religion or communalisation of 
politics by political leaders for political purposes; failure of the Indian state to safeguard 
constitutional rights of the religious minorities; and critique of the secular state by Hindu, 
Sikh, Muslim and Christian communities. The study is an effort to explain the complicated 
and problematic relationship between religion and state and majority and minority religious 
communities, and how this complicated relationship helps in escalation of religious hatred 
and violence against the secular state and among the conflicting communities. Second, third, 
fourth and fifth chapters are the case studies of Sikh religious terrorism, Islamic terrorism in 
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Kashmir, Hindu religious terrorism and Naga Christian militancy respectively. The case 
studies are based on a critical survey of literature and secondary sources rather than on 
primary material or fieldwork. The studies present: some of the prevalent arguments of 
different scholars on the rise of terrorism/militancy in India; my argument on the rise of the 
religious terrorism; socio-historical background of religious antagonism; religious and socio-
political concerns of the conflicting religious groups and augmentation of religious 
antagonism in the post-independent period; how religious ideology is fused together with 
historical and socio-political concerns and experiences of the people of the given religious 
communities by religious or religio-nationalist actors to motivate holy war against the 
conceived enemies; brief review of the activities of religious terrorism; and how the problem 
of religious terrorism is further complicated by the Indian state’s military strategy. Sixth 
chapter offers a comparative reflection on religious terrorism. Finally, the seventh chapter 
tenders practicable socio-religious solution for conflict resolution and deconstruction of 







RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN INDIA 
 
I.1. Introduction 
Religious terrorism began in the Indian soil from the early 1980s. On account of terrorist 
activities thousands of precious lives are lost, many are permanently (both physically and 
mentally) wounded and enormous amount of public and private properties are destroyed. 
Moreover, religious terrorism has created insecurity, distrust and hatred among the people 
professing different religious faiths. Meanwhile, in-spite of the use of military strategy and 
political tactics by the Indian state to subdue this phenomenon from the very beginning, the 
number of terrorist organizations has increased dramatically from the late 1980s. Apparently, 
one of the most common and important features of religious terrorism is the use of religious 
ideology to mobilize the concerned religious constituency for terrorist activities. Hence, this 
phenomenon is posing a serious threat to the communal harmony of Indian society and the 
political stability of the nation. 
Arrangement of the chapter is as follows. Firstly, I present a review on state secularism and 
how state secularism functioned during the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
governments till the beginning of 21st century. This might help to identify religio-political and 
social factors that become the basis for communal tension, religious violence and terrorism. 
Secondly, a critique of the secular state from Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Sikh perspectives 






I.2. Post-Independent Indian State 
Since independence India has faced severe tests that have threatened its social integrity and 
political stability. India had to cope, on the one hand, with communal violence and the 
resettlement of millions of Hindu and Sikh refugees that poured in from Pakistan and, on the 
other, with the consolidation of the princely states within the Indian Union. The partition of 
British India, into India and Pakistan, was accompanied by communal riots and some of the 
worst social upheaval of the century. The communal riots, which destroyed the lives of 
500,000 to 1,000,000 people1 and uprooted almost 11,000,000 people  from their home-land 
making them refugees,2 seems to have filled the hearts and minds of many Indians with 
distrust and suspicion. Such attitudes have often tended to prove fatal to communal harmony 
and social unity in the post-independent India. Besides the serious problem of communal 
violence and resettlement of refugees, the government of the newly independent India had to 
face the difficulty – which it had inherited from the British – of the consolidation of the 
princely states within the Indian Union.  The British not only caused the great divide, but left 
the fate of more than 362 large and small princely states undecided. The colonial power had 
renounced their treaty rights and had advised all of them to join either India or Pakistan.3 
Within few months all, except Hyderabad, Jammu & Kashmir and Junagadh, were included in 
the federal Union of India through persuasion, cajoling, bullying and threatening.4 But the 
Muslim ruler (nawab) of Junagadh, a tiny seaport state on the coast of Gujarat with Hindu 
                                                 
1 Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 68. 
 
2 According to Percival Spear, “The loss of life was estimated by judge Kholsa, a keen and cautious observer, at 
half a million people. The devastation in terms of the injured, misery and hate was far greater. The refugees 
(about five and a half million) who poured into West Pakistan were nearly one fifth of its then population, while 
the roughly equal number of Sikhs and Hindus moving eastwards were about the same proportion of the Indian 
Panjab and Western Uttar Pradesh.”Percival Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India 1740-1975, 2nd edition, 
16th impression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 405.   
 
3 Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India, 407. 
 
4 Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India, 407. 
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majority, wanted to join Pakistan; at the same time, the Muslim ruler (Nizam) of Hyderabad – 
out of its seventeen million population 85% was Hindu – was not eager to join the Indian 
Union. Ultimately, Jawaharlal Nehru sent in the Indian army and took control of both the 
territories in 1948.  
The case of Jammu & Kashmir was not as straightforward as the case of Junagadh and 
Hyderabad. Muslim-majority Kashmir was ruled by a Hindu Maharajah; and at the same time 
the territory lied in between Pakistan and India. This complication, most probably, made the 
Maharajah put aside the decision of joining either India or Pakistan. But, in October 1947 
Pathan tribesman from the North-West Frontier attacked Srinagar, aiming to forcibly merge 
Kashmir into Pakistan. The frightened Maharajah Hari Singh immediately signed a merger 
treaty with India following which Indian paratroopers landed in Srinagar and saved it from the 
Pathan attack. This incident caused the first full-scale war, in 1948, between India and 
Pakistan. In the war “Gilgit, Baltistan and Muzaffarbad were taken over by Pakistan, while 
the Kashmir Valley, Ladakh and most of Jammu fell to Indian control.”5 Pakistan, despite the 
final ceasefire, refused to recognize the actions of India in Kashmir. Such refusal on the part 
of Pakistan created high tension in the region and two more wars, in 1965 and 1971 (besides 
the first war in 1948), were fought between India and Pakistan. The tension continues to 
prevail between the two neighbours on Kashmir, although the Simla Agreement of 1973 
partitioned Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The Kashmir territorial issue is arguably the 
most volatile one in the South Asian region. The problem not only strains the relationship 
between the two neighbours and threatens to cause nuclear war in the region, but also seems 
to play a dynamic role in the furtherance of the already prevailing distrust and suspicion 
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between Hindu and Muslim communities, not only in the Kashmir valley but in the wider part 
of India.  
However, in-spite of the communal problem faced by the post-independent Indian state, 
various religious communities seemed to have continued to coexist as one society (without 
being perturbed by any form of communal tension or violence) in many parts of India. Such 
mutually coexisting societies can be found, even today, in several parts of India. In the time of 
great socio-political upheaval these coexisting sections of Indian society could have been the 
ray of hope for the leaders and people of the newly liberated and truncated nation.  Moreover, 
these coexisting societies appear to have latent potentialities that might provide a suitable 
model for conflict resolution in the present socio-religious and political environment in India. 
Even though the post-independent India had to face severe socio-political crisis in the early 
stage because of “the bitter legacy of communal rioting,”6 Indian national leaders turned away 
from communalism and made India a multi-party secular democracy.  
I.3. Secular State and Role of Religion in the Public Life 
From the dawn of Indian independence the leaders of the Hindu Organizations – the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – were against the secular project; 
their desire and demand was to make India a Hindu Rashtra (nation), which would be 
governed by Hindu laws and tenets. The leaders of Mahasabha and RSS were not the only 
ones that campaigned against the secular scheme, but in the Indian National Congress (INC) 
too there were some – both “backward looking” and “forward looking” Hindu traditionalists – 
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who opposed secularism and some others who expressed their serious doubts concerning 
secularism as the correct political principle for India.  
From 1947 to 1950 the INC consisted of three groups with differing political views. All these 
three groups wielded a significant influence within and outside the INC. Among them, one 
group wanted to build India as “a liberal-democratic state with a constitution that was both 
secular and parliamentary in character;” another group wished to make India “a socialist state 
in which Collectivist Principles governed social and economic organization; and the third was 
working to realize a state which embodied Hindu traditions and values.”7 The third group was 
divided into “backward looking” Hindu traditionalists and “forward looking” Hindu 
nationalists. The “backward looking” traditionalists were conservatives who were in favour of 
continuation of age-old “hierarchical social order;” and the Hindu nationalists desired “to 
remould Hindu society on corporatist lines and to fashion the state accordingly.”8 The Hindu 
traditionalists gave more emphasis to Hindu culture and Hindu tradition. The traditionalists 
were “more xenophobic in outlook” but differed from the “Hindu nationalists,” because they 
hardly had “the ideological commitment of the latter.”9 According to Jaffrelot, “While Hindu 
nationalism is built around opposition to the Other, whether Muslim or Christian, Hindu 
traditionalism is manifested simply by the promotion of culture, together with the interests of 
the community.”10  
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Although there were (both within and outside the party) Hindu traditionalists and Hindu 
nationalists, the INC under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru remained a pluralistic, non-
communal political organization that was committed to secularism. There were two important 
reasons behind this commitment: first, the party had pledged “to create a polity which would 
be scrupulously neutral towards all religions and into which, the socialist faction of the 
Congress believed, religion would gradually disappear;”11 second, the party had to counter the 
threat of “Hindu nationalism’s continued demand after independence for a state in which 
Hinduism would enjoy a hegemonic role.”12 Besides, the post-independent Indian population 
consisted of significant percentage of minority communities (in addition to the untouchables 
and outcastes within the Hindu community) that could not be ignored.   After the partition 
there remained more than “43 million Muslims” in India who “constituted a potential source 
of opposition to any political movement aiming at Hindu domination;”13 and besides Muslims 
there were also Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains and Zoroastrians.  
Pre-independent INC-led Indian nationalism sought to unite all Indians against imperialist 
forces to achieve Indian independence. According to Nehru and his allies, post-independent 
secularism was the continuance of pre-independent nationalism. Therefore, “Nehru insisted 
that whatever might happen in Pakistan, the Congress ‘must pursue with even greater 
determination than in the past our efforts’”14 in making India a secular state where every 
individual – irrespective of race, religion, caste and colour – would be able to live and walk 
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without any fear. Thus, the concept “of two nations, each based on a religion, was opposed to 
the secularity on which the Indian state was established.”15 
India was declared a secular state by the Constituent Assembly in the Constitution of 1950, 
though the actual term “Secularism did not find a place in the Preamble till 1976.”16 The two 
fundamental principles of state secularism in India are Sarvadharma Sambhaba (good will 
towards all religions) and dharma nirapeksha (religious neutrality). According to these 
principles the Indian state is neither religious, nor anti-religious; rather the state has to observe 
goodwill towards all religions.17 These principles seem to be appropriate for a multi-religious 
country like India; however, practically there has been difficulty in the implementation of 
these principles due to the overwhelming Hindu majority.   
There are three noteworthy factors in regard to Indian secularism: firstly, Indian secularism is 
a Gandhian-Nehruvian synthesis that, though sounds ambiguous, proposes to manage state 
neutrality and recognises religious diversity – this “religious diversity is acknowledged and 
protected through a framework of enabling provisions”18 – religious equality and religious 
liberty, and attempts to promote good will among diverse religious communities; secondly, it 
does not make clear-cut separation between the state and religion – in it sacred and secular 
often assume interchangeable forms; and thirdly, it recognizes religious political parties (like 
the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP], the Shiv Sena, and the Akali Dal) and permits them to 
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contest elections and to form government in both state and the centre. Hence, the public and 
political life of Indian State is marked by religious mobilizations and religious symbols.  
The Indian Constitution, “instead of restricting religion to the private domain,” recognizes the 
existence of various religious communities “with their own distinct moral and social codes 
and ways of life.”19 Article 25 of the Constitution grants every citizen the right to “profess, 
propagate and practice” her/his religion; and according to Article 26 every religious 
community has the right to “establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable 
purposes.”20 Yet the most remarkable feature of the Indian secularism is that Indian State 
recognizes “the presence of plural and diverse personal laws” (like the Hindu Code Act and 
Muslim Personal Law) “as well as the religious institutions involved in the enunciation and 
the interpretation of these codes.”21 These constitutional provisions guarantee the protection 
of the distinct identities of all minority communities, and prevent the majority community 
from applying any form of compulsion to assimilate them.   Thus, the Indian Constitution “at 
the level of abstract principle”22 safeguards religious freedom of the people of all faiths and 
prepares ground that is favourable “to the promotion of religious diversity.”23  
Furthermore, in India people of all religious faiths have the right to practice, perform and 
observe religious rites, rituals and festivals. Many of these rites, rituals and festivals are 
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performed or celebrated collectively; they are performed outdoors, in public places like 
streets, clubs, river banks, etc.  These religious practices place religion on the public stage. 
The State is expected to ensure that these religious practices are performed without any 
outside interference or disturbances. 
So, there is no plainly established “wall of separation” between state and religion in India,24 
though India was made secular democracy. Gandhi and Nehru had different view in regard to 
religion and state. For Gandhi “all religions were true” and “a state based on a single religion 
was ‘worse than undemocratic,’” which meant negation of truth. Therefore, the post-
independent Indian state, according to Gandhi, should adopt a political setup in which people 
professing different faiths would have equal rights, and would live together as one people. 
But, in the view of Nehru “religions were untruths,” and therefore he was  
firmly convinced of the idea of a secular state as the ‘cardinal doctrine of modern 
democratic practice’. And for him such a doctrine was most clearly defined by ‘the 
separation of the state from religion’.25 
Furthermore, Nehru insisted that secular nationalism was far superior to religion because it 
was different from religion; therefore, in his point of view, there was no returning back “to a 
past full of religious identities.”26 Nevertheless, right from the beginning of Indian 
independence this political aspiration of Nehru (to make India a strong secular nation where 
spirit of secular nationalism would overpower all forms of religious identities) remained 
unfulfilled because of the political forces of Gandhi, the Hindu Right and the religious 
minorities – Gandhians and religious minorities stood for equal rights and privileges for all 
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religious communities, whereas the Hindu Right groups sought more rights and privileges for 
the Hindu majority.  Consequently from 1947 onwards religion played a very important role 
in Indian politics. For example, the government’s active role in the construction of Somnath 
Temple, the enactment of the Hindu Code Bill (1956) and the Shah Bano Case (1986) are 
some of the apparent examples of the force of religion on government – these points will be 
elaborated in the latter sections. Beside the use of religion by political parties, magistrates and 
court judges also would not hesitate to “include theological pronouncements in their 
judgments” to settle disputes between different religious factions.27  
I.4. State Secularism under Congress and BJP Regimes 
During the Nehruvian period, owing to the consolidated leadership and determination of 
Nehru and also due to “the presence of numerous dedicated secularists in the party ranks,” the 
Congress remained “loyal to secular principles and practices,”28 even though Nehru’s 
government had to make certain positive responses to Hindu pressures. But, from the second 
half of 1970s the political dominance of the Congress began to slip away and with that 
“India’s secular principles began to be sapped.”29 During the Congress regimes (particularly 
under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi) state secularism began 
to weaken, due to the use of religion for political objectives, i.e. to woo Hindu (in Punjab, 
Hariyana and Jammu and Kashmir) and Muslim (in other regions of India) votes for the 
Congress Party so that the Congress leaders would hold on to political power – such power 
mongering political strategy of the Congress leaders prepared fertile ground for the rise of 
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communal elements that could undermine the secular and democratic values of the Indian 
state. State secularism was further upset by unrestricted Hindu communal politics of the BJP 
and the Sangh Parivar (family of militant Hindu Organisations).  
I.4.1. Nehru and His Administrative Policy 
Nehru, a visionary of socialist democracy, had to struggle with the Hindu traditionalist 
elements (mainly) within the INC. Three of the most prominent leaders of Hindu 
traditionalists within the INC were Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (the Vice-premier and Home 
Minister), Kanaiyalal Maneklal Munshi (the Union Minister of Supply), and Rajendra Prasad 
(the first President of Indian Republic). The traditionalists within the Congress “looked for 
leadership more to the Home Minister,” Sardar Patel, “than to the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru.”30  One of the Hindu projects the traditionalists carried out was the reconstruction of 
Somnath Temple in Gujarat in 1950-1951. It was Sardar Patel who announced on 12 
November 1947, at Junagadh in Gujarat state, that the temple would be rebuilt. He said: “the 
restoration of the idols would be a point of honour and sentiment with the Hindu public.”31 
Munshi was the one who promoted the decision to go ahead with reconstruction project. 
Initially some leaders in the government considered in providing government fund for the 
reconstruction work; however, on the suggestion of Mahatma Gandhi, the leaders agreed that 
the project be financed by the public subscription.  Finally, the remains of the old temple was 
demolished in October 1950 and in 1951, despite Nehru’s opposition, Rajendra Prasad, the 
President of India, performed the installation ceremony.32 
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Nehru and Sardar Patel sometimes seemed to be at loggerheads. If Mahatma Gandhi had not 
been assassinated by the Hindu fanatic, Nathuram Godse,33 the matter might have taken 
different turn. However, the death of Gandhi brought “emotional union” between the two 
leaders, Nehru and Sardar Patel – according to Percival Spear, “The government acquired a 
new unity and the people a fresh resolution.”34 Before this “emotional union” between the two 
leaders broke apart, Patel died in December 1950 due to a heart attack. The death of Patel left 
Nehru’s leadership uncontested and dashed the hopes of Hindu traditionalists within the INC.  
The Constitution of 1950 “did not recognise religious communities but only individuals, to 
whom it guaranteed in Article 25 ‘freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, 
practice and propagate religion.’”35 Nevertheless, from the 1950s the Nehruvian Congress, 
though managed to distance the state from the communal parties and platform, responded 
positively to the pressure of Hindu community on the government. Two clear examples of 
such policy were promotion of Hindi language as national language and the Hindu Code Bill.  
The purpose of Hindu Code Bill was to make a provision for a civil code in place of the body 
of Hindu personal law. It caused a great controversy when it was introduced to the 
Constituent Assembly on 9 April, 1948. It was then “broken down to three more specialised 
bills which came before the Lok Sabha in its 1952-7 term.” The three specialised parts of the 
Bill are: the Hindu Marriage Bill, the Hindu Adoption Bill and Maintenance Bill and the 
Hindu Succession Bill.  
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The Hindu Marriage Bill outlawed polygamy and contained provisions dealing with 
inter-caste marriages and divorce procedures; the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance 
Bill had as its main thrust the adoption of girls, which till then had been little 
practiced; the Hindu Succession Bill placed daughters on the same footing as widows 
and sons where the inheritance of family property was concerned.36 
The Bill, to the Hindu traditionalists, was a threat to the stability and integrity of the 
traditional Hindu society; whereas the Hindu nationalists criticised the government for 
singling out the Hindu personal law without touching the Muslim personal law in the name of 
providing a uniform Civil Code for India. Finally, Nehru’s government was forced to concede 
concessions to the critics of the Bill. A clear example of such concession is that the enacted 
Hindu Code Bill, “which greatly expanded the legal definition of a Hindu to include not only 
Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs, but also anyone who was not a Muslim, Christian, Zoroastrian or 
Jew.”37 Such concession only asserted the majoritarian right of the Hindus and denied 
distinctive identities and independent status of the Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs and traditional 
tribal religious groups. Nonetheless, the Nehruvian Congress Party maintained its distance 
from the communal politics though there were pressures from religious, ethnic and ethno-
religious organizations like the Jana Sangh, the Akali Dal, Tamil nationalistic movement in 
1950s and Naga Separatist Movement in the, then, Naga Hills.  
I.4.2. State Secularism under Indira, Rajiv and Rao 
In the post-Nehruvian era – mainly from the late 1970s – state secularism began to weaken 
due to the centralization and personalization of political power and the mismanagement of 
religious diversity by Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi for their own political ends. In the first 
half of the 1970s Mrs. Gandhi, though for a brief period, was successful in restoring the 
Congress Party to the leading position due to her populist political slogan garibi hatao (“do 
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away with poverty”); nevertheless, her victory and popularity lasted only for a short period.  
However, after the imposition of emergency rule in 1975-77 Mrs. Gandhi became unpopular 
for which her Party was defeated in the general election of 1977. Although she returned to 
power in 1980 she could not regain her earlier popularity. To consolidate her hold on to power 
she began to flirt “with communal themes, occasionally courting India’s Hindus by rallying 
against religious minorities,” 38 mainly Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims.  In 1980, to keep the 
Akali Dal (Sikh political party) out of power, Mrs. Gandhi not only sought Hindu votes in 
Punjab, but also attempted to create division among the Sikhs. This led to the open hostility 
between Mrs. Gandhi and the Akali Dal, and both “assembled militant forces for political 
ends.”39 In the same manner in 1983 Mrs. Gandhi boosted communal polarization in Kashmir 
when she campaigned on behalf of the state Congress in Kashmir. In that campaign she often 
appealed “to the fears of Jammu Hindus.”40 Farooq Abdullah (son of Sheikh Abdullah) and 
his National Conference Party, riding on the political agenda of regional autonomy for 
Kashmir, secured victory over the state Congress and formed the government. However, in 
1984 with the help of defections from his party Farooq was dismissed from the post of chief 
Minister by Kashmir governor Jagmohan, allegedly to fulfil Mrs. Gandhi’s wish.   These 
strategies of Mrs. Gandhi are sometimes credited for the rise of Muslim ethno-religious 
extremism in Kashmir in the late 1980s and Sikh ethno-religious militancy in Punjab in the 
early 1980s, by social scientists. Apparently Mrs Gandhi’s divisive strategy against the Sikh 
ethno-religious minority ultimately culminated in her assassination in November 1984.  
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Mrs. Gandhi’s inclination “to overstep the bounds of constitutional propriety on secularism 
and other matters” prepared feasible ground for “the rapid rise of an antisecular alternative.”41 
During her administration “most of India’s political institutions fell into disarray.”42  Further, 
she destroyed whatever relationship that existed between the Congress and the minorities 
since independence.  According to Singh: 
The storming of the Golden Temple, the subsequent assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and 
the pogroms against Sikhs in New Delhi – all marked a neat reversal of the 
Congress’s relationship with religious minorities: from being their main guardian it 
became their chief persecutor.43 
 
Mrs. Gandhi’s practice of misappropriation of secular principles for political goal was further 
accelerated by Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs Gandhi’s son and successor, during his tenure as India’s 
Prime Minister. He, being a less experienced politician, unsuccessfully tried to please 
religious (both majority and minority) communities, and in doing so he aggravated the 
communal tension between Hindus and Muslims. He was responsible for reopening the Babri 
Mosque dispute; mishandling of Shah Bano case (which was related to Muslim Personal 
Law); mismanagement of the Punjab militancy problem and the Kashmir issue, which led to 
the present crisis; and the broadcasting of The Ramayana (a Hindu epic) in serial form on the 
state-managed television (Doordarshan) for all India.44 The Shah Bano case, though 
insignificant in itself, became one of the most complicated and worst misused communal 
issues in the post-independent India.  In the Shah Bano case (in 1986) Rajiv Gandhi, “to 
ensure continued support of Muslim voters” and “to prevent further outbreak of violence”, 
introduced a bill in the “Parliament that effectively abrogated the precedent set by the 
                                                 
41 Ganguly, “The Crisis of Indian Secularism,” 15. 
 
42 Ganguly, “The Crisis of Indian Secularism,” 14. 
 
43 Singh, “State and Religious Diversity,” 212. 
 




supreme court’s award of maintenance to Shah Bano. This award had been given under the 
provisions of section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which required husbands to 
support their divorced wives, but the bill abrogated this for Muslims by stating that the clause 
did not apply to Muslim marriages.” The bill “became law on 6 May, even though perhaps no 
other piece of legislation since 1947 had aroused such widespread and impressive 
opposition.” 45 
Shah Bano case had attracted more public attention than any other single concern in the 
Indian Press in 1986 “and it had repercussions that raised fundamental questions about the 
nature of Indian politics.”46 Seemingly the Shah Bano controversy not only promoted 
antagonism between Hindu and Muslim communities in the early 1986, but was inextricably 
connected to Babri Mosque controversy as well as Kashmir problem. According to Asgar Ali, 
if the Shah Bano controversy did not “attract maximum media attention the Babri-Masjid 
controversy would not have heightened.”47  According to Embree: 
In both the Shah Bano and Babri Mosque incidents, the lines of conflict were fairly 
clearly drawn, as far as Muslims were concerned. The legal rights of Muslims as a 
religious community within the Indian national state, as guaranteed by the constitution, 
Muslims argued, were being challenged by Hindu groups who were antagonistic to the 
continuance of those rights.48 
Moreover, it seems that Rajiv not only aggravated already existing distrust and antagonism 
between Hindu and Muslim religious communities, but also promoted Hindu resentment 
against other minorities, particularly against Christians. Thus, Rajiv’s political approach not 
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only weakened his party’s political hold in Northeast Indian states and Utter Pradesh, but also 
played a significant role in weakening something of India’s secular institution. 
Narasimha Rao, Rajiv’s successor, continued to pursue Rajiv’s strategy. During Rao’s 
Premiership the Babri Masjid (a sixteenth century Mosque) in the city of Ayodhya, in Uttar 
Pradesh, was destroyed (on 6 December 1992) “by politically organised mobs of activist 
Hindus, who want to build a temple to Rama on that very spot.”49 According to C.P. 
Bhambhri, the destruction of the Mosque by a Hindu mob “revealed the serious weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities of the Indian state to protect and promote its own values and commitments 
to democracy and secularism.”50 Rao’s Government could have prevented that religiously 
offensive incidence if it was committed to safeguarding the fundamental principles of Indian 
secularism. The failure of both the central and the state governments to prevent the demolition 
of the Mosque led to “communal violence and riots across the country, in which around two 
thousand people or more [have] perished – both Hindus and Muslims, but Muslim victims 
have far out-numbered Hindus.”51 Paul Brass reports that the picture of the destruction of the 
Mosque “was then followed by the pictures flashed round the world of Bombay in flames 
from the riots that followed after the destruction of the mosque a thousand miles away.” 52 
Consequently, the hatred between Hindu and Muslim communities increased.  Apparently the 
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Ayodhya incidence bolstered the moral of the Hindu traditionalists and the Hindu religio-
nationalists. 
I.4.3. BJP Government and State Secularism 
The decline of the Congress Party opened way “for the BJP to enter the political arena as a 
legitimate contender for power at the Center.”53  In 1980 the BJP was formed; since then, it 
has been playing communal politics to consolidate Hindu votes to attain its religio-political 
goal – to capture political power and to utilise the power to fulfil its religious aspiration, i.e. to 
make India a Hindu nation that would be governed by Hindu principles. From the early 1990s 
the BJP, in tandem with Sangh Parivar, created a climate of religious violence against 
minority communities – mainly Muslims and Christians. The worst incidents of such violence 
were the destruction of Babri Mosque followed by communal violence against Muslims and 
persecution of Muslims and Christians in Gujarat (2002) and Orissa (2007-2008). In 1989, 
mobilizing Hindu symbols for its political goal, the BJP won 88 out of 545 total Lok Sabha 
(Lower House of the Indian Parliament) seats for the first time. In 1996 with 194 seats it 
emerged as largest single party in the Lok Sabha and formed the government in the centre for 
the first time in its history, but the government lasted for 13 days only.54 However, the BJP 
contested the 1999 parliamentary election as a part of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of 
more than twenty national and regional parties and won 182 seats. The NDA got 294 seats out 
of 545 Lok Sabha seats, clear majority to form the government. The BJP, being the largest 
party in the alliance, formed the government under the premiership of Atal Behari Bhajpayee; 
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and this BJP led government lasted full term for the first time in its history. Since the BJP 
formed the government in the centre, the party  
sought to systematically undermine the principles of equality guaranteed by the 
Indian Constitution. Among the more disturbing of these is the BJP’s campaign to 
rewrite Indian history [...] it has worked to change the content of history texts. New 
school books extol the virtues of Hinduism, make dubious claims about the alleged 
scientific advances of the Vedic Age (Circa 1500 to 500 B.C.E.) and disparage the 
advent and role of Islam in South Asia.55 
In the BJP government Murli Manohar Joshi, one of the most prominent leaders of the party, 
was made education minister. Soon after taking office, Joshi began to appoint scholars 
“sympathetic to the Hindu nationalist interpretation of history of national academic bodies, 
including the Indian council of Historical Research, the Indian Council of Social Science 
Research, and the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies.” 56 His government’s plan was to 
Hinduise educational system in school by introducing Hindu texts and values to inculcate 
Hindutva (Hinduness) ideology in the mind of young Hindus and to generate religious hatred 
(among all Hindus) against the Muslim and Christian religious minorities in India - if the BJP 
succeeded in its plan, then, Hindu religious violence/terrorism against the said minorities 
would increase (in frequency) and spread all over India within a short span of time.  If the BJP 
government’s design was not opposed by state governments of the non-BJP ruled states, it 
could have succeeded in destroying “the secular fabric of the country with the introduction of 
specious depictions of Muslims [and Christians] as foreign collaborators and oppressors.”57 
The plan was postponed due to opposition within the NDA government. 
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The Gujarat riot of 2002 is the most horrifying acts of religious violence in the history of 
secular India. It was a serious law and order crisis in which the state government totally failed 
to protect the lives of the minority community. The Central government, as per the provision 
of the Indian Constitution, could have dismissed the state government due to its failure in 
maintaining law and order in the state. But, the Atal Bihari Bhajpayee-led BJP government in 
the Centre neither dismissed the state government nor criticised Modi; instead he was 
embraced as a hero of the party and permitted to campaign for fresh elections in and outside 
Gujarat.  The communal violence against the Muslim minority of 2002 and the political 
aftermath in Gujarat raised “serious questions about the Indian state’s commitment to 
secularism.”58 “The genocidal violence of Gujarat,” according to Needham and Rajan, is the 
most “serious crisis of secularism.”59 
I.5. Critique of the Secular State 
As we have seen, Hindu traditionalists and Hindu nationalists worked against the secular 
scheme from the time India got freedom. Moreover, from the 1970s, due to the failure of 
successive governments to safeguard the secular values of Indian secularism, the Indian State 
has been accused of practising favouritism by both majority and minority communities. On 
the one hand, Hindu religio-nationalists argue that the Hindu Majority (which is more than 
four-fifth of the total population of Indian) is ruled by Muslim and Christian religious 
minorities through the Congress Party (a secular party, in the view of Hindu nationalists, that 
defends the religious rights and privileges of these minorities at the cost of Hindu majority in 
the name of secularism); on the other, the religious minorities express their alleged fear of 
Hindu domination in every plan, policy and department of the Indian government since the 
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dawn of independence – therefore, in the minorities’ point of view, the minorities are pushed 
to the periphery and, in the meantime, the (secular) Indian state failed to defend the minorities 
and their constitutional rights and privileges from the aggressive Hinduism in many instances. 
I.5.1. Critique by Hindutva Based Organizations 
The partition and the incidence of communal violence, in which millions of Hindus had to 
migrate into India due to Muslim atrocities against the Hindus in Pakistan, seemed to have 
worked as an approval to legitimize the Hindu traditionalists’ and Hindu nationalists’ hatred 
towards the Indian Muslims. They were emboldened to demand special treatment for the 
Hindus, i.e. India be made Hindu Rashtra. They were against a secularism that viewed equal 
rights for all religions, because they thought of equality of religions as an anathema. In their 
view Muslims were responsible for the partition; therefore, Muslims had no right to demand 
equality in India. The leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS organizations have openly 
expressed that “secularism, championed by the Nehru-Azad combine, had lost its justification 
in August 1947, and the conciliation and compromise with the Muslims had failed to keep 
India united.”60 One of the Hindu Mahasabha thinkers commented that the partition of the 
mother land, which is pitribumi and punyabhumi of the Hindus, was the result of Congress 
“blunders”.61 However, the Hindu traditionalists and Hindu nationalists had failed to realize 
their objective of making India a Hindu nation. 
Subsequently, in 1951 the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Indian People’s Party), a Hindu religious 
political party, was founded by the RSS members, and the RSS pracharaks (preachers) were 
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given permission to serve the party.62 The burning vision of Jana Sangh was to make India a 
Hindu nation. According to it, “Indian society should draw increasingly on ancient Hindu 
traditions and rely less on Western ideas.”63 In 1977 the party, joining three other parties, 
formed Janata Party (People’s Party) and got 295 seats out of 542 seats, a slim majority, in 
the parliament election of 1977 and formed government under the Premiership of Morarji 
Desai. The Janata Government lasted little more than two years due to a rupture in the party. 
In 1980 Jana Sangh finally established itself as the BJP under the leadership of Atal Bihari 
Bhajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani. The BJP’s ultimate ideology is Hindutva (Hinduness), 
and the main objectives of Hindutva ideology are “Hindu domination, the elimination of 
safeguards for minority rights, and the abrogation of the constitution”64 – this Hindu-
nationalistic “ideology has been actively involved in communal conflicts in India.”65 
For the BJP the secular state is not congenial to the Hindu majority, because the Indian state is 
seen by them to be favouring the minority communities at the price of the Hindu majority. 
The leaders of the party cite Article 370 of the Constitution that grants special status to 
Jammu and Kashmir, the Muslim majority state, and the Shah Bano case to demonstrate that 
Indian secularism is biased toward the Muslim minority at the expense of the majority. The 
BJP sees the Congress as pandering to religious minorities, for which it calls the Congress 
“pseudo-secular”.66 According to the Hindu nationalists the Hindu identity is at risk due to the 
minority appeasing policies of the Congress governments. They declare that the policies of 
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the Indian government are formulated for the advantage of minority communities. This is why 
the secular government has become a target for the Hindu religious and religio-nationalist 
leaders’ wrath because they see the state’s policy of religious neutrality as protecting67 
Muslims, Christians and Sikhs. Therefore, the Hindu religio-nationalist leaders attempt to 
assimilate politics with Hindu culture. However “political and cultural integration,” according 
to Marika Vicziany, “has been more intense with highly damaging consequences for Indian 
democracy and secularism.”68 
I.5.2. Indian State Secularism and Christians, Sikhs and Muslims 
The new religio-political developments, which surfaced from the late 1970s, challenged the 
Indian secular democracy. The Janata government’s emphasis on protection of the cow 
during its tenure (1977-1979), the narrow party politics of the Congress governments during 
1980s and 1990s, and the failure of the Indian state to uphold fundamentals of state 
secularism in several instances raised serious questions concerning minorities’ rights and 
religious freedom.  Further, the unrestricted Hindu communal politics of the BJP and its 
family seems to have further confirmed the fear that Indian state is Hindu biased.  
The idea of a secular state sometimes is seen as inimical to the religious minorities 
(particularly Christians, Sikhs and Muslims), mainly for the following three reasons: firstly, 
the secular ideology is Western (which symbolizes the Colonial rule) product; secondly, it is 
non-religious therefore supra-religious; thirdly, the Indian secular state seems to be dominated 
by the Hindu majority for which the constitutional rights of the minorities are violated often 
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by the Hindu majority.   According to National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), a 
separatist ethno-religious group that is fighting for independence of Nagaland, the numberless 
Indian troops are forces of Hinduism that aim to destroy Christianity – Naga ethnicity and 
Christianity (apparently the Naga Christianity is both religious faith of the Christian Nagas 
and an integral part of the modern Naga culture) are inseparable from one another for the 
Nagas. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who was instrumental in the beginning of Sikh 
militancy in Punjab in 1980s, “echoed the common fear that Sikhs would lose their identity in 
a sea of secularism or, worse, in a flood of resurgent Hinduism.”69 His main theme “was the 
survival of the Sikh community.” For the Jama'at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK), 
Indian secularism is un-Islamic: 
Democracy, or the rule of the people, is seen as un-Islamic, for it is said to go against 
the Islamic understanding of God as the sovereign authority and law-maker. For the 
same reason, Western-style secularism, the separation of religion and politics, is 
condemned.70 
Apparently the Sikh, Kashmiri Muslim and Naga Christian minorities have to struggle – 
against the aggressive Hinduism and Hindutva elements that threaten to do away with the 
safeguards of minority rights71 and subjugate the minorities under Hindu rule – for the 
preservation of their distinct ethno-religious identity that they fear might be lost in the ocean 
of Hinduism. In this struggle of survival they could not rely on the Indian state due to its 
failure to protect their constitutional rights from the Hindus’ attack in several occasions; 
rather, the state (to the given minorities) seems to represent a different manifestation of 
Hinduism that seeks to systematically eliminate the minorities’ ethno-religious identities. The 
above-stated concerns might have bolstered the religious and ethno-religio-nationalist 
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extremist elements within the minority communities to inspire and marshal their concerned 
religious constituency for holy war against their avowed enemies – the state and the Hindu 
majority. 
I.6. An Assessment 
For centuries India has been the home of various ethnic and ethno-religious communities. In 
the case of Sikhs, Nagas and Kashmiri Muslims, ethnic and religious identities are inseparable 
from each other; therefore, both identities are to be defended at any price. However, these 
minorities fear losing their identities owing to the nature of Indian secularism, the rising tide 
of Hindu communal politics and Hindu religious hatred against them. This apprehension is 
most likely to provide sufficient incentive for the rise and furtherance of ethno-religious 
nationalism and ethno-religious-nationalist conflicts. Meanwhile, the Hindu majority view 
these minorities as serious threats to the Hindu dharma-and-race, allegedly because of 
minorities’ missionary activities and the minority favouring Indian state. 
 
Besides ethnic and ethno-religious problems and concerns, there are other factors that could 
have supplied further incentive in the rise of religious terrorism in India with reference to the 
Sikhs, Kashmiri Muslims, Nagas and Hindus. In addition to socio-historical experiences 
(which will be assessed in the case studies), the Sikhs, Kashmiri Muslims and Nagas seem to 
have undergone political and military repression right after the Indian independence; at the 
same time they have been pushed to the periphery by majority Hindu-dominated Indian 
politics.  Further, the Naga-dominated regions and Kashmir lagged behind in economic 
development compared to other regions of India. Though Punjab was economically more 
advanced than other regions because of the Green Revolution, many Sikhs of Punjab – 
particularly the Sikh farmers – were antagonized due to the central government’s policy (will 
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be reviewed in the second chapter). Evidently the above-mentioned factors could have 
provoked certain sections of the ethno-religious groups to seek political autonomy or 
independence for the minority dominated regions. Whereas, any form of geo-political demand 
of the religious minorities could pose a serious threat to the Hindu nation, the holy land for 
the Hindus; therefore, the majority religious community would not take the given intention of 
the ethno-religious minorities lightly because, it involves the foundation of their religious 
identity. Thus, religion seems to be main inspirational factor in the rise of religious terrorism 
in India; however, historical and socio-political concerns and issues are profoundly 
interconnected with religion in this regard – the case studies in the following chapters will 
evaluate the extent to which religion, historical context and socio-political factors are 
interrelated, and in what way they contribute to the rise and sustenance of religious terrorism.  
When religion is intensely involved in the conflicts between the majority and minority 
religious communities religious ideology/ideologies is/are certain to play significant role in 
mobilization of the given religious constituency/constituencies for religious terror against the 
conceived enemies. In this regard religious texts and symbols that represent the violent phase 
of religion could be managed by religious actors to trigger off inner passion among the 
followers of each given religion for religious war/violence/terrorism. The case studies will 
analyse how religious texts and symbols are being manipulated by each conflicting religious 
communities to inspire religious violence and terrorism.   
Furthermore, Indian secularism appears to be under intense pressure from the communal 
elements, and if this trend continues, then, the Indian secular democracy could be totally 
undermined by the forces that nurture religious terrorism. Therefore, it is imperative to find a 
possible and practicable solution to contain these destructive forces that threaten to bring 
down the existing socio-political structure of the Indian nation. For this reason the seventh 
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chapter makes an attempt to propose a framework towards communal reconciliation and 
conflict resolution for social harmony in the Indian society; however, I do not make any effort 
to do an exhaustive study in proposing the framework for conflict resolution, rather I initiate a 
model which requires further and in-depth research. 
I.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there had been religious animosity between the majority Hindu 
and minority (particularly Muslim) religious communities from the pre-partition period; 
therefore, the British India was divided into two sovereign nations on religious ground. The 
given religious hostility became intensified in the time of partition for which there occurred, 
in the newly born and newly liberated states, one of the most horrifying incidence of 
communal genocide and one of the worst social turmoil in the known history of mankind. 
Moreover, the communal riots seem to have inculcated long-lasting religious antagonism 
among certain sections of the conflicting religious communities in India, and this antagonism 
gradually got boosted in the post-independent period due to new socio-religious and political 
developments: failure of Hindu religio-nationalists to make India a Hindu nation; granting of 
equal religious rights and privileges to the minorities in the Indian Constitution; granting of 
special status to Muslim majority state (Jammu and Kashmir); geo-political, linguistic and 
other demands of the Sikh, Muslim and Christian minorities; decline in popularity of the 
Congress Party, which stood as a central pillar of Indian secular democracy;  manipulation of 
religion for political purposes by the leaders of the secular parties; and rise of communal 
political forces and unrestrained communalisation and religionization of politics and 
politicization of religion – with the unrestricted communalisation and religionization of 
politics the foundation of the socio-political structure of Indian state and society began to 
quake and, in the meantime, the existing good-will, communal harmony and trust among the 
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concerned religious communities began to fall-apart piece by piece. Besides, there are other 
factors (such as Naga insurgency and missionary activities of Christians, Muslims and 
Hindus) that added more force to the existing religious hatred among the conflicting sections 
of the Indian society. So, this chapter underscores: the intricate relationship between religion 
and political factors; the increasing influence and pressure of religion on the Indian politics 
from the time of Indian independence; and the building up of aggressive communal attitude 
among the conflicting communities from the 1970s. These points provide better 
understanding of the weight of religion in the rise of the religious terrorism in India. 
The socio-historical and political backgrounds of the religious concerns and problems of the 
conflicting communities, issues and demands of the minorities, rise of communal political 
parties and unrestrained communalisation and religionization of politics (and vice versa), 
failure of Indian state to protect the Constitutional rights of the minorities from aggressive 
Hindu majority will be assessed in the case studies in the following chapters. In the meantime, 
the case studies will demonstrate how religion, on the basis of historical and socio-political 
factors, played significant role in motivation and mobilization of the given religious 





CHAPTER II  
SIKH RELIGIOUS TERRORISM 
II.1. Introduction 
Terrorist violence in Punjab seriously threatened the stability and unity of the Indian nation 
and society from early 1980s to 1993. Various socio-economic and geo-political issues are 
taken into account by different scholars to explain the cause of the terrorist problem in 
Punjab. Some of those socio-economic and geo-political issues are: ethno-territorial identity; 
draining of the region’s resources by the Central government; “the more favourable terms of 
trade for industrial-sector goods; the limitations of the Green Revolution technology in further 
raising farm outputs; growing inequalities in the countryside; the problems of unemployed 
youth; and the shrinking electoral base of the Akali Dal.”1 However, the credibility of Sikh 
religious ideologies, based on religio-historical symbols, radically designed for the 
reaffirmation and preservation of given ethno-religious and cultural identity as well as ethno-
religious territory has not garnered weight in these explanations. Thus, in this chapter I will 
make an attempt to explain that, in contrary to the existing explanations, religio-historical 
symbols and experiences and socio-political environment in inseparable alliance with radical 
Sikh religious ideologies inspired terrorism in Punjab. Furthermore, this case study will 
venture to define Sikh terrorism as Sikh religious terrorism. Therefore, Sikh terrorism has to 
be studied together with Islamic militancy in Kashmir, Naga insurgency and Hindu extremism 
that seem to be nurtured by religious ideologies forged by radical religious leaders (such as 
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Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale) on the basis of (the concepts) miri-piri2 and ordination of 
Khalsa Panth by the tenth Sikh guru3. 
This chapter is arranged in the following manner.  Firstly, some of the existing theories in the 
rise of the terrorism are reviewed very briefly. Secondly, an assessment of the historical 
context of the Sikh religious tradition is presented. In this section the formation of the Sikh 
Panth (community), formation of the Khalsa (pure) Panth and the short lived fulfilment of the 
political aspiration of Khalsa Panth are analysed. The study of the historical context attempts 
to highlight the socio-political environment in which Sikhism took its birth and how it 
transformed in the course of its history and reached the present stage. Further, the study 
aspires to investigate the basis of the modern Sikh ethno-religious identity. Thirdly, I survey 
the Sikh resurgent movements that began in the second half of the nineteenth century, to 
underline how Khalsa identity is associated with modern Sikh identity. Fourthly, the post-
1947 Sikh socio-political issues, that provoked Sikhs against the Central government, are 
discussed. Fifthly, an evaluation on post-1966 Sikh religio-political concerns, economic 
progress and its effect on Sikh religious society is tendered. Sixthly, a study in the rise of Sikh 
terrorism is presented. Under this topic I discuss the Sikh movement for reaffirmation of Sikh 
identity, the rise of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as a prominent religious leader, and his 
theology.  The main focus of this section is to underline the role of radical theological 
ideology in the rise and sustenance of Sikh terrorism in Punjab. Seventhly, terrorist violence 
in the pre-Blue-star and post-Blue-star phases is reviewed. Finally, an assessment of the Sikh 
Religious Terrorism and conclusion are offered. 
                                                 
2 See Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalis Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 94. 
 
3 See Struggle for Justice: Speeches and Conversation of Sant Jarnail Singh Khalsa Bhindranwale, translated 
from Punjabi audio and video recordings by Ranbir Singh Sandhu (Dublin: Sikh Education & Religious 
Foundation, 1999), 336. Henceforth, Sandhu (trans.), Struggle for Justice. 
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II.2. Various Theoretical Standpoints on the Rise of the Sikh Terrorism 
There are several theoretical viewpoints put forward by various intellectuals on the rise of the 
Punjab problem. These views can be arranged into five categories: first, views expressed in 
the Government of India’s (GOI’s) White Paper on the Punjab Agitation; second, socio-
economic factors responsible in the rise of the problem; third, the conception of Sikhs as an 
ethnic nation gave rise to the separatist movement; fourth, political machinations of the 
Congress Party orchestrated the Sikh problem;4 and, fifth, the communal factor, i.e., the 
Hindu idea of social system,5 was involved in the rise of the problem. However, in the 
following sections I will critically analyse the opinion expressed in the GOI’s White Paper 
and the argument that socio-economic factors are responsible in the rise of the problem. 
II.2.1. Involvement of External Forces 
External forces, particularly Pakistan, are blamed for the breeding and aggravation of the Sikh 
extremism in Punjab in the Government of India’s Whiter Paper on the Punjab Agitation. 
According to the GOI’s White Paper, a strong nexus between the Akali Dal agitation and the 
“virulent communalism bred by extremism and the secessionist and anti-national activities of 
a small group, largely supported by external elements”6 (allegedly the Sikh Diaspora of North 
America, Britain and Europe, and the Pakistani Government) with deep rooted interest in the 
disintegration of India gave rise to Sikh terrorism in Punjab. The main objectives of the 
extremist violence, as identified in the White Paper, was to create division among the people 
                                                 
4 Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, “Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 3 
(Mar., 1989), 329-331. 
 
5 Mahmood, “Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order,” 336- 340. 
 
6“Text of the White Paper on the Punjab Agitation Issued on 10 July 1984,” in The Story of Punjab: Yesterday 
and Today (Documents, Treaties and Exhaustive Bibliography), Edited by Varinder Grover, Second Edition, 
Vol.III (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications PVT. LTD., 1999), 335; also see Mahmood, “Sikh Rebellion and 




of Punjab (which might mean division in communal line) and destruction of common culture 
of Punjab.7 The above estimation of the Indian government raise several questions: if the 
government was aware of the involvement of external elements, then, why did it take more 
than four years for the government to act against the Sikh extremists? Why was Sant Jarnail 
Singh Bhindranwale, who was arrested on 20th September 1981 in connection with the murder 
of Lala Jagat Narain, released from jail? How were weapons smuggled in large quantities 
within the Golden Temple complex though there was a continuous presence of police and 
other security personnel outside the temple complex? There are no answers to these questions 
in the Government White Paper.8 The GOI’s statements do not explain the real cause of the 
problem; therefore, it plainly signifies that these views are presented only to defend the 
Congress government and to justify the military action against the Golden Temple.  
II.2.2. Socio-Economic Aspects Responsible in the Rise of the Problem 
Scholars (such as Joyce Pettigrew), who consider economic factors as the main cause of the 
problem, are of the opinion that the Green Revolution wrought social tension in Punjab, 
because the Green Revolution created rich, middle and poor classes of farmers.9  Hence, the 
rise of a rich class of farmers prepared a way for increasing competition between the rich 
farmers and the wealthy Hindu merchants in the cities; and in the competition the farmers 
were most likely to feel that their interest was at risk due to the Hindu dominated central 
government. In the meantime, the central government tried to manipulate the communal 
situation in Punjab. 
                                                 
7 “Text of the White Paper on the Punjab Agitation Issued on 10 July 1984,” 335. 
 
8 See “Text of the Speech made by Sh. Parvathaneni Upendra on White Paper in Rajya Sabha on 25 July 1984,” 
in The Story of Punjab: Yesterday and Today (Documents, Treaties and Exhaustive Bibliography), Edited by 
Varinder Grover, Second Edition, Vol.III (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications PVT. LTD., 1999), 372. 
 




The agrarian community of Punjab, in the view of Pettigrew, became aware of the injustice 
being done to them by the central government through its planning and policy that effect their 
agricultural production.10 On account of the government planning and water regulation policy, 
observes Pettigrew, there was scarcity of water for irrigation, shortage of diesel and high 
transportation cost, shortage of electric power, dearth of other technological tools for farming, 
and higher production costs compared to procurement costs that led to indebtedness in some 
cases. Thus, the farmers had a strong desire to free themselves from the state policies that 
affected functioning of their farmlands. Consequently, in the 1970s the farmers began a non-
violent campaign for autonomy through peaceful demonstrations organized both in the State 
Assembly and in the rural areas. The outcome of this, according to Pettigrew, was the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973). The purpose of this Resolution was to seek rectification 
of socio-economic grievances of the Punjab region. When the socio-economic grievances 
listed in the Resolution went unheard, observes Pettigrew, other issues were added and then 
the Punjab issue, through the preaching of Bhindranwale, took national importance. 
Pettigrew, in corroboration of her viewpoint, writes: “socio-economic issues indeed emerge in 
a number of interviews with members of the Khalistan Commando Force.”11 These interviews 
are included in her book The Sikhs of the Punjab. 
The argument that socio-economic aspects were responsible for the rise of the Sikh terrorism 
has two major problems: first, this argument tends to ignore the historical background of the 
socio-religious and cultural grievances of the Sikh religious community; and second, it does 
not take into consideration the religio-political and linguistic struggle of the Sikh community 
from the time of Indian independence. Furthermore, researchers interested in socio-economic 
                                                 
10 Joyce J. M. Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence (London: Zed 
Books Ltd., 1995), 5-6. 
 
11 Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab, 6. 
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issues seem to rely on the recent socio-economic and political developments that began from 
the late 1960s, to explain the problem of Sikh terrorism. Therefore, the socio-economic theory 
is incomplete and unsatisfactory.  
Management of radical Sikh religious ideologies in justification of violence to seek justice for 
the Sikh religious community basing on the religio-historical experiences and symbols and the 
socio-political grievances of the community could have played the most important role in the 
motivation and mobilization of Sikh religious constituency towards religious terrorism. In the 
meantime, it is most likely that religious revival and communal factors had inculcated a strong 
religious passion among many young Sikhs to fight a just battle for the cause of the Sikh 
ethno-cultural-religious identity, which had been the matter of great concern for many 
religious Sikhs from the second half of the nineteenth century. Whereas, the above-reviewed 
socio-economic and geo-political issues and developments appeared to have further 
corroborated the concern or fear that the Sikh ethno-cultural-religious identity was in grave 
danger.  
II.3. Historical context 
To understand the fundamental basis of radical Sikh religious ideology it is necessary to 
review the origin and growth of Sikhism, Sikh community and Sikh religious symbols. 
Apparently contradictory characteristics – love and violence – are present in Sikhism too. To 
highlight these dual characteristics in Sikhism it is imperative to assess briefly the relevant 
features of the historical context of Sikhism. 
II.3.1.  Guru Nanak and Formation of Sikh Community 
Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, was born in the Punjab in 1469– Nanak was Hindu by birth. 
The Punjab during Nanak’s time was under the influence of both bhakti (the Hindu 
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reformation movement in north India) Hinduism12 and Sufism (Islamic mysticism). The 
spiritual quest of Nanak could not be fulfilled by either of the religious systems because the 
mystery, according to Nanak, could neither be found in the Vedas nor in the Quran. For him 
the then-existing socio-political institutions, because of the prevalent practice of rampant 
discrimination and corruption, were not delivering justice to the people. According to Grewal, 
a thorough inspection of Guru Nanak’s hymns (bani) makes it clear that Nanak could find 
hardly anything approvable in the contemporary politics.13 Therefore, Nanak denounced 
contemporary beliefs and practices and “sought to transcend Islam and Hinduism by creating 
a new religion”14 for new social order that would be neither “Hindu” nor “Muslim”. 
Furthermore, in such a social system Nanak determined that none should be discriminated as 
high (uttam) and low (nich) on the basis of one’s birth. 
The message of the new religious system, which Nanak preached, is centred on a formless 
Ultimate Reality that bestows grace upon all, “through the spiritual True Guru, who is the 
manifestation of His message to humanity.”15 He proclaimed that those who seek to attain 
union with God (Vahiguru) have to follow three important rules – nam, dan and isnan. Nam is 
the meditation of “Divine Name”. This comprises of “the total being and nature of Akal 
Purakh or God.”16 One might be able to know about the fundamental doctrine of Nanak by 
                                                 
12 According to David N. Lorenzen, “In the context of north India, all Sikhs as well as almost all Hindus may be 
called followers of bhakti religion since their dominant mode of worship is one of ‘devotion’ (bhakti) toward a 
divine being.” David N. Lorenzen, “Introduction - The Historical Vicissitudes of Bhakti Religion,” in Bhakti 
Religion in North India: Community, Identity and Political Action, edited by David N. Lorenzen (New York: 
State University of New York, 1995), 1. 
 
13 J.S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 28. 
 
14 Gurharpal Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab (Houndmills: Macmillan Press LTD, 
2000), 80.  
 
15 C. Shackle, The Sikhs (London: Minority Rights Group Report, No. 65), 3; quoted in Singh, Ethnic Conflict in 
India, 80. 
 
16 W.H. McLeod, Who is a Sikh? The Problem of Sikh Identity (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1.  
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elaborating this one word. This divine name has the power to release human beings from the 
cycle of birth and death; therefore, the devotee must realise “the reality of the nam” and 
endeavour “to bring one’s own being into complete conformity with it.”17 Dan is alms-giving, 
and isnan is living a pure life. Among the three words nam is the nucleus and other two 
expand its meaning. Another version of this religious formula, which is popular among the 
Sikhs, is nam japo, kirt karo, vand cako,18 meaning “devotion and adoration of the ‘Divine 
Name’, hard work, and the sharing of rewards of one’s labour with others.”19  
From the end of 15th century Nanak’s message began to attract a following from all walks of 
life and formed a community, originally known as Nanak-Panth. The word “Panth” literally 
means “path” or “way”. This term “has traditionally been used to designate the followers of a 
particular teacher or of a distinctive range of doctrine.”20 Thus, the early followers of Nanak 
were identified as Nanak-panthis as well as Sikhs, meaning learners. Nanak, before his death, 
appointed Lahina, renamed Angad,21 his successor and the second guru from among his 
closest followers for the perpetuation, guidance and development of the Sikh community and 
Sikh faith. The line of human gurus continued till the life time of the tenth guru, Guru Gobind 
Singh (1666-1708), who finally closed the era of human gurus. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
17 McLeod, Who is a Sikh?, 2; also see Louis E. Fenech, “Martyrdom and the Execution of Guru Arjan in Early 
Sikh Sources,” in Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 121, No. 1 (Jan, - Mar., 2001), 20f. 
 
18 Khuswant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 47. 
 
19 Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India, 80. 
 
20 McLeod, Who is a Sikh?, 7. 
 
21 “Guru Angad’s period we know very little that can be accepted with anything approaching assurance and we 
can only assume that the constituency and discipline of the Panth must have followed the pattern established 




II.3.2. Transformation of Sikhism: Formation of Khalsa Panth 
As the time passed by the followers of Sikh faith began to increase and by the time of Guru 
Arjun (1563-1606), the fifth guru, Sikhism was rooted firmly in the central districts of the 
Punjab. This development (the increasing number of Sikh followers) initiated the building of 
Harimandir (the Golden Temple) in Amritsar and the compilation of the Adi Granth (Sikh 
Holy Scripture) to mark and formalize the growth of the Sikh community. But, the progress 
and spread of the Sikh faith was not acceptable to the Muslim Emperor, Jahangir. Therefore, 
to frustrate the spread of Sikhism and the growing popularity of the guru himself, the Emperor 
arrested Guru Arjun and ordered him to be tortured to death in 1606.22 The execution of Guru 
Arjun was the turning point in the history of Sikh faith. This incidence was the genesis of the 
“transformation of Sikhism from pacifist reformers to the militant Khalsa”.23 
The process of change in Sikhism was inaugurated by the sixth guru, Guru Hargobind (1595-
1644). The young Hargobind set on his father’s seat “with two swords”, one symbolizing 
spiritual (miri) authority and other temporal (piri) power. To encourage his followers in 
military activity he built a fortress called Lohgarh (an iron castle), and the Akal Takht (the 
immortal throne). In the Akal Takht the devotees listened to “ballads extolling feats of 
heroism, and ... discussed plans of military conquests.”24 It was at this time that the concept of 
“saint-soldier” had emerged in Sikhism25 and made the Sikh Panth more than a gathering of 
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the devotees. Thereafter, the guru exercised “an authority more expansive than that of his 
predecessors”.26 
The shift which commenced with the sixth guru reached its zenith during the time of Guru 
Gobind who established two new ordinances that became the basis for modern Sikh identity, 
due to: constant and cruel persecution faced by the Sikhs in the hands of the Muslim rulers; 
regular attacks on the Sikh institutions; and, schism within the Sikh religious community 
owing to the rivalry for guruship. Firstly, he instituted the Khalsa27 (pure) at Anandpur on the 
first of Baisakh (New Year) in 1699; and secondly, he “gave the institution of Guruship a 
permanent and abiding character by vesting it in the immortality of the Granth.”28  These acts 
of Guru Gobind had provided a concrete model for unity of the Sikh community in the face of 
both internal (factionalism within Sikhism) and external challenges.  
Thenceforth, the Khalsa became a Sikh religious-community that would unflinchingly take up 
the responsibility of defence of the Sikhs. Meanwhile, Guru Gobind prescribed five symbols 
to be kept by the Khalsa to uphold distinct Sikh identity. The five symbols begin with letter 
“k” – kes (wearing unshorn hair and beard), kangha (a comb), kach (a knee-length pair of 
breeches), kara (a steel bracelet) and kirpan (a sword or sabre).29 “Among the five symbols, 
kes symbolizes ascetic character of a person because from antiquity Indian ascetics have been 
accustomed of keeping unshorn hair, whereas kach, kara and kirpan signify martial or 
militant feature. Within very short period the Khalsa Panth gave birth to thousands of 
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“bearded, beturbanned, fully armed” people, who possessed “a crusader’s zeal to build a new 
commonwealth”30 or Sikh nation.  
The purpose of instituting the Khalsa panth could not be more than the establishment of the 
kingdom of the Immortal God (Vahiguru), i.e. the realm of spiritual sovereignty – according 
to Banerjee, “neither the Bachittar Natak” (Guru Gobind’s Autobiography) “nor the 
Zafarnama” (Epistle of Victory) contains any proof that Guru Gobind intended or foretold 
“the establishment of the temporal sovereignty of the Panth”.31 However, the episode of the 
sacrificial enactment and the baptism of the Khalsa at Anandpur, and use of weapons by the 
guru himself enjoined fresh religious ideals and values and generated consciousness among 
the Khalsa Sikhs to transcend the existing religious and theological perception in the given 
socio-political context. 
II.3.3. Realization of Khalsa Aspiration  
Guru Gobind, the innovator of modern Sikh identity, died in 1708. With his death ended the 
line of human gurus in Sikhism. However, the Khalsa Panth, his new innovation, began its 
fresh religio-political adventure. Banda Bahadur, one of the guru’s most trusted followers, 
with the Khlasa army, started militant activity against the Mogul rulers in the Punjab. Banda 
(slave), according to Khushwant Singh, was equipped for the military exploits by Guru 
Gobind Singh himself. The Guru, he writes, armed him “with five arrows from his quiver and 
gave him his own standard and battle drum” and “issued orders (hukamnamas) to the Sikhs, 
urging them to volunteer for service.”32  
                                                 
30 Singh, A History of the Sikhs I, 90.  
 
31 A.C. Banerjee, The Khalsa Raj (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1985), 19. 
 




The original purpose of the armed struggle was to avenge the murder of the guru’s two 
younger sons and the death of the guru himself.  This limited goal was soon expanded for 
gaining political sovereignty for the Sikhs.  It was during this time the Khalsa first raised the 
slogan: “Raj Karega Khalsa yaqi rahe na koi ... (The Khalsa shall rule, no opponent shall 
exist.)”.33 The slogan, which is an important part of the Sikh prayer now, “was composed and 
first sung by the Khalsa during the days of Banda.”34 This aspiration of the Khalsa 
materialized (implicitly and explicitly) in two different periods of the Sikh history: firstly, 
during the brief career of Banda’s military exploits against the Moguls, i.e. from 1709 to 
1715; and secondly, in the period extending from 1769 to 1849. Banda could be the first Sikh 
leader to think of establishing a temporal realm for the Sikhs; however, the period of Ranjit 
Singh’s (1799-1839) rule can be termed as the golden age35 of Khalsa Panth. It was during 
this time the Khalsa’s objective that “the Khalsa shall rule” was fulfilled explicitly even 
though Ranjit Singh’s kingship, in real sense, was not a Sikh theocracy. According to Surjeet, 
Ranjit Singh’s  
Kingdom comprised entire territory between the Indus and the Sutlej. Though a 
monarch, Ranjit Singh was a benevolent ruler. He treated all religions alike, though 
he himself was devout Sikh. This was the period of Sikh glory and it had its impact 
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II.4. Identity Crisis and Sikh Resurgence after the Collapse of Sikh Empire  
The political success of the Khalsa Panth, in actuality, concluded with the demise of Ranjit 
Singh. Within a decade of Ranjit’s death the Sikh empire disintegrated as a result of the 
rivalry among the successors of Ranjit Singh. This chapter of the Sikh kingdom was finally 
closed with the annexation of Punjab in 1849 by the British government. With the fall of the 
Sikh Empire there began a gradual decline of Sikhism, particularly of the Khalsa Panth. 
Thenceforth, the Sikh religious community faced serious challenges from within and without.  
Within the community there existed different sects - Udasi, Nirmala, Ram Dasi, Nirankari, 
Kuka or Namdhari, Sarvaria, etc.,37  and among them Namdhari and Nirankari were the 
notable ones. These sects, particularly the Namdhari and the Nirankari, differed from the 
Khalsa Panth on certain important precepts concerning the gurus and the Guru Granthsahib 
because; the Namdharis and Nirankaris acknowledge “a continuing line of Gurus.”38 Often 
the members of these sects would not differentiate Sikhism from Hinduism. Besides, the Sikh 
community has been mostly divided into Amritdhari (baptised), Keshdhari (those who keep 
uncut beard and hair), Sahajdhari (those who cut their beard and hair), and Patit 
(impure/fallen) Sikhs.  To be Khalsa Sikh one has to be Amritdhari Sikh.  
There were two main external forces responsible for the decline of Sikhism. One of them was 
the Christian missionary activities. Soon after the annexation several Christian organizations, 
supposedly with the active support of British officials, began their missionary activities in the 
Punjab with the aim of gaining converts. Due to the Christian Missionary venture many Sikhs, 
including educated ones and those belonging to aristocratic families, were converted to 
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Christianity, and the Christian population began to grow rapidly. 39 Mostly Sikh leaders were 
alarmed as a result of the conversion to Christianity of learned and aristocratic families.40  
The second force was the missionary activity of the Arya Samaj, a Hindu reformation 
movement. The threat of the missionary undertaking of the Samaj was more serious. 
Dayananda Saraswati, the founder of the Samaj, arrived in the Punjab in 1877 and opened a 
branch of the Samaj at Lahore to begin his Hinduisation enterprise in Punjab. Dayananda 
attacked the very foundation of Sikhism by denouncing the gurus as men of little knowledge 
and by rejecting primary importance of the Granth. According to him, Nanak was a “dambhi 
(hypocrite)” and the Sikh theologians were maha murkhs (great fools) due to their “ignorance 
of Sanskrit” language.41 Following the outlook of Dayananada, his fanatical followers sought 
to convert Sikhs into Hinduism. Meanwhile many Sikhs became Hindu because of the Suddhi 
(purification) campaign of the Samaj. This religious policy of the Samaj created a breach in 
the sustained cordial relationship between the Sikhs and Hindus. 
Consequently, prominent Sikhs felt an urgent need to safeguard the purity of Sikhism and 
Sikh identity ordained by their gurus. Thus, they called a meeting of likeminded Sikhs in 
Amritsar as a result of which there came into existence an association known as the Sri Guru 
Singh Sabha in 1873; later on other Singh Sabhas were established in different parts of  
Punjab. Furthermore, in 1919 Sikh leaders founded the Central-Sikh League to achieve 
“immediate and long-term” religio-political objectives.42 The objectives were: to rebuild the 
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demolished wall of Rakabganj Gurdwara, in Delhi; to put the Khalsa College, in Amritsar, 
under the management of the representatives of the Sikh Panth; to free all gurdwaras (in the 
Punjab and other parts of India) from the hands of the Mahants; and to motivate the Sikhs to 
take active part in the movement for India’s independence. The League achieved the first two 
goals within a short time. Also, the urgent concern of the League to liberate the Golden 
Temple and the Akal Takht and to place them in the care of a representative body of the Sikhs 
resulted in the establishment of two important organizations, the Shiromani Gurdwara 
Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), within a year. These 
organizations were to play fundamental role in the Sikh history after 1920 (the year they were 
founded). 
However, one of the most difficult challenges the resurgent Sikhism faced was liberation of 
gurdwaras. After the fall of the Sikh Kingdom the gurdwaras gradually fell into the control of 
“hereditary Mahants”. These Mahants were Udasis who lived like ordinary Hindus.43 They 
neglected the Sikh religious duties (such as the observation of five Ks) and took hold of the 
properties attached to the Sikh sacred places, and introduced extravagant religious ceremonies 
replacing simple form of the Sikh religious rituals. 
The SGPC and the SAD, with the support of the Sikh League, began a non-violent 
movement- which, according to Singh, “turned into the ‘third Sikh War’”44 – against the 
British government and the Mahants to free their holy places. They organized and employed 
bands of unarmed Sikh volunteers known as jathas in the struggle. After half a decade of 
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struggle and with the loss of four hundred Sikh lives,45 the Sikh reformers succeeded in 
liberating all of their places of worship – “One must, therefore, understand the Gurdwara 
Reform Movement not simply as a political or religious activity but as the stage upon which 
the ritual of martyrdom was played out,” says Fenech. This success could be termed as “a 
great religio-political victory” achieved by the Sikhs against the British government and the 
Mahants and their Hindu supporters. Finally, on 25 July in 1925 “the Sikh Gurdwara Act” 
was passed recognizing the SGPC. Since then the SGPC has been the custodian of all the 
important Sikh places of worship in Punjab.  
Hence, the Sikh reformation movement, which began in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, was – both directly and indirectly – instrumental in giving rise to two of the most 
prominent Sikh organizations, the SGPC and the Shiromani Akali Dal which have been 
playing vital role in the Sikh religion and politics since they were founded. SGPC represents 
the spiritual (miri) and SAD represents temporal (piri) authorities of the Sikh Panth 
(community). 
II.5. Post-1947 Sikh Issues 
SAD and SGPC played an essential role in the freedom struggle of India. In the freedom 
struggle many Sikhs sacrificed their lives and property. In addition to the loss of lives and 
property, they had to bear the pain of partition of Punjab.46 The partition was the most 
horrifying nightmare for most of the Sikhs, particularly those in the West Punjab. Tens of 
thousands of Sikhs lost their lives, land and property – Punjabi Hindus and Muslims both 
suffered the same fate. The partition not only wrought death, suffering and misery upon the 
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Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims, but it divided the sacred spaces of Sikhs between the two 
independent territories – e.g., around twenty five historical gurdwaras, including the Nankana 
Sahib (the gurdwara built on the birth place of Guru Nanak, one of the most sacred places of 
the Sikhs), went over to Pakistan.47 
However, the struggle of the Sikh community, particularly the Akalis, did not cease with the 
partition and independence of India.48 Seemingly the sacrifices the Sikh community made for 
the cause of Indian independence and the promises made to the Sikh community by the 
leaders of the Congress Party, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, were simply ignored. 
Gandhi in 1939 assured the Sikh community that the Congress party would never betray 
Sikhs. Nehru too, in 1946, in more affirming manner said: 
The brave Sikhs of Punjab are entitled to special consideration. I see nothing wrong 
in an area and a set up in the north wherein the Sikhs can also experience the glow of 
freedom. 49 
The independence of India neither solved the long-standing socio-religious concerns of the 
Sikhs, nor could the Sikhs “experience the glow of freedom” as assured by Gandhi and 
Nehru.50 Instead, they became a minority under the dominant Hindu majority – in 1951 the 
Sikh population was about 35% and the Hindu over 62% in the Punjab.51 So, after 
independence the Hindu community became the dominant majority in both the centre and the 
region. Fearing such a situation before independence, Sikh leaders had suggested to Lord 
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Mountbatten that, “either the Constituent Assembly should give weightage to the Sikhs in the 
new constitution or the Hindi-speaking areas of the East Punjab should be separated from its 
Punjabi-speaking areas.”52 The second proposal was totally unacceptable to Nehru and the 
first could not find room in the constitution of a federal republic with parliamentary 
democracy. Due to non-acceptance of their demand the Sikh members of the Constituent 
Assembly refused to sign the draft constitution which was adopted on 26 January, 1950. 
Hence, the aspirations of the Sikh community remained unrealised and their long-standing 
problems unresolved.   
Besides, the language dispute in Punjab took a serious turn, and this problem further widened 
the relationship gap between Sikhs and Hindus. Though the government tried to deal with the 
controversy by implementing three different formulae from 1949 to 1966,53 the controversy 
deepened further mainly due to communalization and politicization of languages by the Hindu 
nationalists, the Akalis and the Congress. The government formulae failed because the Arya 
Samaj refused to accept Punjabi in Gurmukhi or Devanagari as medium of instruction in the 
institutions in those areas where it had its stronghold. The language dispute seems to have 
clearly divided the people of Punjab along communal lines: the Punjabi Hindus, who were 
persuaded to opt for Hindi in Devanagari script instead of Punjabi, their mother tongue; the 
Sikhs, who strongly advocated for Punjabi in Gurmukhi script. The argument against Punjabi 
in Gurmukhi was that, Gurmukhi was the religious script of the Sikhs; and, therefore, to the 
Hindus “it was in fact a communally motivated demand.”54  
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II.5.1. Demand for Punjabi Suba (State) 
The fear of losing the importance of Punjabi language in the Punjab of free India prompted 
the Akalis to put pressure (from 1949 onwards) on the Central government for the creation of 
a separate Punjabi-speaking state in which Punjabi in Gurmukhi would be the official 
language and medium of instruction in the educational institutions.   But the Congress party, 
though it was in favour of restructuring of provinces on the basis of languages before the 
partition of India, began to seriously re-think the question of reorganization on linguistic basis 
after the independence.55 Hence, the demand of separate state on linguistic basis for the 
Punjabis, particularly the Sikhs, was unacceptable to Nehru and the Congress party for three 
reasons: that it was communal plot, because it was voiced by Sikhs; that it would make the 
Hindu-Sikh relationship more bitter, because the Sikh community would be majority in the 
proposed state; and that a section of central leaders envisaged a security threat in the Sikh-
dominated state bordering Pakistan.56 Apparently these arguments underscore the communal 
bias in Congress party’s policy.  
II.5.2. Formation of Punjabi Suba 
The Akali’s demand for the creation of a separate Punjabi speaking state could not be realized 
during the life time of Nehru due to the opposition from the two fronts – Hindus of Punjab 
and the Congress party. To suppress the agitation for a separate Punjabi speaking state (on the 
one side) and to pacify the Akali leaders (on the other) the Congress Party put forward a series 
of impracticable compromises. Therefore, the Akalis re-launched an agitation for a Punjabi 
Suba from early 1960s, and in the next five years they were emboldened by new 
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developments: Nehru and Pratap Singh Kairon, the two chief political opponents to the 
demand, died in 1964 and in 1965 (Kairon was assassinated) respectively; the Akali 
leadership was taken over by Sant Fateh Singh whose idea “of a Punjabi Suba was more 
inclusive and cultural”; and, Hindu opposition weakened due to growing impetus behind the 
Hariyanvi movement for “the creation of Hindi-speaking state in the south-east.”57 
Meanwhile, the suspension of a fast-unto-death by Sant Fateh Singh at the outbreak of Indo-
Pak war in 1965 demonstrated the Sikhs’ patriotism towards national interest. As a reward for 
this patriotism, a Parliamentary Committee recommended the formation of a Punjabi Suba. 
Accordingly on 1 November 1966 the Punjab Reorganization Act (1966) came into effect. 
According to the Act, Punjab province was bifurcated into the Punjab and Haryana states and 
some mountainous areas were merged with Himachal Pradesh. At last the “Sikh homeland” 
with a Sikh majority (60%) became the reality.58 However, at the time of demarcation of 
boundaries some very sensitive matters – such as the non-inclusion of Chandigarh 
(Chandigarh was made the capital of both Punjab and Haryana) and several Punjabi-speaking 
areas (which were merged with Haryana) within the Punjab, and water sharing and language 
disputes – were left unresolved. These issues became the ground of later disputes between 
Punjab, Haryana and the Centre. 
II.6. Socio-Political Issues in Post-1966 Punjab 
The Akali Dal with its coalition partners formed the first elected government in the newly 
created state of Punjab in 1967. However, the Akail Dal government could not last long due to 
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hostile policy of the Congress party, then ruling party in the Centre, towards the non-Congress 
political parties. In less than nineteen months two Akali ministries collapsed and president’s 
rule was imposed – “the United Front ministry fell on 22 November 1967” and Lachman 
Singh Gill’s “ministry fell on 23 August 1968.” The Punjab witnessed three coalition 
governments from 1967 to 1980: the first one, formed in March 1967, “comprised the the 
Akali Dal, the jana Sangh, CPI, Republican Party and a few independent members;” the 
second was coalition of “Akali Dal and Jana Sangh;” and, the third (formed in 1977) was “the 
coalition between the Akali Dal and Janata Party.”59 Therefore, the Akali leaders had to 
review the political condition because of the abuse of power by the Congress government. 
The agreement signed (in October 1968) by the combined Master Tara Singh and Sant Akali 
Dal elucidate the political objectives of the Sikh Panth. According to the agreement, the 
political goal of the Panth 
was well grounded in the commandments of Guru Gobind Singh and given concrete 
shape in the Sikh history. The Khalsa were ‘a sovereign people by birth-right’; all 
decision-making powers belonged to the Panth; and the goal of the Shiromani Akali 
Dal was to achieve an autonomous status in a well demarcated territory within free 
India.60 
Consequently, the Akali Dal demanded that the Constitution of India be formulated on true 
federal basis, and states be granted greater autonomy. The main objective of the demand for 
state autonomy was to get Chandigarh and the excluded Punjabi-speaking areas incorporated 
into Punjab and to gain control of river waters and power projects.  
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The above-mentioned issues clearly reflect the Akali’s conception that, even after the 
independence of India the Sikh Panth was under bondage. This view was given more 
emphasis during the period of terrorist movement in Punjab. 
II.6.1. Economic Transformation and Its Negative Effect 
In spite of political complications, Punjab witnessed rapid economic transformation since 
mid-1960s due to “the Green Revolution” as a result of the process of modernization. From 
mid-1960s farmers began to harvest bumper crops of wheat and rice using “high-yielding 
variety”61 of seeds, chemical fertilizers and modern agricultural machinery tools. This 
changed Punjab from “a food-deficit state” into the “granary of India”62 and helped to 
improve the economic state of many ordinary farmers in Punjab. In addition, many people 
from Punjab immigrated to the Middle East and the Western world in search of job and other 
opportunities due to the open door for immigration to the outside world. Many of the 
immigrants brought back home fortunes earned in the foreign countries, and helped their 
families to improve their economic condition further. The Green Revolution and immigration 
changed the economic and educational map of Punjab in general and Sikh society in 
particular.  
These essential developments wrought by the process of modernization not only transformed 
the Sikh society of Punjab economically and educationally but, also had some negative 
impact. Increasing numbers of Sikhs began to neglect the visible Sikh symbols (the five Ks). 
Seemingly religiously-prohibited habits like smoking, drinking, taking drugs and watching 
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and reading pornographic films and literature, smuggled in by the returning immigrants, were 
part of everyday life for many. Drinking and taking drugs not only impinged on the religious 
life of the persons concerned but also seemed to have reduced the number of worshippers in 
the gurdwaras. These religious and social evils could have caused deep concern among the 
religious Sikhs. 
II.6.2. The Akali’s New Strategy: Anandpur Sahib Resolution 
Though Punjab entered into the new era of economic development, the Akali leaders were not 
happy because of their failure to secure the political power in the state. There were two key 
reasons for their inability to take hold of the political power – factionalism within the Akali 
Dal and the Congress government at the Centre. But, the Congress tended to be greater threat 
to their political success because of the Congress Party’s unfavourable policy towards the 
Akali Dal. Therefore, the Akali Dal devised new religio-political strategy at Anandpur Sahib, 
Khalsa’s birthplace, to achieve their political objective. In 1973, at Anandpur Sahib, the 
Working Committee of the Akali Dal passed resolution generally known as Anandpur Sahib 
Resolution (ASR). The main objective of the ASR is the restriction of the prerogatives of the 
Central Government to defence, foreign affairs, communications and currency.63 A political 
settlement worked out on this line would provide suitable religio-political environment for the 
Khalsa to exercise dominant authority in the state.  
During the Akali agitation (from 1982 to 1984) the ASR occupied very important position in 
the socio-political “grievances” of the Sikh community. The moderate Akali leaders were 
ready to take into consideration the ASR as the ground for the debate on constitutional reform 
                                                 




for closer and better centre-state relationship, but Mrs Gandhi was reluctant to accept it64 on 
the ground that it was religiously inspired. Mrs Gandhi’s indifference towards the Sikhs’ 
socio-political grievances and demands, therefore, compelled the Akalis to launch a fresh 
agitation to realize their aspiration, as stated in the ASR. 
II.6.3. Launching of the Dharm Yudh (Righteous War)  
In pursuance of the ASR the Akalis planned to begin a new phase of agitation known as 
dharm yudh (righteous/holy war) as advised by the World Sikh Convention (held in July 
1981). However, in September 1981, before the agitation was launched, they submitted a list 
of forty-five grievances to the Prime Minister with the prospect that she would address those 
concerns and find appropriate settlement. Then, in October they submitted a fresh 
memorandum, as asked by the Prime Minister, of fifteen demands. Accordingly, three rounds 
of meetings were held between the Prime Minister and the Akali leaders without any concrete 
outcome. After the last meeting, held on 2 April 1982, the Akali leaders returned “with the 
impression that Mrs. Gandhi had already made up her mind to let the issues wait.”65  
Before resolving any of the Sikhs’ grievances Mrs. Gandhi was keen on letting the work on 
the Satlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal begin due to the imminent election in Haryana. This was 
the unilateral decision made by Mrs Gandhi in 1981 to please the people of Haryana for her 
party’s political interest. Thus, the Akalis, with the support of Communist parties, organized 
nahar roko (block the canal) campaign in 1982. After a second nahar roko agitation the Akali 
leaders finally decided to start dharm yudh, to pressurise the government to accept their 
political, religious, economic and cultural demands that are stated in the ASR. The agitation 
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began on 4th August and rapidly gained momentum. Many Akali leaders and volunteers 
courted arrest, making it more difficult for the government to find room for them all in the 
existing jails in Punjab. On 11 September 1982 a bus carrying arrested volunteers (prisoners) 
collided with a running train near Tarn Taran and 34 volunteers died on the spot. This 
incidence further antagonised the Sikhs against the Central government.  According to 
Jeffrey, the agitation “also produced ‘martyrs’ and further ‘evidence’ that Sikhs were ‘second-
class citizens’.”66  
Mrs. Gandhi, instead of addressing the Sikh issues seriously, employed political tactics to buy 
off time. The dharm yudh agitation became a mounting concern to her government due to its 
growing popularity among the Sikhs. To stop the agitation, before it took the form of wildfire, 
she employed the usual Congress tactics of negotiation without true commitment. She 
appointed Swaran Singh, a Cabinet Minister, to negotiate a settlement with the Akali on her 
behalf. Swaran Singh worked out a mutually agreeable formula with the Akali leaders on the 
issues, like Centre-State relations, Chandigarh, river water and the relay of kirtan (singing of 
hymns from the scripture) from the All India Radio. 67  A cabinet sub-committee, which was 
appointed by Mrs. Gandhi to consider the formula, accepted it and Swaran Singh 
communicated that to the Akali leaders. However, at the last moment Mrs. Gandhi seems to 
have turned down the formula worked out by Swaran Singh.68 This approach of Mrs. Gandhi 
could have sent out a message to the Sikh community that the Congress government was non-
committed and unconcerned towards the settlement of Sikh people’s socio-political problems. 
 
                                                 
66 Robin Jeffrey, What is Happening to India? (Houndmills: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1986), 164. 
 
67 Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, 222. 
 
68Mark Tully & Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1985), 83. 
95 
 
II.7. The Rise of Sikh Religious Terrorism in Punjab  
The above reviews assess how religio-historical experiences and symbols and socio-political 
developments facilitate an environment for rise and sustenance of Sikh religious terrorism in 
Punjab in early 1980s. Besides, the preceding observations make it explicit that, in the Sikh 
ethnicity the miri (spiritual) and piri (temporal) are so finely intertwined that it is not possible 
to separate them from one another. Such an intricate Sikh socio-religious pattern has been 
shaped by the process of religious and political transformation and the accumulation of both 
bitter and cherished experiences undergone by the Sikh community down through the course 
of their history.  
The following section will be devoted to the study of Sikh terrorist movements. The period of 
Sikh terrorism will be divided into two – pre-Blue-star and post-Blue-star – phases. In the pre-
Blue-star stage the main focus will be the rise of Bhindranwale as a prominent religious 
authority, his theological ideology and his terrorist movement; and, in the post-Blue-star 
phase the focus will be on the terrorist activities of Babbar Khalsa and its ideology. However, 
it is important to analyse the Sikh resurgence in brief, to examine how Sikh revivalism was 
associated with the rise of Sikh terrorism, before we take up the study of Sikh terrorism.  
II.7.1. Sikh Resurgence 
The Sikh Community did not remain unaffected by the worldwide religious resurgence. The 
modern communication technologies – like radio, television, telephone and news papers – 
could have made the people of Punjab aware of religio-political developments that were 
taking place in other parts of the world. At the same time easy and faster means of travel 
facilities might have provided opportunity for religious Sikhs to interact with the people of 
other faiths in other parts of the world. According to Jeffrey, two major influences were at 
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work for growing Sikh revivalism. “First, knowledge of international affairs, resulting from 
the innovations of the ‘green revolution’”, and second, people “being drawn into a more 
complex world” that “holds out the possibility of prosperity” often making “it difficult to 
observe time-honoured religious practices.” In such situation sant rose as “’a cultural brokers 
between traditional answers and contemporary problems.”69 
From 1967 there began a movement for the re-assertion of Sikh religious identity – the Sikh 
community celebrated the tercentenary of Guru Gobind Singh in 1967 and quincentenary of 
Guru Nanak in 1969.  During the mid-1970s Giani Zail Singh, a Congress Chief Minister of 
Punjab, gave a momentum to this movement by organizing the centenary celebration of the 
founding of the Singh Sabha (1873); celebrating the birth anniversary of Maharaja Ranjit 
Singh; and organizing Kirtan darbars (elaborate religious performance) all over the state; and 
public functions were initiated with ardas (invocations) and Sikh rituals.70 According Tully 
and Jacob, Zail Singh “went so far that more than one senior member of his own party 
complained to Mrs. Gandhi that the Punjab government was communal.”71 
Nevertheless, it was Bhindranwale (born in 1947 in a poor Brar Jat peasant family in the 
village of Rode in Faridkote district, in Punjab – because of poor background he had very 
little formal education),72 an obscure preacher who rose into prominence due to his religious 
zeal to revive Sikhism and to re-establish its pristine glory, who gave impetus to the Sikh 
religious resurgence from late 1970s. This religious zeal, which was cultivated from his 
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young days in Damdami Taksal (for further clarification see Appendix 3),73 an influential 
theological institution for preserving Sikh orthodoxy, earned him popularity among the rural 
Sikhs of Punjab. His initial mission, as a religious preacher, was to bring all Sikhs within the 
Khalsa Panth initiated by the tenth guru and to exhort them to renounce the evils of 
modernity.74  
To carry out his mission he would travel to villages and exhort people to stop smoking, 
drinking, taking drugs and disrespecting the visible symbols of the Sikh faith by not wearing 
them. He was able to establish a close relationship with the rural Sikhs of Punjab because he 
spoke the language they understood. In his preaching tours thousands of young Sikhs 
promised publicly to abstain from the above-mentioned ‘evil lifestyle’ and were baptised; and, 
they began to attend gurdwaras regularly and work more hours in the field. Because of the 
changes brought in the lives of thousands of people through his preaching mission, he was 
revered by the people as Baba Sant Jarnail Singhji Bhindranwale. He, unlike other religious 
preachers, tried to make no distinction between high and low castes.75 This modus operandi, 
which aimed to re-establish equality and Sikh brotherhood, earned him more praise and 
popularity among the rural Sikhs. So, in the eyes of his supporters he was not just a religious 
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II.7.1.1. Change of Course of the Sikh Resurgence 
With the rise of his popularity Bhindranwale endowed upon himself the role of temporal 
authority in addition to his religious (preaching) mission. He organized and trained (in 
modern arms) a band of followers who would see that his verdict is carried out by all means. 
Thus, Bhindranwale vested miri and piri authorities upon himself, emulating the sixth and the 
tenth gurus. To demonstrate his miri and piri authorities in most visible manner he, besides 
wearing five symbols of Khalsa Sikhs, wore a bandolier across his chest “charged with 
bullets, with pistols in holsters on either side of his hips.” 77 He also made a habit of keeping a 
steel arrow with him – which would signify that his authority comes from none other than the 
sixth and tenth gurus themselves.  
Moreover, this kind of arms display suggests his Jat attitude of courage and confrontation78 
because, he was a Jat. Almost 70% of the total Sikh population today is Jat, and remaining of 
the Sikh population consist of other three caste groups79 (Mazhabis or ex-untouchables, 
Ramgharhias or artisans, Khatris, Aroras and other80) roughly in equal ratio. Since the 18th 
century the Sikh religion has been blended together with the Jat culture; therefore, for two 
centuries Jat Sikhs have supplied a pattern to be emulated by other Sikhs.81 This pattern 
includes the Jat attitude of courage and confrontation. According to Karandeep Singh, the 
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inflow of the Jat social outlook gave an extent of “militancy to the Sikh religion and the latter, 
in turn, strengthened this militancy by evoking the concept of martyrdom.”82 
Hence, from the time Bhindranwale vested in himself the twofold authorities the Sikh 
religious awakening rekindled Sikh ethno-religious nationalism. In this Sikh ethno-religious 
nationalistic stirring three sets of symbols played a dynamic role: “historical symbols derived 
from the history of the Sikh kingdoms” before annexation; “religious symbols which have 
been used”83 to demarcate the boundary line between (Khalsa) Sikhs and non-Sikhs, 
particularly Hindus, in the modern Punjab; and cultural symbols, particularly of the Khalsa 
Panth. So, this ethno-religious nationalism further reinforced already existing demarcation 
line between “us”(Sikhs) and “them” (non-Sikhs). The boundary line not only separated Sikhs 
and people of other religious faiths, specifically Hindus, but also differentiated Khalsa Sikhs 
and other Sikhs – e.g., Sahajdharis, sectarian Sikhs and liberal Sikhs. Among these other 
Sikhs the Nirankaris had been the most hated enemies of the Khalsa Panth, since the latter 
half of the nineteenth century because of their heterodox religious belief and practices. The 
Nirankaris “differ from the orthodox Sikhs in their disapproval of the militant brotherhood, 
the Khalsa, and in the homage they accord Dayal Das and his successors, to whom they 
accord the status of living Guru.”84 
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II.7.1.2. Bhindranwale’s Authority 
Bhindranwale firmly established his authority as a religious saint among his Sikh followers, 
and this authority was to play a vital role in making people honour his ideology as “words 
from above.” Dhillon says that Bhindranwale was intensely loved and intensely hated man of 
the time; thus, he “was looked upon as a villain and a hero.”85 According to Jeffrey, “Punjab, 
never more prosperous, literate or widely read, looked constantly to a man who went to school 
for only five years.”86 Though he was a rustic preacher and his speeches were full of 
repetitions and do’s and don’ts, it was this authority which attracted many young Sikhs 
towards him, and they were ready to lay down their lives without any slightest hesitation to 
fulfil his religious ideology. The relationship was like spiritual romance between 
Bhindranwale (who represented the guru) and his followers (disciples).  
So, during his lifetime Bhindranwale could stand as a strong symbol of unity among his 
followers, though there were other groups like Babbar Khalsa and Akhand Kirtani Jatha,87 
who were against Bhindranwale. Some of the Akali leaders, like Sant Harchand Singh 
Longowal, and many educated Sikhs were against his militant ideology. However, “the 
beginning of a powerful new movement” in August 1982 “signalled the fact that 
Bhindranwale was winning the war of symbols.”88 The Akali leaders merged their dharm 
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yudh morcha with Bhindranwale’s with the aim of taking over his movement; instead, he 
“took over theirs.”89  
II.7.1.3. Bhindranwale’s Entry into the National Limelight 
The confrontation with the Nirankaris in 1978 and political wrangling between the Congress 
and the Akali Dal pushed Bhindranwale to the forefront of the Sikh religio-political 
movement. On 13 April 1978 Bhindranwale’s supporters were killed by Nirankaris at the 
Nirankari Convention, in Amritsar. Nirankari sect was granted permission by the then Akali 
Dal government to hold the convention in Amritsar. But, Bhindranwale and his followers did 
not want the convention to be held in Amritsar, that also during the Sikh holy day (Baisakhi). 
Bhindranwale with his followers marched to the convention to stop it. At the convention 
battle broke out between the Nirankaris and the followers of Bhindranwale. Twelve Sikhs and 
three Nirankaris were killed in the battle.90  After this incident, a new political development 
took place, due to which Bhindranwale, for the first time, came to the limelight in the state 
and national stage.  
Meanwhile, the post-Emergency election (1977) was disastrous for Mrs. Gandhi and the 
Congress party. Mrs Gandhi and her Congress party were heavily defeated in the Centre and 
in several states. In Punjab a coalition government was formed by the Akali Dal “with the 
New Janta Party, which found itself in power in Delhi.”91 Knowing the fragility of the 
alliance, Sanjay Gandhi (Mrs Gandhi’s younger son) set out to break the coalition. To 
accomplish the break-up of the alliance in Punjab, Zail Singh seems to have suggested Sanjay 
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should seek to create division within the Akali Dal. Hence, Sanjay, most probably on the 
recommendation of Zail Singh, was looking for a competent religious figure to carry out his 
intended mission. At that juncture Bhindranwale was found as a capable Sant who could 
“discredit the traditional Akali Dal leadership.”92 The Congress leaders’ strategy was to use 
Bhindranwale as a pawn to do their bidding to achieve their political goal in Punjab. But, it 
took the Congress leaders quite some time to realize that Bhindranwale would give them more 
trouble than the Akalis. Mrs Gandhi and her Congress Party won the Lok Sabha election, held 
in January 1980, and came back to power, and in February 1980 the Akali Dal ministry was 
dismissed “on the ground that they had lost their mandates in the light of the Lok Sabha 
Elections.”93 However, within first year of Mrs. Gandhi’s return to power (1980-81) three 
high profile murders brought to light the tension in the Congress party and placed 
Bhindranwale in the vanguard of the Punjab’s religio-political arena. Finally, Bhindranwale 
fell out with the Congress leaders in 1981; but, immediately the Akali Dal came forward in 
support of Bhindranwale to make him their danda (staff) to beat the Congress government for 
their political end. The calculation of the Akalis, too, proved wrong within a short time. 
Though both the Akalis and Bhindranwale operated in the same cosmos, the first was 
interested in recapturing political power and the later in reviving his religious community. 
II.7.1.4. Bhindranwale’s Theology 
According Bhindranwale, a true Sikh is someone who is formally initiated into the Khalsa 
Panth, who wears the five Ks and who refrains from all kinds of addictions. For him a true 
Sikh should not just be a religious pacifist, but he must be ready to fight in a righteous battle 
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for the sake of justice, Sikh faith and Sikh nation. When Bhindranwale “exhorted his 
followers to action, he called for ‘a struggle ... for our faith, for the Sikh nation, for the 
oppressed.’”94 Bhindranwale’s exhortation suggests that the conflict between evil (the 
political power which oppresses the Sikhs) and truth (the Sikh faith) has already begun; 
therefore, all true Sikhs are obliged to participate actively in the battle. Moreover, the conflict 
is “a conflict between faith and the lack of faith” at a personal level, and “a battle between 
truth and evil” on the cosmic level. 95 In this cosmic battle, according to Bhindranwale, 
enemies arise “from all sides and in all forms” and they use various strategies to destroy the 
Sikh religion.96  Since the enemy’s target is to destroy the Sikh religion, all true Sikhs have to 
fight the battle against these conceived evil forces both for the Immortal Guru and for their 
ethno-religious nationalistic identity – not only Bhindranwale, but other radical Sikh leaders 
too were seriously concerned of losing true Sikh identity. Therefore, by evoking “the image of 
great war between good and evil waged in the present day,” Bhindranwale strongly supported 
the notion of miri and piri powers, 97 to fight the battle against the evil force. In the cosmic 
battle evil ultimately will be destroyed by the grace and power of the Immortal Guru. Further, 
he constantly reminded his followers that the true Sikhs belong to Guru Hargobind, “the 
Master of Miri and Piri”, “‘destroyer of armies, the valiant Guru, the great warrior, the great 
benefactor’”, and Guru Gobind, the originator of Khalsa Panth and “the Tenth King”.98 
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From the time Bhindranwale fell out with the Congress leaders he began to preach anti-
Congress and anti-Hindu rhetoric. His speeches clearly indicate that the Congress party and 
Hindus are not different from each other; they are two different manifestations of same enemy 
of the Sikhs. He called Hindus “dhotian wale (dhoti wearers), topian wale (cap wearers)” and 
“Mrs Gandhi Bahmani (Brahmin woman) and Panditan di dhee (daughter of pundits).”99 
Moreover, this demeaning expression of Bhindranwale refutes the Hindus’ claim that Sikhism 
is not different from Hinduism because (form Hindus’ point of view) Sikhism is a branch of 
Hinduism. Further, the speech asserts the distinctiveness of religious and cultural identity of 
the Sikhs. 
The Congress party, according to him, represented the majority Hindu community and 
worked for the benefit of the Hindus. He further argued that the Sikhs were discriminated 
against and victimised from the time of Indian independence by the Congress party and the 
Hindus. To corroborate his argument he cited the following illustrations: the Indian 
Constitution did not recognize the Sikh community as a distinct religious community; the 
Sikhs’ demands, listed in the ASR, were not accepted; commitment of atrocities by police 
personnel against Sikh men and women (the death of 34 volunteers near Tarn Taran was 
repeatedly mentioned on this account); the dismissal of the Akali ministry in 1980; the 
humiliation of Sikhs in Haryana during Asian Games in Delhi in 1982 and; the Sikhs were 
called extremists by Mrs. Gandhi and militant Hindus because they carry arms (one of the five 
Ks) in obedience to the command of their tenth guru.100 Furthermore, according to him, Hindu 
demands were treated differently from the Sikh demands, different laws were applied for 
Hindus and Sikhs, Sikhs were punished without evidence but Hindu wrongdoers did not get 
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punishment, “Hindu leaders issue threats against Sikhs and the Sikh response is punished,” 
Hindu journalists slandered Sikh faith and went unpunished, defilement of the Sikh places of 
worship was ignored, Sikhs in the Indian army were ill-treated, and “weapons licenses issued 
to Sikhs are being revoked but Hindus can keep illicit weapons”.101  
The above-stated discriminatory activities of the Congress government, in the view of 
Bhindranwale, were clear signs of slavery. For this reason he urged the true (Khalsa) Sikhs to 
throw off the slavery from their necks. They had to achieve the ASR to get rid of this slavery. 
Therefore, he advised his followers to arm themselves with modern weapons and ride bikes 
instead of horses, rode by their ancestors, to fight against the enemies. Further, he exhorted 
them to disregard any government rule that would stop them from carrying arms. They were 
told that the ASR was their license to carry modern arms and to kill enemies of the Sikh 
community and the Sikh faith.102  
Meanwhile, in response to a question about his views concerning the demand for Khalistan, 
Bhindranwale’s response was, “I have never opposed a sovereign Khalistan, nor have I 
supported it”.103  According to him, it was for Mrs Gandhi to decide whether to keep the 
Sikhs in India (Hindustan) or to give them Khalistan. If she wanted the Sikhs to remain within 
Hindustan then she had to give them equal rights, which meant she should accept the ASR. 
However, nothing less than ASR would be acceptable to him and his followers. Since ASR 
was the religio-political right and goal of the Sikhs, they should achieve it at any cost.  
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Thus, violence to achieve the religio-political goal of the Sikhs was justified. However, 
Bhindranwale denied that he ever initiated violence, and a true Sikh, according to him, is “not 
supposed to indulge in violence but it is a different matter if one acted in self-defence”.104 The 
preceding argument of Bhindranwale makes it obvious that he believed Sikhs were enslaved, 
discriminated against and victimised by the existing socio-political system; therefore, they 
had the right to defend themselves to safeguard their religious, cultural and political identity. 
An act of self-defence, he endorsed, should not be called violence.   
II.8. Terrorist Violence during pre-Blue-Star Phase 
During 1980-81 three high profile murders took place – Nirankari guru, Baba Gurbachan 
Singh, and his bodyguards were murdered in Delhi on 24 April 1980; in September 1981 
eighty-two year old Lala Jagat Narain, proprietor of the Hind Samachar group of papers, was 
murdered; on 22 December 1981 Jathedar Santokh Singh of Delhi was killed. Then, 
Bhindranwale was arrested on 20 September 1981 in connection with the murders of 
Nirankari guru and Lala Jagat Narain. In retaliation the followers of Bhindranwale killed four 
people and wounded eleven with sten-guns on 22 September, in Jullundhar; on 29 September 
an Indian airline plane en route to Lahore was hijacked; two people were killed in the 
Chandigarh Secretariat and a murder attempt was made on a leading Nirankari official on 16 
October; a Nirankari, a Hindu politician and two policemen were killed in November. From 
this time Bhindranwale shifted his headquarters to the Akal Takht and his armed followers 
performed their terrorist activities from the temple complex. Besides, modern arms and 
ammunitions were smuggled inside the temple complex, and at the same time Bhindranwale, 
                                                 




with greater force, began to make regular hateful speeches against the “’Hindu government’ 
and the ‘Delhi Darbar.’”105  
On 14th February 1983, Sikhs were burned and publicly humiliated and their gurdwaras were 
desecrated in Haryana.106 This incidence led to communal violence between Hindus and Sikhs 
in Punjab and Haryana. Apparently the incidence of violence against the Sikhs further 
emboldened Bhindranwale because, his assumption that the Sikh identity would be lost in the 
sea of resurgent Hinduism proved right. His anti-Hindu speeches became louder and clearer. 
The tape recordings of his hate-speeches were distributed in the Sikh villages. Furthermore, 
he made it clear that he opposed Hindu-Sikh brotherhood and friendship because of the 
violent incidents against the Sikhs. As per his calculation only 35 Hindus fell in the share of 
each Sikh. Thus, to strengthen the militant Spirit of his followers he said: 
Our guru,’ said one Sikh, ‘could fight, 125,000 (sawa lakh sey ek ladaoon). We have 
calculated that with a total Hindu population of 66 crores [660 millions], it comes to 
only 35 per Sikh. Imagine only 35, not even a hundred. So don’t think of yourselves as 
weak.107  
These anti-Hindu speeches of Bhindranwale further escalated the terrorist violence. The 
violent incidents included bank robbery, stealing weapons, cutting telephone wires, burning 
railway stations, attacks on police personals, bombings, killing Nirankaris, killing civilians 
and attacks on ministers and high profile officials.108 Some of the prominent incidents were: 
killing of Deputy Inspector General, A. S. Atwal, at the Golden Temple complex on 25 April 
1983; the cold blooded murder of Hindu bus passengers in October 1983; and the killing of 
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thirty-five Hindus in retaliation to eight Sikhs killed in Haryana on 19 February 1983, due to 
mob violence against the Sikhs. 
Consequently, on 6 June 1984 a military operation, code named Blue-star, was launched 
against the Sikh militants. In the operation Bhindranwale along with his right hand men, 
Major-General Shahbeg Singh and Amrik Singh, and many of his followers were killed, some 
militants surrendered and many of them escaped. According to Tully & Jacob “200 followers 
of Bhindranwale escaped on 3rd June when curfew was lifted,” and “about 250 people 
surrendered in the Temple complex and 500 in the hostel complex after the two battles were 
over.”109 Among the surrendered, no doubt, many were either pilgrims or temple officials and 
attendants. The Army Operation, says Gurpreet Singh, “left some 1,000 terrorists and 200 
soldiers dead.”110 Total number of military and civilian casualties, “according to one 
estimate,” were seven hundred officers and men and five thousand civilians, mostly pilgrims 
“including women and children.” 111  
Although the operation was successful in flushing out the militants from the temple complex, 
it was a serious political miscalculation. Blue-star rocked India due to two incidents that 
followed – mutinies in several places by young Sikh soldiers,112 the assassination of Mrs. 
Gandhi by her Sikh security guards and the anti-Sikh pogrom in Delhi and other parts of 
India. The Blue-star Operation horrified and wounded the religious sentiment of the Sikhs in 
general; therefore, the Sikhs “were strikingly unanimous in their condemnation of Operation 
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Blue-star as an unnecessary overkill.”113 After the Blue-star, Sikh terrorism, instead of being 
subdued, spread all over Punjab and its neighbouring states and became a serious concern to 
the Indian government. 
II.9. Post-Blue-Star Terrorism  
The military attack on the Golden Temple complex could neither eliminate the terrorists nor 
break their spirit in carrying on their intended mission. Instead, they could garner more 
incentive and public support due to what happened in the aftermath of the Blue-star and Mrs. 
Gandhi’s death. The military attack on the holiest place of the Sikhs and destruction of Sikh 
lives114 and property by the murderous crowds organized by political (Congress) leaders, 
rather proved the argument of Bhindranwale that the enemies of the Sikhs are after the 
destruction of Sikh religion and culture. The target of the military attack on the “spiritual and 
political centre of the Sikhs”, in the view of Pettigrew, was “not to eliminate a political figure 
or a political movement but to suppress the culture of a people, to attack their heart, to strike a 
blow at their spirit and self-confidence.”115 The military attack on the Sikhs’ religio-political 
institutions, in addition to the handling of long-standing Sikh issues without serious 
commitment by the Central government, fuelled Sikh antagonism all over the world against 
the Indian government. According to Baweja, “on the day that the Temple complex was 
handed back to the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee by the army authorities [...] 
men cried unabashedly while the women wailed and beat their chests on seeing the bullet 
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mark [...] That day, women swore revenge and offered their sons for the ‘Sikh cause’.”116 
Apparently the military action against the Sikh holy place further motivated Sikh terrorist 
elements to increase their terrorist activities.   
During the second phase of the terrorist movement the Sikh Diaspora of North America, Great 
Britain and Europe played an active part by organizing, supporting and providing both 
material and diplomatic and moral assistance towards the sustenance of Sikh resistance in 
Punjab.117 According to the Government of India (GOI) White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, 
a number of secessionist Sikh organizations were operating abroad, and among them “the 
National Council of Khalistan, Dal Khalsa, Babbar Khalsa and Akhand Kirtan [sic] Jatha” 
were the chief ones.118 Moreover, the active involvement of the Sikh Diaspora added more 
dynamism and passion to the Sikh terrorist movement in Punjab during the second phase. 
The terrorists who escaped from the Temple complex during the operation Blue-star 
regrouped afterward and carried on terrorist activities all over Punjab and its neighbouring 
states with greater intensity. The military operation, code named Woodrose, which aimed to 
clear “the countryside militants and weapons, instead pushed youths across the border into 
Pakistani training camps.”119 However, the post-Blue-star terrorist groups lacked a strong 
leader, like Bhindranwale, to reign over them. Before the Blue-star there were three main 
terrorist groups – Dal Khalsa, Dashmesh Regiment and Babbar Khalsa, and all of them 
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operated from their base inside the Golden Temple. But, after the Operation several terrorist 
groups – Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), International Sikh Youth Federation(ISYF), All-
India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTFK), 
Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA),  Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), Khalsitan Liberation 
Force (KLF), Khalistan Armed Force (KAF), Khalistan Liberation Organization (KLO), 
Khalistan National Army (KNA), Khalistan Guerrila Force (KGF), and Khalistan Security 
Force (KSF) – came into existence, and terrorist violence increased in number and magnitude. 
The activities of these groups were controlled by three main Panthic Committees during 1986 
to 1993. However, both the Panthic Committees and the terrorist groups were heavily 
troubled with factionalism for which there was regular “internecine warfare among them,” 
and such warfare was “frequently promoted by counterinsurgency operations undertaken by 
the security services.”120  
II.9.1. Babbar Khalsa 
The Babbar Khalsa came into existence in 1978, after a clash between the Nirankaris and 
Sikh volunteers in Amritsar. Sukhdev Singh Babbar was the founder and leader of the group. 
The group took the name of the Babbar Akalis, those who opposed “the Akali Dal’s non-
violent policy during the Gurudwara Reform Movement in the 1920s” and were involved in 
violent activities.121 According to the GOI White Paper, Babbar Khalsa was “a political off-
shoot of Akhand Kirtani Jatha”.122  In 1981, Talwinder Singh Parmar, one of the founding 
members of the group, established an overseas unit of Babbar Khalsa (which is generally 
known as Babbar Khalsa International) in Canada. The main objective of the Babbar Khalsa 
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was to take revenge for the humiliation of the Sikh “volunteers suffered at the hands of the 
Nirankaris.”123 Therefore, the Nirankaris were the avowed enemies of the group. However, 
before the Blue-star the group opposed Bhindranwale, too, for his alleged desertion of the 
Sikh volunteers who were left to march to the Nirankari assembly at the risk of their lives. In 
this incident Fauja Singh, founder of Akhand Kirtani Jatha and husband of Bibi Amarjit Kaur, 
was among twelve Sikhs killed by the Nirankaris – Amarjit Kaur never had forgiven 
Bhindranwale “for not having led the anti-Nirankari demonstration in which her husband was 
killed.”124  Except this accusation and the claim that it was not so much anti-Hindu,125 the 
group seemed to have no ideological differences with Bhindranwale. The group’s objective, 
according to the GOI White Paper, was to achieve an independent territory for the Sikhs, 
because it held the view that unless the Sikhs got independent territory they would not be able 
to maintain their religious purity. 126  
In the pre-Blue-star days the Babbars stood as formidable opponent to Bhindranwale inside 
the Temple complex. This group provided armed assistance to Longowal, who felt insecure 
because of the rising difference between the Akali Dal and Bhindranwale, and it drove out 
Bhindranwale and his armed followers from Guru Nanak Niwas on 15 December 1983. After 
this incidence Sukhdev, leader of the Babbar Khalsa, began to boldly talk to journalist “about 
how it was really the Babbars who had killed most of the Nirankaris so far and how they 
would continue to kill them”.127  According to Tavleen, “the extraordinary thing about the 
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Babbars ... was that they could come and go from the Golden Temple as they pleased because 
the polce [sic] had no idea who they were.”128 Moreover, this group took an oath, along with 
other groups, to defend the temple till death.129 However, when the military moved in most of 
the members of the group (including the leader) escaped by breaking through a wall behind 
the Guru Nanak Niwas.  
In the post-Blue-star days Babbar became the most feared terrorist group because of being 
“connected with number of killings”.130 Nevertheless, the authority of the Babbar was 
challenged by the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) and the Khalistan Liberation Force 
(KLF). Therefore, Babbar with other splinter groups formed an alliance known as Car 
Jhujharu Jathebande (the four groups of freedom fighters). According to Pettigrew, from 
1988 to 1991 Car Jhujharu Jathebande (CJJ) “held sway and carried out a programme which 
suited Delhi’s interest,” intentionally or unintentionally.131 This group was against the 
political dialogue and debate, and it threatened anyone who would come to the political 
prominence.  The group intended to achieve its ideological goal through armed struggle, not 
through dialogue. Therefore, it eliminated many intelligent, truthful and popular political 
figures.132 This derailed any political process for solving the Punjab problem on the one hand 
and created chaotic conditions in the state giving opportunity to the Central government for 
militarization on the other. This group also targeted members of other terrorist groups, 
particularly KCF and KLF, to reinforce its authority over other Sikh terrorist factions. Such 
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killings led to internecine warfare among the different factions. Besides, the group was also 
involved in random killing, kidnapping for extortion, and other violent incidents. 
II.9.2. Transformation of Terrorism in the Post-Blue-Star Phase 
During the Post-Blur-Star phase Sikh terrorism had undergone a radical transformation. The 
following points highlight the transformation: with the death of Bhindranwale and his right 
hand men the terrorist groups lacked central leadership to guide and to control the groups, and 
to infuse a given ideological incentive among them; the centre of gravity of terrorist 
movement shifted from Amritsar to the whole of Punjab and its neighbouring states; the 
terrorists overtly raised the demand of Khalistan in 1986;133 “ideology soon began to fade as 
the terrorists recognised the gun to be a powerful tool in their pursuit for power;”134 different 
groups adopted their own strategy and means for their violent activities; terrorist groups 
mushroomed; one group aimed to overshadow other groups and there began internecine 
warfare; in many cases idle, unemployed, carefree and socially and politically victimised 
young people joined terrorist camps for their personal motives and gains; foreign powers, to 
manipulate the situation for their own purpose, sheltered, trained and supplied modern arms to 
the terrorists; and, more Sikhs were being killed than Hindus.  
The second phase of Sikh terrorism gained more notoriety than the first phase; during this 
period the people of Punjab began to get fade up of terrorism135 because of indiscriminate 
killing, torture, kidnapping and extortion.  Punjab, as described in a survey in July 1992, was 
“an area of darkness” where people were living in continuous fear of violence, and where the 
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state government found its ‘boundaries rolled back and its political will undermined into non-
existence’.”136 
Consequently, the Central government mobilised more than 250,000 paramilitary and army 
personnel and used various anti-terrorist tactics to defeat the terrorism in Punjab.  Sikh 
terrorism was finally crushed in 1993 at huge cost in terms of human lives and monetary 
expense. From 1984 to 1993 there occurred almost thirty thousand fatalities in Punjab due to 
terrorist violence, military operation and counterinsurgency measures and mechanisms of the 
Central government.137 
II.10. Sikh Religious Terrorism: An Assessment  
Inner conviction and passion were the essential dynamics in the act of Sikh religious 
terrorism. The spiritual inspiration or the inner conviction was supplied by the radical Sikh 
religious ideologies based on the Sikh religious symbols, historical experiences and socio-
political context. One of the most prominent religious ideologies was the cosmic battle 
between the evil and good – Sikh faith represented good and Hindus and the Indian state 
symbolized evil. The Sikhs had to fight a battle to safeguard their ethno-religious identity as 
per the command of Guru Hargobind, the innovator of miri-piri, and Guru Gobind, initiator of 
Khalsa Panth.138  Both miri-piri and Khalsa Panth denote that there is ongoing war between 
the truth and evil. 
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Moreover, the inner conviction that one was fighting a battle on behalf of justice and the 
holiness guaranteed religious justification for any act of extreme violence against the targeted 
enemies; at the same time, there was assurance of divine grace and power. Therefore, 
Bhindranwale stressed that Sikhs should not feel weak though their enemies (the Hindus) 
were many times more than their numbers – in the holy battle numbers do not matter, but 
what matters is who is on which side, on the side of the divine or on the side of the evil. To 
reassure the inner conviction of the militant Sikhs he emphasized that the tenth guru himself 
affirmed that one Sikh can fight 125,000 enemies. This inner conviction seems to have filled 
many young Sikhs with passion to do or die for the sake of their ethno-religious identity.  It 
was like a spiritual romance in which they obtained more pleasure through their violent 
activities against their, so-called, enemies. Moreover, the performance of violence against the 
enemies of Sikh faith, most probably, was re-enactment of sacrificial act performed by their 
tenth guru at Anandpur on the day the Khalsa Panth was initiated.  In the act of violence one 
had to offer oneself as sacrificial victim, as demanded by the tenth guru at Anandpur, for the 
sake of their guru, Sikh faith and Sikh nation. Meanwhile, the life and testimony of the Sikh 
martyrs, beginning from Guru Arjan Dev,139 could have added more inspiration to actively 
participate in the cosmic battle and die for the sake of their faith if necessary – death for them 
“was excitement, drama, a proof of their daring, their bravery, as true sons of the Khalsa.”140  
Meanwhile, the Indian military action against the holiest place of the Sikh might have further 
substantiated the religious concept that the enemies of the Sikhs were after the destruction of 
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the Sikh religion. Therefore, the scene of destruction and desecration of the Golden temple 
and the deaths of Bhindranwale and other Sikh extremists inside the temple complex (during 
the army action) inspired more young Sikhs with the  inner religious zeal to fight for the sake 
of their Vahiguru and their ethno-religious identity. “The violation of the Temple precincts 
and the death of their co-religionists,” writes R. H. Greenfied, “has inflamed even the most 
moderate” Sikhs.141 Many of those inflamed young Sikhs were spiritually motivated to join 
the Sikh terrorist groups to fight against the enemies of Sikhism. Furthermore, the military 
action against the Temple attested the religious concept of the cosmic battle and justification 
of violence of any form against the enemies that seek destruction of the good. Hence, the Sikh 
religious terrorism after Blue-star took horrifying form and crossed all human limitations in 
performance of acts of violence. At the same time, the involvement of other factors – like 
factionalism, ideological differences, personal interests and military counterinsurgency 
mechanisms – intensified the violent activities of Sikh religious terrorism during the post-
Blue-star period.  
II.11. Conclusion 
In this chapter I endeavoured to make it obvious that the apprehension of losing the distinct 
Khalsa ethno-religious identity – which is very closely related with historical, social and geo-
political factors – in the sea of resurgent Hinduism was the major concern that led to the rise 
of Sikh religious terrorism. Sikh religious identity fear factor had played a dynamic role in the 
innovation of modern Sikh (Khalsa) ethno-religious identity, which has become one of the 
key pillars of present Sikhism. However, this fear persisted in-spite of the religio-political 
victory of the Sikh community (in 1925) against the Mahants and their Hindu supporters and 
the British government. The partition of the Punjab, the horror of death and destruction and 
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partition of sacred places the Sikhs experienced reaffirmed the conception that their faith and 
community is at great risk. This view was further substantiated by: Nehruvian Congress’ and 
Punjabi Hindus’ opposition to their linguistic and political demands on religious ground; the 
development of unfavourable socio-political environment from the 1970s.  
This case study underlines the following contributions: Sikhism embodies important religious 
symbols that can be manipulated to justify religious violence of any form; in Sikhism sacred 
and secular and spiritual and experiential aspects are inseparably intertwined; both the Sikh 
ethno-religious (Khalsa Sikh) identity and the land (Punjab, which the birth place of Sikhism) 
are vital for the survival of Sikh faith and community; the Khalsa Panth is considered (by 
radical and conservative Sikhs) as the only true repository of original Sikh faith, this is why 
other sectarian Sikh groups are regarded as enemies of Sikhism; the idea of cosmic war or 
dharma yudh can be stage-managed for socio-political objectives; the Sikh social-religious 
outlook includes the Jat attitude of courage and confrontation; the Sikh martyrs play very 
important role in the life of the Sikh community; religious antagonism against the Hindus and 
the sectarian Sikh factions germinated before the Indian independence; all the past and present 
socio-political issues and concerns are given religious connotations due to the inseparable 
interrelation between the sacred and secular. These points clarify why religion is vital force in 
the birth of the Sikh religious terrorism.  
The following chapter will present a case study of Islamic religious terrorism in Kashmir. 
There are certain commonalities between Sikh religious terrorism and Kashmiri Islamic 
terrorism: firstly, they are the only known technically organized modern religious terrorist 
groups in India so far; secondly, they seem to battle against the same enemies – Hindu 
majority and allegedly Hindu biased Indian state; thirdly, both camps see no difference 
119 
 
between Hinduism and Indian state; fourthly, supposedly they get help from external forces 
(particularly Pakistani establishments) in their struggle against the Indian state; fifthly, both  
fight for their ethno-religious identity and their ancestral land and, at the same time, their 
main objectives are to liberate and to govern the lands with the given religious laws; sixthly, 
they (including the Hindu extremist groups) invoke the concept of dharma yudh/holy war or 
cosmic battle to justify religious terrorism; socio-political experiences, grievances and 




CHAPTER III  
ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS TERRORISM 
III.1. Introduction 
For more than two decades Islamic terrorism has been a serious socio-political challenge to 
the Indian sub-continent. In India Islamic terrorism began in Kashmir in the late 1980s. From 
the early 1990s this force gained impetus and started spreading its tentacles of terrorist 
activities beyond the borders of Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmiri terrorist groups have been 
known for – besides attacks on the Indian military and paramilitary personnel and 
installations – killing of innocent civilians, attacks on people belonging to other faiths (mainly 
Hindus), bombing, breeding religious hatred, and other destructive activities in different parts 
of India. Moreover, some of the terrorist groups seem to have established links with some 
other terrorist organizations, within and outside India.  
Although a great deal of research has been done by many social scientists (Sumit Ganguly, 
Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, Riyaz Punjabi, Balraj Puri, Mohammad Ishaz Khan, Chitralekha 
Zutshi, Ashutosh Varshney and host of others) on the Kashmiri terrorism it is necessary to do 
this study for further investigation of the important motivating factor/factors that prompted 
the rise of the problem in Kashmir. In this case study I will attempt to establish that, in 
contrast to the existing views, the primary motivating factors for the rise of the Islamic 
terrorism in Kashmir were a strong combination of socio-historical experiences, political 
problems and radical Islamic religious ideologies. Hence, it is imperative to assess how the 
socio-religious and political environment from the time of the Dogra period produced 
negative impact among the Muslim community in Kashmir and how this negative effect 
turned into religious hatred or antagonism. Moreover, in the post-independent India this 
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antagonism had been further aggravated by various factors, like political, religious and 
cultural grievances. 
This chapter is arranged in the following order. Firstly, to initiate the debate on the Islamic 
religious terrorism in India, I discuss in brief the beginning, aim and objective of Kashmiri 
militant movement. Secondly, explanations of different scholars on the origin of the militancy 
in Kashmir are examined and disputed. Thirdly, a short review of the socio-political condition 
of the Kashmiri people, during the Dogra period, is presented. The purpose of this review is 
to explain how and why a deep-seated antagonism developed among the Kashmiri Muslim 
community against the Hindu rulers and their Hindu counterparts from the time of Dogra rule 
and how that antagonism was further aggravated by the Indian state later on. Fourthly, I 
analyse the theological disputes that began in the late 19th century in the Kashmir valley and 
the Muslim uprising in 1931 and consider how Islamic religious ideologies could have played 
a significant role in the uprising. Fifthly, I briefly assess the political problem of Kashmir 
during the transitional period. Sixthly, a study is done on why there was no militancy in 
Kashmir before 1988, and how the socio-historical context, political issues and radical Islamic 
religious ideologies collectively played a fundamental role in motivating religious terrorism in 
Kashmir in the late 1980s. Then, very concisely Kashmiri terrorist groups, particularly 
Lashkar-e-Toiba and its ideology, are assessed. Finally, suggestion towards solution of the 
problem, outline of the contributions of the Chapter and conclusions are offered. 
III.2. Beginning, Aim and Objective of the Kashmiri Militant Movement 
Islamic Militant activities began in Kashmir in 1988 – the militant violence is termed as 
“ethnoreligious and secessionist violence”1 by some scholars like Sumit Ganguli. In July, 
                                                 
1 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson 
Centre Press and Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1. 
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1988, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a pro-independence and the oldest 
Kashmiri militant group, launched an armed struggle against the Indian rule over Jammu and 
Kashmir.2 The main objective of the JKLF was to achieve independence and union of both 
sides of Kashmir – Pakistan occupied Kashmir (known as “Azad” or “Free” Kashmir) and 
Indian Kashmir. This aim of the JKLF neither was acceptable to India or nor to Pakistan; 
therefore, lack of Pakistani training and support, on the one hand, and the heavy military 
repressive measures of the Indian state, on the other hand, marginalized this group within a 
couple of years. In the next few years the group was split several times, and the largest 
surviving faction of the JKLF declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1994.3  
From the last part of 1989 the armed movement was taken over by other well trained, better 
armed and hardened Islamic militant groups, like the Hijb-ul Mujahideen (HuM – Party of 
Holy Warriors), who were provided training, arms and support by the Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) Agency of Pakistan.4 The aspiration of these Islamic militant groups is to 
seek the union of both parts of Kashmir and merge (the united Kashmir) with Pakistan.5  The 
objective of these Kashmiri militants is religio-political one; nevertheless, in Islam religion 
and politics are so interlinked that they are “like two sides of a same coin”6 – Prophet 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Alexander Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad as It Gets,” in Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. II, No. 1 
(Spring 2000), 69. 
 
3 Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency,” 69. 
 
4 Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, “India and the Crisis in Kashmir,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No.5 (May 
1994), 405; Atul Kohli, “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-
Determination Movements in India,” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2 (May, 1997), 341. 
 
5 Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “ Kashmir’s Secessionist Movement Resurfaces: Ethnic Identity, Community 
Competition, and the State,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 6 (2009), 935. 
 
6 G.H.Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1979), 17. In Islam a defining feature, according to 
Mervyn K. Lewis, “is that Islam commands authority over the totality of a Muslim’s being, not accepting any 
distinction between the sacred and the secular [...] In Islam, the realms of God and Caesar are not separate 
jurisdictions. Two aspects in particular shape the nature of Islamic corporate governance. One is that Islamic 
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Muhammad and his first four successors (the first four Khalifas, who are being honoured as 
the righteous Khalifas by all Sunni Muslims) did not differentiate sacred (spiritual) and 
secular (temporal) aspects; they were both spiritual and political heads/leaders.7 Thus, to 
achieve their goal the Kashmiri militants began to carry out whatever violent attacks they 
could plan against their supposed enemy targets.  Owing to the violent activities of the Islamic 
militants there was a mass exodus of more than two hundred thousand Kashmiri Hindus 
(generally known as Pandits)8 – who had been coexisting with their Muslim brethren in 
Kashmir for several centuries – to Jammu and other parts of Northern India in 1989,9 and 
more than ten thousand (according to some conservative estimates at least forty thousand) 
lives were lost10 within the first decade of the militant violence. Furthermore, their violent 
activities were not constrained within the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. They have been, 
directly or indirectly, involved in several deadly bomb blasts that killed and injured hundreds 
of people in Mumbai, Delhi, Hyderabad and other places in India. Such violent activities 
make it evident that the intention of these militants is to cause and spread terror all over India 
with the aim of achieving the given religio-political goal.  
                                                                                                                                                        
law, the Shari’ah claims sovereignty over all aspects of life, ethical and social, and to encompass criminal as 
well as civil jurisdiction. The literal meaning of the Arabic word Shari’ah ‘the way to the source of life’ and, in 
technical sense, it is now used to refer to a legal system in keeping with the code of behavkiour called for by the 
Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah (the authentic tradition [the tradition of the Prophet]). Every act of believers must 
conform with Islamic law and observe ethical standards derived from Islamic principles. These ethical principles 
define what is true, fair and just, the nature of corporate responibities, the priorities to society, along with some 
specific governance standards.” Mervyn K. Lewis, “Islamic Corporate Governance,” in Review of Islamic 
Economics, vol. 9, no. 1 (2005), 14-15. 
 
7In the view of Sayyid Qutb, “Muhammad dictated a strict new law code, which put religion once more at ease in 
physical world, except a better way than ever before. Muhammad’s prophecies, in the Koran, instructed man to 
be God’s ‘vice regent’ on earth – to take charge of the physical world and not simply to see it as something alien 
to spirituality.” Paul Berman, “The Philosopher of Islamic Terror,” in The New York Times (23 March, 2003), 
IV. 
 
8 Sumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay,” in 
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn 1996), 76. 
 
9 Tremblay, “Kashmir’s Secessionist Movement Resurfaces,” 926. 
 
10 Kohli, “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism?,” 338. 
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III.3. What Prompted the Rise of the Kashmiri Militancy in the late 1980s? 
The existing arguments on the rise of the Kashmiri militant movement can be divided into 
two categories: 1) the explanations of the apologists for the Indian and the Pakistani 
governments; 2) the observations of the social scientists. Apologists for the Indian 
government argue that the problem was created by Pakistan with its subversive plan to 
destabilise Indian Kashmir. They claim that Pakistan has been involved in inculcating Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Kashmir valley from late 1970s. These apologists hold that once 
Pakistani masterminds cease to provide training, arms and help, and “call off their terrorist 
underlings” violence in Jammu and Kashmir will end and a “peaceful settlement be 
achieved.”11 This argument comfortably dumps the major responsibility for the misfortunes of 
the Kashmiri people at the doorstep of Pakistan, and vindicates Indian leaders of political 
negligence and mismanagement for the violence and military brutality in the state.12 
Therefore, this explanation sounds incomplete and one-sided because it tends to forget the 
grievances of the Kashmiri people against the Indian state and the role of Indian state in the 
aggravation of the crisis in Kashmir. Whereas the Pakistan government has defensively 
argued that the Kashmir problem is the outcome of “historical betrayals, constitutional 
despotism, negation of socio-cultural identity, religious discrimination, economic deprivation 
and state repression, besides 43 years of misrule and manipulation by Delhi.”13 But, in this 
argument there is no mention of the involvement of Pakistan’s ISI in providing training, arms 
                                                 
11 Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Original Conflict and Its Resolution 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1994), 115; this is the argument of Afsir Karim, Counter Terrorism: The Pakistan 
Factor (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991). 
 
12 Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 115. 
 
13 Shaheen Akhtar, Uprising in Indian-Held Jammu and Kashmir (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 




and support to the militant groups, like HuM and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT);14 therefore, this 
explanation rather gives the impression that the argument is put forward to justify the 
Pakistani involvement in supporting the Kashmiri militancy. 
Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, Riyaz Punjabi, Balraj Puri, Mohammad Ishaz Khan, Chitralekha 
Zutshi, Ashutosh Varshney, Stephen Cohen, Neil Aggarwal, Imtiaz Bokhari, Perry Thornton, 
Patricia Ellis, Zafar Khan, Deepak Lal, Mohammed Ayoob and Sumit Ganguly attempt to 
locate the origin of the Kashmiri militancy in the conflict of compelling nationalist ideologies, 
widespread electoral malpractices, collapse of the fused Kashmiri identity (Kashmiriyat), or 
the rise of disappointed middle class.15  
III.3.1. Disintegration of the Traditional Bond of Kashmiriyat 
Kashmiriyat (Kashmiriness or the state of being a Kashmiri) generally denotes Kashmiri 
identity that cuts across religious division. Therefore, this concept has been described by 
various intellectuals as synthetic and syncretic (also symbiotic) Kashmiri identity.  The key 
elements that define Kashmiriyat are the love for Kashmir (the motherland) and common 
language (Koshur).  In the view of Balraj Puri, Mohammad Ishaq Khan, Zutshi and Riyaz 
Punjabi the concept of Kashmiriyat symbolizes a common Kashmiri culture that does not 
have religious connotation. This concept, opines Khan, “has evolved out of the yearning of 
the Kashmiri, both Hindus and Muslims, to situate their motherland (Mouj Kashir) in 
something unique;” however, “something unique is not merely reminiscent of their 
preoccupation with self-definition but also with certain historical contradictions.”16  
                                                 
14 See Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad as It Gets,” 70 & 71. 
 
15 Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency,” 78.  
 
16 Mohammad Ishaq Khan, “The Rishi Tradition and the Construction Kashmiriyat,” in Lived Islam in South 
Asia: Adaptation, Accommodation and Conflict, edited by Imtiaz Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld (New Delhi: Social 
Science Press, 2004), 63. 
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Kashmiriyat, for Puri, had been the most dominating, homogeneous and crucial part of the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. He says, “the Kashmiris have always perceived their identity as 
distinct and separate” from other regions of India; therefore, this exclusively Kashmiri 
identity encompassed all sections (Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists) of the Kashmiri society.17 
According to Riyaz Punjabi the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir embody very unique 
socio-cultural characteristics; and both Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus represent customs and 
traditions which are distinct from their counterparts elsewhere in the subcontinent. 
Kashmiriyat flourished in the pre-partition period therefore there was ethnic harmony among 
the different ethnic communities in Kashmir. During the time of partition there was no 
communal tension in the Kashmir Valley; instead 
The Valley provided asylum to many a Hindu sufferer from the neighbouring areas of 
the valley which were scene of communal riots. There was no communal riot at the 
time of the partition in any part of the valley. This is perhaps why Gandhiji saw a ‘ray 
of hope’ in Kashmir.18 
Therefore, the Kashmir crisis, in his opinion, is caused by the disintegration of this Kashmiri 
cultural identity, which was the fusion of diverse Kashmiri cultures.19 The central 
government’s policy of promoting and supporting the unpopular regime in Kashmir, he 
asserts, gradually alienated the Muslim population and the traditional bond in the common 
vision of Kashmiriyat fell apart and gave birth to the problem.  
Although the so-called Kashmiriyat, the concept of integrated Kashmiri identify, sounds 
fascinating the ground reality, however, was that the Kashmiri society was deeply divided on 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
17 Balraj Puri, “Kashmiriyat: The Vitality of Kashmiri Identity,” in Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 4, No. 1 
(1995), 55. 
 
18 Riyaz Punjabi, “Communal Politics in Jammu and Kashmir State,” in Contemporary South Asia (1995), 159. 
 




the religious and the sectarian line from the time of the Dogra period20 – this point will be 
discussed further later on. Furthermore, the concept of Kashmiriyat was developed by Zain-
ul-Abdeen, a Muslim ruler of fourteenth century, to serve his political or administrative 
purpose. However, the Dogra kings, who hailed from Jammu region, identified themselves 
with Hindu community and favoured Hindus and Sikhs in both religious and political areas 
against the Muslims. According to Zutshi, the Dogra regime was responsible for bestowing 
distinct political identity upon the Muslim community of Kashmir.21 The idea of integrated 
Kashmiri identity was further shattered by the Muslim uprising against the Dogra Hindu 
rulers (which will be assessed in later sections) in early 1930s. For Kashmiri Muslims the 
Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) represented their oppressors or enemies rather than their Kashmiri 
brethren,22 and this impression continued after the Indian independence. Hence, the 
disintegration of the fused Kashmiri identity could not be practically reasonable for the rise of 
the crisis in Kashmir. 
III.3.2. Assertions of Religious, Ethnic and Secular Nationalism 
Ashutosh Varshney contends that the competing assertions of three types of nationalism – 
religious, ethnic and secular – gave rise to the militancy in Kashmir.23 These three types of 
nationalism, he contends, were compromised, particularly in Kashmir, for the purpose of 
nation-building and political convenience; therefore, the Kashmir problem is the product of 
                                                 
20 See Chitralekha Zutshi, Language of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2004), 148. 
 
21  Zutshi, Language of Belonging, 139 
 
22 Zutshi, Language of Belonging, 233. 
 
23 Ashutosh Varshney, “Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir has been a Problem,” in Perspectives 





the clash of national visions that was compromised.24 Mainly four parties and two factors, in 
the view of Varshney, have been involved in this regard. Four parties are:  Pakistan, Indian 
state, Hindu nationalism and Kashmiri Muslim ethno-religious nationalism. From the 
beginning of its birth Pakistan has represented Islamic nationalism, and has claimed that it has 
unqualified right over Kashmir because, the State is dominated by Muslim majority; 
therefore, it has been employing both obvert and covert tactics to win over the Kashmiris and 
merge the Indian Kashmir into Pakistan. Indian state symbolizes secular nationalism, but it 
has not been able to restrain the aggressive outlook of the Hindu religious nationalism that 
seems “to demonstrate the most virulent form of nationalism” and prefers “to recall Babar and 
Aurangazed, the intolerant Moghul rulers, rather than Akbar, the tolerant one.”25 In the 
meantime, the Indian political leaders mismanaged Indian secularism and used religion for 
their political goal. Meanwhile, the Kashmiri ethno-religious nationalism has aspired for the 
separation of Kashmir from Indian Union on the ground that it is an object of “terrible 
nationalist repression” on the basis of religion. The two factors are: availability of deadly 
weapons in plenty in many parts of the world; and the modern information technology such as 
videos and televisions. The first aspect made the “ethnicity –  and the response to it – more 
brutal in unprecedented ways,” and the second one imparted “a new emotional intensity that is 
not the same as reading or hearing about one’s own community on an insurgency path or in 
watching security forces roll it back.”26 Militants make use of the information technology to 
serve their purpose, i.e., to spread their propaganda. Thus, on account of these (the above-
                                                 
24 See Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir, 19. 
 
25 Ashutosh Varshney, “India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism, “ in Asian Survey, Vol. 31, 
No. 11 (Nov., 1991), 998. 
 




given parties and factors), he maintains, the Kashmir problem, which dates back to partition 
period, has taken violent form and has consumed the lives of many people. 
If the Kashmir problem, as admitted by Varshney, has began from the time of the partition, 
then why did it took so long for it to take present violent form? Even though the modern 
information technology was not available then, weapons could be supplied by foreign forces 
(as in the case of Naga and other militant groups in Northeast India) if Kashmiri people were 
ready for an armed rebellion against the Indian state and Hindu society; but it did not happen. 
Varshney’s explanation does not give a definite answer to this query. Moreover, this argument 
seems to be mainly based on the external, like interference of the Cold War politics, and the 
internal Indian politics during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The main weakness in this 
argument is that Varshney fails to link the problem to its historical background, on the one 
hand, and the communal dispute that began in Kashmir in 1930s (this will be discussed later 
on), on  the other. 
III.3.3. Breakdown of the Original Relationship between the Centre and the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir  
Reeta Tremblay, in her article “Kashmir’s Secessionist Movement Resurfaces,” acknowledges 
the involvement of entirely internal dynamics in the rise of the militancy; at the same time, 
she admits that Pakistani and the Islamic Jihadi (holy war) elements have, to some extent, 
played a role in the organization and continuation of the militant movement.27 According to 
Tremblay, the following issues were accountable for the origin of the militancy: breakdown of 
the originally invented relationship (ref. Appendix 4 for explanation on “breakdown of the 
originally invented relationship”) between the Centre and the state of Jammu and Kashmir; 
                                                 




corrosion of the state’s autonomy granted by the Article 370 of the Indian Constitution as a 
result of the adoption of constitutional measures from 1953, the year in which Mohammad 
Abdullah (also known as Sheikh Abdullah) was deposed from his position as Prime Minister 
of Jammu and Kashmir, till 1975,  for the rapid consolidation of the state within the Indian 
union; lack of economic development of Kashmir; and finally, the rigging of 1987 election 
depriving election victory to the Muslim United Front candidates.28  
Tremblay seems to mostly rely on the political and economic factors that developed after 
1953, to explain the cause of the problem.  No doubt the political developments contributed 
towards the eruption of the problem but, they were, to use D.N. Danagara’s words, the 
symptoms only, not the disease29 – in reality the disease began to develop before the Indian 
independence. The problem began like a volcanic formation deep below the surface from a 
certain point of time in the past and erupted in the late 1980s. The above argument fails to 
investigate, for the explanation of the problem, the socio-historical context of the Kashmiri 
Muslim community during the Dogra rule. Further, the argument does not examine the 
possibility of the role of Islamic religious ideologies, which justify violence on the basis of 
socio-historical and political experiences of the Muslim community of Kashmir, for the rise of 
the Islamic terrorism in Kashmir; therefore, this argument fails to explain the main cause of 
the problem adequately. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “Review: Kashmir Conflict: Secessionist Movement, Mobilization and Political 
Institutions,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, (Winter, 2001-2002), 575. Tremblay, “Kashmir’s Secessionist 
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III.3.4. Re-eruption of the Problem left Unsolved in 1947 
Cohen, Aggarwal, Bokhari, Thornton, Ellis and Khan are of the opinion that the Kashmir 
extremism took birth due to the problem that has been left unresolved from the time of 
partition. Some of the above mentioned thinkers blame the Colonial power for throwing 
Kashmir into the present imbroglio. According to Stephen Cohen, “Kashmir originally came 
into dispute because of a British failure of will when they divided and quit India in 1947.”30 
For Cohen the method with which the fate of the princely states was sorted out was not 
competent enough. Thence, the political leaders of both India and Pakistan “compounded the 
original problem when they turned Kashmir into a badge of their respective national 
identities.”31 So, from this time Kashmir became the bone of contention between the two 
countries. Neil Aggarwal too contends that the Kashmir problem is the outcome of the 
unfinished business of partition.32 The partition, point out Imtiaz Bokhari and Perry Thornton, 
laid the groundwork for the today’s unresolved problem of Kashmir.33 The Hindu ruler of 
Jammu and Kashmir “joined his state to India in a clear violation of the intent, if not the letter, 
of partition;” and from that time, in their observation, Kashmir became the apple of discord 
between India and Pakistan. Patricia Ellis and Zafar Khan argue that the rise of the Kashmiri 
militancy is the re-eruption, in a more powerful form, of the problem left unsolved in 1947; 
because, according to them, many of the Kashmir’s population had never accepted the 
                                                 
30 Stephen P. Cohen, “Kashmir: The Roads Ahead,” in South Asia Approaches the Millennium: Reexamining 
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31 Cohen, “Kashmir: The Roads Ahead,” 129. 
 
32 See Neil Aggarwal, “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier,” in Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial 
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2008), 222-235. 
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partition of Kashmir between India and Pakistan.34 This unsolved problem, in their 
understanding, triggered off the eruption of the Kashmir crisis in the late 1980s. 
The partition and the unsettled problem of Kashmir since 1947 has been one of the major 
concerns of the people of Kashmir. The Kashmiris have been struggling for, what they 
consider, their birth right from the time the land came within the Indian Union; however, their 
struggle did not take violent form till the late 1980s. This argument does not make it clear 
why it took almost half a century for the re-eruption of the problem if many of the Kashmiri 
people had never accepted the partition of Kashmir. At the same time, the people had an 
ample opportunity to rise against the Indian state in the 1960s and in the early 1970s, because 
during this period Pakistan and India fought two wars – one over Kashmir and the other over 
Bangladesh. The Kashmiris could have sided with or supported Pakistan during the wars, but 
they did not do so. One cannot deny that partition is one of the major international and 
internal political concerns of India, Pakistan and Kashmiri people of both sides of Kashmir; 
however, this political issue alone does not satisfactorily explain the cause in the rise of the 
Kashmiri militancy in the 1980s. 
III.3.5. Hindu Organisations, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi were Accountable for the 
Crisis 
Two factors are involved in this argument: political and communal factors. Mrs. Gandhi and 
Rajiv Gandhi are blamed for political failure in Kashmir due to their party politics. In the 
view of Punjabi, the state of Jammu and Kashmir represented a strong tradition of secularism. 
This strong tradition began to drift away from its past due to “the political phenomenon and 
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power-game.”35 This political power-game, he thinks, to a large extent contributed towards 
polarization of the population of the state in communal line and strengthened the communal 
forces in the state. “The politics of Kashmir in the 1980s,” says Deepak Lal, “is one of rigged 
elections, with the Congress Party attempting to gain control over the state.”36 The Congress 
under the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi was blamed for engineering split in the National 
Conference Party of Farooq Abdullah and dismissal of him from the post of chief ministers in 
1984. According to one Indian bureaucrat, with long years of service in Jammu and Kashmir, 
the “critical event” in triggering off the armed insurgency took place in July 1984 when the 
popular chief minister of the state, Farooq Abdullah, was deposed from his post with “the 
behind-the-scenes assistance of New Delhi.”37 From that time, he contends, psychological 
alienation of Kashmiri people from the Indian state started, before that incidence many 
Kashmiris thought that the Kashmir problem was over.  Meanwhile, Hindu communal forces 
have been indicted by Kashmiri Muslims as well as other intellectuals for inciting Hindu 
communalism in Jammu region, where Hindu population has two third majorities. 
Mohammed Ayoob in the article, “Dateline India: The Deepening Crisis,” holds accountable 
the Hindu religious and political organizations (the BJP, the RSS, the Shiv Sena, and the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and Indira and Rajiv Gandhi for the birth of the militancy in 
Kashmir.38 According to Ayoob, both Indira and Rajiv, for their temporary electoral gain, 
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“condoned Hindu communalism by pandering to chauvinistic instincts within the religious 
majority.”39  
This argument focuses on the detrimental political development that began to take place from 
the late 1970s. It is true that the atmosphere of the Indian politics began to deteriorate owing 
to the waning popularity of Indira and her Congress party and the active involvement of the 
Hindu communal politics. Such political atmosphere, without doubt, helped to further 
antagonise the minorities – like Sikhs and Muslims – and pushed them to the point of the 
explosion in 1980s. But the root of the Kashmiri problem began, as hinted in the earlier 
sections and will be dealt with in the later sections, long before the birth of the Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad, the BJP, the Shiv Sena and the entry of Gandhis in the Indian politics.  
III.3.6. Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay  
Moreover, Sumit Ganguly attempts to offer more satisfactory explanation of the reasons for 
both the origin and the timing of the militant movement in Kashmir. He has challenged the 
other arguments by proposing a new explanation to the problem. Thus, political mobilization 
and institutional decay, he maintains, best explains the origin and timing of the militancy in 
Kashmir. Political mobilization, according to him, had taken place very rapidly all over India 
and in Kashmir in particular, as a result of the national policies and projects. In the meantime, 
successive central governments had done little to strengthen the institutional politics in 
Jammu and Kashmir.40 
Political mobilization, as defined by Ganguly, is a type of political awakening with the 
passion for political participation, and this awakening is created by “increased literacy, media 
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exposure, and economic development.”41 He confirms that: there was speedy growth in 
literacy rates in the Kashmir valley during 1960s and 1970s due to the increasing number of 
educational institutions in the area. According to him, during the period starting from 1971 to 
1981 the growth of literacy rate in Jammu and Kashmir was more than forty three percent, 
which was the third fastest growth rate in India. Along with the expansion of formal education 
there was rapid growth of madrassas (Islamic educational institutions) in Kashmir – from 
1983 there was further boost in the growth of Madrassas in the Kashmir valley due to the 
inflow of Pakistani money and migration of Bangladeshi Mullahs (religious leaders) from 
Assam due to the violence against Bangladeshi population in Assam.42 At the same time, the 
Kashmiri people were exposed to the mass media due to the rapid expansion of the 
technology in Jammu and Kashmir. Hence, Ganguly observes that with the speedy growth of 
literacy rate and exposure to mass media the Kashmiri people of 1980s were far more 
conscious of their “political rights and privileges,” 43 and were highly politically mobilized 
people. Therefore, the Kashmiris, being regularly “denied their voting rights in deeply flawed 
elections,” were filled with bitterness against the malpractices of the Indian state and this 
bitterness had turned into violence.44 
Ganguly’s argument better explains the timing of the militancy instead of the cause of the 
problem. According to Ganguly’s observation there was chaotic imbalance between the socio-
economic-educational development and the development of institutional politics in Jammu 
and Kashmir. This chaotic imbalance plus electoral malpractices, according to him, explicate 
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main reason of the rise of the militancy in the 1980s. But, Ganguly does not attempt to 
explain sufficiently the role and influence of the religious leaders (Mullahs – who could have 
been instrumental in radicalisation of many young Muslims in Kashmir and other parts of 
India) and religious institutions (Madrassas – where Muslim children and young people are 
being radicalised45) in the life of the Muslim community in Jammu and Kashmir. Further, this 
argument does not take into consideration the socio-historical background of the pre-1947 
Kashmiri people in relation to the present development. Hence, this argument too is deficient 
in providing the satisfactory explanation to the cause of the problem. 
All the above-arguments are partial explanations of the cause of the Kashmir problem. The 
above-discussed issues, without doubt, had contributed considerable amount of force in the 
eruption of the militancy, but none of them give satisfactory answers to the following 
questions. Why did Kashmiri militants target Kashmiri Hindus (who were a small minority)? 
Why did the Indian state (in-spite of its constant effort towards economic and educational 
developments of Kashmir during 1960s and 1970s) fail to gain the confidence/trust of the 
Kashmiri people (Muslims)? Why did hardcore Islamic terrorists begin to grow (in number 
and capability to strike intended targets anywhere in India) despite Kashmir being heavily 
militarized by the Indian state? Apparently without a strong support of the Kashmiri Muslim 
community (may be a section of the community) foreign terrorists or mercenaries would not 
be able to survive for long in the battle against almost half a million strong Indian military 
force stationed in Kashmir from the time Islamic militancy took birth in the state.  
Meanwhile, in the mobilization of the Islamic religious constituency with the objective of 
achieving a religio-political goal, the motivating aspect should have the dynamism to inspire 
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both spiritual and physical spheres of the members of the religious community/group. In this 
regard only radical Islamic religious concepts, like “jihad” (holy war) against the enemies of 
Islam, could play such powerful role. “Jihad” (“literally, jihad means to strive”), as found in 
the Quran, may not always mean fighting. Jihad, in the view of al-Bukhari (one of the greatest 
Islamic theologians) means Istidsha (martyrdom) rather than murder or killing. “According to 
Muslim theology,” said al-Bukhari, “the highest act of love that a person could offer to Allah 
is his or her own martyrdom.”46 However,  
All Muslims agree that the Quran allows Muslims to fight in two main circumstances: 
self-defence and to maintain their right to worship. Yet each Muslim can decide when 
self-defence is needed or when the worship of Allah is jeopardized. Again personal 
interpretation is far more relevant in understanding jihad than the literal text.47 
Therefore, from the early period of Islam the concept has been associated with warfare and 
conquest48 against the enemies of Islam. Thus, the concept of Jihad seems to have played a 
very significant role in motivating Kashmiri Muslims for religious violence/terrorism against 
their perceived enemies. Moreover, from the time of Dogra period the Kashmiri Muslim 
society had been struggling against two different forces (enemies) – the Hindu rulers and their 
Hindu supporters, on the one hand, and different sectarian (particularly the Kashmiri Sufi 
order) religious teachings that, according to orthodox Muslims, dilute Islam, on the other 
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hand. Therefore, I suggest the combination of socio-historical context, political issues and 
radical Islamic religious ideologies played the fundamental role in the birth of militancy in 
Kashmir. The mobilization of the religious constituency by exploiting certain Islamic 
religious texts and symbols justifying acts of violence against so-called enemies on the basis 
of socio-historical experiences, religious conviction and political grievances could explain 
both the origin and the timing of the outbreak of the Kashmir problem more adequately. To 
comprehend the socio-religio-historical context of the Kashmiri Muslim community it is 
necessary to briefly review the socio-political environment of Kashmir during the period of 
Dogra rule.   
III.4. Pre-1947 Jammu and Kashmir: Socio-Political Context during the Period of Dogra 
Rule 
Kashmir has been known for its rich natural beauty and splendour that enchanted people from 
far and wide. Several writers call it “the fabled”49 land or the paradise on earth. As its scenic 
beauty enthralled many foreigners so also the land fascinated many foreign rulers to make it 
their dominion. The Kashmir valley, known as the Vale of Kashmir, went under the Muslim 
rule in the fourteenth century; then, in 1752 Akbar, the Mogul Emperor of India, made it a 
part of his kingdom, and from this time the Kashmir valley became the summer residence of 
the successive Mogul rulers. With the decline of Mogul reign the control of the land passed 
on to the Afghans and then to Sikh maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819. After the death of Ranjit 
Singh, Gulab Singh, who was Dogra Hindu Rajput and Rajah of Jammu, bought the land 
from the British.50 According to the Treaty of Amritsar, writes Rekha Chowdhary, “the state 
was sold to Maharajah Gulab Singh by the British for seventy-five lakhs [seven and half 
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million] of rupees and Maharaja became the supreme sovereign of the state.”51 Thus, the 
Dogra rulers were responsible for the creation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir as a single 
political entity in 1846. The Dogra kings ruled Kashmir for a century before it was accessed 
to India. 
Hence, it is indispensable to have a bird’s eye view of the socio-political context of the people 
of Jammu and Kashmir during the time of the Dogra rule in explaining the rise of the Islamic 
terrorism in Kashmir in late 1980s; because, the mobilization of Muslim constituency  with 
the slogan “Islam in danger” began in Kashmir in the early 1930s.  In 1931 a Muslim 
uprising, the first of its kind during whole period of the Dogra rule, took place in the Kashmir 
valley and this unrest was mainly inspired by religious factors. The incident made two things 
obvious: first, the communal cleavage between Hindus and Muslims began to emerge in 
Jammu and Kashmir; and second, consciousness of community identity and aspiration for 
socio-religious freedom were fully developed among the Muslims of the Kashmir valley. 
Moreover, after more than eight decades of its oppressive rule against the dominant Muslim 
majority in Kashmir the authority of the Dogra regime was seriously challenged by this 
rebellion. So, the root of the present Kashmir problem can be traced back to this historical 
antecedent – according to Mridu Rai, Kashmir’s problems began from the time of the Dogra 
regime owing to the regime’s anti-Muslim – religious, economic and political - policies.52  
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III.4.1. Religio-Political Economy of Dogra Regime 
The Dogra rulers had been oppressive from the outset of their reign over the Muslim subjects 
of Jammu and Kashmir. According to Alastair Lamb, the Dogra rule was corrupt and 
discriminatory because it favoured Hindus and Sikhs.53 Probably due to the unusually 
submissive nature of the Muslim peasantry (in the view of Tyndale Biscoe “a people whose 
‘manhood’ had been crushed by exploitation,”54) the Dogra rulers could rule over them for 
almost a century without any threat to their oppressive administration. The Dogra kings 
regarded the Kashmiri Muslim peasants as their slaves, and did not grant them “equal 
opportunities in trade, industry, education, jobs, agriculture and above all for their upliftment 
as a community culture.”55 Therefore, the Muslim peasants under the regime had no identity, 
except as a race of slaves. In the early twentieth century, as narrated by Biscoe, Muslim 
peasants in Kashmir Valley lived in virtual enslavement with no conception of rights.56 They 
did not have the freedom to practice their religion as the Hindus and the Sikhs did, because 
the legal system of the regime was Hindu and Sikh biased. “Muslims,” writes Bose, “were 
generally not permitted to become officers in the state’s military, which was led by Sikhs and 
Hindu ‘martial’ castes such as Dogras and Rajputs, and were virtually unrepresented in the 
state’s civil administration.”57 The Dogra rulers were communal, casteist and racist, therefore, 
the Kashmiri Muslims had to bear triple burden of suffering. It was communal because it was 
Hindu biased and provided opportunity to the Hindus, from outside the Kashmir Valley, to set 
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up business, trade and industry.58 The racial character of the rulers was made obvious by their 
practice of favouring Dogras (their own people) as superior to all other as in the case of 
British colonial power under the auspices of whom the regime worked. One of the laws 
established by the regime was that any other person, except a Dogra, could be hanged. 
Moreover, the Muslims were regarded as outcastes or untouchables and slaves. The 
communal, racist and casteist structure and policy of the Dogra rule disadvantaged the 
Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir economically, educationally and socially. They might have 
accepted their economic and socio-political condition as their karma – Hindus believe that the 
low-birth is the fruit of past evil actions. Though the caste system and law of karma was un-
Islmaic the majority of Kashmiri Muslims, being converted from Hinduism, were yet to be 
free from certain Hindu beliefs and practices. This might be the reason why Maqbool Shah, in 
his poem, wrote:  
They [the peasants] regard the mosque and temple as equal, 
Seeing no difference between muddy puddles and the ocean. 
They know not the sacred, honourable or the respectable,  
They are unaware of the sharia, the millat, or Islam. 59 
This poem depicts the pathetic condition of Islam in Kashmir during the period of Dogra rule. 
There is a clear indication of infiltration of some Hindu religious elements into Kashmiri 
Muslims’ belief and practice system. Hence, the Dogra regime not only oppressed the 
Muslim subjects of Jammu and Kashmir, but also suppressed and corrupted their Muslim faith 
and practice by imposing the legal system that disadvantaged the Muslim population of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Under the Kashmiri law, cow-slaughter was strictly prohibited and 
anybody who was found guilty of cow-slaughter would be imprisoned for up to ten years, 
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whereas goat-slaughter was allowed only on specific days of the year.60 Conversion from one 
religion to another was not legally prohibited, but the person who changed his/her religion 
would forfeit one’s ancestral property – on the whole this law punished Muslims, because 
Hindus did not practice proselytization.61 In addition, the regime’s other activities, like use of 
some mosques and religious buildings for official purposes, further confirmed that the Dogra 
rulers disregarded the religious symbols of the Muslim subjects. In such socio-political 
environment what else, except Islamic religious ideologies, could provide courage and 
inspiration to the downtrodden Muslim people of Kashmir to resist this powerful oppressive 
regime? 
III.4.2. Theological Discourse during the Dogra Period 
Islam did not enter into Kashmir as a conquering power as was the case with most of other 
regions of South Asia; instead, Islam was brought in by Sufi saints in the fourteenth century.62 
The mass movement of Kashmiri people to Islam was not a forced one. Islamic and historical 
conditions, in view of M. I. Khan, “suggest a peaceful conversion in contrast to the previous 
scholarly focus on Brahman resistance to Islam.”63 Therefore, the vast majority of the 
Kashmiri Muslims venerate Sufi saints and their shrines. Nevertheless, the Kashmiri Muslims 
were divided into: Sayyids, who claimed themselves as the direct descendents of the Prophet; 
Moguls, originally migrated from central Asia; Sheikhs, descendents of local Hindu converts 
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to Islam; and Pathans, the descendents of the Afghans.64 Besides, they belonged to different 
Islamic sects – Sunni, Shia and Ahmadiyya sects – Sunni Muslims were the dominant 
majority. Hence, the Muslim community of Jammu and Kashmir was not a homogeneous one; 
at the same time, veneration of saints and their shrines was very important part of Kashmiri 
Islam. According to Ishaq Khan: 
Kshmiri Mislims’ devotion to the shrines of the Sufis and the Risis is deep-rooted in 
the local context rather than Islam alone. It is not just the famous shrine of Hazaratbal 
or that of the most prominent Sufis like Mir Sayyid ‘Ali Hamadani, Shaikh Nuru’d-
Din Rishi, Sahikh Hmza Makhdum, etc. That attract a multitude of Muslim devotees 
on the eve of urs but also innumerable shrines of the known or unknown Sufis that 
form objects of their veneration.65 
Later on this religious practice of the Kashmiri Muslims was sternly denounced as un-Islamic 
practice by those Muslim leaders who came under the influence of radical Islamic religious 
ideologies propagated by puritanical theologians, like Yahya Shah and his followers. Yahya 
Shah and his followers called the managers of the Sufi shrines, their Khadims (administrators) 
and their followers, mushriks (polytheists or idolaters – the ones who assign partners to 
Allah), therefore they were against the unity of God (tawhid),66 one of the two central dogmas 
of Islam. The two central dogmas of Islam are God’s Unity and Mohammad’s prophetic 
mission. These fundamental principles of faith are put together as, “There is no god but God; 
Muhammad is the Apostle of God.”67 
Consequently, from the late nineteenth century competing Muslim religious leaders began to 
assert their authority over the same city shrines with the focus of influencing the people to 
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accept their theological ideologies. Such competing claims gave rise to intra-community 
conflict and infused a consciousness of community identity among Muslims of the Kashmir 
valley. The dispute was mainly on the definition of Kashmiri Islam; therefore, it was 
theological issue which included all Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir and their belief and 
practices. One group of Muslim leaders were favouring and defending the saint or shrine 
worship and the role of pirs (Sufi saints) in the life of the Kashmiris. The other group 
denounced the practice of saint worship as an un-Islamic and sacrilegious act, and they called 
their opponents sacrilegious saint-worshippers (mushriks) and defilers of Islam; in other 
words, this group called the Kashmiri Muslims back to the Quran and the teachings of 
Muhammad. The first group accused the second group for attacking the traditional religion of 
Kashmiri Muslims through preaching Wahhabi doctrine that was imported from Hindustan 
(India). Wahhabism was first propounded by Muhammad ibn Abd-ul-Wahhab (1703-1791) in 
Arabian Peninsula. According to Wahhab, Islam was corrupted and made weak by later 
dilutions and addition; therefore, he asked all Muslims to return to original simplicities of 
Islam.68  His aim was to re-establish the golden age of the Prophet Muhammad and his 
immediate companions. Within a short time Wahhab’s teaching and example influenced the 
Indian Muslims profoundly.69 
Regarding the dispute between the above stated two groups (the group that defended the saint 
worship and the group that denounced the saint worship) Zutsi writes, “by framing the dispute 
in terms of religious ideology, the contenders were attempting to define and appropriate the 
Kashmiri Muslim collectivity itself.” 70 Moreover, the dispute made it apparent that radical 
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Islamic theological ideologies of Wahhab, Ahl-i-Hadith (people of the Traditions – which was 
originally known as Fara’idi, Wahhabi sect in India) and Dar-ul Uloom (“House of 
Knowledge” – also known as Deobandi) School of Deoband, in North India, began to 
infiltrate into Kashmir valley from late 19th century and slowly but steadily started the process 
of mobilization of Kashmiri Muslims. These schools of Islamic theology sought to purify 
Islam by ridding it of the Sufi tradition which was believed to be un-Islamic and corrupting 
product of British colonialism and Hindu influence. They emphasized the importance of 
Taqlid (tradition or “acceptance of the old interpretations”) and denounced the concept of 
ijtihad (re-interpretation of Islam according to time).71 According to the orthodox Muslims, 
in Islam a perfect law has been given, even to the details of religious, social and 
political life [...] and since all first principles are contained in the Qur’an and the 
sunna, what does not coincide with them must be wrong.72 
Hence, the Islamic theological undertaking, in conjunction with the socio-political factors, 
could have played a very significant role in causing the Muslim riots in 1931. 
III.4.3. Muslim Uprising in Jammu and Kashmir in 1931 
Two occurrences – which might not sound so serious to non-Muslims – had instigated 
Muslim riots in Jammu and Kashmir in 1931. These were an insult of the Quran by a Hindu 
constable and discovery of some pages of the Quran in a drain in Srinagar.73 During the 
unrest the Muslim crowd and the police clashed outside the Srinagar central jail and several 
people in the crowd were killed due to the police firing on them. Following this incidence 
there was general rioting during which many shops and homes of Hindu Pandits, money 
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lenders and minor government officials in the city were destroyed by Muslim mobs.74 The 
Muslim revolt of 1931 changed the religio-political map of Kashmir for forever. One of the 
most significant outcomes of the uprising was the formation of the Muslim Conference which 
clamoured for agrarian reform,75 because most of the cultivable land belonged to landlords 
who would give their land to the Muslim farmers on lease. Hence, the farmers who tilled the 
land every year remained poor and ragged, because a good portion of the produce of the land 
would go to the landlords and another portion would go to the government (as tax). Even the 
farmers who owned land would hardly be able to feed their family because of heavy land 
taxation. At the same time most of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir were farmers, who 
totally depended upon the production of the land. So, the Muslim farmers were totally at the 
mercy of the landlords and the Hindu government. Therefore, it was necessary to bring land 
reform to liberate the Muslim farmers from the control of landlords as well as the 
government. The agrarian reform was people centred project – I will further discuss this in the 
later section. 
In relation to the cause of uprising the contemporary observers were divided.  Some British 
and the Dogra government officials held that it was the work of external forces like 
Bolshevist agents. According to E.M. Jenkins, the then Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, 
the cause of the problem was the economic condition of the Muslim people.76 But, the 
economic condition of the Muslim peasants of Jammu and Kashmir had never been better 
throughout the Dogra rule, therefore, the economic situation could not be the main cause of 
the insurgence. Copland on the other hand associates the uprising to three factors: first, “the 
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example of [the] civil disobedience movement in British India” infused courage to resist the 
suppressive authority; second, the death of Mirwaiz, the hereditary spiritual leader of the 
Muslims of Srinagar in 1931, which deprived the Palace of a close Muslim friend and an 
influential Muslim leader who was instrumental in putting in check the more radical Muslims; 
and third, “the emergence, in the late 1920s, of an embryonic Muslim political class able and 
willing to carry the torch for their co-religionists.”77 Among the three factors the second one 
sounds more reasonable because the radical Islamic religious ideologies of Wahhab, Ahl-i-
Hadith and Dar-ul Uloom already began to spread gradually in Kashmir in late nineteenth 
century and gain followers among the Kashmiri Muslims. In the struggle against the 
oppressive Hindu government and the sectarian teachings the concept of jihad (here it may 
mean both spiritual and physical struggle) might have boosted the moral of many Muslims 
who came under the influence of the puritanical theology.  
There had been radical Islamic theological undercurrents at work from the time, as mentioned 
above, in the Kashmir valley. This religious force could have gradually inculcated among the 
Muslims in the valley a strong sense of community identity and spiritual passion and 
inspiration to protect the sacred religious symbols of Islam. Meanwhile, the Hindu police 
constable who was accused of insulting the Quran78 represented, on the one hand, the 
oppressive Dogra regime and, on the other, the minority Hindu community which had been 
supporting the regime from the very beginning. Hence, both the parties the constable stood for 
were anti-Muslim and oppressive forces. At the same time, the insult of the Quran was anti-
Islamic and anti-divine act for which the wrongdoer had to be punished severely for the sinful 
deed, but the government by dismissing the charges against the constable proved that it was 
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also a party in the sinful act.  Besides, the Quran is not just a religious text or symbol for the 
Muslims, but it is the revelation and eternal Word of God. Therefore, the insult of the Quran 
enraged the Muslims of the Kashmir valley and they rose up against the government and its 
supporters.79 At the same time, other grievances – economic and political – added more fuel 
in the uprising. The rebellion had widened the community cleavage between the Hindus and 
Muslims and this chasm had turned into deep-seated communal antagonism and mistrust, 
which resurfaced sporadically in the form of communal violence in post-independent Indian 
Jammu and Kashmir. Meanwhile, the post-independent Indian state policies against the 
Kashmiri people seemed to have further intensified this antagonism and mistrust against the 
Indian state and the dominant Hindu majority.    
III.5. Post-1947 Jammu and Kashmir: Betrayals and Broken Promises 
After a century of ill-treatment the Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir entered into a 
new era in 1947. Unfortunately the transition was not a favourable development for the 
Kashmiri people, because the new age dawned with the partition of Kashmir and war between 
India and Pakistan – about a third of the Kashmir was absorbed into Pakistan and the two 
thirds became Indian Kashmir. So, since 1947 the Indian Kashmir has been bone of 
contention between Pakistan and India. The two nations have already fought three declared 
and one undeclared wars – out of the three declared wars one was fought over East Pakistan, 
present Bangladesh. From the time the Indian subcontinent was partitioned the Kashmir issue 
became an international concern and the United Nations Organisation (UNO) was involved 
with the search for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue from the very beginning; 
however, the Kashmir issue remains unresolved till today due to the prevailing disagreements 
between the two nuclear powered nations.  
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Thus, some scholars, like Tremblay, trace the roots of the Kashmir militancy to the Treaty of 
Accession signed by Hari Singh, the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir, on 26th October, 
1947.80 The Hindu Maharajah of the dominantly Muslim majority state was hesitant to join 
India in the beginning, but when he was unable to defend Kashmir from the invading 
Pakistani tribesmen he, having no other choice, was compelled to sign the Instrument of 
Accession to get the Indian military support to drive away the invaders. Alastair Lamb, in his 
book Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, questions the legitimacy of the Instrument of    
Accession.81  According to him the Treaty was not signed by the Maharajah on 26th October 
1947, a day before the Indian troops landed in the Kashmir valley; therefore, he argues, the 
accession of Kashmir to India was the result of a plot hatched between the leaders of the 
Indian Congress, the Kashmir government and senior military officers (including British).82 
Although the claim of Lamb sounds like the argument postulated in favour of Pakistan there 
is a considerable amount of truth in it, because the Treaty was an agreement hastily arranged 
between the leaders in the Indian government and the Maharajah, and it was implemented 
without being endorsed by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, after ten decades of 
cruelty and oppression the Treaty was the final betrayal connived by the Hindu Dogra regime, 
on its death bed, against the Muslim people of Kashmir. This last act of deception of the 
regime left the land of Kashmir divided between the two rival nations and, at the same time, it 
gave birth to a permanent dispute that has been a serious threat to the whole of Southeast 
Asia. Besides, the Kashmiri people were tossed from one Hindu rule into another Hindu-
dominated secular rule – under both the governments, as per the theological proposition of the 
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radical (fanatical) Islamic theologians like Jamal al Din al-Afghani and ‘Abd al-Qadir, Islam 
is in danger – according to Abd al-Qadir, the leader of a jihad against the French, “the 
Muslims must not submit to unbelieving rulers, and that Muslims who helped them and 
served as their accomplices themselves became unbelievers.”83 The present Kashmir 
problems (i.e. the division of Kashmir between the two hostile nations and the Islamic 
militancy/terrorism in Kashmir) would not have occurred if the Maharajah would have taken 
concrete steps to gain the confidence of the Muslim majority of his Kingdom after the 
incidence in 1931, and would have sought the people’s approval before the partition of Indian 
subcontinent in 1947, to decide whether to join India or Pakistan or remain independent.   
However, although the Treaty of Accession was signed by the Maharajah without the consent 
of the Kashmiri people Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General of India, assured the people 
of Kashmir through the Maharajah that the question of accession would be placed before the 
people of Kashmir after the liberation of the land from the invaders. Likewise, Nehru at once 
confirmed this conditional acceptance and, in a detail statement to the Constituent 
Assembly of India, reasserted the ultimate right of the people of Kashmir, under the 
supervision of an impartial international tribunal such as the U.N., to decide their 
future political association.84 
Meanwhile, both India and Pakistan, as per the report of the U.N. Security Council in 1948, 
agreed that “the fate of the country should be finally decided by a free expression of will of 
the people.”85 These assertions and agreement assured the Kashmiri people that, soon their 
natural right, the right of being the sons of the soil, to decide their own fate would be given 
back to them. So, the people waited with high hope for the time they would exercise their 
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right of self-determination, but the day never dawned for them. So, once again the Kashmiri 
people were betrayed – this time by the Hindu dominated secular administration.   
However, the Indian Constitution accorded a “special status” to Kashmir granting it 
considerable autonomy within the federal system of India and, at the same time, the central 
government sanctioned a substantial amount of financial aid towards the economic 
development of the state. Nevertheless, both the constitutional and the economic provisions 
were granted with the intention of total integration of the state of Jammu and Kashmir within 
India without holding any plebiscite. According to Kohli, this strategy of the Indian 
government did the “Trick” from 1950 to 1980, because during this period ethnic nationalism 
in Kashmir remained mild even though the memories of subjugation, betrayal and injustice 
against them were kept alive and, in the mean time, there were international problems over the 
Kashmir issue.86  
III.5.1. Why There was no Insurgency before 1988? 
Since the ground was conducive for the people of Kashmir to rise up against the Indian state 
from early 1960s to early 1980s, why did the insurgency not erupt in this period? There were 
two noteworthy factors that played a key role in preventing any armed movement in Jammu 
and Kashmir till the early 1980s. One of those factors had been the leadership of Sheikh 
Muhammad Abdullah. He was “a master political strategist”87 and “‘founding father’ and 
much revered leader”88 in Kashmir. He was rightly called the sher-i-Kashmir (“Lion of 
Kashmir”) because he fought and suffered bravely for the rights of the Kashmiri people. 
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Abdullah was not only a political leader, but he was also a devout Muslim – in 1931 Mirwaiz 
Kashmir (the hereditary religious leader of the Muslims in Srinagar) was so impressed by 
Abdullah’s religious zeal, that he permitted Abdullah to make Jamia Masjid as the 
organizational centre for his political activities.89 Besides, from the very beginning of his 
political carrier he used Islamic concept of social and political rights which was the concept of 
a unified Muslim community.90 Hence, he had been able to balance both spiritual and political 
as “two sides of a same coin in Islam” throughout his life.  
Moreover, right after he held the responsibility of administration of Jammu and Kashmir 
Abdullah took two bold decisions to ameliorate the economic condition of the downtrodden 
people of Jammu and Kashmir.  In 1950 his government passed two very important pieces of 
legislation: “the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act and the Distressed Debtors Relief 
Act.”91 The first Act seized all cultivable land of more than twenty-three acres and distributed 
it to the landless peasants, and the remaining land was made state property.  The second piece 
of legislation formed a board that instituted guiding principles for the debt relief.92 These 
timely and poor people oriented actions of his government though alienated big landholders 
made him the most popular and respected leader among the Kashmiri mass. 
Further, he stood tall among all the Kashmiri leaders due to his constant determination to 
achieve socio-economic and political liberation for Kashmiri people. Because of such 
determination the Indian government was not able to persuade him to change his views over 
the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris. Abdullah disregarded all the tactics of 
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persuasion by the authorities in the Indian government to give up the idea of self-
determination, and such defiance left the Indian leaders with no other choice but to detain him 
for an indefinite period.93 Hence, in 1953 he was deposed from the post of Prime Minister of 
Kashmir and kept under house arrest for over fourteen years; however, even the dismissal and 
detention could not break his will power. 
Abdullah was able to channel his influence upon the people of Kashmir even though he was 
incarcerated. Nevertheless, he was against following the path of violence to achieve the 
political goal. The main reason behind this viewpoint was that he and his associates were 
deeply influenced by Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence and the effectiveness of passive 
resistance in the struggle against the British government in India,94 and that influence 
continued. Abdullah’s standpoint was recognized by the Indian leaders at the time the state 
government was troubled by communal violence between Hindus and Muslims. In 1967 
communal violence broke out in Srinagar and seriously undermined the law and order in the 
city. The Kashmir government was forced to put the city under curfew, ban the publication of 
the newspapers and close down all colleges in the city. Yet the situation continued to be very 
tense and unpredictable. At this critical juncture the Central government authorities 
acknowledged that Abdullah was the only person who “possessed the stature and influence to 
revive the political moderation and communal harmony in the state.”95 Therefore, the Central 
government, in spite of strong opposition from some quarters, released him in the beginning 
of January 1968. The recognition of the weight of his leadership by the Indian government 
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during such crucial time makes it obvious that he played a highly influential role in averting 
any armed movement in the state, and Abdullah continued to uphold the above stated 
standpoint till he breathed his last.  
Abdullah remained the revered leader and “the Lion of Kashmir” till the end of his life 
although in the latter days of his life his administration was accused of financial 
irresponsibility and exploitation of his authority to increase the wealth of his family.96 He died 
in 1982, and with him also died the hope of a peaceful solution of the long-standing Kashmir 
issue. 
The second factor, which was instrumental in prevention of armed movement before 1980s, 
was the economic and educational development in Jammu and Kashmir. Due to central 
government’s financial aid there was rapid economic and educational development during 
1960s and 1970s. The Kashmiri people, who very recently had shed the load of slavery, in all 
probability, did not want to miss any economic and educational opportunities for their and 
their children’s’ future welfare.  In the 1960s the majority of the people were first generation 
Kashmiris who had undergone the experience of slavery, therefore, for them more important 
and urgent needs were economic prosperity and the opportunity for their children’s education; 
whereas, political issues like self-determination bore less weight compared to these urgent 
necessities. Thus, the Central government’s strategy, as mentioned earlier, did the “Trick”, 
because the government was able to divert the Kashmiri people’s attention towards economic 
and educational opportunities. 
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 Therefore, the Islamic theological undercurrent, which had been at work since the pre-
independence period, could not mobilize the religious constituency in Kashmir towards the 
creation of an Islamic insurgency till early 1980s. During this period (i.e., before the early 
1980s) there were several aggressive and militant Muslim groups working secretly and, who 
were willing to apply force to achieve their goal; among those groups the Awami Action 
Committee, led by Mirwaiz Farooq, the 24 year old spiritual leader of the Jama Masjid 
(mosque) in Srinagar, was “more openly militant and pro-Pakistan in its political outlook.”97 
Since the ground for the mobilization of Kashmiri Muslims to take up arms in the name of 
Islam was not yet ready these aggressive and militant groups could not inspire armed 
rebellion in Kashmir. Only from the late 1970s, due to the success of the Islamic resurgence 
in Iran and the engagement of Taleban fighters against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the 
moral of those radical Islamic theologians (who favoured armed struggle against the so-called 
infidels in India) was boosted.   
III.5.2. Islamic Religious Ideologies in the Rise of Terrorism in Kashmir 
Bin Taymiyya, one of the radical Islamic theologians, divided the world into dar al-Islam (the 
land/house of Islam) and dar al-kufra/dar al-harb (the land of unbelief or house of war).98 
The first one is the domain in which governing principle is the Islamic law (sharia) based on 
the Quran and the Traditions (Sunna) of the Prophet; the second one is the realm which is 
governed by non-Islamic law. Haji Shari’at Allah of Bahadurpur, who was a Wahhabi (a 
follower of Wahhab’s theological ideology) and the founder of Fara’idi sect in Faridpur 
district in East Bengal in 1804, declared India “the house of war,” because India was ruled by 
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non-Muslim government99 and, for this reason, India was not suitable place for the Muslims 
to live. This radical theological teaching of Wahhab motivated the Indian Muslims to 
denounce the educational system of the British government after the defeat of Sepoy Mutiny 
in 1857. According to the orthodox Muslim religious leaders (maulawis) the British 
educational system was “the pathway to certain apostasy designed to destroy their young 
ones.”100 So, those Muslims who sent their children to government or Christian Mission 
schools were considered as infidels by the orthodox Muslim leaders and their followers.  
From late 19th century, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the radical theological ideologies 
of Wahhab, Ahl-i-Hadith and Dar-ul Uloom School of Deoband began to make deep inroads 
into the Muslim society of Kashmir through the preaching of radical Muslims who opposed 
the practice of Sufi Islamic tradition in Kashmir. Since then, the radical ideologies of these 
schools had been gradually expanding their domain in the Kashmir valley. After the 
independence of India the radical Muslims of Kashmir got full freedom, due to the freedom of 
religion granted by the Indian Constitution, to preach and teach those radical ideologies to the 
people of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1940s Jamaat-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK) came 
into existence with two objectives – to purify Kashmiri Islam and establish an Islamic state. 
The ideological framework of this Islamic organization does not differ from other branches of 
the Jama’at elsewhere. The Ideology of the JIJK is based on the writings of the founder, 
Maulana Sayyed ‘Ala Maududi (1903-1979), of the Jama’at. According to Maududi, Islam is 
an absolute ideology and way of life that covers all areas of a Muslim’s individual and 
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collective existence.101 To impose Islam in its totality it requires all Muslims to struggle for 
the establishment of an Islamic state or states that is/are governed by Islamic principle.  
Democracy is an un-Islamic political system because it stands in opposition to the Islamic 
understanding of God as the ultimate authority and maker of law. Likewise, secularism is to 
be condemned, because it separates religion and politics. The JIJK had been committed to 
fulfil this understanding of Maududi by all means. According to this understanding every 
Muslim of Kashmir must fight for the liberation of Kashmir from India for the purpose of the 
establishment of Islamic state.  
Further, the growth of Islamic educational institutions could have assisted in inculcating these 
Islamic theological ideologies in the mind of Kashmiri youths from their young days; 
therefore, the second and the following generations of Kashmiri youths, born after 1947, were 
more likely to be radicalised with these theologies. Hence, in late 1980s many of the Kashmiri 
youths were educationally advanced; theologically radicalized; politically deprived; and better 
updated of the happenings around the globe. So, this radicalized Islamic religious 
constituency was like a time bomb ticking for the appointed moment to explode. Meanwhile, 
the success of the Islamic movement in Iran, a worldwide Islamic revival and the rise of 
Taleban force and its success against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan added more inspiration 
and determination to fight against the supposed infidels, the Indian government and its 
supporters, to attain the given religio-political goal of the Kashmiri people.  
Furthermore, the political and communal elements which occurred in the 1980s, after the 
death of Abdullah, worked together as detonating device and set off the time bomb in 1988. 
The political and communal elements were the Hindu appeasing tactics applied by Indira and 
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Rajiv when their popularity began to wane, dismissal of Farooq Abdullah’s government in 
1984 because he aligned with other non-congress heads of the states,102 communal and 
political activities of the Sangh Parivar and its threat to Non-Hindus, particularly Kashmiri 
Muslims, in India because the Sangh Parivar vies to do away with the Article 370 (the Article 
which grants special status to Jammu and Kashmir) of the Indian Constitution, betrayal of 
Kashmiri people by Farooq and his party by making alliance with the Congress for the 1987 
election and, finally, the rigging of the 1987 election denying election victory to several of the 
Muslim United Front candidates.103  The rigging of the 1987 election was the last straw that 
broke the camel’s back; because, in this election the Muslim religious constituency was 
betrayed and humiliated by applying unfair means. Most noteworthy aspect in this incident 
was the involvement of the National Conference party in the betrayal, which could be 
understood as apostasy or a denial of the Islamic faith. These events of 1980s were not 
isolated ones but, they were very much interconnected with the anti-Muslim and suppressive 
forces of the past, discussed earlier in this chapter. All these events sent out very strong signal 
to the people of Kashmir in general and to religiously radicalized Kashmiri youths in 
particular that Indian government was anti-Kashmiri and anti-Muslim, therefore, India was 
not the house of Islam but the house of struggle or war. So, 1988 was the right time for them 
to start their armed struggle to achieve their goal. 
III.6. Islamic Terrorist Groups: Lashkar-e-Toiba and Its Ideology 
Among the Islamic terrorist groups in Kashmir the most prominent ones are JKLF (found in 
Britain in 1977), HuM (militant wing of JIJK, most probably found in 1987), Muttahida 
Jehad Council (United Jehad Council, started in Muzaffarbad, in Pakistani Kashmir, in 1990), 
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Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT - The Army of the Pure), Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of the Prophet 
Mohammad – started in 2000), and Harkat-ul Mujahideen (earlier known as Harkat-ul Ansar 
– began its terrorists activities in 1995).104 Harkat-ul Ansar was the first Kashmiri terrorist 
group to be listed in the U.S. Department of state’s list of the groups that sponsor terrorism in 
1997; then, the group changed its name to Harkat-ul Mujahideen. Among these terrorist 
groups JKLF is considered as secular or nominally secular by Ganguly and Tremblay. The 
other three are more radical Islamic terrorist groups. Among these the most dreaded and brutal 
one is the Lashkar-e-Toiba.  
Lashkar is the militant arm of Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad (the Centre for Preaching), an Islamic 
religious organization of the Pakistani Punjabis.105 This militant group was established in the 
late 1980s to train young Pakistani Muslims to fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 
After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended the terrorist organization diverted its 
attention to other parts of the world. Lashkar terrorists are given training in Pakistani camps. 
They receive two stages of training – basic and intensive. Basic is short course which lasts for 
21 days and the intensive training is three-month rigorous training course. In the training the 
trainees are taught the tactics of guerrilla warfare, use of modern arms and ammunitions, 
endurance and survival, and aeroplane hijacking. As the militants of LeT are well trained and 
highly religiously inspired, they are extremely efficient in their modus operandi to engage 
their conceived enemies on the enemies’ own territory. Lashkar militant recruits come from 
different parts of the world. Further, the Lashkar militants are known for their brutality, 
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because they treat their victims with inhuman cruelty – they behead or eviscerate their 
captives.106 This terrorist organization seems to have some link with the Al-Qaeda, because its 
political wing, Markaz, received contribution from Osama Bin Laden in 1987 for its building 
project.107 Therefore, besides Kashmir, this movement is involved in terrorist activities in 
other Muslim dominated regions of the world like Chechnya; therefore, it recruits more 
militants mainly from Pakistan and the Middle East.  
The LeT infiltrated into Kashmir in January 1990; since then it has been carrying out its 
terrorist activities in Kashmir and other parts of India. Meanwhile, the organization claims 
that it can strike any-place in India. Some of the most daring terrorist acts of the Lashkar 
militants in India were: the attacks against the symbolically crucial Red Fort (in 2000) and the 
attack on the Indian Parliament (on 13 December 2001), the most vital organ of Indian state, 
in the heart of the capital of India, Delhi.108 The attack on the Indian Parliament almost 
dragged India and Pakistan into full-scale war. The LeT, in the early 2002, had declared that it 
had sent 14,369 Indian soldiers to hell (wasl-e jahannam), whereas about 1,200 rebels had 
“drunk the cup of martyrdom (jam-e shahadat nush karna).”109 
The ideology of the Markaz and the Lashkar is derived from the radical theological teachings 
of Ahl-e Hadith and Deobandi School. The group’s main objectives are, to purify Kashmiri 
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Islam and establish pan-Islamic state under a Caliphate (Spiritual leader of all Muslims). In 
this regard Kashmir is looked at as the single element of struggle toward the creation of pan-
Islamic state in the entire Indian subcontinent.110 Therefore, the objectives of the Lashkar are 
much broader than the objectives of other Islamic terrorist groups in Kashmir. LeT, in the 
view of Abou Zahab, 
Promotes transnational activities in the name of jihad against infidels in the world 
where Muslims are perceived to be oppressed, aims at creating a new deterritorialized 
identity (i.e., the ummah) based on its understanding of Islam. It rejects all cultural 
particularities, as they are perceived as dividing Muslims and having a negative 
influence on ritual practice.111 
 
The above-given reasons make it plain that the terrorist activity of the group is not restricted 
to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir alone. 
II.7. Towards a Solution 
There are many suggestions towards the solution of the Kashmir problem. Among the 
suggested solutions there seems to be a common understanding among the scholars, who 
studied the Kashmir problem, that some kind of regional autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir 
might be helpful towards the resolution of the problem.112 Granting of limited regional 
autonomy to the state might not be right solution to the deep rooted antagonism and mistrust. 
The most important factor towards the solution of the problem is to gain the trust of the 
Kashmiri people in the Indian administration.  In this regard the best possible solution is the 
re-implementation of the special status granted to the state in the Indian constitution. The 
Central governments, from the beginning, never honoured the special status granted to the 
state by the constitution. According to the provision of the Constitution Indian state could 
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only have jurisdiction over defence, foreign affairs and communications of the state. The 
constitutional provision gives Kashmir a separate constitution, flag, penal code and criminal 
procedure code; therefore, the state of Kashmir, as per the constitutional provision, is different 
from the other states of India. But, these constitutional provisions were gradually eroded due 
to the policy of the total integration employed by the Congress governments. If the 
constitutional provision is once again honoured and the original status of Kashmir is restored 
the people of Kashmir might gradually begin to trust and cooperate with the Indian 
government. At the same time, non-interference in the state politics by Indian political leaders 
may help to establish better centre-state relationship: better and sustainable centre-state 
relationship seems to be imperative in search of peaceful solution of Kashmir problem. 
Furthermore, the Indian government has to work out plans and projects for the regular 
interaction and cooperation among different religious communities of the state. In this regard 
government might have to take a strong measure to restrict any outside communal element 
that might attempt to create communal tension in the state. Besides, the violence of human 
right by the Indian military forces needs to be strictly checked and any report of past or 
present violence has to be thoroughly investigated. The Indian government has to be 
considerate in several areas to win the trust of the people and to let them get rid of the deep 
seated socio-historical, political and religious antagonism.   
III.8. Outline of the Contributions in this Chapter 
1. The root of the present Kashmir problem stretches back to the Dogra period. The 
following four issues had been very significant in the birth of the crisis in Kashmir. 
1.1. The Dogra regime was unquestionably communal because it adopted the policies – 
religious, socio-economic and political – that favoured Hindus against the Muslim subjects 
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though Muslims were the dominant majority in Kashmir. The communal policies of the 
regime deprived the Muslim majority of their – educational, political, economic and religious 
– rights and privileges. Hence, the regime demarcated a clear cut religious boundary line 
between the Hindu subjects and the Muslim subjects and sowed the seeds of religious 
antagonism between the Muslims and the Hindus.  
1.2. During the Dogra period the Muslim community was facing a serious religio-cultural 
identity crisis both from within and from outside the Muslim society – this religio-cultural 
identity crisis was expressed in poems by several poets like Maqbool Shah to awaken the 
Muslims from their ignorance and spiritual slumber. The Kashmiri Muslim community was 
not homogeneous one, but it was divided into different sects and groups and lacked unity; at 
the same time the racist, casteist and communal Dogra regime did its best to deprive them of 
their rights and privileges and degraded the Kashmiri Muslims to the lowest rung of the 
Kashmiri society. So, lack of unity within the community and the oppressive rule, which was 
from outside the Muslim community, pushed them to chaotic and defenceless – both 
religiously and politically – state. In such hopeless situation only religion, as seen in Islamic 
revolution in Iran in 1979, could provide succour and inner courage. 
1.3. The Dogra rulers did not take any measure to stop the infiltration of puritanical 
Islamic theological ideologies from the British India into Kashmir. Therefore, the radical 
Islamic theological ideologies slowly but steadily began to gain adherents in the Kashmir 
valley from the late 19th century. The radical religious leaders/preachers constantly 
propagated the theological ideologies of Wahhab and Dar-ul Uloom of Deoband to awaken 
Muslims of the Valley towards their Islamic faith and obligations. These religious 
leaders/preachers, to a considerable extent, succeeded in awakening the Muslims of the 
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Kashmir valley from late 1920s. The result of that awakening was the Muslim uprising of 
1931. 
1.4. The boundary line which was demarcated by the Hindu rulers between the Hindus 
and the Muslims was further strengthened with the infiltration and propagation of the 
puritanical theological ideologies in Kashmir. Hence, from early 1930s it became explicit 
that the Kashmiri society was deeply divided in communal line; meanwhile the Muslim 
community nurtured deep seated antagonism against Hindus due to more than eight decades 
of the oppressive Hindu rule. 
2. The Muslim uprising in the Kashmir valley in 1931 was the outburst of this deep 
seated antagonism. Though there were economic, educational and political factors involved 
in the uprising radical Islamic religious ideology, that could justify violence against so-
called enemies of Muslim community on the basis of socio-economic-religious-political 
experiences undergone by the community, was the most important inner driving force. 
This uprising was the turning point in the history of Kashmiri Muslims mainly for four 
reasons: first, the incidence demonstrated that the Muslims of Kashmir were awakening, both 
spiritually and politically; second, sacred symbols of Islam had played very powerful role in 
mobilization of the constituency against injustice; third, the wall of separation between 
Hindus and Muslims became visible; fourth, the incidence infused courage and hope among 
the Muslims of wider circle, and worked as a perfect example for future Muslim unity in 
Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, this incidence was the most important focal point for latter 
socio-religious and political developments in Jammu and Kashmir. 
3. The last Hindu Dogra ruler not only oppressed the Kashmiri Muslims, but also 
betrayed them in 1947 by signing the Instrument of Accession without the people’s consent. 
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The last act of the Dogra regime worked like a powerful blow to the Kashmiri society which 
caused a never healing wound. It was a double betrayal, for the Kashmir and Kashmiris were 
divided between two hostile nations, and the people of Indian occupied Kashmir were handed 
over to another Hindu dominated Indian secular government by the Hindu regime that 
oppressed them almost a century. This betrayal added more fuel to Muslim religious 
antagonism against the Hindus. Therefore, for the Kashmiri Muslims Hindus always 
represented anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic force. 
4. The Kashmiri Muslim society was again betrayed in the post-independent India by 
Hindu dominated secular government. Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, who 
happened to be Kashmiri Pandit, betrayed the Kashmiris by disregarding the promise he and 
the Viceroy of India made to the people at the time of accession of Kashmir to India. Nehru’s 
government, instead of fulfilling the promise, began to implement the policies for the total 
integration of the state of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian union. If the people of 
Kashmir were given a chance to exercise their right, as promised by Nehru in the beginning, 
the present situation might not have come into existence.  
5. The leadership capability of Mohammad Abdullah and the economic and educational 
development in the state restrained armed uprising before 1988. Though the religious 
antagonism had been very much alive and the radical Islamic religious ideology was regularly 
at work through Islamic educational institutions (madrassas) the first generation Kashmiri 
people had high hope of their problem being solved through peaceful political means. In the 




6. The second generation Kashmiris, those who were born after 1947, were more 
radicalized due to the rapid educational (both religious and secular) developments that took 
place from early 1960s. Hence, in 1980s many young people of the second and the following 
generations could be easily mobilized in the name of Islam. Moreover, “Islam in danger” 
slogan had been regularly raised from 1931 onward, because the Kashmiri Muslim 
community had been constantly at struggle for their faith and socio-political dignity from the 
time of Dogra rule. At the same time, in Islam sacred and secular cannot be separated 
from one another. So, the concept of jihad (here this means both spiritual and socio-
political struggle), though it was not openly applied before, was very much practical and 
part of the life of the Kashmiri people. 
7. The hope of peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem died down with the death of 
Abdullah. In the meantime there began to take place unfair political and religio-political 
developments from early 1980s. Farooq, the son of Abdullah, was unable to fill the leadership 
vacuum created by the death of his father; however, the first few years the people tried to 
keep their hope alive with the expectation that he would work for the solution of the Kashmir 
problem. But this hope was shattered when Farooq and his party joined hands with the 
Congress party, the party which betrayed the people of Kashmir several times, for electoral 
gain. This was a severe blow to the remaining hope of the people of Kashmir for the peaceful 
solution of the Kashmir problem. Finally, the result was the eruption of socio-religio-
political frustration, anger and hopelessness, that continued to built-up from the time of 






This chapter has illustrated that the historical experiences, political issues from the time of the 
Indian independence and the radical Islamic religious ideologies – particularly the radical 
religious ideologies propagated by Wahhab, Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi School – were 
responsible for the birth of the Islamic religious terrorism in Kashmir. However, the political 
developments in the 1980s – after the death of Abdullah, communalism and communal 
politics, misappropriation of power by the Central government authority against the religious 
constituency in Kashmir, and denial of the democratic rights of the Kashmiri people by 
rigging election in 1987 detonated the terrorist blast in Kashmir.  
This case study offers the following contributions: Islam plays essential role in the life of the 
Kashmiri Muslim community; in the Kashmiri Islamic society sacred (which includes shrines 
of pirs) and secular are very closely interrelated; the land of Kashmir has special significance 
in both religious and secular life of the people;  the puritanical Islamic theological ideologies 
have been (since the early twentieth century) expanding their support base in the Kashmir 
Valley;  from the early 1930s Islam has been providing inner courage, determination and 
passion to the people to rise up against the forces of injustice; the socio-religious antagonism 
(among the Kashmiri Muslims) against the Hindu religious community budded from the 
Dogra period; the Hindu communal activities against the Muslims (which will be evaluated in 
the following chapter) and religious and political developments from the late 1970s 
strengthened the Islamic extremist elements within the Kashmiri community. The afore-
mentioned points offer better knowledge of the importance of religion (Islam) in instigation 




CHAPTER IV  




Incidence of religious violence against minority communities, particularly Muslims and 
Christians, has increased in figure and intensity in several Hindu dominated regions (like 
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Orissa and Bihar) in India from the early 
1980s.1 Owing to the acts of religious extremism/terrorism, thousands of Muslims, Christians 
and Sikhs were killed, wounded, and made homeless or forcefully converted into Hinduism. 
Meanwhile, religious violence against the ethno-religious minorities seems to be gradually 
spreading to all over India due to hate-minority propaganda of Hindu militant organisations 
like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). 
Moreover, what makes Hindu religious terror more complicated and horrifying is an 
involvement of saintly characters like Swamis (spiritual leaders/masters) Sadhus (holy-men) 
and Sadhvis (holy-women) – some of them were arrested in relation to the bomb blast cases at 
Mecca Masjid (Mosque) in Hyderabad (2007) and in Malegaon, in Maharashtra (2006 and 
2008).2  Involvement of, so-called, holy people in the acts of extreme form of religious 
                                                 
1 See “2002 Gujarat Violence;” available from http://www.bookrags.com/wiki/2002_Gujarat_violence; Internet 
accessed: 19 February 2011; “Violence against Christians in Orissa, India,” Turn back to God (October 23, 
2008); available from http://turnbacktogod.com/violence-against-christians-in-orissa-india; Internet accessed: 19 
February 2011. 
 
2“Hindu Holy Man Aseemanand in Curtody Over India Blasts,” available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12180193, Internet accessed: 21 April 2011; “Swami 
Aseemanand’s Confession Reveals Hindutva Terror Activities,” available from 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1073223.ece, Internet accessed: 21 April 2011; “Malegaon 
Blasts: Murder Charges on Sadhvi, 2 Others,” available from http://www.indianexpress.com/news/malegaon-
blasts-murder-charges-on-sadhvi2/377519/, Internet accessed: 21 April 2011; “Mecca Masjid Blast: Apology, 
Compensation sought for Innocent Youths,” available from  http://www.twocircles.net/node/235668; “Swami 
Asimananda Alias Jatin Chatterji Master mind of Macca Masjid Blast Arrested. Are there Hindu Terrorists?,” 
http://www.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20101119193644AAg1ccg;   “Judicial Remand of Sadhvi 
Pragya Extended till Nov 29,” available from http://www.zeenews.com/nation/2008-11-17/484246news.html, 
Internet accessed:19 February 2011; Main Accused in Mecca Masjid Ajmer Blasts was Killed in 2007,” in 
Rediff.com (June 24, 2010); available from  http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/jun/24/sunil-joshi-was-behind -
hyde-ajmer-blast-says-cbi.htm; Internet accessed: 19 February 2011. 
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violence underscores that Hindu religious terrorism is not a force to be underestimated; rather, 
it could be more dangerous than Sikh and Islamic terrorism, because Hindus constitute the 
large majority3 of the total population of India.4 There are only five states and one union 
territory in which Sikh, Muslim and Christian communities are in majority. However, the 
entire population of the minority dominated states is far less than the population of any one of 
the several Hindu dominated states. So, even the minority communities of the minority 
dominated states might not remain unaffected in the near future if the trend of Hindu religious 
terror against the minority communities continues.  
Nevertheless, scholars have not taken into account seriously Hindu religious violence as Sikh 
and Islamic religious terrorism so far. Asgar Ali Engineer, Kathinka Froystad, Steven 
Wilkinson, Ashutosh Varshney, Atul Kohli, Ashis Nandy and host of others tend to consider 
violent activities of Hindu militant organizations as communal riots/violence. Such perception 
only suggests that the forces of Hindu religious terrorism are either underestimated or not 
taken for real. At the same time, mostly economic and socio-political factors are being 
accounted for the production of religious violence or communal riots in India. Therefore, in 
this chapter I will make an attempt to critically assess why Hindu religious extremist 
organizations have been involved (since 1980s) in violent activities against the members of 
minority religious communities. Furthermore, I will examine how certain Hindu religious 
texts and symbols are manipulated to mobilize Hindu religious constituency for the acts of 
Hindu religious terrorism. In the meantime, a critical study will be done to explain how 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 See Amrita Basu, “Reflections on Community Conflicts and the State in India,” in The Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2 (May, 1997), 395. 
 
4Government of India, “Census and You – Religion,” Office of the Registrar General & census Commissioner 
(New Delhi); available from http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/religion.aspx; Internet accessed: 




religion and other aspects, particularly historical and socio-political contexts, have been 
interrelated in inspiring Hindu religious extremism.  
The arrangement of this chapter is made in the following manner. Firstly, a review of some 
scholars’ arguments concerning the rise of religious/communal violence/riots/conflicts in 
India will be presented; then, my viewpoint on the rise of Hindu religious terrorism will be 
proposed. Secondly, I will critically analyse the nineteenth century Hindu socio-religious 
reformation movements, specifically the Brahma Samaj and the Arya Samaj. It is imperative 
to make critical examination of these modern reformation movements to understand the 
historical background of the present Hindu militant movements. This will be followed by an 
evaluation of early twentieth century Hindu religio-nationalistic organizations, specifically the 
Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS. The main objective is to underline on what ground these 
Hindu movements came into existence and to what extent they are responsible for the 
motivation of Hindu religious extremism/terrorism. Thirdly, activities of the Sangh Parivar 
(the VHP, the RSS and their affiliates) will be assessed to describe how the militant Hindu 
organizations are involved in terrorist activities. Finally, an assessment on the Hindu religious 
terrorism and conclusion will be offered. 
IV.2. Scholars’ Arguments 
According to the observation of Engineer, Froystad, Wilkinson, Gyanendra Pandey, Partha 
Chatterjee, Romila Thapar, Varshney, Kohli, Nandy, T. N. Madan, Shikha Trivedy, Sahil 
Mayaram, Achyut Yagnik and host of others religious violence in India occur due to socio-
economic and political factors. Elites of the Hindu or other conflicting communities, in the 
view of these intellectuals, manipulate religion for their own economic or political 
advancement; hence, leaders of any of the given communities might use religion to fuel 
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communal conflict or violence to fulfil their aspirations. Thus, religion is considered as a 
mask that is managed to hide the actual socio-political purpose of the political actors.  Some 
of these intellectuals’ viewpoints in relation to the cause of violent activities of Hindu 
religious extremism are critically analysed under the following sections. 
IV.2.1. Political and Economic Dimension – Erosion of Political Order and Authority 
Political Scientists (such as Zoya Hasan, Engineer, Froystad, Wilkinson, Varshney and 
Kohli), applying comparative approach, take into an account explicitly political and economic 
dimension to explain the communal or religious violence in India.5 In the view of Hasan 
economical and political interests “play a vigorous part in fomenting communal conflict in 
India.6 Engineer claims that: “the communal phenomenon is political in genesis;” and 
communal problems occur when elites of a particular religious community skilfully 
manipulate “the religious sentiments and cultural ethos” of the people of the given community 
with the aim of realising their (the elites’) “political and cultural aspirations by identifying 
these aspirations as those of the entire community.”7 “Those politicians who claim to be most 
patriotic,” says Engineer, mastermind most of the riots to gain political power “by 
propagating hate politics against minority communities.”8 Froystad opines that communal 
riots/violence in India, in-spite of their ruthlessness, are a short-lived category of political 
violence than any other form of violence, such as religious war or terror.9 Wilkinson argues 
                                                 
5 Basu, “Reflections on Community Conflicts,” 391. 
 
6 Zoya Khaliq Hasan, “Communalism and Communal Violence in India,” in Social Scientist, Vol. 10, No. 2 
(February, 1982), 25f. 
 
7 Asghar Ali Engineer, “The Causes of Communal Riots in the Post-partition Period in India,” in Communal 
Riots in Post-independence India, edited by Asghar Ali Engineer (1991), 34. 
 
8 Asghar Ali Engineer, “Communal Riots, 2003,” in Economic and Political Weekly (3 January, 2004), 21. 
 
9 Kathinka Froystad, “Communal Riots in India as a Transitory Form of Political Violence: Three Approaches,” 
in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 32, Issue 3 (2009), 442-459. 
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that ethnic or communal riots are planned for political purposes by politicians. “Political 
competition,” he says, “can lead to peace as well as violence.”10 According to Varshney, the 
Congress Party, key political institution of India, had undergone “a profound organizational 
decay, with no centrist parties taking its place” in the 1980s.11 Since the mid-1960s, Kohli 
contends, India’s governing – which includes development and accommodation of diverse 
interests – capability has weakened significantly. The decline of the competence to govern 
eroded the order and authority “to deal with the pressing problems of law and order, 
corruption, and poverty.”12 These political problems, asserts Kohli, have often given rise to 
violence. Mainly, emphasizes Kohli, Congress Party under the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi and 
her son, Rajiv, were responsible for the present political predicament.  
Political and economic matters, no doubt, could cause conflicts/violence to certain extent 
among the different sections of the Indian society; but it is seriously questionable that whether 
political and economic interests are mostly responsible for Hindu religious 
extremism/terrorism that seems to have an intention to do away with the given religious 
minorities and establish India as a Hindu rashtra. Meanwhile, it is true that from the latter 
half of the 1960s there began to develop adverse political conditions owing to the 
disintegration of major political institutions, particularly the Congress Party. On account of 
the undesirable political developments the Indian state, on several instances, failed to 
safeguard the constitutional rights and provide safety and security to the minorities from the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10 Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1; on theory of political decay see L. P. Singh, “Political Development or 
Political Decay in India,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring, 1991),  66f. 
 
11 Ashutosh Varshney, “Contested Meanings: India’s National Identity, Hindu Nationalism and the Politics of 
Anxiety,” in Daedalus, Vol. 122, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), 227. 
 
12 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability, reprint (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5. 
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attack of majority religious community. These political developments could have further 
emboldened the Hindu religious extremist-elements that had been at work since the latter half 
of the nineteenth century to achieve certain religio-political goals. However, the political 
activities in the 1960s and in the following decades might not be the main factors for inspiring 
Hindu religious terrorism against the given religious minorities because, Hindu religious and 
socio-political antagonism against the minority, specifically Muslim, Christian and Sikh, 
communities appears to have taken root long before. In the meantime, the above-given 
explanations do not clarify why only particular ethno-religious (Muslims and Christians) 
minority communities are targeted by Hindu extremists. So, political and economic factors 
cannot satisfactorily explain the cause/causes of Hindu religious violence/terrorism against 
the particular religious minorities. 
IV.2.2. Communal Violence is caused by Western Ideas 
Scholars, like Ashis Nandy and T.N.Madan, construe communal violence as a reaction to, or 
denunciation of Western ideas, such as secularism,13 democracy, westernization, 
modernization, etc. Nandy opines that secularism and mass democracy are responsible for 
communal or political violence in India, because secularism and mass democracy upset the 
system of social relationship of the Indian society.14 According Shikha Trivedy, Sahil 
Mayaram and Achyut Yagnik (including Nandy) Hindu communal movements (like 
Ramjanmabhumi) and communal violence take place due to the disintegration of traditional 
social and cultural ties that bind together all religious sections of Indian society, due to large 
                                                 
13 See A. Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance,” in Mirrors of Violence, 
Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia, edited by V. Das (Delhi: 1990), 69ff; T. N. Madan, “Secularism 
in Its Place,” in Politics in India, edited by S. Kaviraj (New Delhi: 1997), 342ff. 
 




measure of modernization and Westernization being undergone by Indian nation.15 They 
further argue that due to high degree of modernization and Westernization there emerged 
modern mass oriented version of religion which became both a political ideology and an 
identity for sections of urbanites that lost many of their traditional principles and beliefs and, 
at the same time, lacked a strong hold in modernity and its related benefits. These intellectuals 
hold the Colonial rule responsible for the communal problems in India because, the Colonial 
government was responsible for introducing a Western concept of nation state and national 
self-determination that totally differed from the Indian traditions in managing community 
relations and differences. Romila Thapar, Gyanendra Pandey and Partha Chatterjee claim that 
the contemporary problem of communalism and communal violence is “inlaid within the 
emergence of colonial modernity in South Asia.”16    Likewise, Madan and Saberwal consider 
that communal violence is generated by the modern political system, because the modern 
political system, they assert, is unable to accommodate the traditional and religious norms that 
deeply govern the Indian society.17 
The above-stated views sound like the critics of Colonial rule, secularism and modernity. 
Moreover, these observations only tend to explain why communal violence takes place in 
India, but they don’t specifically shed light on why and on what basis Hindu extremists are 
motivated to kill or terrorise members of the particular minority communities. Furthermore, 
the views have the tendency to generalize all religious violence in India as communal or 
ethno-cultural conflicts. But, some religious violence, such as the Gujarat pogrom and 
                                                 
15 See Ashis Nandy, Shikha Trivedy, Shail Mayaram and Achyut Yagnik, Creating a Nationality: The 
Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 
16 Chandana Mathur, “Communalism and Globalization: An Opening Gambit in a Conversation between Two 
Literatures,” in Communalism and Globalization in South Asia and Diaspora, edited by Deana Heath and 
Chandana Mathur (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 4. 
 




violence against Christians in Orissa differ from other communal violence to a large extent – 
rather these violent incidents display characteristics of religious terrorism. Thus, the modern 
concept of secularism and modernity – although is responsible for the emergence of 
communalism and communal violence to certain extent – do not adequately define the actual 
cause of Hindu religious terror against the particular religious minorities. 
IV.2.3. Religious Violence: By-product of Globalisation  
Scholars, like Patel, Heuze and Masselos, think that due to globalisation communal violence 
occur in India. According to them, globalisation and economic liberalisation cause social 
displacement and disarray of the Indian society, and give rise to increasing number of 
communal violence and communal or ethno-religious identity politics.18 Globalization, says 
Marika Vicziany, is not only an economic affair. The most obvious  
evidence for globalization in India today is to be found in foreign funding to a 
virulently right wing Hindu nationalism that has gripped the country in last ten years. 
The consequences of Hindutva (Hindu Nationalism) campaign were seen in the state 
of Gujarat that suffered from mass anti-Muslim killings in 2002.19 
 
Arjun Appadurai associates communalism with globalisation. Global process or globalization, 
he argues, is accountable for production of social uncertainty, and the social uncertainty can 
steer a project of ethnic cleansing.20 In the view of A. Ahmad, Hindu or “Hindutva terror – its 
exclusory rhetoric of national unity, its hegemonic grip on popular culture, and its 
                                                 
18 S.Patel, “Contemporary Bombay, the Power Base and Popular Appeal of the Shivsena,” in NCSAS Discussion 
Paper, No. 3 (1997); G. Heuze, “Cultural Populism: The Appeal of the Shiv Sena,” in Bombay, Metaphor of 
Modern India, edited by S. Patel and A Thorner (Bombay: 1995), 213ff; J. Masselos, “The Bombay Riots of 
1993:The Politics of an urban Conflagration,” in Politics of Violence, edited by Howard Brasted, John McGuire 
and Peter Reeves (New Delhi: 1996), 111ff. 
 
19 Marika Vicziany, “Globalization and Hindutva: India’s Experience with Global Economic and Political 
Integration,” Globalization in the Asian Region: Impacts and Consequences, edited by Gloria Davies and Chris 
Nyland (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004), 92. 
 
20 Mathur, “Communalism and Globalization: An Opening Gambit in a Conversation between Two Literatures,” 




representations of Indian Muslims as menacing” – is inseparable from the neoliberal 
globalization that has mostly benefited upper and middle class Hindus in India.21  Riaz 
Ahmed, in his article “Gujarat Violence: Meaning and Implications,” wrote that the Gujarat 
violence took place due to the total political and economic crisis sweeping through the Indian 
political system. This political crisis, Ahmed observes, was both the cause and the outcome 
“of the process of globalisation, authoritarianism and communalism.” “Globalisation,” as he 
understands, “has not merely opened up new economic avenues; it has also made the 
economic crisis worse.”22 
Globalization (ref. Appendix 5 for explanation on globalisation and its effects) can pose a 
serious threat to the traditional cultures and socio-historical set-up by spreading Western 
culture and imagery and as a new form of colonialism, cultural colonialism, which is “more 
insidious and more effective in cementing the dependency of the post-colonial periphery than 
the fiscal crudities of earlier decades,” through “late modernity, cultural flow and information 
technology.”23 Hans Opschoor says, “Globalisation and modernisation may pose threats to 
ethnic and religious diversity and thus also to social cohesion and stability.”24 However, the 
argument focused on globalisation, in explaining Hindu religious/communal violence, does 
not explicate why Hindu extremists should mostly target Muslims, Christians and Sikhs. Do 
Muslims, Christians and Sikhs present a serious socio-religious threat to the dominant Hindu 
                                                 
21 A. Ahmad, On Communalism and Globalization: Offensives of the Far Right (Gurgaon: Three Essays 
Collective, 2003), 121. 
 
22 Riaz Ahmed, “Gujarat Violence: Meaning and Implications,” in Economic and Political Weekly (18 May, 
2002), 1871. 
 
23 Peter Golding and Phil Harris, eds., Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalization, Communication and the New 
International Order (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 4. 
 
24 Thomas Pogge, “Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor,” in  
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majority? Why the dominant majority becomes overwhelmingly violent, in any pretext, 
against the given minorities? Why Hindu spiritual leaders and saintly characters are involved 
in Hindu terror tactics? The argument fails to answer these questions appropriately. 
IV.2.4. Hindu Religious Ideologies, Historical Context and Socio-Political Environment 
are Accountable for the Emergence of Hindu Religious Extremism/Terrorism 
All the above-discussed postulates tend to explain the reason why there are increasing 
incidents of communal or ethno-religio-political violence in India; but, they do not 
specifically define Hindu religious terrorism (like Sikh and Islamic terrorism) and what could 
be the cause of the emergence of this force. No doubt, Hindu-Muslim communal violence 
(which began to occur from the latter half of the nineteenth century)  is one of the most 
complicated and persistent problems in India. The first significant chain of local Hindu-
Moslem communal riots/violence had taken place in “Bombay and the United Provinces in 
the 1870s; others have occurred in one or more parts of India in every succeeding decade.” 25 
One of the most important issues (although there were numerous immediate issues) for the 
occurrence of Hindu-Muslim communal riots during the latter nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries was the question of cow-slaughter.26  
Although communal violence began to take place before Indian independence, the partition of 
India has given birth to longstanding religious violence on communal lines. In certain cases 
communal violence appear to be visible symptoms of a more serious problem (i.e. Hindu 
religious terrorism) the root of which could be traced back to the nineteenth century Hindu 
                                                 
25 Daniel Thorner, “Hindu-Moslem Conflict in India,” in Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 17, No. 7 (7 April, 1948), 78. 
In the second decade of the twentieth century there began the Gurdwara Reform Movement in Punjab, and 
during the period of this movement hundreds of Sikhs were killed and thousands were injured or jailed. This was 
both religious as well as political movement. See Louis E. Fenech, Martyrdom in the Sikh Tradition : Playing the 
Game of Love (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 227. 
 
26 Thorner, “Hindu-Moslem Conflict in India,” 78. 
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socio-religious movements. This problem is becoming a chronic malady that seems to be 
spreading all over India without restraint and looks like resisting all kinds of treatment. 
Besides bomb blast cases, two of the most gruesome acts of religious terror perpetrated by 
Hindu extremist organizations were brutal religious violence against Muslims in Gujarat in 
2002 and against Christians in Orissa in 2007-08. There are certain factors (will be analysed 
critically in later sections) that make it evident that the Gujarat and Orissa violence were 
different from other communal riots. These two violent incidents rather demonstrate certain 
features of holy war. 
Therefore, in the discourse of Hindu religious terrorism political, economic and social factors 
do not sufficiently explain the origin and design of Hindu religious terrorism. It appears that 
there are mainly three deeply interlinked aspects involved in motivating Hindu religious 
terrorism. They are radical Hindu religious ideologies, historical context and prevailing socio-
political environment. In the meantime, attempts have been made (by some Hindu thinkers) to 
reconstruct Indian (rather Hindu) history to exhibit the past glory and superiority (compared 
to all other cultures and races) of the Hindu culture and society, and to prove the demonic 
nature of the conceived enemies.27 One of the primary intentions behind the attempt of 
reconstruction of Hindu history seems to be the projection of these forces of evil as a grave 
threat to the survival of Hindu dharma and Hindu society; therefore, acts of religious terrorism 
could be justified as righteous deeds. In the RSS branches cadres are handed down “simple 
messages of Hindu glory, tales of resistance to Muslim tyranny.”28  They are also told that the 
struggle against the Muslim tyranny, for Hindu independence, is a thousand-year-old-struggle 
                                                 
27 See Sumit Ganguly, “The Crisis of Indian Secularism,” in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 4 (October, 
2003), 21. 
 
28. Tapan Raychaudhuri, “Shadows of the Swastika: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Hindu 




Hence, religious ideologies, formulated on the basis of select Hindu texts (particularly the 
Ramayana and the Mahabharata) and symbols (cow protection, liberation and purification of 
holy land or poonya bhumi, liberation and construction of Ramjanmabhoomi temple and other 
holy places, re-establishment of Ramrajya, chariot procession or rath yatra, etc.), conceived 
and reconstructed historical and socio-political contexts could appropriately elucidate the 
emergence of Hindu religious terrorism. To understand how these factors are closely 
interlinked in giving rise to Hindu religious terror, we have to critically review some of the 
modern Hindu socio-religious reformation movements that began in early nineteenth century 
and how they were instrumental in formation of twentieth century militant Hindu religio-
nationalist organizations and how they succeeded in infusing militant Hindu ideologies 
among many Hindus. 
IV.3. Modern Hindu Socio-Religious Reformation Movements 
From the early nineteenth century there began modern Hindu socio-religious reformation 
movements in India. Basically these Hindu socio-religious movements characterized “a 
reaction to the threat of Western domination and especially to a twofold cultural challenge, 
the utilitarian reformism and Christian proselytism.”29 Activities of both the parties might 
have appeared very dangerous to the prevalent socio-cultural balance of the Hindu society.   
The main objectives of these socio-religious movements were: to defend Hinduism from 
outside attacks, particularly from Christian missionaries;30 to wean Hinduism from various 
                                                 
29 Christophe Jaffrelot, “Hindu nationalism, Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building,” Paper prepared for 
presentation at the Conference of the British Association for South Asian Studies, (Birmingham: 10-12 April, 
1992), 2. 
 
30 See Yogendra K. Malik and Dhirnedra K. Vajpeyi, “The Rise of Hindu Militancy: India’s Secular Democracy 




socio-religious and customary behaviours31 – e.g., sati (burning of a widow on her husband’s 
funeral pyre – for explanation on sati see Appendix 6),32 idol worship, child marriage, 
prohibition of widow remarriage, infanticide, and caste system; to unite all Hindus of India; to 
awaken (educationally, religiously and socio-politically) Hindus to liberate India from 
colonial domination; and, “to create a purified future in which Hindus would regain,” as 
conceived by certain Hindu religious thinkers, “their lost honor, their dignity, and their role as 
spiritual leaders in the world.”33 According to Zavos, in the nineteenth century Hindu 
thinkers, interested in social and political matters, postulated a set of ideas that have become 
prominent in the formation of modern Hindu identities. Mainly, he says, concepts of the 
‘Golden Age’ of Vedic Hinduism, the Aryan race as the fundamental force that produced 
Hindu culture, “the slow disintegration and eventual stagnation of that culture during the 
medieval period, and the related notions of forced conversion to Islam and destruction of 
Hindu temples as the defining events of that particular period.” These notions have 
“contributed a great deal to analyses of the predicament of India both as a subjugated land and 
as a force in the development of the modern world; as a Hindu in this context.” 34 
Hence, these movements could be accredited for militant Hindu religio-nationalistic 
awakenings from the second half of the nineteenth century. Among the modern Hindu socio-
religious movements the Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj are the most prominent ones. 
                                                 
31 James Warner Bjorkman, Fundamentalism, Revivalists and Violence in South Asia (Riverdale: The Riverdale 
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32 See Paul B. Courtright, “The Iconographies of Sati,” in Sati, the Blessing and the Curse: The Burning of Wives 
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IV.3.1. The Brahmo Samaj: Towards Assertion of Hinduism as Universal Religion  
The Brahmo Samaj (Society of Ultimate Reality or Brahman) was the first important Hindu 
socio-religious reform movement. The Samaj was formally founded in 1828, in Calcutta (now 
Kolkata), by Rammohan Roy (1774-1833).35 Later on the Samaj came to be known as Adi 
Brahmo Samaj. Roy’s aims were to dissociate his countrymen from the evils of Puranic36 
Hinduism37(ref. Appendix 7 for explanation on Puranas and Puranic Hinduism) and draw 
their attention to the original purity of the teaching of Vedanta (Upanishads are called 
Vedanta), to defend Hinduism from outside attacks, particularly from Christian missionaries, 
and to ascertain it as a universal religion. Christian missionaries mainly attacked the practice 
of idolatry, polytheism and caste system. Roy considered that only the Vedanta (Upanishads) 
and the Vedanta-Sutra as authoritative Hindu religious texts. Further, he was convinced that 
Vedanta taught, similar to Christian and Islamic texts, monotheism. Therefore, the idolatry, 
polytheism and sacrifices, according to Roy, had to be avoided from Hinduism; consequently, 
he sought to reform Hinduism from within to project it as a universal faith. Roy strongly 
advocated monotheism and, at the same time, he fervently argued that idol worship was later 
addition to “a most perfect antiquarian religion in which God was worshipped as a pure 
Absolute.”38 Thus, the form of devotion adopted by the Brahmo Samaj was prayer to the 
“One Absolute Reality or Brahman.” 
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36 See “Hinduism,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008 Ultimate Reference Suite (Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2008). 
 
37 See “Hinduism,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008 Ultimate Reference Suite. 
 




The Brahmo Samaj in pursuit of reforming Hinduism almost isolated itself from its mother 
religious institution. However, the Brahmo Samaj had wider influence all over India and 
emulating it several other religious reformation movements came into existence in different 
parts of India. The Arya Samaj was one of those Hindu reformation movements which 
generated lasting impact in the Hindu society till today. The Arya Samaj can be called the 
forerunner of latter militant Hindu religio-nationalistic organizations.  
IV.3.2. The Arya Samaj: Re-establishment of the Vedic Golden Age 
The Arya Samaj was founded in 187539 by Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1883).  In 1872, 
Dayananda went to Calcutta and met Keshab Chandra Sen and other Brahmo Samajists who 
had a great influence upon him. Although Dayananda disapproved certain practices of the 
Samajists he followed them in institutionalizing “the idea of a Vedic monotheism and joined 
in the criticism of the idolatry of popular Hinduism.”40  The Satyartha Prakash (“Light of the 
Truth”), the work which Dayananda completed in 1875, expounds the fundamental principles 
of the Arya creed: 
The belief in a single, unitary God, the identification of the Vedas as the embodiment 
of complete truth, and the logical inference that the age of Vedic religion constituted 
the Golden Age not only of Hinduism, but of all religion.41 
 
As per the perception of Dayananda, his work was the re-introduction of the religious 
practices of the Vedic-Hinduism; therefore, whole Hindu population ought to practice them. 
This is why his watch word was “back to the Vedas,”42 in other words, all Hindus must return 
back to the original and unadulterated Hinduism to re-establish the Vedic-Golden-Age. 
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The objectives of Dayananda on founding of the Arya Samaj were: to project Hinduism as 
superior religion, compared to all other religious traditions; to liberate and purify the holy 
land of Hindus; to protect Hindu religious symbols, especially cow; and to do away with 
Christian, Muslim and Sikh faiths from India. To realize these aspirations Dayananda 
introduced Suddhi (purification-ritual)43(for further clarification on Suddhi see Appendix 8) 
and Sangathana (organization). Suddhi was introduced to fulfil two objectives: to reclaim 
those Hindus who were converted to Christianity, Islam and Sikhism; and, to give equal status 
to untouchables with other high caste Hindus by investing sacred thread on them. Sangathana 
was an organization for self-defence that would help to cultivate a militant spirit, manliness 
and self-respect (which had been lost, as supposed by Dayananda, under the Muslim 
domination) among the Hindus, so that the Hindus could meet the enemies (Muslims and 
Christians) in their strongholds. The Sangathana movement was widely popularized, in the 
early 1920s, by the Hindu religio-political organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha and the 
RSS “largely in response to expressions of Pan-Islamism and the growth of Muslim 
organizations during the Khilafat movement.”44 In support of Sangathana initiatives, Urban 
merchants and notables of north India frequently made large financial donations or granted 
free land for the formation of gymnasiums and wrestling clubs or dens. Practice of Suddhi and 
Sangathana make it evident that Hindu socio-religious antagonism against the given minority 
communities began to germinate during this period. Furthermore, Suddhi and Sangathana 
systems erected a concrete barrier, between Hindus and Muslims-Christians-Sikhs, which was 
reinforced by latter developed militant Hindu religio-nationalistic ideologies.  
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So, the Brahamo Samaj and the Arya Samaj sounded an urgent wake up call to the Hindus to 
defend their socio-cultural and religious identity and their holy land. Two most significant 
issues they pointed out were degradation of Hinduism and a serious threat posed by 
Christianity and Islam to both Hindus and their sacred territory. Therefore, these movements, 
to a large extent, were instrumental in inspiring militant spirit among Hindus. During 
Twentieth-century, following these movements, there came into existence present militant 
Hindu religio-nationalistic organizations, among them the All India Hindu Mahasabha, the 
RSS and the VPH are the most prominent ones. 
IV.3.3. Cow Protection Movement for Hindu Unity 
The original cow protection movement could be dated back to the 1860s. However, from the 
1890s the issue of cow protection began to occupy prominent public stage and became a 
powerful religious symbol of a broader Hindu religious nationalist agenda from 1920s.45 
During the 1880s, Dayananda travelled several parts of the country lecturing on the Hindu 
reformation and establishing cow protection societies (Gaurakshini Sabhas). He founded “his 
first gaushila (cattle sanctuary) in Rewari in 1979, a cow protection society was established in 
Agra by 1881, and another in Calcutta in 1882.”46  
The cow protection movement, as Pandey observes, has been very important issue to establish 
close connection between urban and rural, and elite and ordinary Hindus to develop mass 
Hindu communal consciousness.47 This movement, Van der Veer argues, was neither 
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religious or nor Hindu nationalist movement.48 Whereas John Zavos opines that though cow 
protection was not like other socio-religious movements – because the approach for cow 
protection on the whole was non-confrontational – it was an important step towards the 
development of Hindu nationalistic ideology.49 In the meantime, Katherine Prior suggests that 
the role of the cow as a symbol of Hinduness was strengthened by colonial involvement in the 
disputes related to cow protection in the early nineteenth century.50 “Hinduness,” according 
Copley, is a radical Hindu identity which “excludes Indian Muslims, Sikhs, Parsees, Jains, 
Buddhists, Christians, Animists, and to a degree, the scheduled castes and tribals whose 
loyalties are, at most, but partially Hindu.”51 
The cow protection movement has to be studied in relation with other Modern Hindu socio-
religious movements, especially the Arya Samaj and its institutions of Suddhi and 
Sangathana, to comprehend the design in launching this movement. Cow has been the most 
important of all Hindu holy symbols from the Vedic period for both religious and socio-
economic purposes – on the one hand, almost in every Hindu ritual and ceremony cow 
products, like milk, ghee (clarified butter) and cow dung, were/are essential and, on the other, 
oxen and bullock were/are needed to plough fields, pull bullock-carts etc. Moreover, cow (as 
a holy/sacred symbol) was the only most promising universal (among all the practicing 
Hindus) religious symbol that could be managed to cement problematic gap between different 
classes (high and low castes, urban and rural etc.) of Hindus. Thus, Dayananda could have, 
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keeping in view the religious significance of the cow to all religious Hindus, launched cow 
protection movement. At the same time, he might have other motives – to popularize his Arya 
movement among all Hindus, to seek Hindu unification,52 and to breed religious hatred 
among Hindus against Christians and Muslims (because Christians and Muslims slaughter 
cow and eat beef) – in launching the cow protection movement. Hence, the cow protection 
movement could have given birth to Hindu communalism and communal tension between 
Hindus and Muslims and Christians in several parts of British India from the early 1880s.53 
IV.4. Emergence of Militant Hindu Organisations during the early Twentieth Century 
From the late nineteenth century socio-reformation movements, especially the Arya Samaj, 
had been attempting to unite and regenerate the Hindu community by promoting more 
militant form of Hinduism. From the 1920s, as a result of the activities of these socio-
reformation movements, increasing number of Hindu zealots started to present themselves as 
the aggressive force of resurgent Hinduism,54 and there emerged several militant Hindu 
religio-nationalist organizations. These militant organizations played very crucial role in 
widening relationship-gap between Hindu and minority communities. Muslims were 
visualized as oppressors who were responsible for the decline of Hinduism, supposedly on 
account of the detrimental effect of Muslim rule on the Hindus.55 Among these militant 
organizations the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS are the most important ones in the discourse 
of Hindu extremism. Therefore, it is necessary to review these movements briefly to assess 
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their significance in intensifying communal division between Hindu and minority 
communities. 
IV.4.1. All India Hindu Mahasabha – a Religio-Political Platform for Hindu Unity 
The All India Hindu Mahasabha was formally founded in April 1915, in Hardwar, 56 one of 
the most important Hindu sacred places in North India. The Punjab Hindu Sabha (Hindu 
Forum), which was developed between 1907 and 1909 by Arya Samjists, was the driving 
force in establishing the All India Hindu Mahasabha. The main purpose in formation of this 
organization was to create national level religio-political platform to bring together different 
Hindu religious movements to oppose British concessions to the Muslim League, which was 
founded in 1906 – in this year “a delegation of Muslims had applied to the British for separate 
electorates,” which “had led to fears that minorities might indulge in separatism.”57 In other 
words, the intention of the concerned Hindu religious leaders in forming this kind of national 
level Hindu organization was to seek Hindu unity to mobilize masculine/aggressive form of 
Hinduism against Muslims and British government to achieve their religio-political goals – 
members of the caste-ridden Hindu society had been described as weak by the British.58 In 
1923, B.S. Moonje (leader of the Central Provinces Hindu Sabha), in his report on Malabar 
Hindu-Muslim riot, pointed out three main weaknesses of Hindus: (1) Hindu practice of “the 
un-Vedic principle of ahimsa” and vegetarian diet compared to Muslims’ virility, non-
vegetarian diet and practice of sacrifice – he suggested reintroduction of “the  Vedic 
institution of Yajnathag” (understood as animal sacrifice) to make Hindus familiar with the 
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sight of spilling blood and killing; (2) lack of Hindu unity compared to the Muslims; and (3) 
Social disunity created by caste system.59 
Therefore, the Mahasabha campaigned for the Hindu character of India, encouraged the 
practice of Suddhi to reconvert those Hindus earlier converted to Islam and Christianity, 
strongly advocated the adoption of Hindi in Devanagri script as the national language of 
India, ardently campaigned for cow-protection and Hindu uplift. So, the organization sought 
to ascertain ageless correlation between Hinduism (includes Hindu race) and the land as 
conceived by certain Hindu religious thinkers, like Dayananda and Acharya Ramdev. At the 
same time, Vedic Golden Age (which is perceived as the glorious past of Hinduism), Sanskrit 
(sacred) and Hindi (prestigious) languages, and historical60 and holy land have been 
visualized as the criteria of the identity of Hindu religio-nationalism. However, the idea of 
Vedic Golden Age has been replaced by Ramrajya (an ideal Kingdom of Rama) from the 
early 1980s. 
Acharya Ramdev (1881-1939), an ardent Hindu nationalist, wrote Bharatvars ka Itihas 
(history of India) as a textbook for Gurukul Kangri, which was founded in 1902 near the holy 
city of Hardwar.61 In the book Ramdev makes an attempt to prove that Vedic civilization was 
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chiefly responsible for the growth of the entire major “high cultures” of the world.62 He 
refutes the argument that whatever cultural progress the Hindus achieved is due to their 
contact with Babylonians, Greece and Romans. Citing some philological and archaeological 
evidence, he tries to prove that China, Persia, Afghanistan, Greece, Rome, Babylon, Egypt, 
America, and Celtic civilizations had drawn a lot from Aryans’ achievements.63 Whether the 
arguments he states and the philological and archaeological evidences he postulates in the 
book could be historically and scientifically verified and validated or not present day Hindu 
nationalism draws a lot of inspiration from Ramdev’s reconstructed Hindu history. 
Thus, the structure of the Hindu Mahasabha was erected on the fertile ground of Hindu 
communal-antagonism against Muslims. This was why after 1922 its growth depended on 
communal issues, i.e., its growth was “strongest where communal riots were fiercest.”64 From 
1920, the year in which Khilafat movement was launched in India, the parameter of the Hindu 
communal-antagonism against the Muslim community enhanced. In this regard Muslim 
religious leaders of that time could be accounted for adding fuel to the Hindu communal 
resentment against the Muslims, for three reasons: “the loose talk of a holy war and the 
manifestly Pan-Islamic aims of many Khilafat leaders led Hindus to fear a revived and 
aggressive Islam;” Muslim religious leaders openly exhorted Muslim mass to make efforts to 
convert non-Muslims; and  the uprising of the Moplahs in Malabar (in August 1921), which 
was tactlessly covered-up by the Central Khilafat Committee.65 According to Gaul Minautt, 
“The Khilafat movement was primarily a campaign by a particular group of Indian Muslims 
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to unite their community politically by means of religious and cultural symbols meaningful to 
all strata of that community;” as a result, the movement was viewed as a quest for “Pan-Indian 
Islam”.66 The afore-mentioned Muslim activities confirmed the fear of Hindus that the hidden 
agenda of the Khilafat movement was to enlarge the domain of Islam. Consequently, Hindu-
Muslim communal riots broke out in several places during 1922 and 1923. The Mahasabha, 
which remained formally non-functional from 1920, was revived in 1922 in reaction to the 
Hindu-Muslim communal violence. From this time the communal tension between the two 
communities heightened.67 In the meantime, the relationship between the Mahasabha and the 
Indian National Congress (INC) began to strain because the INC conceived the emerging 
Indian nation a collection of all existing religious communities.68 All communities, whether 
majority or minority, were regarded “more or less equal and the Hindu majority was expected 
to accept some sacrifices in the interest of national integration.”69 Whereas the goal of the 
Mahasabha was to make India Hindu nation, therefore, any concession to minority 
communities would not be acceptable to the leaders of the organization – the differentiation 
between the INC and the Mahasabha began to be clearly visible from 1937, the year in which 
Veer D. Savarkar became president of the Mahasabha.70 Lal Chand defines the ideology 
behind the founding of Hindu Sabha in the following words:  
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patriotism ought to be communal and not merely geographical [...] The idea is to love 
everything owned by the community. It may be religion, it may be a tract of country, 
or it may be a phase of civilization.71 
According to the religio-nationalist Hindus’ exclusivist view India and Hinduism are 
inseparably and eternally interrelated; for this reason only Hindus, by virtue of being born 
Hindu, could have the supreme right to live and rule in this land. Such Hindu religious-
nationalism or communalism demonstrates exactly similar features of Islamic religious-
nationalism, which has been vying to create pan-Islamic state, or some other religious-
nationalism that do not tolerate other religious communities within their religio-politically 
demarcated boarders. Therefore, militant Hindus, to a considerable extent, were accountable 
for the division of Indian subcontinent in 1947 because of their adamant and uncompromising 
form of religio-nationalistic conception on emerging Indian nation. It is most likely that on 
account of this religio-nationalistic standpoint Muslim leaders were forced to demand separate 
land for the Muslims from the late 1930s – the demand for the creation of Pakistan was 
formally launched only in 1940.72 However, the partition of India on religious lines 
“reignited”73 the spirit of militant Hindus in their attempt to make India Hindu nation in 
which minorities should not exist or be subservient to the majority community. But they could 
not succeed in their plan because of Gandhi, Nehru and other secular minded Indian leaders. 
Hence, making of independent India a secular nation was a huge blow to the Hindu 
communalists and religious-nationalists. However, Hindu religious-nationalists have not 
given up their agenda of making India a Hindu rashtra even though it was declared a secular 
state by the Constituent Assembly in the Constitution adopted in 1950; rather these forces are 
                                                 
71 Lal Chand, Self-Abnegation in Politics, forward by Bhai Paramanand (Lahore: The Central Hindu Yuvak 
Sabha, 1938), 103; quoted in Jaffrelot, “Hindu nationalism, Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building,” 13. 
 
72 See Ayesha Jalal, “Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of ‘Communalism’: Partition Historiography 
Revisited,” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July 1996), 687-688. 
 




bolstered from the late 1970s to make all-out attempt to attain their longstanding religio-
political goal. 
Thus, from the early 1920s the Arya Samaj and the Mahasabha inculcated militant religio-
nationalistic spirit and communalist passion among wider Hindu mass that made the public 
phase of Hinduism increasingly exclusivist and militant. An aggressive/militant Hinduism is 
clearly manifested during religious processions and festivals in many parts of India. In regard 
to such aggressive picture of Hindusim, Gooptu writes: “the dominant image of Hinduism 
emerged to be one of very large crowds of people, wielding staffs, flags, swords and other 
arms, marching in processions during religious festivals.”74   
IV.4.2. The RSS and Its Militant Hindutva Ideology 
The RSS was found in Nagpur, in Maharashtra, in 1925 by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar. This 
organization too, like the Mahasabha, came into existence in reaction to the Hindu-Muslim 
violence that erupted in several parts of India during the early 1920s. The RSS was originally 
a Hindu socio-cultural organization that was devoted to protect Hindu ideals75 and to define 
and create India a Hindu nation. Therefore, the RSS along with the Mahasabha and other 
Hindu organizations “opposed not only the Muslim League but also the Congress conception 
of India as a nation of many religions.”76 However, during the leadership of Hedgewar the 
organization was kept away from direct affiliation with any of the political organisations that 
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were fighting the British rule.77 The distinguishing feature of the RSS, among the Hindu 
religio-nationalist organizations, has been its shahkas (branches), where ideological and 
physical training is imparted to young male volunteers. The RSS from the beginning of its 
history started its own military unit “in charge of supervising and implementing military 
discipline and full-scale infantry training, minus weapons (but with swords and lathis – metal-
tipped bamboo staffs in the Shakhas.”78 The RSS volunteers (swayamsevaks) of each shakha 
are required to offer prayer before the saffron flag, which represents Hindu nation and the 
RSS “guru”.79 
In 1940, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906-1973) became the second sarsanghchalak 
(leader) of the RSS. From the time Golwalkar (also known as Guruji) took the leadership the 
institution began to grow in size. Meanwhile, Golwalkar co-opted the Hindutva – the term 
Hindutva (Hinduness) was coined by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966) in 1923 – 
ideology and attempted to directly transform the Hindu nationalism into action. Thus, 
Golwalkar’s RSS organization stands for an extreme form of Hindu nationalism that supports 
the notion of Hindu nation on the basis of Hindu values and Hindu religious-culture 
(Hindutva). According to the Hindutva ideology of Golwalkar all non-Hindus who want to 
live in Hindustan 
must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in 
reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the 
Hindu race and culture, i.e., they must not only give up their attitude of intolerance 
and ungratefulness towards this land and its age-old traditions but must also cultivate 
the positive attitude of love and devotion instead – in a word they must cease to be 
                                                 
77 “Analysis: RSS Aims for a Hindu Nation,” in BBC News (March 10, 2003); available from 
http://news.bbe.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/655722.stm; Internet accessed: 2 May 2011. 
 
78  Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 94. 
 
79 Gwilym Beckerlegge, “Saffron and Seva: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s Appropriation of Swami 




foreigners, or may stay in this country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, 
claiming nothing, deserving no privilege, far less any preferential treatment – not 
even citizens' rights.80 
The above-quoted account makes it evident that Golwalkar and his organization’s nationalism 
is an extreme form of exclusivist Hindu religio-nationalism which denies the rights of all 
existing non-Hindu and ethno-religious minorities in India.  Besides Muslims and Christians, 
it excludes animists, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsees and schedule tribes; nevertheless, 
animists, Buddhists, Jains, Parsees and schedule tribes do not seem to openly challenge the 
Hindu claim as Muslims, Christians and Sikhs do. Such Hindu religio-nationalism can be 
termed as Hindu religio-cultural-colonialism, which aspires to do away with all non-Hindu 
cultures and religions. This extreme form of exclusivist Hindu nationalistic-spirit is 
continuously infused among many young Hindus in almost forty thousand RSS shakhas in 
more than twenty-seven thousand places spread all over India.81 Therefore, the RSS shakhas 
seem to play same role as those of Islamic madrassas where young Muslims are radicalised to 
destroy non-believers or infidels.  Seemingly the methods adopted by both the institutions 
(shakhas and madrassas) to indoctrinate their young volunteers are similar – they differ in 
their ideology, but not in their tactics. The RSS has the capability to produce and mobilize 
thousands of Nathuram Godses (Godse assassinated Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 – he was a 
member of the RSS, the Hindu Rashtra Dal, and the Hindu Mahasabha) to terrorise religious 
minorities across India. Moreover, this militant organization poses a serious challenge to the 
Indian secularism and socio-political integrity of the Indian nation. The Indian government 
had thrice imposed ban on this organization due to its undemocratic and unconstitutional 
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activities. The first ban was imposed in 1948 following the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi; 
the second ban was imposed in 1975 by Indira Gandhi; in 1993 it was banned for third time 
because of its role in the demolition of the Babri Mosque, in Ayodhya. These government 
bans imposed upon it are clear indications of the serious nature of this Hindu militant 
institution. 
Furthermore, the RSS was instrumental in formation of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and 
the VHP.  The BJS, a militant Hindu nationalist political party, was established in 1951 with 
the help of some senior RSS members, who were allowed by the organization to be actively 
involved in the party. Therefore, the BJS “became the most aggressive and determined of the 
Hindu nationalist Parties which were attempting to win power by constitutional means.”82 The 
burning vision of the BJS was the transformation of India into an organic Hindu nation by 
returning it back to its roots – according to the BJS ideologues, the “Indian society should 
draw increasingly on ancient Hindu traditions and rely less on Western ideas.”83 This burning 
zeal of the BJS made it different and more dangerous from other Indian political parties. The 
BJS was dissolved in April 1979, on account of the power debacle in the Centre – after the 
power debacle many of the Jana Sanghis finally resumed an independent existence. However, 
in April 1980, the former BJS members helped to establish Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),84 
the political wing of the Sangh Parivar, of which the RSS is a very vital organ.  
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At present the RSS has about four and a half million active members all over India and more 
than hundred smaller militant Hindu organizations affiliated to it. The extreme form of 
exclusivist militant Hindu religio-nationalist ideology, its tens of thousands of shakhas where 
ideological and physical/military trainings are imparted to the young volunteers, millions of 
active members and more than hundred militant Hindu organizations, which are affiliated to 
it, project the RSS as more potential threat compared to other religious extremist/terrorist 
organizations in India.  
IV.5. Post-1947 Hindu Religious Organization: The VHP and Its Modus Operandi to 
Create Religious Violence 
From the beginning of Indian independence a deeper sense of insecurity and a fear began to 
develop among many Hindus on account of two specific reasons/assumptions. These 
assumptions are: fear of being overwhelmed by aggressive minorities; and minority favouring 
secular Congress government. According to Eva Hellman,  
The concept of Hindus as being under threat from hostile forces is at the heart of the 
VHP discourse. The most frequently mentioned enemies are Christians, Muslims and 
Communists, with secularists and materialists also being denounced as inimical 
forces. They are said to represent threat such as separatism, anti-nationalism and 
disregard for spiritual and ethical values. 85 
 
Therefore, the Hindus who have developed such insecurity and fear strongly oppose the claim 
of certain politicians that minorities are marginalized or suppressed in India. Suppression of 
minorities, in the view of Amar Zutsi, is a distortion of historical evidence. In Zutsi’s 
understanding “it was the Hindus who were subjected to centuries of repressive Mugal rule, 
culminating in the rise of Aurangzeb and followed by the British Raj.”86  
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Moreover, the second assumption is more serious than the first one because it involves the 
secular government. The secular government, as supposed by them, unduly favours and 
supports these aggressive minorities or the enemies of Hinduism; therefore, the secular 
government becomes the enemy of Hindu dharma. This is why Niranjan Dev Tirtha, the 144th 
Jagatguru Shankaracharya and one of the most revered figures of Hinduism, said that “the 
Government is the greatest enemy of Hinduism because of its policy of appeasing the 
minorities.”87 Likewise Rajendra Singh (former RSS general Secretary) claims that India is 
the only country where small minority rules the dominant majority, and there is no one who 
considers oneself defender of Hindu faith. In this regard these Hindus cite the constitutional 
provisions (specifically Articles 25 to 28 and 370)88 that safeguard the religious rights of the 
minorities and grant special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir – but, they do not have 
any problem with those Articles in the Constitution which are Hindu bias (e.g.  as per  the 
Article 342, Hindi in Devanagari script is made official language of India; Article 352 
expresses the duty of Union government to develop, promote and spread Hindi language in 
India; Article 48 mentions the prohibition of cow slaughter; according to the Article 25, 
clause (2), sub-clause (b), Sikh, Jaina and Buddhist religions are categorized as Hindu 
religion89).  
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Therefore, Hindu leaders felt an urgent need of the formation of an international level Hindu 
umbrella organization. 90 Subsequently, with the help of the RSS leadership the VHP was 
formally organized in 1964 – originally with religious aims. The main objectives of the VHP 
are:  to seek Hindu unity; to develop and spread Hindu values; to establish and strengthen 
relationship with Hindu Diaspora;91 to defend, protect and preserve the Hindu society from 
the alien religion, culture and ideologies, “to check the spread of Christianity among the tribal 
populations;”92 and to support the country-wide campaign against the cow-slaughter. 
Although the VHP originally was established with religious aims the seed of militant Hindu 
religio-nationalism was present in it. Moreover, the presence of RSS in the functioning of the 
VHP in organizational as well as functional level, did suggest that it contained militant feature 
from the very beginning – but, this militant Hindu religio-nationalist characteristic remained 
dormant in the VHP until late 1970s. 
However, the VHP underwent transformation from the beginning of 1980s, and this 
revolution was mainly facilitated by the change of the RSS leadership, the decline of the 
Congress party and the establishment of the BJP. The RSS leadership was taken over by 
Balasaheb Deoras who, unlike his predecessors, regarded “active electoral politics an 
important vehicle for the dissemination of the idea of Hindu nationalism;” whereas his 
predecessors had avoided active politics and hold back the RSS and the VHP from actively 
participating in electoral politics. At the same time,   
Deoras believed in employing religio-cultural symbols for political mobilization. The 
VHP within this changed orientation, seemed competent for the job of building a 
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mass-based political movement grounded on religious demands. This was a scenario 
where religion became a strong instrument for political power and identity politics 
which eventually became the basis of material advancement for sections associated 
with the VHP and related organisations.93     
Thus, from the early 1980s the VHP and the RSS opened new chapter in their account by 
actively involving in the electoral politics. From this time politicisation of Hinduism (and vice 
versa) and manipulation of Hindu religious symbols for political purposes began in full force. 
The Sangh Parivar and the BJP started to plan and organize various religio-political activities 
to accomplish the set goals. Due to the Hinduisation of politics communal tension began to 
heighten from the early 1980s, and in the second half of the 80s a series of communal 
violence was flared-up in several North Indian cities and towns, like Meerut, Ahmedabad, and 
Bhagalpur. “In the 1980s more than 7,000 people [mostly Muslims] were killed in some 4,500 
communal incidents,” almost four times more than the figures of communal violence for the 
1970s.94 
Apparently the main intention behind the creation of communal violence was consolidation of 
wider Hindu mass to garner support for the BJP. For this purpose Hindu religio-nationalists 
had to create a focal-point which would draw together all Hindus. What else could be the 
most appropriate focal-point than battle-cry against Muslims and Christians who have been 
perceived as serious threat to the survival of Hindu dharma.  Meanwhile, the Hindu religio-
nationalistic think-tanks had to find or generate definite on the spot-evidence/evidences of 
enemies’ cruelty which could be used as a valid explanation to inspire masculine/aggressive 
spirit among wider Hindu constituency and to justify any act of religious violence to produce 
communal riots against Muslims and Christians. Moreover, to carry out their plans and 
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projects effectively they required appropriate socio-political environment. Fortunately, the 
socio-political developments that began to take place from the late 1970s provided suitable 
ground to launch their planned projects. Subsequently, the religio-political strategies (like 
rath yatra and Ramjanmabhoomi) helped to increase the BJP’s support base from the second 
half of the 1980s, and within a decade the party managed to increase its parliament seats from 
just two in the eighth Lok Sabha in 1984 to “85 in the 1989 election with 11.4% of the vote, 
and to 119 in 1991 with 19.9% of the vote.”95 How different aspects are linked together and 
what short of on the spot-evidences were generated to create communal violence will be 
assessed in the following sections. 
IV.5.1. Religio-Political Schemes towards Creation of Religious Violence  
Three religio-political schemes – Ekmata Yajna, Ramjanmabhoomi and Rath yatra – that 
were executed during the 1980s and the early 1990s by the Hindu religio-nationalist 
organizations and their political wing are very significant in the study of Hindu religious 
terrorism. A brief evaluation of these religious schemes will help us to understand how and 
why communal violence was created by the Hindu religio-nationalists.  
IV.5.1.1. Ekmata Yajna: Unity for Hindu Divinity 
In the first half of the 1980s the VHP organized Ekmata Yajna (integration rite) with an 
objective to build-up Hindu unity. According to the VHP leaders, “India cannot be kept united 
without uniting the Hindus.”96 In the Ekmata Yajna Bharat Mata (Mother-India) was 
portrayed as one of the most prominent Hindu divinities and her image was worshipped by 
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hundreds of thousands of Hindus on the way when it was taken in yatra (procession) from one 
part to another part of India.97  
The depiction of India as one of the prominent Hindu divinities suggests two things: first, 
India is embodiment of Hindu divinity, therefore, India is the holy land (which symbolizes 
physical body of divine mother) of the Hindus; second, Hindu divinities, the land, Hindu 
dharma (which may mean religion, culture, moral ethics, duties and responsibilities, 
obligations etc.) and Hindus are inseparably interrelated, and this relationship is eternally 
divine-ordained. Hence, those who refuse to honour or worship India as divine mother are not 
the children of the Mother (India); instead, they are the enemies of India, Hindu dharma and 
Hindu race. Whereas Muslims and Christians (due to their monotheistic belief system) refuse 
to give divine honour to Mother-India; so, they become the enemies of Hinduism and forfeit 
the right to exist within boarders of India. 
IV.5.1.2. Rath Yatra: Re-enactment of Mythical Battles between Dharma and Adharma 
(Good and Evil) 
A Rath Yatra (chariot procession) was launched by L. K. Advani, the BJP leader, in 
September, 1990. The Rath was designed as the chariot of Arjun (legendary hero of the battle 
of Kurukshetra in the Mahabharata), so that the chariot would look like a war chariot, and 
decorated it with the RSS symbol (the saffron flag) and the lotus symbol of the BJP.  The 
procession commenced from the Somnath Temple, in Gurjarat, and passed through several 
places in Western and Northern India to reach Ayodhya.98 The organizers of the Rath yatra 
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called all Hindus to exhibit their Rama Bhakti (devotion to Rama) and lok shakti (people’s 
power).99 On the way the chariot procession was greeted by youngsters  
. . . armed with bows and arrows, swords and trishuls (tridents), sadhus applied tilaks 
[religious mark on the forehead] of blood on Advani and other ‘holy warriors,’ and 
the BJP/RSS organizers organized rallies and welcome parties in towns and villages 
along the route. Prior passing through of the yatra, VHP and Bajrang Dal activists 
prepared the route with decorations, and saffron colors, and incited communal 
propaganda . . . .100 
Like the Ekmata Yajna, the objective of the Rath yatra was to seek and consolidate Hindu 
unity for the battle against the religious minorities that threaten Hindu dharma by occupying 
Hindu holy places, like the birth place of Rama.  The Rath yatra was re-enactment of the 
battle of Kurukshetra and the war between Rama and Ravana – these wars are the reminder of 
ongoing cosmic battle between dharma and adharma. Thus, the Sangh Parivar and the BJP, 
through the yatra, attempted to make three things obvious: declaration of dharma yudha 
against the supposed enemies; justification of the holy war on the basis of Hindu history; and, 
demonstration of the proof of Hindu victory. The chariot of Arjun symbolized divine 
justification of battle against the enemies of Hinduism; Advani and other BJP leaders declared 
the commencement of the religious war against the enemies by representing themselves as 
Rama and Lakshmana (legendary heroes of the Ramayana) and by receiving tilaks of blood in 
the hands of sadhus (holy men); and, the Somnath Temple, from where the Chariot procession 
began, signified the Hindu victory – the Somnath Temple also symbolized future victories. 
Hindu unity was imperative in the battle against the enemies to liberate their sacred places. 
Seemingly to arouse anti-Muslim spiritual-passion among the wider Hindu public the RSS, 
the VHP and the Bajrang Dal activists instigated communal riots during the chariot 
procession. Rath of Advani, writes K. N. Panikkar, 
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turned out to be ‘a chariot of fire.’ From the very beginning the yatra created tension 
between the Hindus and Muslims, even in localities far removed from its route. 
Between 1 September and 20 November, 116 communal riots occurred in which 564 
people died. 101 
 
 
IV.5.1.3. Ramjanmabhoomi: Re-establishment of Conceived or Mythical Hindu 
Golden Age 
From the 1980s Ayodhya issue has taken the central place in the Hindu communal debate. 
According to the Hindu understanding, based on the Ramayana, Ayodhya is the birth place of 
Rama, one of the ten major incarnations of god Vishnu (one of the Hindu trinity). However, 
the problem is not the birth of Rama in Ayodhya, but the belief that the place where the Babri 
Mosque stood is the exact location of Rama’s birth.102 Furthermore, Hindus believe that 
Zahiruddin Mohammed Babur (1483-1530), the founder of the Mogul dynasty in India, 
“ordered the construction of the mosque in 1528 after demolishing a Ram’s temple that had 
stood on the same spot.”103 According to Panikkar, the row over the Babri Masjid, constructed 
by Mir Baqui, “a noble of Babur’s court, had simmered for long, at least since 1885 when 
litigation had begun for the right to property in the area.”104 From the early 1980s this Hindu 
belief became an appropriate agenda for the Hindu religio-nationalists for the fulfilment of 
their religio-political design. They, applying various methods, attempted to communicate 
among the Hindus that construction of a Ram temple at its original place is must to inaugurate 
the re-establishment of the ancient Golden Age/Ramrajya. Finally, the Sangh Parivar and the 
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BJP managed to mobilize Hindu constituency in large number to entirely destroy the Babri 
Masjid within a day.105  
The legend of Rama as Vishnu’s avatara is recounted in “the ancient Sanskrit epic Ramayana, 
as well as in countless later vernacular versions.”106 The character of Rama, basing on this 
religious text, has been developed as the archetype of righteous and just king – one who 
brings peace and happiness upon all his subjects – of the Indian (Hindu) culture. Thus, the 
legend of Rama and his birth place suited very well “to develop into a symbol of the struggle 
against the forces that threatened traditional Hindu society and values”107  – “the religious cult 
of this incarnation of Vishnu,” according to Bakker, “only assumes significant proportions in 
the period that saw the forces of Islam threatening to destroy Hindu society, many centuries 
after the formation of the Ramayana itself.”108  
The above-analysed three religious projects explicitly suggest that the main focus of Hindu 
religio-nationalists was/is to terrorize (and subjugate) religious minorities by inspiring deeper 
religious hatred among wider Hindu constituency. Therefore, the activists of militant Hindu 
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organizations might have instigated communal violence against religious minorities during 
the time the above-mentioned projects were executed; Hindu leaders neither restrained their 
supporters from stirring communal violence, nor condemned the violent activities performed 
by the Hindu activists. 
IV.5.2. Hindu Extremist Groups and Their Terrorist Activities 
From the late 1960s to 1990s there emerged several extremist/militant Hindu dals (groups), 
senas (armies) and bahinis (armies) that are devoted to create communal violence or terrorise 
religious minorities in India. These extremist groups/armies are affiliated either to the RSS or 
the VHP or to both the organizations. Activists of these groups are given some sort of 
physical/military training by the All India Hindu Forum.109 With the rise of these extremist 
Hindu armies – such as Bajrang Dal, Akhil Bharatiya Shiv Shakti Dal, Shiv Sena, Trishul 
Sena, Durga Vahini (Durga’s Battalion – it “is a women’s militant organization founded by 
RSS in 1990, which imparts training in martial arts, self-defence, and nationalist ideology to 
young women mainly from the lower castes.”)110 and Abhinav Bharat – the communal tension 
and violence between the majority and minority communities has been mounting in many 
parts of India from the early 1980s. Some of the resounding slogans of these Hindu extremist 
armies are: “jo ham se takrayega choor choor ho jayega” (whoever attempts to confront us 
will be crushed into dust); “Hindu ki pahchan, Trishul ka nishan” (Hindus’ identity is the sign 
of trident – trident is weapon of god Siva, one of the Hindu trinity);111 “jo to ke kanta bove 
tahi bove tu bhala. Voh bhi hum ko kya samjhega, para kisise pala” (one who pricks you with 
a thorn, pierce the one with a spear and teach that person a lesson which he/she will ever 
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remember);112 “Hindustan Hindu ka, nahi kisi bap ka” (India belongs to Hindus only); “Jis 
Hindu ka khoon na khaula, woh khoon nahin, pani hai (the Hindu whose blood does not boil 
does not have blood but water).”113 These slogans accentuate that the main focal-point of 
Hindu extremists is to terrorise and eliminate religious minorities. Therefore, it is probable 
that in any pretext they can be overwhelmingly violent against the given minority 
communities. A critical assessment of two of the recent violent incidents against Muslims and 
Christians will help us to understand how these groups manage and execute their terrorist 
activities.  
IV.5.2.1. Gujarat Genocide: “Fire for Fire” 
In March, 2002, Gujarat was deeply shaken by communal violence. However, the Gujarat 
violence differed from other communal violence in several respects. According to Needham 
and Rajan, “several factors distinguished the communal violence in Gujarat 2002 from earlier 
riots, including the degree and kind of violence perpetrated against the Muslims ....”114 In 
most of the cases communal violence are “spontaneous and unthinking;” in other words, 
communal violence is a blind fury.115 But the Gujarat violence (also can be called genocide, 
because the intention seems to be elimination of the members of an ethno-religious 
community) “bore the imprint of long and meticulous planning of systematic military-style 
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organization.”116  The pretext for the flare up of Gujarat violence was death of fifty-eight 
Hindus, mostly women and children, who were burned to death in a train which caught fire 
while it was stationed in Godhra town, in Gujarat; but, how the train caught fire remains a 
dispute. The train was carrying Hindu religious activists who were returning back from 
Ayodhya. Muslims of Godhra were blamed for setting train on fire and from the following 
day there began genocide against Muslims all over Gujarat for three days without any respite. 
During the violence extremist activists of Sangh Parivar slaughtered (many were burned 
alive) over a thousand Muslims,117 looted or burned down Muslim properties, raped Muslim 
women and made tens of thousands of Muslims homeless. During the violent spree against 
the Muslims Narendra Modi’s (the BJP Chief Minister of the state and a full-time member of 
the RSS) government failed to protect the members of the minority community in the state – 
besides, a “considerable evidence mounted that key figures in his administration orchestrated 
the carnage.”118 Moreover, the BJP government in the Centre neither did anything to stop the 
carnage in the state, nor arrested the responsible people in the state government after the 
carnage was over; instead, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who has been considered to 
be moderate BJP leader by many, blamed Muslims for triggering off the violence by setting 
the train on fire at Godhra. Vajpayee said,  
wherever there are Muslims, they do not want to live in peace with others. Instead of 
living peacefully, they want to propagate their religion by creating terror in the minds 
of others.119    
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Such statement of the leader of a nation, at that critical juncture, only suggests the complicity 
and gravity of the problem. Besides the failure of both the state and the Central governments 
to stop the violence, there are other factors that indicate that the violence was an act of Hindu 
religious terrorism. According to Dube, 
Targets had been identified precisely and listed, and the manpower and materials of 
destruction had been moved in swiftly and efficiently. It was the demonstration of the 
logistics of war. All writers noted that state forces at the very least looked the other 
way and sometimes were active participants in the butchery. At some places the 
police steered victims into the arms of the killers, at others they themselves stepped in 
to shoot those who could not be killed in the primary control room and had mobile 
phones, as did the leaders of the ‘rioters’. This is a strange form of spontaneity.120 
The negligence of the BJP led governments of the state and the Centre, spread of violence all 
over the state of Gujarat, blaming Muslims for the violence by the Prime Minister before 
thorough investigation of the train burning incidence, indictment of Modi and his government 
by the Concerned Citizens Tribunal (“The Concerned Citizens Tribunal headed by Jutice 
Krishna Iyer released a report indicting the Chief Minister Narendra Modi and the state 
apparatus in what they clearly identified as a genocide against Muslims in Gujarat in 
2002”121), re-election of Modi and his party by the people of Gujarat with popular mandate, 
mobilization of all section of Hindus (even tribals and ordinary Hindus),122 and gruesome 
slaughter of Muslim women and children make it evident that the Gujarat violence was pre-
planned123 by the Hindu extremists to systematically annihilate Muslim minority of the BJP 
ruled state.  
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IV.5.2.2. Violence against Christians in Orissa: Design to Eliminate Religious Minority 
In December, 2007, first phase of recent violence against Christian minority broke out in 
Kandhamal district in Orissa. The alleged mastermind behind the violence against the 
minority was Lakshmananda Saraswati, a radical VHP leader. The alleged reason for violence 
against the Christian minority was an assault on Lakshmananda (supposedly by some 
Christians), who led an anti-conversion and cow-protection movement.124 In this period of 
violence three people were killed and thirteen churches were burned down by Hindu 
extremists.125 
However, the worst phase of violence against the minority took place during August and 
September, 2008. On 23 August Lakshmananda and four of his followers were shot dead by a 
group of gunmen, who stormed into his ashram (religious centre) in Kandhamal where the 
VHP leader and his followers were meditating. Immediately the Sangh Parivar blamed 
Christians for the assassination126 although evidence clearly indicated that Maoists were 
responsible for the killing. Subsequently, thousands of Hindu extremists launched violent 
attacks against Christians and their establishments. The Hindu extremists did not even left 
orphanages which housed many orphan children. During this period of violence Churches and 
Christian houses were razed to the ground, fifty Christians were killed according to the report 
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of the Asian Centre for Human rights, and thousands of Christians were made homeless.127 
The minority groups, including the All India Mujlis-e-Mushwarat (an umbrella body of Indian 
Muslim organizations) expressed their anguish over the continued violence in Orissa and 
demanded the ban on the Bajran Dal, the group which was also involved in the gruesome 
murder of Australian Christian missionary Graham Staines and his two sons (who were 
burned alive in their van) in 1999.128  
The Sangh Parivar’s history of religious terrorism against religious minorities in Orissa began 
in the late 1990s. Moreover, from the beginning of twenty first century the Hindu extremist 
groups – like the Bajrang Dal, Durga Vahini, and Shiv Sena – have been emboldened by the 
BJP’s coalition government with the Biju Janata Dal. Angana Chatterji reports, “In October 
2002, a Shiv Sena unit in Balasore district declared the formation of the first Hindu ‘suicide 
squad.’”129 The RSS has six thousand shakhas with around 1,50,000 volunteers, the Bajrang 
Dal has two hundred akharas (training and meeting places) with fifty thousand activists, and 
the Durga Vahini has around seven thousand activists in Orissa.130 Besides these extremist 
groups there are several other militant Hindu organizations which are affiliated to the Sangh 
Parivar. 
The reviews on Gujarat and Orissa violence reveal the following common features: 
production of on the spot-evidences to prove that the minorities are dangerous enemies of 
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Hinduism; spread of violence throughout the whole region within very short time; gruesome 
act of killing by burning alive (using inflammable items like kerosene and petrol) or 
mutilation of bodies; no mercy shown to women, disabled and children of the minority 
communities; destruction of minorities’ property and their establishments with fire and 
overwhelmingly large human force; and, covert support of the BJP or coalition (in which the 
BJP was an important coalition partner) governments. In both the violent incidents the main 
reasons (or on the spot-evidences) for which the violence against the minorities were started 
appears to be production or generation of evidences by the Hindu religious extremists to carry 
out already planned design of religious terrorism. Although the BJP government and its 
machineries tried to prove that Muslims of Godhra were responsible for the heinous crime 
how the train caught fire remains controversial subject even now. There are some suggestions 
that the fire broke out from inside the compartment S-6 (the compartment which was the main 
target), not set on fire from outside. Sheela Bhatt reports that one of the main investigating 
officers in the Godhra train burning case, “has no doubt that the Sabarmati fire was 
meticulously thought out” plan.131 Noel Parmar, the (then) assistant police commissioner in 
Baroda and the investigating officer, recounted  that when he went to the exact place where 
the train was halted before it was burnt down the first thing he “noticed was that the 
compartment’s steps were intact.”132 His argument, therefore, is that if the train was set on 
fire from outside the steps would be burnt first. So, he opines that such case is almost 
impossible to solve.133  
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Whereas the initial evidences, in the case of the main reason which triggered off the carnage 
against the minority in Orissa, clearly suggested that Christians had no hand in the 
assassination of the VHP leader; yet, violence broke out and the Sangh Parivar, in-spite of the 
Orissa police report that Maoists were involved in the act of killing, went on blaming 
Christians. The above-stated facts have the tendency to suggest that the Gujarat and Orissa 
violence were pre-planned designs of Hindu religious terrorists to eliminate religious 
minorities from these states. 
IV.5.2.3. Strategy of Hindu Religious Terrorism: “Bomb for Bomb” 
A brief review of Malegaon, Ajmer, Hyderabad, and Samjhauta Express bomb explosion 
cases is very important in the study of Hindu religious terrorism. On 8 September 2006, four 
bombs, which were planted on bicycles near a mosque at a cemetery, exploded in Malegaon, a 
town in Maharashtra, killing 31 people and injuring 297 others.134 In February 2007, the 
Samjhauta (Friendship) Express train that was travelling from India to Pakistan, carrying 
Pakistani and Indian Muslim passengers, caught fire due to twin bomb blasts.135 The blasts 
and the fire killed 68 people and many were wounded. In May 2007, bomb explosion took 
place during Friday prayers at the Mecca Mosque (one of the largest mosques in India) in 
Hyderabad and, at least 14 people were killed. 136 Ajmer Dargah Sharif, a famous Sufi shrine 
                                                 
134Mumbai Bureau, “31 Killed, 100 Injured in Malegaon Blasts,” in The Hindu, Online edition (September 9, 
2006); available from http://www.hindu.com/2006/09/09/stories/2006090916980100.htm; Internet accessed: 21 
April 2011; “Malegaon Blast Mushawerat Chowk Anti-Terrorism Squad,” in Times of India (September 9, 
2006); available from 
 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-07/mimbai28665724_1_malegaonblast-mushawerat-cowk-
ant-terrorism-squad; Internet accessed:  21 April 2011. 
 
135 “Passengers reported hearing two blasts as the train passed near Panipat, about 80 km (50 miles) north of 
Delhi. The train – Sanjhauta Express – was part of a service taking passengers from Delhi to Lahore in 
Pakistan.” Adil Najam, “India-Pakistan Samjhota Express Blasts: 60+ Dead,” in All Things Pakistan (February 
19, 2007) [Article online]; available from http://pakistaniat.com/2007/02/19/pakistan-india-terrorism-blast-
samjhota-express-train-bomb-blast-dead/; Internet accessed: 9 May 2011. 
 
136 “Hindu Holy Man Aseemanand in Custody over India Blasts,” in News South Asia (January 13, 2001); 
available from  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12180193; Internet accessed: 9 May 2011. 
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(which is a pilgrimage centre for Muslims, Hindus and people of other faiths) in Rajasthan, 
was bombed in October 2007. In this incidence three people were killed.137 In Malegoan 
(once again) bomb explosion killed seven people and left more than 100 injured in 2008.  
In the beginning Islamic terrorists were blamed for most of these bombings by the Indian 
government. However, recent arrests and police disclosures in connection with the incidents 
of bomb blasts exposed the network of Hindu religious terrorism. The CBI and the Anti-
Terrorist Police Squad of Maharashtra arrested Swami Aseemananda (RSS leader), Sadhvi 
Pragya Singh Thakur, Lt. Col. Srikant Purohit (an army intelligence officer),138 and several 
other Hindu extremists in relation with Malegaon bomb blast case. Aseemananda admitted his 
involvement in having planned bomb blasts at Ajmer Sharif, Mecca Mashid, Malegaon and in 
Samjhauta Express “in his confession, recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code before Metropolitan Magistrate Deepak Dabas at Tis Hazari courts” on 18 December139 
2010. The main intention, according to Aseemananda, behind bombing Muslim religious 
places was to avenge violent acts of Islamic terrorism. In his statement he said: “I told 
everybody that bomb ka jawab bomb se dena chahiye (we should reply to bomb blasts with 
bombs). I told everyone since 80 per cent of Malegaon are Muslims, we should explode the 
bomb in Malegaon.”140 The bomb blast at Ajmer Dargah, according to him, was to deter 
Hindus from visiting the Dargah. He also named other people who were involved in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
137 Vinay Kumar, “Swami Aseemananda’s Confession Reveals Hindutva Terror Activities,” in The Hindu, (New 
Delhi: January 8, 2011) [Article online]; available from 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1073223.ece; Internet accessed: 21 April 2011. 
 
138 “Malegaon Probe: Army Officer Sent to Police Remand,” in Indian Express (Mumbai: November 5, 2005); 
available from http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Malegaon-probe-army-offices-sent-to-police/381746/; 
Internet   accessed: 21 April 2011. 
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planning and execution of the mission. Indresh Kumar (senior RSS leader), Joshi (the 
murdered RSS pracharak), Sadhvi Pragya Thakur and Sandeep Dange (senior RSS pracharak) 
and Ramji Kalsanga (senior RSS pracharak) are among the important religious figures who 
were involved in planning the acts of Hindu religious terrorism. Another shocking revelation 
of the CBI and police is that RDX was used in Malegaon and Samjhauta Express blasts,141 
and Purohit is suspected of supplying the RDX from an Indian army store.142  
The above-cited facts exemplify that Hindu extremists could adopt/apply any technique to 
terrorise and massacre religious minorities in India. In the meantime, involvement of an army 
officer (while on active service)143 in planning of religious terrorist activities suggests that 
Hindu religious terrorism has penetrated different segments and departments of Indian 
government.  
IV.6. An Analysis of Hindu Religious Terrorism 
The radical Hindu religious perception, that the Muslim and Christian religious minorities 
pose serious threat to the pitri and punya bhumi and Hindu dharma, inspired Hindu 
fundamentalists for extreme form of religious violence to terrorise, eliminate or subjugate 
these minority communities. However, to mobilize wider Hindu constituency for religious 
terrorism against the conceived enemies Hindu unity and stimulation of Hindu masculinity 
were vital. In this regard select Hindu religious texts – particularly the Ramayana and the 
Mahabharata – and Hindu symbols – mainly Ramjanmabhoomi, India pictured as divine 
                                                 
141 “Malegaon Blast Mushawerat Chowk Anti-Terrorism Squad.” 
 
142 Nitin Gokhale, “Malegaon Blasts: Army to Reconvene Court of Inquiry Against Lt. Col. Purohit,” in NDTV 
(New Delhi: Updated March 12, 2011); available from http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/malegaon-blasts-army-
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143 See Christophe Jaffrelot, “Abhinav Bharat, the Malegaon Blast and Hindu nationalism; Resisting and 




mother, chariot of Arjun and gods’ weapons – are being stage-managed by religious and 
religio-nationalist actors to transmit the message to all Hindus that the dharma yudha against 
the enemies of Hindu-race and Hindu-faith is sanctioned by divine will.  
Moreover, exhibition of gods’ weapons (such as tridents, bows, arrows and mace) in rath 
yatras and other religious processions appear to have two-fold purposes: to openly display 
their religious commitment to their divinities, and to spread terror among the enemies. In the 
meantime, the Hindu religious texts and symbols infused religious conviction among many 
Hindus that it was their religious obligation to destroy or terrorise the religious minorities to 
liberate Hindus’ holy land and to safeguard Hindu dharma. Apparently the story of the battles 
between Rama and Ravana, narrated in the Ramayana, and between Pandavas and Kauravas, 
found in the Mahabharata,144 instilled among many Hindus masculine passion like Rama’s 
and Pandavas’ forces (that stood for righteousness) who destroyed the forces of Ravana and 
Kauravas (who represented evil) in the battles at Lanka and at Kurukshetra. In both the battles 
divine beings – Rama, Lakshmana, Hanuman and Krishna – were involved to destroy the 
forces of evil. Evidently involvement of the divine beings in the battles against the evil forces 
remind every Hindu that there is ongoing cosmic battle between the divinity and the forces of 
evil; therefore, whenever an evil force raises its head and threatens Hindu dharma, it is 
believed that the divinity comes down on earth in human or in other forms to destroy the evil 
force to liberate Hindu dharma. In the Bhagavad Gita, IV: 7-8, Lord Krishna says: 
For whatever the law of righteousness withers away and lawlessness arises, then do I 
generate Myself [on earth]. [...] For the Protection of the good, for the destruction of 
                                                 
144 The Mahabharata, one of the Hindu epics, records the battle of Kurukshetra, a place in Hariyana state of 
India. According to The Mahabaharata, it was one of the greatest and devastating battles ever fought on earth. In 
this battle the cousin brothers, Pandavas and Kouravas, fought against each other for the kingdom – the 
Kouravas represent the evil force and the Pandavas the righteous force. The Pandava brothers killed all the evil 
forces of Kourava and became victorious finally.  The great heroes were Lord Krishna and Arjuna. See C. 




evil doers, for the setting up of the law of righteousness I come into being age after 
age. 145 
So, from 1980s the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders, particularly L.K Advani, seem to 
have acknowledged the role either of Krishna or of Rama in the conceived battle against the 
perceived evil force that has threatened Hindu dharma by occupying the holy places of the 
Hindus –like Ayodhya, the birth place of Rama. This is why the BJP leaders were projected as 
Lord Krishna, Rama and Lakshmana, the divinity in human form, during chariot procession 
(Rath yatra) in September 1990,146 to motivate and mobilize Hindu constituency for the holy 
war. The symbolical representation of god-man seems to have inculcated more courage and 
passion among many Hindus; in the meantime, the war-cry of the god-men (BJP leaders) 
made them violent warriors who ruthlessly killed, burned alive, mutilated and tortured 
innocent victims. It was like an act of sacrifice in which an innocent victim is killed without 
any mercy or regret. Thus, on the prevailing historical and socio-political contexts select 
Hindu religious texts and symbols work as fire to boil the blood of many Hindus to perform 
acts of religious terrorism against the minorities.  
IV.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the main objective of Hindu religious-nationalists is to establish 
Hindu rule in India. These Hindus are vehemently against the idea that ethno-religious 
minorities should have equal rights with the Hindus. The main contributions of this chapter 
are that: Hindu religious symbols (such as cow and Vedic Golden Age) began to be stage-
managed from the latter half of the nineteenth century to unite the caste and class ridden 
Hindu society; Hindu history has been reconstructed Hindu religio-nationalists to present 
                                                 
145 “R. C. Zaehner, The Bhagavad-Gita: With a Commentary Based on the Original Sources (Oxford: At the 
Claredon Press, 1969), 184. 
 
146 See Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 165. 
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Hindu religion, Hindu culture and Hindu race as superior to all other religions, cultures and 
races; Muslims and Christians (for their missionary activities and for Muslim and Christian 
rule over the Hindus) have been identified as perpetual enemies of Hinduism and Hindu 
civilization from the time Hindu religious symbols began to be manoeuvred for Hindu unity; 
Sikhs were considered as deluded Hindus, therefore, they had to be brought into Hindu fold 
through purification rituals; Hinduism began to be projected as aggressive religion by the 
militant Hindu religio-nationalist organizations from the second decade of the twentieth 
century; Hindu hostility against the Muslim and Christian minorities intensified from the time 
the modern militant Hindu religio-nationalist organizations came into existence; for Hindu 
religio-nationalists Hinduism and India (or Hindustan) are inseparable from one another, 
therefore, India should be ruled by Hindu religious laws and principles (the first chapter 
explained that why religio-nationalist Hindus were against the secular project and equal 
religious rights and privileges granted to the minorities). These points explain why Hindu 
religion could foster religious terrorism against the religious minorities. In such Hindu religio-
nationalist atmosphere the minorities’ movement for geo-political demands and the rise of 
Naga insurgency (which will be discussed in the following chapter), Sikh religious 
militancy/terrorism and Islamic religious terrorism in Kashmir (studied in the preceding 
chapters) added more fuel to the already burning fire of Hindu religious-nationalism and anti-
minority attitude, and gave rise to Hindu religious terrorism. Nevertheless, only a small 
segment of Hindus, who are deluded by reconstructed and perceived Hindu history, seem to 
support Hindu religious terrorism. So, the responsibility to rebuild trust among the conflicting 
communities, for maintaining communal harmony in the Indian society, lies on the shoulders 
of the majority of the peace-loving and temperate Hindu population. Besides, the peaceable 
sections of the minorities too have an obligation to work side by side with the Hindu majority 
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in restoration and rebuilding of trust among the conflicting fractions of the Indian society. The 
peace-mission initiated by the Naga Christian Church (discussed in the following chapter) to 
settle Naga problem peacefully could be a good illustration in this regard. Moreover, the 
model proposed in the final chapter in this thesis might be helpful for rebuilding affable 








Naga insurgency is the main focus of study in this chapter, because Nagaland is one of the 
three mostly Christian dominated states in the Indian Union, and Naga armed conflict is one 
of the oldest unresolved armed conflicts in the world1 and, in the opinion of some scholars, 
the epicentre and forerunner of all insurgency problems in Northeast India.2 Naga militancy 
began in the 1950s in the Naga Hills (present Nagaland), then one of the autonomous hill 
districts in the state of Assam. The main objective of the Naga armed movement has been 
national independence of Naga inhabited areas. From the early 1950s the Indian state had 
launched military repressive measure, political and economic machineries to defeat the Naga 
freedom movement, but the problem remains unresolved until the present time. Due to the 
fight between the Naga extremist groups and Indian armed forces thousands of people (both 
Nagas and non-Nagas) lost their lives.3 Besides, the Naga extremist groups are suspected, by 
the Indian government, for supporting other insurgent movements4 in the Northeast by 
providing training and weapons. However, Naga insurgency appears to be different from 
Sikh, Islamic and Hindu religious terrorism.  
                                                 
1 See Sanjib Baruah, “Confronting Constructionism: Ending India’s Naga War,” in Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 40, No. 3 (May, 2003), 321; Sanjib Baruah, Postfrontier Blues: Toward a new Policy Framework for 
Northeast India (Washington: East-West Center, 2007), vii, 16. 
 
2 According R. Upadhyay, “The Naga problem is the epicentre and fore-runner of all insurgencies in northeast 
India. It encourages almost all the ethnic groups in the region either for secessionist demand or for creation of 
separate statehood within Indian union.” See R. Upadhyay, “Naga Insurgency – A Confusion of War or Peace!,” 
in South Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 1256 (February 17, 2005) [Article online]; available from  
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%Cpapers13%5Cpaper1256.html; Internet accessed: 10 August 2011. 
 
3 According to Sanjib Baruah the Naga armed conflict cost “tens of thousands of lives.” See Baruah, Postfrontier 
Blues, 16. 
 
4 In July, 2009 the Indian Home Minister, P. Chidambaram expressed in the Parliament that “there is spillover of 
the Naga Insurgency into territories lying beyond the Nagaland state borders.” See “Nagaland Assessment – year 
2010;” available from  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/nagaland/index.html; Internet 
accessed: 10 August 2011. 
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Although the main objective of Naga armed movement is geopolitical one, the underlying 
motivating factors seem to be religious, ethnic, historical and socio-political aspects, which 
are intensely fused together in giving rise to the Naga problem. So far no satisfactory study is 
done on these issues in explanation of the birth of the conflict even though certain researchers 
have discussed some of these matters in their arguments on the rise of the crisis. Thus, further 
study is necessary to investigate the important role of the given factors in the genesis and 
persistence of the problem.  
The arrangement of the chapter is made in the following order. Firstly, standpoints of some of 
the intellectuals are examined; then my point of view, in regard to the rise of the Naga 
conflict, is proposed. Secondly, a brief review of the historical and pre-historical background 
of the Nagas is presented. It is essential to have a bird’s eye view of the Nagas’ historical 
context to trace the root cause of the Naga problem. Thirdly, importance of Christianity in the 
formation of Naga ethnicity is discussed. This discussion is expected to help the readers to 
understand how and why Christianity is one of the most vital parts of Naga identity. Fourthly, 
Nagas’ ethno-religious apprehension and their aspiration of national freedom for Nagaland are 
assessed; then, I review the policy of the Indian state toward the Nagas to explicate how the 
freedom movement, which appeared non-violent in the initial stage, took violent form. 
Finally, Naga militancy, an assessment, suggested solution to the conflict and conclusion are 
tendered. 
V.2. Scholars’ Viewpoints on the Rise of the Naga Insurgency 
Intellectuals’ standpoints regarding the cause of the Naga problem can be classified into the 
following four categories: first, the British colonial administrative policy was accountable for 
the origin of the problem; second, Christian missionaries and foreign forces were behind the 
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creation of Naga conflict; third, political negligence and economic underdevelopment caused 
the crisis in Northeast India; and fourth, fear of losing ethno-cultural identity gave rise to the 
conflict. 
V.2.1. British Administrative Policy Caused the Naga Problem 
Scholars like Jyotindra Dasgupta, Dinesh Kotwal, Subir Bhaumik, R. Upadhyay, M. S. 
Prabhakara, Maya Chadda, B. B. Kumar and B. P. Singh hold British colonial policy 
accountable for the origin of Naga and other insurgency problems in Northeast India.5 In this 
regard these thinkers cite two main reasons: first, exclusion of the hill regions6 (particularly 
Naga and Lushai Hills – on further clarification on why hill areas were excluded from the 
direct administration see Appendix 9) of British Northeast India from the direct British 
administration; and second, segregation of hill tribes (Nagas and Mizos) by introducing 
“Inner Line” regulations, which strictly restricted outsiders from entering into the hill areas7 – 
“the Bengal-East Frontier Regulation, which brought into force what came to be known as the 
‘Inner Line,’” was promulgated by the Lieutenant Governor of Assam in 1873, with the 
                                                 
5Jyotindra Dasgupta, “Community, Authenticity, and Autonomy: Insurgence and Institutional Development in 
India’s Northeast,” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2 (May, 1997); Dinesh Kotwal, “The Naga 
Insurgency: The Past and the Future,” [Article online]; available from http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul-700.html; 
Internet accessed: 10 August 2011; Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in 
India’s Northeast,” in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, edited by Satu P. Limaye, Robert G. 
Wirsing and Mohan Malik (Hawaii: The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004); Upadhyay, “Naga 
Insurgency – A Confusion of War or Peace!;” M.S. Prabhakara, “Mother of Insurgencies or Reinvention?,” in 
The Hindu (March 26, 2011) [Article online]; available from 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article1571528.ece; Internet accessed: 10 August 2011; Maya Chadda, 
“Integration Through Internal Reorganization: Containing Ethnic Conflict in India,” in The Global Review of 
Ethnopolitics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (September, 2002);  B. B. Kumar, “Ethnicity and Insurgency in India’s North-East,” 
in The Problems of Ethnicity in the North-East India, edited by B.B. Kumar (Delhi: Astha Bharati, 2007); B. P. 
Singh, “North-East India: Demography, Culture and Identify Crisis,” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 
(1987). 
 
6 M.S. Prabhakara, “Mother of Insurgencies or Reinvention?” 
 
7 A. Mackenzie, The Northeast Frontier of India (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1994 ), 55-56; Verrier Elwin, 




approval of the Governor-General of British India.8  In the view of Kotwal Indian state took 
over scores of problems of the British days, and among those problems Naga issue is the most 
“intractable and protracted” one.9 Singh opines that the “divide and rule policy” of the British 
Raj had “an adverse impact on northeast India.”10 The British policy of seclusion, contends 
Chadda, left the hill people “resentful and suspicious of all governments that had sought to 
control the Northeast from New Delhi.”11 According to Kumar, the British policy of gradual 
separation of the tribals and non-tribals, hill areas and the plain areas, “creation of ‘non-
regulated,’ ‘backward’ and ‘excluded’ areas/tracks was able to break centuries of historical, 
cultural, social and religious continuance and connectedness.”12 Dasgupta claims that the 
colonial power, till the last stage of its rule, exercised its “colonial reason and administrative 
cunning,” and always made distinction between the “Assam proper” and tribal peoples of the 
northeast, and these hill tribes were divided into mainly five13 different categories and 
subcategories – the five broad divisions were: “the Northern, North-eastern, and the Southern 
‘Hill Tribes,’ the Nagas and Manipur.”14 Bhaumik and Kotwal assert that the British officials, 
before their final withdrawal from India, hatched a plan to separate entire Northeast region 
from India and Northwest region from Burma to form into an independent geopolitical entity, 
which would be turned into a special “Crown Colony” to ascertain a limited but strategic 
                                                 
8 P.C. Chakravarty, The Evolution of India’s Northern Borders (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1971), 39-40. 
 
9 Kotwal, “The Naga Insurgency: The Past and the Future.” 
 
10 Singh, “North-East India: Demography, Culture and Identify Crisis,” 260; also see R. Gopalakrishnan, 
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British presence in rim-land Asia. It was J. P. Mills, who first proposed the “Unification of the 
hill regions of northeast India and Upper Bruma” in 1942-43; later on this plan was given 
final shape by Regiland Coupland, who was secretary to Strafford Cripps.15 In the opinion of 
V. K. Anand, “the psychological face of the Naga insurgency began” at the time the Naga 
Club, which was formed in 1918 at Kohima for the promotion of Nagas’ interests, turned into 
an effective political organization of the Naga tribes.16  
The above-mentioned arguments tend to suggest that if the hill areas of Northeast were 
wholly integrated with mainland India during the British period and free movement of the 
plains people into the hills was not restricted, then, the sense of a separate ethno-nationalism 
would not have developed. Hence, these arguments have an inclination to suppress the unique 
historical reality of the hill tribes of Northeast India and advocate socio-historical-cultural and 
geopolitical unity or close interconnectedness of Indian nation down from the Vedic period as 
propagated by Hindu religio-nationalists. Furthermore, it proposes that ethno-cultural 
nationalism is superimposed by colonial power therefore it has no historical basis or validity. 
However, the Indian government had an ample time to resolve the Naga issue and win the 
trust of the Nagas on the Indian state, because the Naga insurgency began almost a decade 
after the Indian independence. The Indian government, instead of taking into serious and 
sympathetic consideration the Nagas’ concerns, demonstrated its military might (even before 
Naga insurgency began17) by launching military repressive measure to silence the Nagas’ 
                                                 
15 See R. Coupland, Future of India (London: 1944), 160; R. Coupland, The Constitutional Problems of India, 
Part 3 (London: Oxford University Press, 1944). 
 
16 V. K. Anand, Conflict in Nagaland (Delhi: Chanakya Publication, 1980), 55. 
 
17 The Naga insurgency began in 1956, but “a massive crackdown on NNC [Naga National Council – the 
offshoot of Naga Club] took place in 1953 when troops in large numbers moved by the Government of India into 
the Naga Hills.” “Insurgency and Peace Efforts in Nagaland;” available from 
http://www.edspindia.org/nagaland_insurgency.asp; Internet accessed: 10 October 2011; also see H. Srikanth 
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movement. The military tactics of the Indian administration seems to have further alienated, 
not only extremist faction but also many moderate Nagas, from the Indian state. Why the 
Indian government did not explore and employ all possible political and economic ways and 
means, instead of military approach, to resolve the Naga concerns and apprehensions before 
the insurgency began? Indian leaders (particularly Gandhi and Nehru) were well aware of 
Nagas’ demand quite some time before India got independence,18 then, why no effort was 
made to curve out separate autonomous state (which would include most of the Naga 
inhabited areas of the Northeast) for the Nagas right after India got freedom from the British 
rule? What took it more than fifteen years to create present state of Nagaland? Why boundary 
and certain other political issues not resolved at the time the state was demarcated? The 
argument, that British colonialism caused the problem, does not answer these questions; 
instead, it seems to echo Anglophobic characteristic and judgemental attitude.  
V.2.2. Christian Missionaries and Foreign Forces Caused the Conflict 
Christian missionaries have been attacked by Hindus from the early nineteenth century. The 
Brahma Samaj and the Arya Samaj were founded to face the challenge posed, as perceived by 
the leaders of these modern Hindu socio-religious movements, to Hinduism due to Christian 
missionary activities.  J. N. Farquhar in his book, The Crown of Hinduism (published in 
1913), wrote that educated Hindus considered Christian missionaries as great enemies of 
Hinduism because Christian missionaries, in the judgement of these Hindus, had attempted to 
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destroy time-honoured customs and institutions, sacred literature and traditions, history and 
society of the Hindus.19 Christian missionary, according to Prof. Har Dayal, 
is the arch-enemy who appears in many guises, the great foe of whatever bears the 
name of Hindu, the ever-watchful, ever-active, irreconcilable Destroyer of the work 
of the Rishis and Maha Rishis, of that marvel of moral, intellectual, and civic 
achievement which is known as Hindu civilization. Let us labour under no delusions 
on this point. You may forget your own name; you may forget your mother. But do 
not for a moment forget the great, all-important fact that the missionary is the most 
dreadful adversary you have to meet . . . the greatest enemy of dharma and Hindu 
national life in the present age.20 
Seemingly this missionary-phobic as well as Christian-phobic outlook began to take more 
aggressive nature from the time India got independence. Two factors were involved in the 
increase of aggressive Hindu attitude against missionaries and Christian church: on the 
one hand, antagonism against religious (particularly Muslim and Christian) minorities 
began to gain ground due to rising trend of Hindu religio-nationalism among many 
Hindus; and on the other, most of the Christian missionaries hailed from Europe and 
America therefore missionaries were considered as secret agents of the alien power and 
Christianity as foreign religious element cultivated in the minds of Indians (Hindus) by 
the missionaries with an intention to re-establish the alien rule by destroying Hindu 
religion, culture and civilization.  
Therefore, from the very beginning of the Naga resistance movement Hindu communalist 
and nationalist forces and some top national political leaders of India accused Christian 
missionaries and foreign forces for inculcating the idea of freedom among the Nagas and 
providing support to them to begin armed rebellion against the Indian state. Nehru, 
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commenting on the memorandum demanding National independence for the Nagas, said, 
“as no Naga could have written”21 the memorandum. In the view of Nehru the simple 
minded Nagas would not have come up with such big idea; thus the concept of national 
independence for the Nagas, he surmised, might have been planted in the minds of the 
Nagas by Christian missionaries in collusion with some British administrators. This 
conception of Nehru was further confirmed by Gopinath Bordoloi, the then Chief 
Minister of Assam, who “blamed the Baptist missionaries for abetting ‘a foreign 
conspiracy to separate the Naga Hills from India and retain it as an imperialist 
stronghold.’”22 Therefore, within short time (in 1955) the remaining Baptist missionary 
was asked to leave Naga Hills – since then a strict control has been imposed on the entry 
of foreign missionaries into Naga Hills (now Nagaland). Furthermore, on a number of 
occasions charge had been made, by Hindu nationalists, that Christian missionaries had 
given encouragement to number of tribal political movements, particularly in the Naga 
Hills.23 According to Upadhyay, due to the inducement of some Christian missionaries 
and with the support of some foreign powers a section of Nagas demanded secession of 
their territories on the line of Pakistan.24 At the same time, missionaries were blamed for 
creating a wide gap between the hill people and plain people.25 
Besides, foreign powers, particularly Pakistan and China, were accused by the Indian 
government for providing training and weapons to Naga guerrillas to launch armed 
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23 J. H. Beaglehole, “The Indian Christians – A Study of a Minority,” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 
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conflict against the Indian state. Lawrence E. Cline says, “The Indian government is apt 
to see the hidden hand of Pakistan” behind every problem in India, “but there are strong 
indications that Islamabad has provided some fairly significant support to several 
insurgent movements [which includes Naga militant group/s] in the Northeast India.”26  
According to Bhaumik and Sanjay Hazarika, from 1956 onwards Pakistan and China 
provided training and other logistic supports to the Naga and other insurgent groups in the 
Northeast India till the early 1970s, but Pakistani help stopped after East Pakistan (present 
Bangladesh) got freedom. However, in the late 1970s, confirm Bhaumik and Hazarika, 
Bangladesh military rulers began to help them.27 
The alleged involvement of Christian missionaries and foreign powers in the rise of the 
Naga conflict encouraged the hardliners (particularly Jana Sangh) in the Indian 
Parliament, from the very beginning of the Naga independence movement, to pressurise 
the Indian government to exercise its “economic and military power to impose an ‘Indian 
solution’ on Nagaland, regardless of Naga opposition and the denial of democratic 
processes among the Naga people.”28 The Hindu nationalist party issued a number of 
policy statements concerning Naga problem or the question of policy toward the tribal 
people in the North-East Frontier areas.29 Seemingly the intention of the hardliners was to 
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repress the Naga freedom movement by employing military power without giving any 
consideration to the Nagas’ demands. 
There are two major weaknesses with the argument that Christian missionaries and 
foreign hands were behind the creation of Naga problem: first, it sounds like an argument 
postulated in support of the use of harsh military measure (launched by  the Indian 
government from the early 1950s) to crush Naga demand by force; second, the 
explanation attempts to invalidate ethno-historical fact of the Nagas and the good works 
done by the missionaries among the Nagas30 and other tribes (Mizos, Khasis and Garos – 
ref. Appendix 10 for explanation on the good works of Christian missionaries) of 
Northeast region – making Christian missionaries responsible for the Naga conflict 
clearly suggests Hindu nationalists’ propaganda of vilification of Indian Christianity (in 
general) as foreign religion which, in their judgemental view, serves foreign interests. 
Moreover, the proposition, that Christian missionaries and foreign forces were behind the 
rise of Naga conflict, either disregards or does not give due consideration to the 
underlying ethno-religio-cultural issues and apprehensions of the Nagas. Hence, the 
argument is self-defensive, imbalanced, biased and deficient. 
V.2.3. Economic Underdevelopment and Political Negligence 
P.R. Bhattacharjee, Purusottam Nayak, Shibani Kinkar Chaube, Sunil Munsi, Amalendu 
Guha, O.M. Rao, Udayon Misra and Bethany Lacina suggest that economic and political 
negligence of the Northeast are the main reasons for the Naga and other insurgency 
                                                 





problems in the region.31 Northeast India, according to Bhattacharjee and Nayak, has two 
distinctive characteristics – persistent underdevelopment and growing insurgency – and 
these two features are interconnected to each other, which they term as “vicious circle”; 
i.e., on the one hand, economic underdevelopment gave rise to Naga insurgency,32 and on 
the other, the growing insurgency problems contributed towards stagnation of economic 
development in the region. Moreover, the indigenous people of the region get no 
significant role to play in the developmental works that have been undertaken by the 
Indian government in the region, because those developmental projects are planned and 
directed by the Centre. Therefore, Bhattacharjee and Nayak maintain that what looks like 
revolt against the Indian government to attain either sovereignty or autonomy “is actually 
a violent expression of grievance against a political and economic structure in which the 
indigenous people” are given a little political share and economic benefit.33 In the view of 
P. C. Dutta, “economic deprivation, disparity and lack of development have been 
responsible for the rise of conflict and insurgency” in the region.34 In the observation of 
Chaube, Munshi and Guha hardly any development took place in the Northeast (mainly in 
the hill regions) till 1971 although the region has large reserves of oil, coal, silimanite, 
limestone, bamboo and timbers distributed over wide areas. As per their study, which was 
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published in Social Scientist in 1975, the lowest levels of growth (includes economic 
growth, infrastructure, educational institutions and medical centres or institutions) was 
found in more than 62 percent of the total area (which included Naga Hills, Lushai Hills, 
North East Frontier Agency  [NEFA] and other hill areas) till 1971; only 12 percent of the 
total area (plains and some parts of Khasi and Garo Hills) fell in the top levels of 
growth.35 This disparity, in their view, was at the root of many tensions and insurgency 
problems.36 
Meanwhile, Lacina and Misra are of the opinion that a control over all local 
administrative affairs by the Central Government aggrieved the people of the region and 
encouraged armed movement. J. R. Mukherjee, a retired army lieutenant general, in his 
book An Insider’s Experience of Insurgency in North-East, writes:  
Control over all matters of even trivial policy is currently exercised through 
Delhi. This implies handling by bureaucrats and politicians sitting in Delhi, who 
do not even know the north-east or comprehend the local situation  - their 
portfolios are also changed very frequently – one can even quote situations where 
there were no officials to handle important subjects for long periods during crisis 
ridden times.37 
 
Political and economic factors, no doubt, have been deeply involved in the rise of 
insurgency problems in Northeast India; however, only economic and political reasons do 
not satisfactorily explain the cause of the Naga extremist movement. During the Colonial 
period (except Khasi Hills) no economic development took place in the hill areas. Nagas 
and other hill tribes persisted on their traditional method of livelihood. Thus, economic 
underdevelopment would not have so much impact on the life and political outlook of the 
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Naga community during the early years of Indian independence. When we talk about 
political involvement in relation to Naga insurgency, we have to go back to 1929, the year 
in which a delegate of Nagas strongly expressed their unwillingness to become a part of 
Assam or any other geopolitical entity when the Simon Commission on constitutional 
reforms visited Kohima (this point will be discussed further in the later section). Thus, the 
later political developments (which were against Nagas’ aspiration) might have 
exasperated many Nagas and forced them to take up arms against the Indian state; 
nevertheless, the political factor by itself does not define the cause of the Naga uprising. 
Therefore, the argument that economic and political factors caused the problem seems to 
be inadequate. 
V.2.4. Fear of Losing Ethno-cultural Identity 
Another explanation concerning the cause of the insurgency problem in Northeast is an 
apprehension that ethno-cultural identity is at risk. Mainly three interconnected factors – 
immigration, alienation from land and integration/assimilation – are supposed to have 
generated such fear among the people of Northeast. With British occupation of the region 
there began a steady influx of people into the region from the mainland India, mainly 
from the undivided Bengal. The constant flow of people from outside territories, in the 
view of Bhaumik, Weiner and Nag, augmented ethnic and religious diversity and gave 
birth to “nativist-non-nativist” conflict.38 From 1901 to 1981, observes Dasgupta, the 
region’s population grew six times on account of the unchecked inflow of people from 
neighbouring regions and countries (mainly from Burma and East Bengal).39 The annual 
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growth of population in the region from 1951 to 1961 was 3.5 percent – Tripura 6 percent 
and Naga Hills 5.6 percent – whereas India’s annual growth rate for the same period was 
1.96 percent.40 Tripura, among all other states, had born the largest brunt of population 
growth. According to Robbins Burling: 
Two or three generations ago Tripura State was predominantly Tibeto-Burman, 
but so many Bengalis have now settled there that the indigenous Tibeto-Burman 
speaking Kokborok, once the dominant group, have been reduced to a minority to 
their own homeland.41 
Migrant population, says Erika Forsberb, can cause ethnic conflict when immigrants 
compete over resources, such as employment and cultivable land; in such case the local 
population may perceive a significant risk to the existing demographic or political setup.42 
From 1947 the large-scale migration of population from outside, argues Singh, alienated 
hill tribes of several areas of the region from their land and caused widespread identity 
crisis, which was further accentuated by the inability of the immigrant population to adopt 
to local languages, customs and traditions. According to Singh, tribal peoples’ cultural 
traits, language, code of laws, geography and socio-economic institutions are the main 
features of their distinct identity; therefore, the extraordinary attachment of a tribal group 
to land is an intricate “web of relationships, the primary forces of which is economics.”43  
In the opinion of B.R. Rizvi, ethnic insurgencies in Northeast India involve the assertion 
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of ethnic and cultural identities of various ethnic groups.44 The consciousness of ethnic 
identity, affirms Rizvi, began from the time of the colonial period.45 Ved Prakash opines 
that one of the root causes of insurgency in the Northeast is fear of ethnic and cultural 
identity at risk in the midst of the “mega-identity” called India.46 Walter C. Ladwig 
suggests that ethnicity and identity are the sources of the Naga and Mizo conflicts against 
the Indian government because neither the Nagas nor the Mizos “identified themselves as 
‘Indian’ and their customs and religious practice set them apart, at least in their own 
minds, from the Indian mainstream;” meanwhile, this problem of identity was further 
complicated by the quality of governance (which was low in both Naga Hills and Lushai 
Hills) before the violence broke out.47 According to Srikanth and Thomas, the Indian 
nationalist leaders, right after they took over the political authority from the British 
government, desired to build-up a strong and united nation-state in India; in this effort of 
nation building the Indian state, applying a carrot and stick policy, sought to totally 
integrate even the tribal regions, which were “excluded” and “partially excluded” by the 
British administration.48 But, the Nagas resisted the assimilative move on the basis of 
their “distinct” ethnic identity and “unique” history.49  
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It is a fact that from the beginning of Indian independence survival of ethno-cultural 
identity has been one of the main concerns of the most of the tribal societies of Northeast 
India. Mainly two factors – huge influx of outside population and the policy of total 
integration (which also suggests assimilation) of the post-independent Indian state – 
appeared to have given rise to the apprehension that ethnic and cultural identity has been 
in great danger. Immigrants displaced many tribal people from their land (particularly in 
Tripura) and their subsistence economy. Land, for the tribal people, is not only the 
primary force of their economy, but it is related to their history, their ancestors, their 
family ties, their tradition and their religion.50 Ethno-socio-cultural structure of the tribal 
society begins to crumble down once the tribal people are alienated from their land, 
therefore, claim or reclaim of land is vital to assert or reassert their ethno-cultural identity. 
Thus, one cannot deny that some of the insurgent groups (which came into existence from 
the 1960s) in the region were motivated by ethnic identity factor. 
However, identity at risk theory too, on its own, cannot describe the main cause of the 
Naga conflict, although ethnic identity issue is one of the correlated motivating factors of 
the crisis.  Naga ethnicity is more complex compared to other ethnicities and, at the same 
time, Christianity appears to have played a vital role in shaping the Naga ethnic identity; 
therefore, without Christianity Naga ethnicity cannot be understood rightly. At the same 
time, the immigration problem, which had/has severe impact on the tribal peoples of 
Tripura and other areas of the Northeast, did not affect the Nagas even though the 
population growth of Naga hills increased almost six times during 1951 to 1961 – there 
might be other reasons, like development of better health care and education, for 
population growth besides immigration from outside. In addition, the Naga conflict seems 
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to have different socio-historical setting compared to other insurgent groups; therefore, 
the case of the Naga insurgency has to be considered separately from other armed 
movements.  
V.3. Ethno-religious Apprehension, Historical and Political Contexts gave Rise to the 
Naga Conflict  
The above-discussed arguments arguably present either biased or incomplete explanation 
of the main cause of the Naga problem. Therefore, I suggest that historical factors, ethno-
religious concerns and (unsympathetic) policy of the post-independent Indian state 
motivated Naga insurgency. In the Naga debate the aspiration of freedom occupies the 
central place, because the consciousness that the Naga inhabited areas should not be made 
part of any other territory seems to have inspired the Nagas to seek national independence 
for Nagaland from the British period. Thus, it is indispensable to investigate: whether the 
concept of freedom, as suggested by Indian and Hindu nationalist intellectuals, was 
inculcated by alien forces from the 1920s or the concept has historical basis; the impact of 
Christianity in determining the modern Naga ethnicity and nationalism; and, what were 
the apprehensions or concerns behind the expression of strong protest against the British 
plan to make Naga territory part of Assam. In this regard we need to briefly review the 
historical background of the Nagas to comprehend the underlying socio-historical fact 
that might help us to trace back the root of the problem.  
V.4. The Nagas: Meaning of the Term “Naga” 
From long time there has been a dispute on the meaning and derivation of the word Naga. 
J. H. Hutton, the chief authority on the Naga tribes, at first thought that it was a corrupted 
form of the Assamese word Naga (pronounced as Noga) which probably meant “‘a 
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mountaineer,’ from the Sanskrit nag, a mountain or inaccessible place.” Later on he 
recanted this view due to “the fact that Ptolemy in the third century and Shyabbu’ldin 
Talish in the Sixteenth both speak of Nagas as nanga, or ‘naked;’”51 however, in the 
opinion of W. Robinson, this was not a very strong argument.52 Weddell “explains Naga 
as meaning ‘hillman;’” whereas Peal “derives it from nok, a word used by some Eastern 
Naga tribes for ‘people’.”53 In the view of Reid “‘Naga’ is not a term the tribesmen 
themselves would ordinarily use; it is merely an Assamese word meaning ‘naked’.”54 
“The most likely derivation,” says Elwin,  
is that which traces ‘Naga’ from the word nok or ‘people,’ which is its meaning in 
a few Tibeto-Burman languages, as in Garo, Nocte and Ao. It is common 
throughout India for tribesmen to call themselves by words meaning ‘man’, an 
attractive habit which suggests that they look on themselves simply as people, 
free of communal or caste associations.55  
Whatever might be the derivation and meaning of the term Naga, one thing is obvious 
that the word was not originally used by the Naga tribes themselves, it was the generic 
identity given to them by outsiders. This generic term was either used in derogatory form 
or to identify the hill tribes that lived a free and natural way of life in different realm.  
V.4.1. The Nagas: Historical Background  
Nagas are the aboriginal inhabitants of several hill areas (Nagaland and part of Manipur, 
Assam and Arunachal Pradesh) in Northeast India and Sagaing Division and Kachin State 
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in North-West Myanmar. The Nagas, according to Elwin and Alemchiba, belong to the 
Indo-Mongoloid group and they speak the Tebeto-Burman dialects of Sino-Tibetan 
family. Racially the Nagas belong to Sino-Mongolian family and linguistically they are 
related to the Tibeto-Burman language group.56  It is very difficult to determine how long 
the Nagas have been in possession of their present habitation. The origin, patterns and 
period of migration of the Nagas are some of the most difficult tasks that lie before the 
present and future scholars to be unravelled.57 The earliest reference to the Nagas, claims 
Shimrey, was made in 150 A.D. by Claudius Ptolemaius in his geography, where he 
mentioned the Naga inhabited region as “the Realm of the naked.”58 But, one cannot be 
assured that Ptolemaius or Ptolemy ever visited the land of the Nagas – he might have 
collected the information from a third party.59 S. K. Chatterjee firmly believed that the 
word Kirata, mentioned in the Vedas, referred to “all those Sino-Tibetan-speaking tribes, 
Mongoloids of various types in race, who entered into or touched the fringe of the cultural 
entity that is India – the Himalayan tribes (the Nepal tribes and the North-Assam tribes), 
the Bodos and the Nagas,” and other tribal groups of Northern and North-eastern 
Himalayan regions.60 Elwin and Kotwal, too, support the view of Chatterjee that the hill 
tribes (including the Nagas) were the ones mentioned in the ancient Sanskrit literatures 
(more than a thousand years Before Christ) as Kiratas, who were different from Aryan 
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and pre-Aryan people of the plains.61 Although the term Kirata might refer to the hill 
tribes possessing distinct physical features, cultures, customs and traditions from that of 
the Aryan and pre-Arayan people of the plains there is no guarantee that the Nagas were 
among those hill tribes, mentioned in the ancient Sanskrit texts. 
Nevertheless, the Nagas have been living in the hill areas of Northeast India and North-
West Myanmar from the pre-historic period. Lack of any historical record of their origin 
and migration clearly indicates that the Nagas have probably lived in their present 
homeland for an unknown period of time (probably for tens of centuries) in total isolation 
and without any sort of outside interference. This was why they appeared to have evaded 
any kind of outside socio-cultural or religious influence. Before their conversion to 
Christianity the Nagas were “persisting in an ancient type of culture virtually 
uninfluenced by the Hindu civilization of the plains of Assam and Buddhism of 
Burma.”62  
To conjecture the pre-history and history of the Nagas till thirteenth century A.D. (from 
13th century onward we can find some written historical accounts about the Nagas) we 
have to wholly rely on the myths of their origin. Every Naga tribe has its own myth of 
origin; but all Naga myths indicate one thing that their ancestors came out of the land 
which they possess. “Going by the legends,” writes Vashum, “one forms a rough idea that 
most of the Naga tribes traced their origin from Makhel63 (or ‘Mekhoramia’ in Angami 
meaning ‘the place of departure’) or its adjacent area. Makhel is about ten miles from 
                                                 
61 Elwin, Nagaland, 2; Kotwal, “The Naga Insurgency.” 
 
62Christoph von Furer-Faimendorf, Return to the Naked Nagas: An Anthropologist’s View of Nagaland 1936-
1970,  New Edition (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1976), 1. 
 
63 According to J. H. Hutton, “Makhel,” which is “usually regarded as the place of division, not emergence.” See 




Kohima, capital of Nagaland state, and located in Mao area, in the state of Manipur. The 
myths of the Angamis, Chakhesangs, Rengmas, Semas, Lothas, Tangkhuls, Somra Nagas, 
Maos, Marams, Thangals, Marings and also Meities indicate that Makhel or its adjacent 
areas as these tribes’s original place.64 The Zeliang tribes believe that their first ancestors 
emerged from the Japfu Mountain, which is located near Makhel, and from where they 
spread towards the South.65 According to the legend of the Semas, the village Swemi or 
the hills of Japfu in the Angami area is the place of their origin.66 The Aos believe that 
their forefathers came out of “Lung-terok or Lungthorok (meaning ‘six stones’ in ‘Ao and 
also in Tankhul languages) at Chongliyimti which is at present in Sangtam area;” whereas 
“Noctes, Tangsas, Wanchos and Pakans trace their original migration to Burma.”67 
The myths of origin might not literally mean the emergence of the Nagas’ ancestors from 
the earth or stone, but they suggest one of the following assumptions: either all the Naga 
tribes, in-spite of significant language and some socio-cultural differences among 
different groups, had common ancestry (many of the Naga tribes claim common 
ancestry68), or in the antiquity the ancestors of different Naga tribes were living together 
as one group of people. In this regard one can suppose that in the remote past, on account 
of certain unknown reason/reasons, a calamitous social tragedy might have occurred, and 
that tragic incidence would have caused a deep division and enmity among different 
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clans, family groups and segments of the ancient Naga society and dispersed them as 
different tribes into various locations in Northeast India and North-West Myanmar - the 
meaning of Ao (i.e. “those who came”) and Mirir (meaning “those who did not come”), 
for example, may suggest a clue of such division and dispersion to different locations in 
the past. According to Mills: “The name Ao is a current mispronunciation of Aor, their 
own word for themselves, meaning, according to their own statements, ‘those who came’ 
(i.e. across the Dikhu), as distinct from Mirir (‘those who did not come’), the term used 
for Sangtams, Changs, Phoms and Konyaks.”69 From that given point of departure each 
Naga tribe may have developed its own language and socio-cultural pattern (distinct from 
another tribe) – Nagas speak more than 30 different languages and dialects that linguists 
classify “into ‘at least two, and possibly several, completely distinct branches of Tibeto-
Burman’” language groups.70 Also, there is another possibility in relation to the evolution 
of distinct Naga dialects and languages that: either they had developed different dialects 
for different socio-religious occasions  before they were forced to split-up, or their 
original language had very limited words which in the course of time were replaced by 
new words and expressions.  
Furthermore, the deep division and enmity, most apparently, gave way to constant 
warfare (between different tribal groups) and culture of headhunting. W. Robinson, 
concerning constant warfare among the Nagas, writes: 
...the various tribes dispersed over the Naga Mountains are not only independent 
and unconnected, but engaged in perpetual hostilities with one another. Interest is 
not either the most frequent or the most powerful motive of their incessant 
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hostilities. They must in a great measure be imputed to the passion of revenge, 
which rages with such violence in the breast of savages ....71 
Hence, the Nagas’ headhunting culture could have developed after the break-up of the 
original Naga society. This supposition is supported by the Naga story that in the 
beginning they  
did not know how to make war.  But one day a bird dropped a berry from a tree, 
and a lizard (Shangkung) and a red ant (muritsu) fought for it. A man who was 
watching saw the ant kill the lizard and cut off its head. So men learnt to take 
heads ....72 
The enmity that began at the time of tragic incidence, most apparently, made different 
Naga tribes deadly hostile to one another and they began to raid the villages of other 
groups/tribes and kill the victims and take their heads as trophy achieved through their 
bravery. As the time lapsed, headhunting, besides being an act of revenge and bravery, 
seemed to have gained socio-religious meanings and significance. Constant warfare 
between different tribes and headhunting culture, on the one hand, made the Nagas 
ferocious warriors/fighters who would defend their own (mostly village) society at all 
cost, and on the other, further deepened the enmity and suspicion between different tribal 
groups.  
The earliest historical accounts of the Naga settlements are found in the Ahom 
Chronicles, known as the Ahom Buranjis, and the Royal Chronicles of Manipur. “The 
Ahoms,” writes Barua,  
belonged to Tai or Shan race, migrated to upper Assam through Myanmar in 13th 
Century. By subjugating the local kings and tribal chiefs, the Ahoms gradually 
established their rule over the whole of Brahmaputra Valley. The Ahom rulers 
had a deep sense of history. Under their patronage, the priests and the nobles 
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meticulously recorded the history of Ahoms from the earlier time to the end of 
their rule in the hand written tomes called ‘buranjis’.” 73 
According to Furer-Haimendorf, the Ahom Buranjis “record fierce fights as well as 
peaceful dealings with the inhabitants of numerous Naga villages.”74 The earliest record, 
which dates back to the thirteenth century, narrates how Sukapha, the first Ahom king 
(who founded the Ahom kingdom in Assam in 1228 A.D.75), conquered many Naga 
villages with greatest cruelty when he was travelling across the Naga country (through 
Burma) with his large army.76 From the time the Ahoms established their rule over the 
Brahmaputra Valley the relationship between the Ahom rulers and the Nagas was mixture 
of hostilities and friendship.77 It appears that the Nagas were never subjected under the 
direct rule of Ahoms, nor their country was ever made part of Ahom kingdom, although 
some Ahom kings considered Nagas as their subjects and took taxes from them.78 
Shihabuddin, the Mogul historian, who accompanied Mir Jumla’s Assam expedition in 
1662, wrote that even though most of the hill tribes of the neighbouring hills, most 
probably including the Nagas, paid no tax to the King of Assam, “yet they accept his 
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sovereignty and obey some of his commands.”79 Hence, from thirteenth to nineteenth 
centuries the relationship between the Nagas and Ahoms oscillated between hostility and 
friendship – at times they had very friendly and ruler-subject like relationship, and in 
other they clashed against each other, and the Nagas hunted heads of Ahom subjects. In-
spite of the fluctuating relationship the Ahom rulers never seemed to have attempted to 
subjugate the Nagas under the Ahom rule as other indigenous tribal groups (like Bodo 
and Mikir [now Karbi]) of Brahmaputra Valley.80 Although historically it appears that 
there was no united Naga nation as such before the British occupation, the Nagas lived for 
thousands of years in their ancestral land with absolute freedom – they were the masters 
of their destiny and rulers of their ancestral land divided among different tribes, sub-tribes 
and clans;81 therefore, the Nagas’ aspiration to regain freedom cannot be a new idea or 
foreign construction, even though the concept of the united Naga nation may sound later 
invention.82 
V.4.2. British Occupation and Nagas’ State of Affairs 
British conquest of Northeast (mainly Assam) region began from 1824,83 the year in 
which the first Anglo-Burmese war concluded.84 Although Assam occupation began from 
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1824 the British, for a long time, did not show any intention to extend their authority over 
the Naga territory, because their main interest was to develop tea plantation on the plains 
and foothills.85 However, from the early 1850s British were compelled to apply a policy 
of slow but positive control over the Naga inhabited area due to several deadly Naga raids 
(in which many people lost their lives) in the Assam valley.86 Thenceforth British 
gradually extended their authority over the Naga territory. But, the control of the Naga 
territory did not mean an active or direct administration of the region, because the British 
strategy throughout was to leave the Nagas to themselves; therefore, the Nagas continued 
to manage by themselves their village organization and tribal council without any 
interference from the British government. Besides, the British administration endorsed the 
Inner Line regulations to protect the Nagas and their land from exploitation. According to 
Mackenzie, the British government introduced the Regulations to restrict the entry of both 
white planters and non-tribal Indians to protect the land, customs and traditions of the hill 
peoples.87 It had twofold objectives: to protect the land of the Nagas from outside 
encroachment and to protect the people of Assam plain (mainly the tea garden owners and 
labourers) from the Naga raids.88 Furthermore, exclusion of the Naga area from the active 
administration, on the one hand, protected the Nagas from outside influence and 
exploitation and gave them opportunity to continue to enjoy their freedom (except 
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headhunting) under the British rule; and on the other, the British policy kept alive in them 
the awareness that they were not part of any other territory.  Concerning British policy of 
seclusion of Nagas Maxwell writes:  
‘British official laboured for a hundred years to ensure that Nagas should retain 
their racial characteristics and should not be reduced to the status of tribals in the 
plains [who are] regarded as untouchables to be exploited by money lenders and 
all of higher caste. 89 
If the British government adopted a policy of total integration and assimilation (a policy 
which the Indian and Hindu nationalists would have preferred British to implement with 
full force right after the occupation of Northeast region) with mainland India, then, the 
situation of Nagas would not be different from the tribal groups of the non-excluded and 
non-protected areas (mainly Tripura and present Assam) of Northeast India. Moreover, 
the policy of exclusion and isolation of the hill regions seems to have worked in the 
Nagas’ favour, therefore, there was no rebellion – except a semi-religious movement 
which was launched by Jadonang in Manipur hill area in 1931 – against the colonial rule 
from the time whole Naga inhabited Northeast region came under the control of British 
administration (except few clashes between some Naga tribes who were yet to give up 
their headhunting tradition).90 The semi-religious movement of Jadonanga, a Kabui Naga 
(who was arrested and hanged), in the view of Reid, was in no sense a revolt against 
British rule.91 
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V.4.3. Role of Christianity in Collective Naga Identity 
During the British period two major developments, that have lasting impact in the socio-
religio-cultural and political spheres of the Nagas, took place. These developments were 
the conversion of the Nagas to Christianity and formation of collective Naga ethnicity and 
identity. Before they were converted to Christianity Nagas practiced a type of tribal 
religion (or animism),92 of which headhunting appeared to be one of the essential rituals. 
The Nagas, in the pre-Christian days, did not have shared ethnic identity as such, because 
they were divided into various distinct tribes that were constantly at war with one another. 
In those days Nagas would identify themselves by their given tribe or clan, not by the 
generic term “Naga.”93 It was Christianity that helped them to gain the present unity and 
Naga ethnicity – after conversion to Christianity the Nagas gave up their tribal warfare 
(headhunting culture) that alienated them (different Naga tribes) from one another and, in 
the meantime, the Christianity generated a strong sense of common brotherhood (or 
blood-relationship) among all the Christianized Naga tribes.    This is why Shimrey terms 
the conversion to Christianity of the Nagas as “a revolution in the Naga history.” “The 
message of the Gospel,” says Shimrey, “was the beginning of all things in Naga 
history.”94  
The process of Christianization of the Nagas (apparently Christianity is both individual 
faith and a vital part of cultural identity of the Naga society)  was taken up by the 
American Baptist missionaries from the early 1840s, however, the first Naga conversion 
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took place in 1851 and from the 1870s the mission work gained momentum.95 According 
to Gundevia, conversion commenced with the arrival of American Baptist Mission in 
1872.96 Christian missionaries not only preached the Gospel of Christ, but they opened 
schools to educate Naga youths and build hospitals.97  The impact of Christian message 
combined with education and better health care was such that in little more than a century 
most of the Nagas of Nagaland became Christian. In the opinion of Richard Eaton Nagas’ 
conversion to Christianity was second (only to that of Phillipines) most massive 
movement to Christianity in whole of Asia; therefore, at present almost ninety percent of 
the population of Nagaland is Christian98 - most of the 10 percent is non-Naga population. 
When the Nagas became Christian they gave up their traditional belief and practices. 
Thus, Christianization effected social transformation in the Naga society and they 
gradually started to participate in the modern civilization. This is why Ashikho Mao 
thinks “Culturally Naga Hills became a colony of American Evangelism.”99 Even though 
the social change affected the traditional culture and customs of the Naga society, 
Christianity made them aware of their rights and it gave them unique social status and 
self-esteem among their neighbours.  
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Nagas’ conversion to Christianity, in the view of Baruah, was the single most important 
development that made collective identity possible.100 Singh acknowledges that 
Christianity became a new process of modernization which stopped headhunting, led to 
the growth of literacy and development of better health care, and reduced tribal languages 
to writing.101 Hence, Christianity has become one of the most important parts of 
collective Naga ethnic identity in the present time.102 “Collective identities,” according to 
Anna Bull,  
can be defined as constituted by a shared and interactive sense of ‘we-ness’ 
(anchored in real or ‘imagined’ or ‘simulatated’ attributes and experiences) 
associated with a collective agency [...] in terms of content, collective identities 
can be constructed around specific traits which are seen to distinguish one group 
from another – language, ideology, class, ethnicity or religion.103  
Thus, Naga Christianity and Naga ethnicity are inseparably intertwined, and any attempt 
to separate them may cause severe damage to the whole Naga social structure. Moreover, 
Naga Christianity began to become a vital organ of Naga collective ethnic identity before 
Indian independence; it is not that “the Naga conflict helped make Christianity a part of 
Naga identity,”104 as suggested by Baruah. Christianity has played a major role in the 
growth of socio-political consciousness among the Nagas from the 1920s. Furthermore, it 
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has been the most important factor for the process of enlightenment, liberation (from 
Naga traditional customs and manners that divided them) and (socio-political) 
empowerment of the Naga tribes in the Northeast region.105 
V.5. Ethno-religious Apprehension and Aspiration for Independence 
It is indicated earlier that the Nagas did not have friendly relationship with the people of 
Assam and other plains people of mainland India due to their socio-religio-cultural 
differences. They also did not have any good relationship with Hinduised Manipuris 
(Meiteis) who considered the Nagas and other hill tribes as “altogether lower creatures” 
because of their food habits and socio-cultural tradition.106 The Hill tribes even today are 
considered by orthodox Hindus as low class human beings mainly because of the food 
they eat. Some of the food items (like fermented drinks, fermented meat, fermented beans 
or seeds, beef, pork, dog-meat etc.) which the hill peoples enjoy eating are totally unholy, 
disgusting and repugnant to Hindus (particularly high caste Hindus). In the meantime, 
most of the hill tribes (including the Nagas) of Northeast do not have caste system, 
whereas the Hindus and Hinduised Ahoms and Manipuries strictly practiced/practice 
caste hierarchy. From the time of Sankardev (15th and 16th centuries A.D.),107 the most 
popular Vaisnavite saint of Assam, process of Hinduisation of some of the tribes living in 
the Assam plain and Manipur Valley began. Due to the process of Hinduisation some of 
the casteless Mongoloid tribes (like Dimasa Kacharis, Rava and Lalung) of Brahmaputra 
and Barak Valleys have been gradually converted to Hinduism and introduced into caste 
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hierarchy. But, Hinduism could not make inroad into Naga country (and also Mizos’ 
land), most probably, due to their exclusiveness, ferocity and head hunting culture. 
Nevertheless, it had very good prospect to infiltrate into these impenetrable areas after the 
British occupation of both the territories if these regions were not excluded from the 
direct administration and isolated from the mainland India. Though the British policy was 
not sympathetic toward Hinduising elements, the Nagas seemed to be happy with the 
political arrangement made to protect them and their territory.  
However, in the late 1920s the Nagas perceived an impending danger to their socio-cultural 
system and to their territory when they came to know that the British was planning to make a 
series of political reforms in India in view of the rising anti-colonial mobilization. Therefore, 
in 1929 a strong delegation, representing various Naga tribes, of Naga Club submitted a 
memorandum to the Simon Commission108 demanding their hill areas to be excluded from the 
proposed reform scheme and to be kept under direct British administration. Furthermore, the 
memorandum asked the Commission to leave out the Nagas from any reform scheme and to 
give them freedom (or revert to their earlier status) when the British would leave India.109 
Various intellectuals may interpret this memorandum according to their scholarly wisdom and 
judgement, whereas only the Nagas of that time could tell us what they really felt when they 
realized that Naga country would be made a part of Assam or another territory in the near 
future. In regard to Nagas’ fear Robert Reid, the then governor of Assam, expressed:  
the inhabitants of the excluded Areas would not now ... be ready to join in any 
constitution in which they would be in danger or coming under the political 
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domination of the Indians .... The people of the hills of Assam are as eager to work 
out their own salvation free form Indian domination as are the people of Burma and 
for the same reasons.110 
 A people which never had experienced lack of freedom, who recently started to realize their 
collective Naga ethnicity and identity and who did not have any good relationship with 
Hinduised or Hindu people were certain to perceive serious threat to their ethnicity and 
identity when they suddenly became conscious of the fact that their future was going to be in 
the hands of those who belonged to different race, religion and culture, and who considered 
them lower creatures. The fear of the Nagas (including Mizos and people of NEFA) were well 
understood by the British government when the Commission reported the concerns of these 
tribes. In 1935, the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act, as a result of 
which Naga Hills (including Lushai Hills, NEFA and North Cachar and Mikir Hills) became 
Excluded Area within the Assam Province.111  
Although Nagas were excluded from direct administration, according to the Government 
of India Act passed in 1935, their apprehension did not die down, because they were 
certain that British was leaving India soon. Then the Naga leaders tried to find political 
ways and means to safeguard their Naga ethnicity and identity (then intensely moulded 
together with Christianity even though only little more than half of the Naga population 
was Christian), but no political scheme seemed to have assured them a safe and protected 
socio-religio-political future within the post-Independent Indian state. Therefore, the 
Naga National Council (NNC – the offshoot of the Naga Club),112 under the leadership of 
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Angami Zapu Phizo, declared independence of Nagaland one day before (i.e. 14 August, 
1947) India got independence. Most probably the question of declaration of independence 
for Nagaland would not have arisen if the Indian national leaders together with Naga 
leaders would have worked out reasonable and concrete political arrangement to resolve 
Nagas’ concerns before India got independence. However, the post-independent Indian 
state neither recognized the independence declared by the NNC, nor appeared to have 
given due thought to the Nagas’ real concerns. In the meantime, although the Indian 
government was against making any additional concession (except the autonomy within 
Assam), a nine-point agreement between the British appointed governor of Assam, Sir 
Akbar Hydari, and NNC was signed in 1948 after series of talks,  under the preamble “the 
right of the Nagas to develop themselves according to their freely expressed wishes is 
recognized.” The Article 8 of the nine-point agreement was the bone of contention for the 
Nagas. The Article 8 stated:  
The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the Government of the Indian Union will 
have a special responsibility for a period of ten years to ensure the due 
observance of this agreement; at the end of this period, the Naga National 
Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended 
for a further period, or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people 
arrived at. 113 
The NNC leaders interpreted the Article as  
The Governor of Assam as the agent of the Government of India will have a 
special responsibility for a period of ten years to ensure the due observance of the 
Agreement at the end of the period the Nagas will be free to decide their own 
future.114  
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Therefore, the Naga leaders took it for granted that the Article gave them the right to opt 
out of Indian union after 10 years; whereas, the Indian government “interpreted the 
agreement in the light that the Nagas had the freedom only to suggest revision of 
administrative pattern after ten years, an interpretation, which was unacceptable to the 
NNC.”115 Moreover, the Central government treated the nine-point agreement as a dead 
letter from the moment it was concluded, because the agreement was signed between the 
British appointed governor of Assam and NNC. Meanwhile, during the period of Indian 
independence the Nagas were given some assurances by Gandhi, Nehru and C. R. 
Rajagopalcharria (the Governor-General of India)116 that they had the right to determine 
their own future, but those assurances appeared to have no significance in practical 
level.117  
V.6. Policy of the Indian State 
From the early 1950s the NNC began Naga resistance movement. In the initial stage the 
Nagas resorted to peaceful forms118 of protest to compel the Indian government to fulfil 
their demand.119  However, the Indian government viewed the resistance as a law and 
order problem created by some misguided individuals like Phizo, therefore, the Assam 
government issued order to raid the houses of Phizo and other Naga leaders, and also 
banned the Naga newspapers.120 During this time several NNC leaders went underground 
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to evade arrest and harassment by armed forces. These Naga leaders, from their hideouts, 
continued to guide the Naga freedom movement to achieve Nagas’ geopolitical goal. In 
1952, the Nagas demonstrated their unity and their disobedience to the Indian state by 
boycotting the first general election of the independent India held in the same year.121 
From this time the Naga unrest spread outside the Naga Hills. In 1953, the first violent 
incidence, owing to the Naga unrest, occurred in Tuensang, then part of NEFA.122 The 
Indian government, from the early 1950s, appeared to be determined to suppress the 
Nagas’ freedom movement with the use of force – according to Lacina, “Initially, Delhi’s 
coercive response to the NNC was quite heavy-handed and the Center refused to negotiate 
with the rebel leadership.”123 Therefore, the incidence of violence worked as a strong 
supporting evidence to use Indian armed forces against the Nagas. Thus, the Indian state, 
instead of settling the Naga problem through political dialogue, adopted hard-line policy 
by deploying armed personnel in the Naga area. Moreover, the Central government 
equipped its armed forces with special powers by enacting several “‘black’ laws such as 
the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous Districts) Act 1953, The Assam 
Disturbed Areas Act 1955, Armed Forces (Assam, Manipur) Special Powers Act 1958 
etc.”124 The military tactics of the Indian government corroborated that it had perceived 
Naga freedom movement a great internal threat to the newly liberated Indian state; 
therefore, the situation was considered extraordinary condition which had to be dealt with 
extraordinary power – “perceived internal threats,” in the view of Margaret Blanchard, 
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“often have created far greater repressive reactions than when the nation is at war.”125 
Apparently mobilization of Indian armed forces into the Naga Hills was tantamount to 
declaration of war against the Nagas or invasion of the land of the Nagas. Hence, 
deployment of armed personnel (at one time Indian government stationed “between 
40,000 and 50,000 soldiers to control a civil population of only about 300,000.”126), 
equipping them with special power, not only escalated the Naga situation, but also 
seemed to have alienated the moderate section of the Nagas. This fact is acknowledged by 
Sinha, who was one of the senior officers during early stage of military operation in Naga 
Hills, in his book Lost Opportunity. He Writes:  
The harsh measures taken by the army in the face of violent guerrilla attacks in 
the fifties contributed to the sense of separateness even among that section of 
Nagas, who favoured a peaceful settlement. When insurgency started in 1956 
neither the political leadership nor the army had any experience in fighting 
insurgency. The then Army Chief, Gen K. S. Thimaya, is reported to have 
candidly told Nehru that it required political wisdom rather than military muscle 
to solve the Naga problem [...] It will serve no purpose to deny that in the initial 
stages there were wide spread violations of Human Rights and acts of vendetta in 
which innocent lives of civilians were lost and villages burnt. Torture to elicit 
information was quite common. 127  
The military stratagem clearly demonstrated that the Indian government was acting as per 
the instruction of Hindu nationalists (Jana Sangh), who strongly suggested that “the 
Indian government should ‘brook no nonsense’ from any Nagas and it should not be 
afraid to use its economic and military power” to crush the Naga resistance.128 In the 
meantime the Indian army, too, seemed to have followed hard-line position129 on the 
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Naga problem for which they required to be equipped with special powers to defeat the 
Naga resistance mercilessly.  The hard-line policy of the Indian government reflect anti-
minority attitude. 
Nonetheless, the military tactics of the Indian state failed to achieve its goal; instead, it 
produced the first and long-lasting armed militancy in the post-independent Indian soil. 
Therefore, from the early 1960s the Indian government adopted policy of political 
negotiation with the moderate Naga leaders. The outcome of the political dialogue was 
16-point agreement which was signed between the moderate Naga leaders and New 
Delhi. As per the agreement the present state of Nagaland came into existence in 1963 in-
spite of objection from Hindu nationalists – Hindus of “Madras warned that to grant 
statehood to the Nagas would set up a chain-reaction of similar demands throughout 
north-east India.”130 Despite the formation of the state of Nagaland the Naga insurgency 
continued; and in the meantime, the Indian Government failed to implement all the terms 
mentioned in the agreement.131 One of the most sensitive issues is the inclusion of the 
Naga inhabited areas that fall within the states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal 
Pradesh.132 This sensitive issue has created ethnic tension and violence between Nagas 
and other ethnic groups in Manipur and Assam. The boundary problem could have been 
solved at the time of Indian independence if the Indian national leaders would have taken 
the Naga situation considerately. Due to various complications the Naga problem does not 
look like going to end very soon.  
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V.7. Naga Militancy 
When the state repression increased the NNC formed Federal Government of Nagaland 
(FGN), also known as underground government of Nagaland in March 1956.133 The FGN 
created its own army (Naga Home-Guards) of almost three thousand guerrillas,134 who 
were trained and armed (with the weapons left behind by Japanese and Allied forces in 
the end of the World War II). According to Nirmala Nibedon, the NNC “began armed 
operations in 1956 with a strength of some 15, 000 guerrillas.”135  Thus, the first armed-
movement in the post-independent India began in Nagaland136 (then Naga Hills District – 
an autonomous district council within Assam state) in 1956, under the leadership of 
Phizo. In the early stage of the Naga insurgency (i.e. from 1956 till the creation of the 
state of Nagaland) the Indian army appeared to have applied a brutal method to root out 
the militancy. During this time there were reports of wide spread violations of human 
rights (innocent people were tortured or killed, women were raped, villages were burned, 
and innocent people were denied justice) by army personnel.137 The military strategy 
forced many innocent and educated young Nagas into the insurgency camps.138 However, 
the Nagaland Baptist Church has been involved in peace mission to settle the Naga 
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problem peacefully from the very beginning of the birth of insurgency. In-spite of the 
collapse of Peace Commission (which was formed by the Church leaders of Nagaland in 
1964) in 1966139 the Church, moderate Naga elites and positive thinking Indian political 
pundits continued their peace effort to resolve the problem. The result of such endeavour 
was the Shillong Accord, signed by the representatives of NNC-Federal Government 
Nagaland and Government of India on 11 November 1975, at Shillong (Meghalaya).140  
After the Accord was signed a faction of the NNC cadres surrendered their arms and 
renounced violence, and for some time there was normalcy in Nagaland. This period of 
Naga insurgency can be called the first phase of militancy.  
With a lull of about five years second phase of militancy began in Nagaland in 1980. A 
section of NNC denounced the Shillong Accord as “treason” and the NNC-FGN 
signatories of the Accord were declared as traitors.141 This group formed the NSCN on 2 
February 1980 (under the leadership of Thuingaleng Muival, Isak Chisi Swu and 
Khaplang) and proclaimed a new “Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland” 
with Swu as Chairman, Khaplang as Vice-chairman and Muivah as General Secretary.142 
With the rise of NSCN the insurgency problem spread all over Northeast India. In April 
1988 the NSCN, due to some internal feud, split into two groups (NSCN-Isak-Muivah or 
I-M and NSCN-Khaplang or K); since then, these two groups are sworn enemies of each 
other. Between the two groups NSCN (I-M) is stronger one and it is a well organized, 
well trained and well armed insurgent group in Northeast India. At present both the 
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groups are in ceasefire agreement with the Indian government, but their occasional intra-
group fighting is going on. It is said that more NSCN (K) cadres have been killed by 
NSCN (I-M) than by Indian military. Besides these groups, the NNC still survives in 
Angami area, but it is split into two groups – NNC (A) led by Phizo’s daughter Adino and 
NNC (K) under the leadership of Khadao Yanthan. According to Sinha,  
Muivah group enjoys influence among Thangkhuls, Semas and Phoms in 
Zuneboto, Wokha, Ukhrul, Dimapur and Kohima, whereas Khaplang group 
among Konyaks and Aos in Tuensang, Mokokchung and Mon. In Angami and 
Chakesang areas the legacy of Phizo still lingers.143  
Hence, the Naga insurgency problem is the longest unresolved problem in India and one 
of the oldest in the world.  
V.8. Naga Militancy: An Assessment 
Though freedom has been the main objective of the Naga armed movement, the main 
underlying motivating factors have been Naga historical context and Naga ethno-religious 
identify. Moreover, for two reasons weight of religion in the inspiration of armed-
insurrection cannot be underestimated. Firstly, religion (Naga Baptist Christianity), 
played vital role in creating the modern Naga ethnicity and identity, therefore, it is the 
most vital force that built unity in the midst of Naga diversity, and it seems to be the only 
force which could protect the Nagas’ unity from any divisive machinery/machineries. 
Secondly, Christian Nagas were well aware of the danger to Christian minority due to 
increasing Hindu opposition and hostility144 (these aspects are elaborated in the preceding 
chapter) against religious minorities on both religious and political ground - from the 
British period Christian community has been accused for “denationalisation and 
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association with imperialism,” therefore, the community experienced various forms of 
discrimination,145 the trend increased in the post-independent India. Such discrimination 
in the political sphere is made obvious by the government policy that schedule castes 
Christian converts are excluded from the benefits granted to Hindu and Sikh schedule 
castes.146 If schedule caste Christians reconvert to Hinduism, then, they get the benefit. 
This policy, on the one hand, discourages conversion to Christianity and, on the other, 
encourages conversion or reconversion to Hinduism.147 Besides, Hindu religious 
nationalists had frequently raised slogan against Christian missionaries,148 because 
Christian missionaries were considered as the spies and agents of alien power. Therefore, 
fear of Naga Christians, that “within the Indian Union the religious freedom of a small 
Christian minority would be compromised,”149 could have played very significant role in 
inspiring both the freedom movement and Naga armed uprising. According to P. and N. 
Means,  
there can be no doubt that the rebel Nagas are a sincerely pious lot. By all 
accounts hymn singing and prayers constitute an important part of their daily 
routine in their jungle hideouts. The vice-president of the NFG, Mr. Mhiasiu, was 
a preacher before joining the underground. Serving as chaplains for the Home 
Guards are many Baptist minister.150    
However, Naga insurgency is different from Sikh, Islamic and Hindu religious terrorism. 
There are three main reasons for the differentiation of Naga insurgency from other 
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religious terrorism in India. First, it is an armed insurgency which mainly targets armed 
personnel of Indian government. This point is attested by Colonel Ved Prakash, an army 
officer who was involved in military operation against the Naga and Mizo insurgents, in 
the following words:  
A word of praise is due to the Naga and Mizo militants. Not only were they brave 
and doughty fighters, they observed a certain code of honour. They usually 
targeted uniformed men, soldiers and policemen, and seldom the civilians. Of 
course, the perceived ‘informers’ were indeed targeted.151 
Second, its armed activity is strictly limited within the Naga inhabited territories that, it 
claims, belong to the Nagas historically. It may support other insurgent groups, as alleged 
by the Indian government, in the Northeast for the purpose of raising fund and diverting 
the attention of Indian military machineries. Third, although religion is one of the main 
factors in instigating Naga freedom movement, it does not seem to have any holy war 
ideology, as in the case of other religious terrorism, to inspire acts of terrorism to destroy 
and terrorise people of other religious faiths or take revenge on religious ground. In the 
meantime the Naga Church has been persistently involved in the establishment of peace 
in Nagaland and solution of the Nagas’ geopolitical concern through peaceful means. The 
Shillong Accord was one of the outcomes of the relentless involvement of the Naga 
Christian leaders in peaceful settlement of the Naga issue. Therefore, the Naga militancy 
cannot be categorized as religious terrorism; it is an armed insurgency152 that aims to 
achieve Naga freedom and protect Naga ethno-religious identity. 
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Hence, the case study in this chapter make it clear that the Naga insurgency (unlike Sikh, 
Kashmiri Muslim and Hindu religious terrorism) arise more from political and ethnic 
factors rather than specific theological or scriptural convictions.  
V.9. Solution toward the Conflict Resolution 
There are various suggestions postulated by different thinkers for the resolution of the 
Naga problem. Among the postulates economic and political solutions are given more 
importance. B. G. Verghese, an Indian journalist and policy thinker, proposed a non-
territorial approach that would “strengthen the Naga way of life” and would not disturb 
the integrity of other states. In this regard he suggested formation of a Naga Regional 
Council that would allow Nagas of whole of Northeast India a say in the cultural matter 
of Nagas.153 B. K. Roy, a noted anthropologist, proposed an institution modelled on the 
Sami Council where the Sami people living in Sweden, Finland and Norway are 
represented.154 Bhattacharjee and Nayak suggest federal system, from the local level, that 
would ensure decision making power to different ethnic groups; so that all ethnic groups 
may feel that their socio-cultural-ethnic distinct identities are respected.155 In the view of 
Kotwal more autonomy to the state and genuine economic and infrastructural 
development and better and new national and international trade routes might solve the 
problem.156 No doubt the above-stated suggestions sound attractive, but they may solve 
only part of the Naga problem. To solve the Naga problem Indian government has to first 
gain the trust of the Naga people on the Indian state. In this regard the Central 
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government needs to: recognize the unique historical background of the Nagas; officially 
acknowledge the past mistakes of the Indian government; demonstrate that the 
Constitutional rights of the ethno-religious minority communities are well protected from 
the Hindu religio-nationalists; implement every agreement it makes with the concerned 
party. Any negligence in the part of the government to fulfil its obligation might indicate 
that the government is not sincere or concerned, and could further aggravate the given 
situation.  
The main obstacles in the solution of the Naga problem (including the Sikh, Kashmir and 
Hindu problems studied in the preceding chapters) appear to be communal factors – 
communalisation and religionization of politics, communal propaganda and communal 
rhetoric etc. Unless the detrimental communal factors are contained, the above-given 
problems will continue to deepen or expand. However, the Indian government alone 
cannot solve the problem; the majority of the people who do not support any form of 
violence need to come together and take a bold step to restrain communal elements from 
destroying the centuries old social fabrics of the Indian society. In this regard, the model 
proposed in the last chapter might be useful. Once the positive communal ethos is 
restored in the Indian society the militancy/terrorism/insurgency will not find their 
support base to expand their activities.  
V.10. Conclusion 
This case study underscores the following points: the Nagas possess unique history and 
this fact has not been plainly and openly recognized by the Indian government; 
Christianity played most significant role in creating the modern collective Naga ethnic 
identity, therefore, Christian religion is the vital part of the Naga society; the Naga 
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ethnicity, Naga Christianity and the land of the Nagas are profoundly interrelated, for this 
reason no outside threat to any one of them cannot be tolerated; the Nagas (because of 
their culture and tradition) had been looked down upon by the Hindus (or their Hinduised 
neighbours) for which they did not have good relationship with them. 
The Nagas began to perceive a serious threat to their collective ethno-religious identity 
and to their freedom from the pre-independent period; meanwhile, the Indian leaders 
could not assure the Nagas that their ethno-religious identity, their unique history and 
their freedom would be protected in the post-independent India. If the Indian leaders 
would have considered the Naga concerns seriously and sympathetically in the beginning 
of Indian independence and created a separate autonomous state integrating all the Naga 
inhabited areas within it, then, the present crisis might not have taken birth. Instead the 
Indian government attempted to impose its rule on the Nagas by demonstrating its 
military might as suggested by Hindu communalists and nationalists, who were not in 
favour of showing any concern to a few hundred thousand minority religious hill people. 
The military tactics of Indian state against the Nagas seemed to have signified neo-
colonisation of the Nagas. It indicated that the Indian government was forcing the Nagas 
to submit to the dictates of the Indian state or face dire consequences. Furthermore, the 
policy put the Nagas in such situation that, either they had to quietly submit themselves to 
the dictates of the rulers and risk their ethno-religious identity and freedom or had to rise 
up and fight for their right – latter one was the best choice for the extremist faction of the 
Nagas. In the meantime, Hindu religio-nationalist factors (analysed in the previous 
chapter) could have emboldened the extremist Naga faction that was determined to start 
armed movement for their freedom and identity. Thus, the Nagas ethno-religious 
apprehension and historical and geo-politcal concerns gave rise to the oldest armed 
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insurgency in India. Although the Naga problem appears to be complicated one, there are 
possibilities to solve it in a peaceful way. Solution of the Naga problem should not be 
measured in number or size, but the uniqueness has to be given prominence.  At present 
more important is to gain the trust of the Nagas on the Indian state. To do that the Indian 
state has to prove that the government is sincere in fulfilment of any agreement it makes 
with the Nagas. There have been some lapses in the past which need to be corrected. 
The following chapter will present a comparative reflection on religious terrorism on the 
basis of the case studies done on the second, third, fourth and fifth chapters. However, the 
Naga insurgency might not fit in entirely in the comparative reflection because, the Naga 
insurgency cannot be categorised (as indicated earlier in this chapter) as religious 
terrorism.            











CHAPTER VI  
COMPARATIVE REFLECTION ON RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN INDIA 
VI.1. Introduction  
In each case of religious terrorism in India there seems to be common ideological elements: 
the apprehension that religious or ethno-religious identity is in grave danger; the perception 
that the modern idea of secular nationalism is incompatible in religious, moral and socio-
economic affairs.1 In the meantime, there is a common awareness that the secular state is 
biased to particular religious group or groups and it is not doing enough to safeguard the 
religio-political rights of every religious community; as a result, the secular state is envisaged 
as an adversary by both the majority and the minority religious communities. Therefore, 
religion has become the prominent ideology of protest. Religious actors of the given faith 
communities have marshalled religious texts and symbols: to address regional as well as 
national social, economic and political issues; and to resist the modern secular system, secular 
state, supporters of the secular-political structure, and perceived threats of religious plurality. 
Subsequently, religio-nationalist actors of the conflicting religious communities have skilfully 
fused together spiritual with the historical, socio-political and economic grievances, tensions 
and experiences of many people of each of the concerned parties. Hence, depiction of war 
between truth/light and evil/darkness (found in every religion) in both personal and cosmic 
level is being skilfully portrayed by religious specialists as both spiritual and physical or 
internal and external battle against the forces of evil.  
In this chapter I would like to make a comparative reflection on religious terrorism in India. In 
this regard it is necessary to assess the following factors: correlation between sacred and 
secular and importance of geo-political territory in the survival of religious or ethno-religious 
                                                          
1 Cp. Mark Juergensmeyer, “Is Religion the Problem?”, Levinson Lectures, Centre on Religion and Democracy 
(University of Vriginia, November 7/2003), in Hedgehog Review, vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring, 2004), p. 6. 
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identity; common ideological component; religious nationalism; ethno-religious conflict; and 
religious concept and techniques of religious terrorism. 
VI.2. Interconnection between Sacred and Secular  
From antiquity religion has been playing indispensable role in both sacred and secular aspects 
of Hindu, Sikh, Islamic and Naga tribal societies. In India, before the establishment of British 
colonial rule, kingdoms and societies were governed by religious laws. In the socio-political 
system of those days spiritual and temporal were inseparable from one another. Kings, 
chieftains and rulers of the temporal kingdoms were regarded either as divine incarnation or 
divinely ordained authorities on earth2 – On divinity of Hindu Kings Washburn Hopkins 
opined that kings became divine by virtue of a religious ritual, in which the mere human 
beings by “consecration and baptism at inauguration” assumed a divine nature.3  Religious 
authorities (such as Brahmins, priests, gurus, mullahs and imams) exercised extensive powers 
and functions in the mundane matters, because religious and mundane affairs were blended 
together; in other words, church and state were like one unit. Though far-reaching socio-
political changes had taken place during the British and post-independent periods religion and 
religious actors continued to exercise significant authority over the sacred and secular life of 
the given religious societies.4  
Each religion, in India, has to be viewed from vertical and horizontal perspectives. Vertically 
religion connects the Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Naga Christian societies to their ultimate 
                                                          
2 See J. Goda, “Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View,” in Numen, Vol. 3, Fasc. 2 (January, 
1956), 36f; Jean Lyon, Just Half a World Away (New York, 1954), 253. 
 
3 E. Washburn Hopkins, “The Divinity of Kings,” in Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 51, No. 4 
(December 1931), 309. 
 
4 “But while churning out hundreds of thousands of geeky graduates, India does remain a country as seemingly 
attached to gods and goddesses as it was two thousand years ago.” Angela Saini, “The God Confusion,” in New 
Humanist, vol. 126, issue 2 (March/April 2011), available from http://newhumanist.org.uk/2500/the-god-
confusion; Internet accessed: 4 May 2012. 
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reality, their ancestors, their mythical golden-age and history; horizontally religion endows a 
distinctive identity to each of these communities, binds together different individuals, groups 
and factions within the given unit, and requires every individual of the community to conform 
to its established religious principles and venerate and protect the given sacred spaces and 
territory. In Native American religion, according to Joel Martin, the spirituality is fused with 
“place and practice”. When we “talk about Hopi religion,” Martin writes, we  
must talk about blue corn. One thing always leads to another and another when land, 
religion and life “are one”.5 
Similarly, when we speak about Hindu, Sikh, Kashmiri Muslim and Naga Christian religions 
we have to talk about their geo-political territories; in other words, religion, land and life of 
the Hindu, Sikh, Kashmiri Muslim and Naga Christian societies are deeply interconnected. 
Therefore, the land represents both invisible/spiritual and physical cosmos that ascertains 
perpetual relationship with divinity, ancestors and community. For Hindus whole Indian 
territory is the body of divine mother, and the relationship between the divine-mother and 
Hinduism-and-Hindu race is believed to be eternal; for Sikhs Punjab is the cradle of Sikhism, 
for which the territory is both holy and unique; the land of Kashmir symbolizes the glorious 
period of Islamic expansion and Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent, at the same time, it is 
dotted with sacred shrines of pirs and historical mosques, therefore, Kashmiri Muslims 
consider themselves as a “Chosen People” and the land as “the Promised land;”6 Naga 
inhabited territory stands for microcosm and macrocosm for the Nagas, because it is the place 
of their origin, tribal division, religious transition and Naganess (Naga unity, ethnicity and 
identity). Religion and geo-political territory, for the above-mentioned reasons, play very vital 
                                                          
5 Joel W. Martin, The Land Looks After Us: A History of Native American Religion (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), x. 
 
6 Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (London: 
The Macmillan Press, 1994),  127. 
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role in the (both spiritual and every-day) life of the Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and Naga Christian 
societies in India. Hence, protection and preservation of both the aspects is sheer necessity for 
each community.  
However, although religious boundary appeared to be explicable the geo-political boundaries 
remained indecisive, for which hostility between the competing communities became 
inevitable. From the dawn of Indian independence Hindu majority has been claiming an 
absolute right of the Hindus over the whole territory – within which fall Naga, Sikh and 
Muslim territories; besides, they have been accusing Christians and Muslims for 
encroachment of Hindu religious boundaries by employing their missionary tactics. The 
Khalsa Sikhs, in the meantime, have indicted Hindus for infiltrating into Sikh socio-religious 
and geo-political boundaries through various socio-political means. Likewise Kashmiri 
Muslims and Naga ethno-religious societies have perceived Hindu threat to their land and 
religion from the pre-independent period. Thus, the common conception, that both religion 
and land is in danger, seemed to have caused a concrete vertical division between the majority 
and the minority communities from the beginning of Indian independence – this division was 
further reinforced in the late 1970s due to various socio-religio-political factors assessed in 
the preceding chapters. In the meantime, because of the Indian state’s failure to fulfil their 
religious and geo-political expectations, the state has been suspected by these religious 
communities as being biased to one particular religious group. As a result, both the majority 
and the minority communities envisaged a serious threat to the foundation (religion and geo-
political territory) of their existence and identity; therefore, it became a pressing need for the 
religious and religio-nationalist leaders of the concerned religious communities to take the 
matter of safeguard of their geo-political boundaries and religious or ethno-religious identity 
on their own shoulders. In this regard religious texts and symbols that depict cosmic battle 
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against forces of evil were proficiently manipulated: to motivate and mobilize the concerned 
religious constituencies; and to justify any form or extent of religious violence against, so-
called, enemies. 
VI.3. Common Ideological Component 
Observations in the preceding chapters elucidate that in each case of religious terrorism in 
India there is a common ideological component, i.e., the understanding that modern secular 
nationalism is not sufficient in moral, socio-religious, economic and political aspects; because 
the spirit of nationalism rises beyond the loyalties to religious traditions and attachment to 
one’s family, society or community, ethnic group and territory. It is a “form of ‘political 
religion,’” says Smith, whose tensions with traditional religions have led to a growing 
politicisation of religion, as well as the messianisation of politics.”7 Political religion is 
concerned with the social and political order. It tends to sacralise certain aspects of socio-
political life by means of public rituals and collective ceremonies. In this regard, political 
beliefs and behaviour obtain a “religious” aspect. Thus, political religion could be regarded as 
a belief system or a surrogate religion that expresses the identity of a collectively. The 
political religion, like different types of secular ideologies, may attempt to impose “group 
identity to legitimize an existing political order, by injecting a transcendental dimension of a 
religious gloss on the justification.”8 
The secular nationalism, in the view of the Hindu religio-nationalists, does not give due 
importance to the religio-political rights of the dominant Hindu majority; it, rather, grants 
                                                          
7 Smith, “The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism,” 792; See Ramesh Thakur, “Ayodhya and the Politics of India’s 
Secularism: A Double-Standards Discourse,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 7 (July, 1993),  647. 
 
8 Marcela Cristi, From Civil to Political Religion: The Intersection of Culture, Religion and Politics (Ontario: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2001), 3. 
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more rights and privileges to the minority communities.9 Therefore, Hindus have been 
vigorously working towards transformation of India into a Hindu nation, in which Indian 
(Hindu) society, instead of relying on modern western secular ideas, would draw most of its 
governing principles from the ancient Hindu traditions.10  The (Khalsa) Sikhs too apprehend a 
serious danger from the Indian secular nationalism because, on the one hand, the secular 
Indian state is being regarded as Hindu biased and, on the other, the western model of secular 
ideology allegedly threatens to swallow-up the traditional Sikh religion by introducing many 
young Sikhs to modern life-styles that pollute the moral and spiritual life of the Sikh people 
and make them neglect their visible Khalsa symbols as well as day-today religious duties and 
obligations.11 Consequently, the (Khalsa) Sikhs aim to establish an independent Sikh state in 
which “Religion and State will not be separated; rather all aspects of life will be regulated 
according to divine commands as preserved in the Sikh faith.”12 Likewise, for the Indian 
Muslims (particularly Kashmiri Muslims) secular nationalism is un-Islamic, because it goes 
against the will of God and his authority;13 for this reason, liberation (of Kashmir) and 
establishment of Islamic law in Kashmir became paramount necessities for Muslims of 
                                                          
9 Malik and Vajpeyi, “ The Rise of Hindu Militancy,” 317. 
 
10See B.D. Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana 
Sangh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 6. “Among Hindus the idea has been gaining ground 
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Nationalism and Sikhism,” in Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics, 
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Kashmir.14 Meanwhile, Indian secular nationalism, for the Nagas, is pro-Hindu (that threatens 
to submerge the Naga Christianity into the ocean of Hinduism) and anti-Christian.15 Hence, 
the secular nationalism – particularly to the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims – is not only a 
foreign/Western product which dissects state and religion and places secular above religious 
matters, but connotes “antireligious or suprareligious”16 import.  
VI.4. Religious Nationalism 
Although “nationalism has historically been a predominantly secular phenomenon,” with the 
resurgence of religious movements in the late 1970s, “religion and nationalism have been 
revived as potent forces” 17 and they have allied together in India and other parts of the world, 
giving rise to a strong wave of religious nationalism. In India the root of (particularly Hindu 
and Muslim) religious nationalism could be traced back to the early twentieth century – 
during this time the Muslim and Hindu religio-nationalist movements (such as the Muslim 
League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS) were organized.18 However, in the late 1970s, 
due to the religious resurgence and certain political developments, religious nationalism 
became a formidable force.  In India an alliance between nationalism and religious 
nationalism became possible because, the national identity of the Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and 
Naga Christian societies has been predominantly strengthened and permeated by their 
religious beliefs and practices. In the case of these societies their religious beliefs and 
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16 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (California: 
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practices “shape and inspire the national identities and nationalisms,” and lend “power and 
depth which serves to ground the inter-state order in the ‘will of the people’ in ways that 
democratic practices often fail to do.”19 The activists of the Hindu, Islamic and Sikh religious 
nationalism, to use Juergensmeyers’ words, “are waging popularist struggles against Western 
culture and its political ideology, and they aim at infusing public life with indigenous cultural 
symbols and moral values.”20 Religious nationalism has become the cause of militant Muslim 
nationalism, militant Hindu nationalism,21 militant Naga ethno-religious nationalism and 
militant Sikh nationalism in India. Therefore, this phenomenon has been increasingly 
challenging the secular national identity in India by rekindling extreme forms of religio-
nationalism.  
Furthermore, to the supporters of Hindu, Muslim or Sikh religio-nationalism, secular 
nationalism has failed “not only because its institutions and leaders have disappointed them 
but also they have ceased to believe in it.”22 They cease to believe in it mainly because: 
secular nationalism and secularization are in alliance, and such alliance makes it non-
traditional; therefore, it is a threat to the traditional religion, culture, society and geo-political 
attachments. Meanwhile, the party politics, party interests and use of religion for political 
purposes by secular political parties (mainly the Congress Party) weakened the Indian secular 
nationalism and gave way to increasing degree of (mainly Hindu) communal politics in India 
from the late 1970s. This political development seems to have further confirmed the 
                                                          
19Smith, “The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism,” 792. 
 
20 Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?, xiii. 
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conception that Indian secular nationalism is predisposed to particular religious 
community/communities. 
VI.5. Ethno-religious Nationalist Conflict 
The term ethnic is used here in its broader sense, i.e., “race, language, religion, tibe,” culture 
and caste. “This is the sense,” to use the words of Ashutosh Varshney, “in which the term is 
widely understood in popular discourse, both in India and elsewhere.”23 Ethno-religious-
nationalism is ethno-religious-democracy, the project of fashioning a territory or a state 
around a dominant ethno-religious core.24 Therefore, there is every possibility for the ethno-
religious-nationalism to take “the more radical form of the expulsion or marginalization of 
national minorities” by severely discriminating and denying their right of citizenship.25 
Ethno-religious-nationalist conflict is a violent (often brutal form of violent) confrontation 
between different ethno-religious groups that share the same state, but not the same ethno-
religious and cultural identity.26 Seemingly religion, culture and geo-political issues are the 
most important aspects for such discrimination.    
In India modern Hinduism has been projected as the mega-ethno-religious-nationalism by the 
supporters of Hindu religio-nationalism through their Hinduisation projects27 – such as, 
                                                          
23 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (London: Yale University Press, 
2002), 4. 
 
24See Delanty and O'Mahony, Nationalism and Social Theory, 149. 
  
25 Delanty and O'Mahony, Nationalism and Social Theory, 149. 
 
26 Compare Daniel Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Quoted in 
Anamaria Dutceac, Globalization and Ethnic Conflict: Beyond the Liberal – Nationalist Distinction,” in The 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 3, no. 2 (January 2004), 23. 
 
27 Savarkar, aimed “for a religio-cultural amalgamation based on Hindu identity and ideals.” Hindu religio-
cultural nationalism required the allegiance of a mass actively aware of their religio-cultural identity. See 
Amalendu Misra, Identity and Religion: Foundations of anti-Islamism in India (New Delhi: Sage Publications 
India Pvt Ltd., 2004), 153. 
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popularization of Vedic religion and culture, establishment of national and international 
Hindu socio-religious and religio-political organisations for Hindu unity and for defence of 
Hinduism from outside attack, spread of Hindi language in devanagari script, their claim that 
all non-Muslims and non-Christians are Hindus, and Hindu intellectuals’ hypothesis that 
Hindu is a race (therefore a people) and Hinduism a religion and a culture.28 It is the mega-
ethno-religious-nationalism because more than four-fifth of the population of India is Hindu. 
The ultimate aim of this nationalism is to make India a Hindu rashtra, which will be governed 
by Hindu religious laws and in which only Hindus will have the supreme right. However, in-
spite of Hindus being dominant majority the supporters of Hindu ethno-religious-nationalism 
have failed to realize their goal till now, mainly due to: the supporters of secularism and 
secular nationalism; and Muslim and Christian ethno-religious minorities. The mega-ethno-
religious-nationalists, most probably, did not anticipate any threat to their religio-nationalistic 
scheme from other ethno-religious minorities because; they were regarded and included (in 
the Indian Constitution) as various forms of Hinduism. Whereas, Hindu-Muslim and Hindu-
Christian relationship began to strain from the early nineteenth century due to various socio-
religious and political occurrences (that are assessed in the case studies), and gave rise to 
Hindu religious antagonism against the minorities. From the time of partition of the British 
India (on religious ground) the Hindu hostility, particularly against the Muslim minority, took 
a serious turn. Moreover, political and religious developments (such as failure of the said 
Hindu mega project, granting of equal religious rights and privileges to the minorities in the 
Indian Constitution, alleged missionary activities of the minorities, demands for 
autonomy/independence of Jammu and Kashmir and Naga Hills or Nagaland by the Kashmiri 
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Muslims and the Nagas, and Naga militancy against the Indian state) from 1950 to the late 
1970s posed a grave threat to the mega-ethno-religious monopoly, domination and ideals.  
Besides, the Sikhs of Punjab launched their religio-political movement, right after the 
independence, demanding recognition of Punjabi language (in Gurmukhi script) and separate 
state for the Sikhs of Punjab. Apparently the main motive behind the Sikh religio-political 
movement was separation and safeguard of Sikh ethno-religious identity from Hinduism; but, 
to preserve distinct Sikh identity land and Sikh (Khalsa) religious-culture were vital factors. 
However, the Sikh movement not only vertically divided the Sikhs and Hindus of Punjab in 
communal lines, but challenged the religious domination of the Hindu majority. Such religio-
political action of the Sikh ethno-religious group was certain to provoke Hindu discrimination 
against the Sikh community over which Hinduism exercised its monopoly. 
Thus, the Muslim, Sikh and Naga Christian ethno-religious minorities, by demanding 
territorial autonomy/separation and religious rights and privileges, dared to attack the 
“religious wall”29  of the Hindu majority and posed a serious threat, as assumed by Hindus, to 
Hinduism.30 Moreover, in addition to constant problem of Naga separatist movement in 
Northeast India (from 1956) there began Sikh militancy in the Punjab (in the early 1980s) and 
Islamic militant movement in Kashmir (in the late 1980s). In the meantime, these minorities 
managed to garner some external (Pakistani and Chinese) support in the struggle for 
achievement of their religious and geo-political objectives.31 The Sikh and Islamic militants 
through their separatist and violent activities not only challenged Hindu domination and 
                                                          
29 Fox, “Religious Causes of Discrimination,” 427.  
 
30 Ahmed, “Religious Nationalism and Sikhism,” 260. 
 
31 Ethno-religious discrimination takes a severe form when the ethno-religious minority gets outside support 
from either a foreign government or a kindred group. See Fox, “Religious Causes of Discrimination,” 427f. 
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monopoly, but appeared to have made mockery of Hindu pride and Hindu masculinity. 
Consequently, the Muslim, Sikh and Christian minorities added more hatred to the already 
existing Hindu religious antagonism, and incited ruthless form of Hindu religious 
discrimination as a response to the challenge and contempt. Such ruthless form of religious 
discriminations against the minorities were being demonstrated in the brutal violence against 
Sikhs in 1984, in the communal violence following the Ayodhya incidence, in the Gujarat 
pogrom against Muslims, in the communal violence against Christians in Orissa, and in 
Malegaon and Hyderabad bombing incidents – these are some of the examples of the acts of 
religious terrorism performed by activists of the mega ethno-religious community against the 
Muslim, Sikh and Christian minorities. 
Furthermore, the ethno-religious-nationalist conflict, in the case of India, takes the form of a 
vicious cycle because of disproportionate religious demographic formation in different 
regions in India. Although Muslims are minority in India, they are dominant majority in 
Jammu and Kashmir; likewise, Sikhs are majority in the state of Punjab; whereas, Hindus are 
minority in these states. Therefore, any form of anti-minority activity of Hindu community 
within or outside the minority dominated states could provoke violent discrimination against 
Hindus living in these states. In addition, disregard to the long-standing Sikh religio-political 
concerns and issues by Hindu dominated Indian state, on the one hand, and Hindu domination 
over the Sikh religion, on the other, were perceived as Hindu discriminations against the Sikh 
ethno-religious community; consequently, from the early 1980s Sikhism nurtured Sikh 
religious extremism, and Sikh militants embarked on violent/terrorist activities against the 
Indian state and the Hindus in Punjab and Haryana.32 Likewise, Islam in Kashmir (apparently 
because of the socio-historical-political grievances and Hindu religious violence against the 
                                                          




Muslims in other parts of India) gave birth to Islamic militancy which (besides its armed 
activities against the Indian state) started terrorist violence against the Hindu pundits in 
Kashmir from the very beginning. In the meantime, the terrorist activities of the Sikh and 
Muslim religious extremists against the Hindus in Punjab and Kashmir might have indicated 
to the Hindu mega ethno-religio-nationalist-extremist elements (such as the RSS and its 
affiliate militant organizations) a further and serious attack on the Hindu religious wall by the 
religious minorities; subsequently, the Hindu-religious-extremist elements, in response, began 
to motivate more ruthless form of Hindu discrimination against the (Muslim, Sikh and 
Christian) minorities in the Hindu dominated states from the 1980s – the violent incidents 
cited in the case studies on Hindu religious terrorism33 corroborate this argument.  
Moreover, some of the violent incidents (such as Gujarat pogrom and Orissa violence) 
reviewed in the case studies strongly suggest that, in the vicious cycle of ethno-religious-
nationalist conflicts episodes of ruthless religious violence are systematically planned and 
executed to terrorise and annihilate the targeted enemy community/communities. In this 
regard the case study in the fourth chapter indicates that in certain cases events of violence are 
invented or created with an objective of mobilizing wider religious constituency against the 
enemy ethno-religious community/communities. However, planning and execution of such 
systematic annihilation might only be possible in those states where one community is 
dominant majority and, at the same time, both central and state governments are headed by 
communal political party/parties that favours/favour the dominant majority – the Gujarat 
pogrom was facilitated by both the factors (religious demographic formation and control of 
political power in the Centre and the state by Hindu communal parties). Gujarat incidence, 
though one of its kind, is the reminder of a looming danger of ethno-religious-nationalist 
                                                          
33 See Chapter IV for explanation on Hindu religious terrorism. 
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conflict. Besides, because of the huge imbalance between Hindu population and 
Muslim/Christian/Sikh population and increasing religious antagonism among the conflicting 
communities, the vicious cycle of ethno-religious-nationalist conflict appears to be an ever 
revolving process of complicated problems that constantly inspire, empower and embolden 
the religious extremist elements in each case of religious terrorism in India. Although ethno-
religious conflict may occur occasionally in violent form, seemingly religious discrimination, 
religious prejudice and apprehension (that at any time and for any reason brutal religious 
violence may take place) are rampant among members of conflicting communities – 
particularly in those states where one or another conflicting religious community is small 
minority. There is every possibility that at any time radical religious actors and extremist 
ethno-religio-nationalist elements might activate large-scale religious violence (like Gujarat 
and Orissa violence) by manoeuvring the prevailing religious prejudices and apprehensions, 
and further broaden the relationship gap between the conflicting communities in wider circle. 
Hence, the vicious cycle of ethno-religio-nationalist conflict is one of the most probable and 
potential factors for sustenance and intensification of religious terrorism in India. 
VI.6. Religious Concept and Techniques of Religious Terrorism 
There seems to be common assumption that the enemies are after the total elimination of the 
divine ordained religion, therefore, it is a war between the truth and evil, justice and injustice, 
and righteousness and unrighteousness. As a result the secular issues and concerns (such as 
historical, social, economic and geo-political) are skilfully fused together with spiritual 
aspects and given religious interpretations and meanings by radical religious specialists and 
religio-nationalist actors of conflicting communities, to stir or instil inner passion for violence 
among the members of the concerned religious community in the battle against the conceived 
enemies. In this regard the most appealing and spiritually invigorating religious ideology in 
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each case of religious terror seems to be the concept of holy war or dharma yudha. Arguably 
the concept of holy war (holy violence or cosmic battle) infuses the spirit or will to be more 
violent, because the physical world is regarded as battle field where followers of each 
concerned religious faith have to fight against the forces of evil to safeguard the divine 
ordained religious truth. “Concepts of cosmic war,” says Juergensmeyer,  
have been employed in this-worldly social struggles. When these cosmic battles are 
conceived as occurring on the human plane, they result in real acts of violence.34 
Imageries of ongoing war between light and darkness and truth and evil are found in every 
religion. The imageries of divine warfare, observes Juergensmeyer, 
are […] not new but are a part of the heritage of religious traditions that stretch back 
to antiquity, and abundant examples of warfare may be found in sacred texts.35 
The battles between the forces of Rama and Ravana and Pandavas and Kauravas narrated in 
the Ramayana and the Mahabharata respectively played powerful role in inciting Hindu 
communal violence against Muslim and Christian minorities; the concept of miri-piri and 
symbol of the establishment of the Khalsa Panth were manipulated by Sikh radical preachers 
(particularly Bhindranwale) to instigate Sikh religious terrorism against non-Khalsa Sikhs, 
Hindus and the Indian state; apparently the concepts of jihad and India as “the house of war” 
played dynamic role in instigating holy war against Hindus and the Indian state in Kashmir.  
Thus, the symbol of holy war seems to be more inspiring than other religious imageries and 
teachings in the motivation and mobilization of each concerned religious constituency for 
religious terror against the supposed enemies. The idea of holy war or dharma yudha works as 
a magical charm which can allure thousands of young people from all walks of life into the 
fold of religious terrorism and infuse a violent and strong determination to do or die for the 
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sake of religion and land (the interrelated factors); therefore, they can mercilessly perform any 
form of brutal terrorist activities against the assumed enemies (see case studies for further 
clarification). “The term” holy war, says James Turner Johnson,   
has the power to fire the blood, to cause passions to surge, to pump new life into 
otherwise dormant causes; conversely, the foreboding instilled by a threat of holy war 
can make the blood run cold and render the prudent timid.”36  
Furthermore, the concept of holy war not only justifies any ruthless act of religious terrorism 
against the enemies of dharma or din, but assures honour on this earth and eternal happiness 
in heaven to those faithful ones who sincerely participate in the divine battle. Apparently 
these spiritual guarantees induce religious extremists to be more hardcore and brutal terrorists. 
Meanwhile, religious terrorism functions in two different forms in India – technically 
organized and religio-politically motivated forms. The first category is organized in military 
style, and its activists are given training in modern arms to fight against the Indian state and 
the demonized “Others”. Technically organized terrorist groups make use of modern weapons 
of mass destruction to attack and destroy wide range of targets (which include the Indian 
military personnel, important public figures, important public and private properties, 
important religious symbols, and important national symbols) and modern technology to 
spread their religio-political propaganda. They employ various terrorist tactics (such as 
kidnapping, plane hijacking, random shooting in crowded places, bombing and hostage 
taking) for the purpose of achieving their given religio-political goal. The Sikh extremist 
groups (mentioned in the case study of Sikh religious terrorism) and Islamic extremist groups 
(named in the case study on Islamic religious terrorism) are technically organized terrorist 
groups. The remaining Sikh extremist group (Babar Khalsa International) and most of the 
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Kashmiri extremist groups are listed as terrorist organizations by the Indian government, 
because they are regarded as a serious threat to the Indian state and Indian public.  From the 
beginning of the birth of religious terrorism the Indian state has been pursuing military tactics 
to defeat this terrorism. 
The second form of religious terrorism is nurtured by Hindu religious tradition; however, it 
differs from the first category in certain ways. In this category too there are several militant 
religio-political organizations (such as RSS Sakhas, Bajrang Dal, Siv Sena and Durga Bahini) 
which give some sort of military training to their active members, but these militant 
organizations do not openly declare war against the secular Indian state (even though Hindu 
religio-nationalists consider secular Indian state as minority biased); instead, they employ 
political tactics by actively taking part in the political process to capture power in regional and 
national level. In the meantime, as they do not fight armed battle against the Indian state, they 
are not considered as a threat to the nation, therefore, they do not come under the purview of 
terrorist organizations like technically organized groups. These Hindu religious extremist 
groups tactfully manipulate both communal and political factors and opportunities to plan and 
execute their terrorist activities to terrorize and subjugate Muslim and Christian minorities in 
Hindu dominated states. Seemingly the most powerful weapons of the second type of 
religious terrorism are overwhelming Hindu majority and majority favouring political 
authorities in different levels; therefore it is not less threatening, rather it appears more 
dangerous than the first category.  
VI.7. Conclusion 
The case studies have demonstrated that in India Hindu, Muslim or Sikh religious terrorism 
fights battle in two fronts: on the one side it fights against Western/modern ideals of 
secularism, supporters of secular nationalism, and the secular Indian state; on the other it 
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fights against demonized “Others”. However, both the enemies are perceived to be closely 
related to each other (or interdependent) and equally evil because, they battle against the 
dharma, din or truth ordained by Brahman, Allah, or Vahiguru. According to Hindu religio-
nationalists’ point of view: the secular constitution has denied the divine bestowed right of the 
Hindus by granting equal religious rights and privileges to the minorities, who supposedly 
have no loyalty or attachment to the land (India); the secular government steadfastly works 
for the wellbeing of the minorities and neglects the interests of the dominant majority; the 
given minorities, on account of their separatist agenda and proselytization activities, are 
enemies of India and Hindu dharma. Since the secular state safeguards the minority rights and 
privileges, it becomes greater enemy of Hinduism and Hindu society.37  While, in the view of 
the Kashmiri Muslims, Sikhs and Naga Christians Indian state is both Hindu dominated and 
Hindu biased; it does not protect the constitutional religious rights and privileges of the 
minorities from the aggressive Hindu majority; therefore both are the enemies of the 
minorities – they are portrayed as two different manifestations of an evil force that is after the 
elimination of divine truth.38  Hence, the above-assessed points make it obvious that each 
conflicting community categorizes the secular Indian state as a great enemy that unwaveringly 
supports, protects and pleases Muslim/Sikh/Christian minorities (as supposed by Hindus) or 
Hindu majority (as conceived by the minorities). Consequently, religious terrorism, in each 
case, has to battle against two enemy-forces simultaneously.  
Furthermore, involvement of the two enemy-forces in the fight, apparently, makes the matter 
more serious and battle more complicated as well as indispensable for every conflicting party: 
                                                          
37See  Malik and Vajpeyi, “ The Rise of Hindu Militancy,” 317; Eva Hellman, “Dynamic Hinduism: Towards a 
New Hindu Nation,” in Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics, edited 
by David WesterLund, 4th Impression (London: C. Hurst & Company, 2002), 242. 
 
38 See Chapter II for further clarification. 
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because of the alliance the enemies become more powerful, and pose serious threat to the 
concern religious community/communities. Therefore, it becomes religious obligation for all 
faithful ones of each given conflicting faith community to arise and fight divine battle for the 
sake of religious or ethno-religious identify and survival, and in the battle any form of 
violence is justified on the basis of religious texts and symbols. In the meantime, those who 
participate in the religious war are assured (implicitly or explicitly) honour in this life and 
eternal happiness in heaven after-life. Therefore, religious terrorism, in each case, becomes 
more ruthless, destructive and dangerous than any other secular militant group/groups in 
India. The examples of the brutality of religious terrorism are illustrated in the case studies on 
Sikh, Islamic and Hindu religious terrorism. This force is not only dangerous and brutal, but 
threatens to entirely bring down the existing socio-political structure of the secular Indian 
nation; therefore, it is urgent necessity to find an appropriate method to contain this 
phenomenon before it takes insurmountable form. For this reason the following chapter 





DECONSTRUCTING RELIGIOUS TERROR: TOWARDS A 




Religious terrorism not only threatens the socio-political integrity of the Indian subcontinent, 
but appears to have the propensity to throw the whole of South Asian region into a chaotic 
situation for an uncertain period. Meanwhile, in-spite of various tactics used by the Indian 
state, to subdue religious terrorism, this problem is becoming more complicated. In the post-
independent Indian socio-political environment radical religious specialists seem to have 
better prospects to manoeuvre religious teachings and symbols mobilize their religious 
constituency against demonized “Others”.  Moreover, it is most likely that religious conflict 
of any dimension can further kindle violent religious-passion of the followers of radical 
religious ideologies that authorize religious violence or terrorism. Therefore, it may not be 
possible to vanquish religious terrorism simply by using military force, and political and 
economic mechanisms. Rebuilding trust and close socio-religious rapport among the 
conflicting religious communities could be indispensable aspects in rooting out the problem 
of religious terrorism. Thus, in this chapter I make an effort – delving within the Indian 
society – to suggest practicable socio-religious solution for conflict resolution and 
deconstruction of religious terror. However, I do not attempt to do an exhaustive study on the 
field suggested here; rather I initiate a suitable model for the conflict resolution.  
Arrangement of the chapter is made in the following manner. Firstly, a summery of the issues 
is tendered. Secondly, a framework towards conflict resolution is worked out. Then, a brief 




VII.2. Summary of the Issues  
From the dawn of the Indian independence the fear of losing religio-cultural or ethno-religio-
cultural identity became a matter of grave concern for the Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Christian 
religious communities of the Indian society. However, the apprehension (that religio-cultural 
identity was in danger) was expressed, mostly by Hindus and Sikhs, from the latter half of the 
nineteenth century; therefore, to safeguard their religio-cultural or ethno-religio-cultural 
identity they started Cow Protection, Suddhi and Singh Sabha movements.   The afore-
mentioned fear was, most probably, generated by both internal and external factors. The 
internal aspects were factionalism, passive religious teachings (such as non-violence/ahimsa 
and tolerance)1 and division (on caste or class basis2), which were perceived to have 
emasculated or weakened (as suggested by some Hindu nationalists like Vinayak Damodar 
Savarkar and M. S. Golwalkar)3 and distracted the religious (mainly Hindu, Sikh and Muslim) 
communities from a true religion revealed in the religious text/texts (such as the Vedas and 
the Quran) by Brahman/Allah/Guru. This might be the reason why Dayananda Saraswati4 and 
Muhammad ibn Abd-ul-Wahhab5 had called their respective religious community back to the 
                                                 
1 In 1923 B.S. Moonje, leader of  Hindu Sabha of the Central Princes, “advocated ‘ending the un-Vedic principle 
of ahimsa’  (dispensing vegetarianism) and rehabilitating ‘the Vedic institution of Yajnathag (seen as an animal 
sacrifice) accustoming a Hindu to the sight of spilling blood and killing’.” Christophe Jaffrelot, “Hindu 
Nationalism, Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building;” paper presented at the Conference of the British 
Association for South Asian Studies (Birmingham: 10-12 April, 1992), 14.  
 
2 E.g. “’Hinduism’ is a series of social communities stratified along caste lines, with different rituals and 
different gods.” James Warner Bjorkman, “The Dark Side of the Force: Notes on Religion and Politics,” in 
Fundamentalism, Revivalists and Violence in South Asia, edited by James Warner Bjorkman (Maryland: The 
Riverdale Company, 1988), 5. 
 
3 According to Savarkar, it was because of “self-destructive weakness and lack of confidence among Hindus” 
Muslims posed serious threat to Hindus. M.S. Golwalkar challenged Hindu men “to rid themselves of fear.” 
Golwalkar wrote: “Let us shake off the present-day emasculating notions and become real living men, bubbling 
with national pride, living and breathing the grand ideas of service, self-reliance and dedication in the cause of 
our dear and sacred motherland . . . . Today more than anything else, mother needs such men – young, 
intelligent, dedicated and more than all virile and masculine.” “Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: 
Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 80 and 83.  
4 See Lajpat Rai, A History of the Arya Samaj (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1976), 58. 
 
5 See G.H.Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1979), 92. 
287 
 
Vedas or the original teachings of Islam. External factors were socio-historical experiences, 
aim to enforce majoritarian idea (for example, attempt to enforce Hindu majoritarian idea in 
the whole of India,  Islamic principle in Jammu and Kashmir, and Khalsa Sikh religious 
norms in Punjab), and unfavourable socio-religious and political factors.6 Consequently, from 
the beginning of the Indian independence Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and Christian religious 
communities had begun to battle against the aforesaid problems. On the one hand, the 
concerned religious leaders or religio-nationalists had to struggle for the unity within the 
given community and to instil masculine spirit among the members of the community; on the 
other, they had to defend their religion and culture from outside attacks. 7   In such situation it 
was most likely for the conflicting religious communities to devise and espouse more 
exclusive religious strategy for the preservation of their endangered religio-cultural identity.  
Meanwhile, use of exclusive religious strategy by these religious (more specifically by Hindu, 
Muslim and Sikh) communities for the sake of safeguarding their religio-cultural or ethno-
religio-cultural identity had given rise to a culture of socio-religious antagonism, intolerance 
and isolation – e.g. Cow Protection and Suddhi movements implanted among Hindus spirit of 
antagonism against Christians, Muslims and Sikhs; Singh Sabha and Gurdwara Reformation 
movements created relationship-gap and intolerance between Sikh (Khalsa Sikh) community 
and other  religious communities (mostly Hindus and non-Khalsa Sikhs); likewise, Khilafat 
movement, which was launched by Muslims in 1920 with a pan Islamic aspiration, further 
isolated Muslims from Hindus. So, exclusive religious strategy had two-fold long-lasting 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 See case studies for further clarifications. 
 
7 According to Bjorkman, religious fundamentalists require “two enemies: one within their ranks, the other 
outside. Since the internal enemy might betray the “cause,” periodic purges and purifications of members 
become necessary; since the external enemy threatens to destroy the “cause,” ranks must consolidate.” 
Bjorkman, Fundamentalism, Revivalists and Violence in South Asia, 3. 
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effects in the Indian society from the pre-independent period: it bred spirit of distrust and 
hatred between majority and minority religious communities and it gave rise to undying 
communal problems – specifically between Hindu and Muslim communities. 
It was Hindu-Muslim communal complications that gave birth to militant Hindu religio-
nationalist organisations (such as the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS) that sought to make 
India a Hindu rashtra. The failure to attain what they considered divine-created Hindus’ 
right8 cultivated among religio-nationalist Hindus deep hatred not only against the religious 
minorities, but also against the secular parties. As a result, they employed more exclusive 
religious and political tactics to isolate the religious minorities and the secular political parties 
from Hindu mass from the early 1950s. To carry out their more exclusive religio-political 
design they founded Hindu nationalist political party (the Jana Sangh) and made a great effort 
to consolidate Hindu unity to mobilize wider Hindu constituency to achieve the set religio-
political goal. Consequently, there came into existence the VHP and several other smaller 
Hindu militant/extremist groups during the following three decades (1960s to 1980s), to work 
for the realization of their aspiration. Meanwhile, during this period the RSS local sakhas 
were established in most of the cities and towns in India.  
With the multiplication of militant Hindu organizations communal incidents against minority 
religious communities increased many-fold and affected many parts of India. According to the 
report in the India Today, in 1987, 250 out of 350 districts in India were affected by 
                                                 
8 Savarkar, in the following sentences, tries to communicate to every Hindu that from the time immemorial India 
(the pre-partitioned India) belongs to Hindu race because, before Muslims and Europeans invaded and occupied 
India, it was ruled by unbroken line of divine-kings (like Rama and Krishna) for Yugas and Kalpas (ages – i.e. 
thousands of years)  –  therefore, he calls all Hindus to rise up to reclaim and purge the sacred territory from 
foreign invaders. Savarkar  writes: “The Hindu counts his years not by centuries but by cycles the Yug and the 
Kalpha – and amazed asks ‘O Lord of the line of Raghu [Rama], where has the kingdom of Ayodhya gone? O 
lord of the line of Yadu, where has Mathura gone!!’” Quoted in Joseph S. Alter, “Somantic Nationalism: Indian 




communal violence; whereas only 61 districts were affected in 1961.9 Communal 
violence/riots, in certain cases, were generated (e.g. during Ekmata Yajna and Rathyatras 
VHP and Bajrang Dal activists incited communal propaganda)10 by religious specialists or 
religious-nationalists manipulating Hindu religious symbols to serve two-fold purposes – to 
unite different sections and factions of Hindus and to infuse masculinity among all Hindus.  
The objective of the first one was to consolidate Hindu vote bank for the BJP so that the 
Hindu religio-nationalists’ goal of making India a Hindu nation would be realized through 
political tactics, and the purpose of the second one was to inspire Hindu religious fanaticism 
and extremism to   reaffirm Hindu religio-cultural identity as superior to all other religio-
cultural identities and to attack the enemies of Hindu dharma in their strongholds as suggested 
by Dayananda Saraswati.11  The second ambition of Hindu religio-nationalists made the 
public phase of Hinduism “increasingly exclusivist and aggressive” from the early 1980s. 
Some of the war-cries of “increasingly exclusivist and aggressive “Hinduism are “India 
belongs to Hindus only,” “the Hindu whose blood does not boil does not have blood but 
water”12 and “pehele kasai, phir isai” (first the butchers/Muslims, then the Christians).13 
These slogans could transmit two-fold messages to the Hindus: firstly, Hindu dharma and 
Hindu race are in great danger on account of anti-Hindu activities of Muslims and Christians; 
secondly, the battle against the enemies of Hinduism already began, therefore, every Hindu 
                                                 
9 India Today (15 June, 1987), 17 and 19; Alter, “Somantic Nationalism,” 561. 
 
10 See Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 165. 
 
11See  Nandini Gooptu, “The Urban Poor and Militant Hinduism in Early Twentieth-Century Uttar Pradesh,” in 
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (October, 1997),  911 
 
12 Arvind Rajagopal, Politics After Television: Religious Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Indian Public 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30. 
 
13 Kapil Komireddi, “India Must Face up to Hindu Terrorism,” [Article online], available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/jan/19/india-hindu-terrorism-threat?INTCMP=SRCH, 
Internet accessed: 15 April 2012. 
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has the religious obligation to take up arms and join in the battle to destroy the forces of 
adharma. This is why Sadhvi Rithambhra, said that Hindu culture and heritage tells Hindus 
“to answer every Ravan in the manner of Ram”14 – that is, killing of Muslims (and also 
Christians) is justified on the basis of the story of the battle narrated in the Ramayana. 
Meanwhile, the aspiration of Hindu religio-nationalists to make India a Hindu rashtra  and 
their use of more exclusive religio-political strategies to achieve their goal, further confirmed 
the fear (that ethno-religious identities might be lost in the ocean of Hinduism) of the 
Kashmiri, Sikh and Naga ethno-religious communities. These religious communities 
(particularly Nagas and Sikhs) were compelled to voice their ethno-cultural and geo-political 
concerns to the British government before the Indian independence,15 because of the 
apprehension; but they were given no other choice except to be part of Indian union. At the 
same time, political leaders (particularly Nehru) of the post-independent Indian state ignored 
the political assurances made to these minority communities.16 Therefore, from the early 
1950s the Sikhs of Punjab, Nagas and Kashmiri Muslims began to pressurise the Indian state 
to consent to their demands – i.e. independence for Naga inhabited region, creation of Punjabi 
suba for the Sikhs of Punjab, and to grant right of self-determination to the Kashmiri people. 
However, the Indian government did not give a sympathetic consideration to the religious and 
socio-political grievances of these religious minorities. As a result, the first insurgency 
movement in the post-independent India began in Naga Hills in 1956. The military repressive 
measure, that was launched against the Naga insurgency, instead of defeating Naga militancy 
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15 See J.S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
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antagonised more Nagas against the Indian state and, at the same time, the military strategy 
confirmed Naga militants’ propaganda that the numberless Indian troops were forces of 
Hinduism that aim to destroy Christianity.17  
Furthermore, the Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims were deeply irked due to the opposition to 
their religio-cultural and geo-political demands from two fronts – on the one side, opposed by 
political leaders,18 and on the other, by Hindu community (largely by Punjabi or Kashmiri 
Hindus). Such political complication might have further enraged Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims 
against Hindu dominated Indian state and Hindu majority. In the already existing tense 
communal atmosphere any additional undesirable socio-political occurrence could have 
boosted the moral of radical religious elements to follow a path of violence to achieve their 
objectives. Nevertheless, in the 1960s and 1970s the ethno-religious minorities experienced 
certain positive socio-political and economic progress – e.g. Nagaland and Punjab were made 
full-fledged states within the Indian Union in the 1960s, the Green Revolution changed the 
economic and educational life of the people of Punjab, and rapid economic and educational 
developments were carried out in the state of Jammu and Kashmir; but, in-spite of these 
positive achievements, socio-religious antagonism against the Indian state and Hindu majority 
had intensified during the period (1960s to 1970s) on account of the following factors – 
certain unresolved socio-political issues (such as boundary dispute, water sharing dispute, 
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Ingunn N. Means, “Nagaland – The Agony of Ending a Guerrilla War,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, No. ¾ 
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language dispute, and dispute on constitutional provisions),19 and activities of increasingly 
exclusivist and aggressive Hinduism.  
However, despite rising trend of religious and socio-political resentment between the Hindu 
majority and the ethno-religious minority communities the Indian society was not plagued by 
religious terrorism, except Naga insurgency (but the militancy problem of Naga insurgency 
was restricted within Naga inhabited areas in the Northeast India), till the end of 1970s. The 
following two factors, most probably, were responsible in preventing the rise of religious 
terrorism till the end of the 1970s: firstly, the Indian state maintained neutrality on religious 
matters, and religion was not used for political gain by the secular political parties; secondly, 
prominent leaders (such as Sheikh Abdullah and Sant Fateh Singh) of the Sikh and Kashmiri 
ethno-religious nationalist movements exerted their influence to shun path of violence, 
because they followed non-violence and passive resistance to achieve their set goals.20  
But, development of an unfavourable socio-religious and political atmosphere (in the late 
1970s) opened ground for unrestrained communal politics in which religious symbols that 
signify war, subjugation and victory were stage-managed openly by communal parties with 
the aim of attaining their religio-political goals. So, unrestricted communal politics created 
more communal violence, further deepened religious hatred and antagonism between the 
Hindu majority and Muslim/Sikh/Christian minority communities, and weakened centuries 
old socio-cultural strands that bind together different religious groups in the Indian society. 
Meanwhile, on account of Mrs. Gandhi’s new political strategy, to regain her popularity, the 
ethno-religious minorities lost whatever trust and expectation they had so long on the 
                                                 
19 See case studies on Sikh, Islamic and Christian Religious Terrorism. 
 




Congress party and on the secular Indian state.21 At the same time, due to the re-entry of 
religion in the public stage radical religious specialists and religio-nationalists gained 
prominence in their respective religious community and many of them (like Bhindranwale) 
replaced or superseded moderate or liberal minded ethno-nationalist leaders that advocated 
non-violence and passive resistance. Besides, by the early 1980s there were many 
Muslim/Sikh/Hindu young people who had undergone some short of religious radicalization 
in Madrassas, RSS Sakhas and other Hindu militant organizations, or Sikh theological 
institutions. Many of these young people were well educated, well informed about the new 
religio-political developments around the globe due to the means of modern communication, 
and dissatisfied on account of the failure of the secular state to meet their religious and socio-
political expectations. In such socio-religious and political atmosphere leaders of the 
diminishing Congress party, by managing religion for political purpose, played in the hands 
of radical religious elements and boosted the moral of religio-nationalists or ethno-religio-
nationalists. This miscalculated political method of the Congress seems to have reinforced the 
already existing communal divide and religious hatred between conflicting religious 
communities, and strengthened radical religious elements to boldly and freely propagate their 
radical religious ideologies to inspire inner passion among members of their religious 
community to perform acts of religious terrorism for the purpose of realization of their given 
objectives. In the prevailing religio-socio-political environment the concept of holy 
war/dharma yudh and religious justification of violence against demonized “Others” seems to 
have motivated the radicalized, disgruntled and socio-politically desperate young people to 
follow the path of religious terrorism to achieve their religio-political goals.  
                                                 
21 For further explanation see Chapter I. 
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Moreover, religious terrorism, to achieve its objectives, appears to have adopted strategy of 
production of communal violence/riots as its most essential project – because the recurrent 
communal riots give a strong impression that the Indian society is prone to communal 
violence. This might be one of the reasons why during 1980s incidents of communal violence 
increased four times more than the incidence of communal violence in the preceding 
decades.22 Most plausible reasons behind manufacturing communal violence are: to widen 
relationship-gap between the conflicting communities; to consolidate unity within the 
concerned religious community and to mobilize or garner support in the wider circle; to 
demonstrate masculinity; to destroy existing social rapport in the Indian society; and to justify 
religious propaganda that the “Other” is perpetually evil. Religious terrorists plan and execute 
various “performative acts” to instigate communal violence. Some of the performative acts of 
religious terrorism are: destruction of centuries old religious monument like Babri Mosque; 
bombing religious places such as Mecca Mosque and Ajmer Dargah Sharif; shooting or 
bombing in cities and towns (like Malegaon, Mumbai, and Delhi) where multi-faith 
communities live together; attack on Indian Parliament; and planting bombs in the Samjhouta 
Express train.23    Hence, shooting, killing, bombing, and other destructive acts of religious 
terrorism are performative acts, which are intended to produce wave of violence or violence 
of greater intensity so that the gap between “us” (those who stand on the side of truth) and 
“them” (those who do not conform to the set norms of truth) can be unbridgeable. So, 
religious terrorism seriously threatens to destroy existing socio-cultural strands that bind 
together different religious communities as one society in many parts of India. The game plan 
of this religious terrorism, most probably, is to totally demolish the existing social ethos and 
                                                 
22 See Manjari Katju, “The Early Vishva Hindu Parishad: 1964 to 1983,” in Social Scientist, Vol. 26, No. 5/6 
(May-June, 1998), 56. 
 
23 See case study on Hindu Religious terrorism. 
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create a total chaos in the whole of South Asian region. Therefore, religious terrorism is much 
more dangerous and destructive than other (secular) extremist/militant groups in India. 
The Indian state, from the early 1980s, has been fighting against this religious terrorism with 
its military might, political and economic mechanisms. Although the Indian state was 
successful in crushing the Sikh religious terrorism in 1993 with enormous costs (in terms of 
finance and human lives) the threat of religious terrorism began to mount from the second half 
of the 1980s due to the rise of Islamic and Hindu religious terrorism. From the early 1990s 
number and capability (technical and military capability to carry out intended acts of terrorism 
in any part of India) of religious terrorist groups began to expand on account of the 
involvement of certain external factors (i.e., infiltration of Islamic terrorist groups from 
Pakistan and covert support from some foreign elements). Besides, some Sikh terrorist groups 
(like Babar Khalsa International) escaped total elimination in 1993, and these groups have the 
potentiality to once again resume the earlier form. Moreover, because of the overwhelming 
Hindu majority Hindu-religious-terrorism, more than other groups, has the propensity to 
cause violence and destruction of enormous intensity and throw the Indian society into a total 
chaos. 
VII.3. Framework towards Conflict Resolution 
In the Indian society religion is the vital part that controls and conducts the given religious 
community, binds together different individual members and sustains unity of the religious 
community; therefore, religious ideologies have inner force to mobilize given religious 
constituency both for good cause and violent activities or religious terrorism. These two 
contradictory functions of religion can be termed as religious “extremism” or “militancy”. 
According to Appleby, both types of religious workers or volunteers (those who struggle for 
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the good of others and those who terrorise “others”) are termed as “extremists” or 
“militants”.24 From ancient time religions in India have been mobilizing countless number of 
devotees to dedicate their lives for well-being and just cause of whole humanity without any 
distinction. These religious extremists (who struggle for the good of the society) have 
established thousands of educational institutions, health posts, hospitals, orphanages and other 
social welfare projects in every nook and corner of India and in some other parts of the world. 
They impart education to millions of young people of all religious communities; provide 
health facilities to numerous poor people; take care of tens of thousands of orphan, discarded 
children and helpless people; organize relief works in times of natural or man-made 
calamities; and work for establishment of peace between different conflicting communities, 
tribes and groups of people - for example, religious actors played significant role in resolving 
conflict between Hmar and Dimasa Kachari tribal groups  in Assam state of Northeast India in 
the beginning of the 21st century.25 Such religious extremists can stretch to any limit of 
physical suffering for the well-being of other people. Besides these, so-called, (good) 
“religious extremists or militants,” religions (i.e., radical religious ideologies) also inspire 
thousands of their devotees to take the path of religious terrorism to terrorise those who do not 
abide by their religious ideologies.  
India is unique in both socio-religious and geographical sense. It is the land in which great 
saints and messengers of peace for humankind (such as Mahvira and Ramakrishna 
                                                 
24 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2000), 10-12. 
 
25According to Hrilrokhum Thiek, several church organizations and many church leaders took special initiative 
to end ethnic conflict between Dimasa Kachari and Hmar tribal groups in the beginning of the 21st century. 
Thiek himself was made the chairperson of the peace commission which was formed to end the violence and to 
re-establish friendly relationship between the two warring tribes. Most of the Dimasa Kacharis profess mixture 
of Hinduism and animism and Hmar tribe practices Christian faith. Personal interview with Hrilrokhum Thiek 
(retired Minister of Presbyterian Church in India) over the phone on 30th September 2011, at 12 noon. Thiek 




Paramahamsa) were born; this land, from the ancient time, has welcomed, sheltered and 
protected people professing and practising varieties of religious faiths – also, both persecuted 
(Zoroastrians or Persis) and persecutors (Muslims) found home in Indian soil26 – and these 
people have lived as indivisible parts of the Indian society. In many Indian villages, towns 
and cities various religious groups are living together as close neighbours without communal 
tension/conflict. One can experience such beautiful sight of co-existence in various regions in 
India (like Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and south Indian states).  
To understand how various groups of people have been co-existing in many parts of India 
despite their religious differences, we have to investigate underlying interconnecting socio-
religious strands – e.g., certain common social conducts, common sacred space, no disregard 
or disrespect shown in any form to others religious faiths and practices, common saints and 
participation in each other’s religious festivals or gatherings. Such interlinking threads might 
be valuable elements in rebuilding trust among the conflicting religious communities in the 
wider circle. But, before I examine the practicability of these socio-religious strings, that bind 
together different religious communities into one society, for the framework towards conflict 
resolution, I will briefly discuss significance of religious pluralism in the Indian society to 
explain an intricate relationship between the Indian society and plurality. 
VII.3.1. Is Religious Plurality a Weakness or Strength of the Indian Society? 
The Indian society is one of the most multicultural and pluralistic societies in the world. In the 
meantime, this pluralistic feature of the Indian society is not recently adopted or developed 
phenomenon, but many centuries old. Moreover, it was religious plurality which gifted Indian 
society with great saints like Dadu Dayal (1544-1603 – a Hindu-Muslim saint who inspired 
                                                 
26 See Maurice Bloomfield, The Religion of the Veda: The Ancient Religion of India (London: Adamant Media 




the formation of a sect known as Dadu Panth),27 Kabir Das (1440-1518 – a Hindu-Muslim 
mystic poet and saint),28 Sai Baba of Siridi (a Hindu saint who practiced Hindu and Muslim 
rituals and lived in a mosque), Guru Nanak, Ramakrishna Paramahamsa (mystic saint), 
Mahatma Gandhi and Mother Teresa. These great souls’ religion was service to humanity and 
their mission was to establish justice, peace and unity among diverse religious communities. 
They (particularly Mahatma Gandhi) inspired many great men (such as Martin Luther King 
and Nelson Mandela) and women all over the world to stand for justice, liberty, equality, 
brotherhood and peace among all mankind without any differentiation whatsoever. The Hindu 
reformers Ram Mohan Roy and Dayananda Sraswati too were the products of religious 
plurality. They were both positively and negatively motivated by Christianity and Islam to 
reform Hinduism and present it as a universal religion. Monotheism and iconoclasm of 
Christianity and Islam influenced and inspired them to take a bold step to start Hindu 
reformation movements to get rid of the shortcomings (such as futility of idol worship, evil 
side of caste system, sati system and child marriage) of the Hindu religious system. Besides, 
plurality has helped (directly or indirectly) to strengthen each religious community within the 
plurality – this is why all existing religious communities in the Indian society could preserve 
their original and unique religious values and norms intact even though these communities 
had to pass through a hostile socio-political environment (for several centuries) in the past.29 
Therefore, the plurality and diversity in India, to put in the words of John Hick, “is not 
ultimately a threat to be warded off, or an embarrassment to be studiously ignored, but a 
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reality of which we must seek to discover the positive meaning.”30 In reality, discovering 
positive meaning or values in other religious faiths is not a new thing to any of the religious 
communities in India; it is an ongoing process for a very long time. This ongoing process 
requires to be enhanced further to create favourable atmosphere among the conflicting 
religious communities to learn to unlearn negative attitudes and perceptions accumulated from 
both the past and present socio-religious and political experiences towards establishment of 
closer relationship among conflicting communities for the good of the whole Indian society.  
Furthermore, if peace and stability of a part of the society gets disturbed, then, the whole 
society suffers the consequence of it, because the relationship between different parts of the 
pluralist Indian society is very intricate. Therefore, it is imperative to maintain the equilibrium 
of the whole Indian society, not just a component of it. To uphold the stability in the whole 
Indian society it is necessary to repair the relationship gap and rebuild trust among the 
conflicting religious communities. In this regard underlying interconnecting socio-religious 
threads – that facilitate help to let the different communities co-exist, as one society, in 
several parts of India – can be very valuable aspects to re-establish trust among the different 
communities in the Indian society. 
VII.3.2. Interconnecting Socio-religious Threads for Deconstruction of Religious Terror 
and Rebuilding of Social Harmony 
To find practicable solution for the conflict resolution we have to peer into local or regional 
multi-religious societies that exist together as one community. One can find numerous such 
smaller societies in different regions in India. These societies could provide us with essential 
socio-religious strands that make possible for them to live together as close neighbours in-
                                                 
30 John Hick and Hasan Askari (eds.), The Experience of Religious Diversity (Aldershot: Gower Publishing 
Company Limited, 1985), 3. 
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spite of their religious differences. The following illustrations of how different religious 
communities participate and share in each others’ religious festivals and sacred space might 
help us to discover some such threads which bind-together these different religious 
communities.  
In the state of Kerala Hindus celebrate an ancient and majestic feast of Thrissur Pooram, “one 
of the most spectacular festivals held on the [Indian] sub-continent.”31 The festival is 
celebrated on 1st May every year. The central activity of the celebration happens in a large 
open space opposite of the main temple of Vadakkunnatham,32 in Trichur. On this occasion 
people from all over Kerala come to Trichur. Even though it is purely a Hindu festival the 
local Christians too respect this occasion. So, on this day the local Christians open the doors 
of their cathedral to well-come several thousand Hindu pilgrims, coming from all over Kerala, 
and prepare food for their lunch. In addition to Thrissur Pooram, there is Onam festival, 
which has more ecumenical character. Onam is the national festival of Kerala, and it is one of 
the most colourful festivals of south-east Asia. This is also annual festival which falls in 
August-September. Though Onam is originally Hindu harvest festival it is celebrated by all 
communities of Kerala. This festival lasts for four to ten days33 and during the period of 
celebration whole of Kerala is untied as one community. It is because of such common socio-
religious heritage Hindus, Muslims, Jews and Christians could co-exist as one people in 
Kerala for many centuries. 
                                                 
31 David A. Hart, One Faith? Non-realism and the World of Faiths (London: Mowbray, 1995), 155; 
“Thrissurpooram Festival;” available from http://thrissurpooramfestival.com/; Internet accessed: 30 July 2011. 
 
32 Hart, One Faith?, 156. 
 




In Gujarat too Hindus and Muslims used to celebrate the festival of Makara Sankranti 
(Repentant Crocodile) annually. According to Hart, in 1993 both Hindus and Muslims of 
Bhavnigar (Mahatma Gandhi’s own university town) were flying kites together “on their 
roofs and participating in a common ritual of celebration” during the festival even though 
Hindu-Muslim communal violence had erupted in Mumbai and claimed hundreds of lives due 
to the destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya.34 However, this socio-religious ethos suffered 
much damage due to the Gujarat pogrom in 2002.  
In addition to the above-stated cases of participation of Christians and Muslims in Hindu 
festivals, few examples of many of the sacred places, which are revered as holy places by 
both majority and minority religious communities, will be more helpful in the framework 
toward conflict resolution. One of these sacred places is Christian Church (St. Mary’s 
Basilica). St. Mary’s Basilica (built in 1882) is situated in Bangalore. Main attraction of this 
Basilica is the St. Mary’s Feast, which is celebrated in September for whole month every 
year.35 On this occasion (all-through the month) the church is packed with people, professing 
different religious faiths, who come from far and wide. Most of the devotees come to pray to 
Mother Mary to grant their wishes. It is believed that people’s wishes are granted by Mother 
Mary if they come into the church and pray to her. This church is one of the examples of 
many churches in several parts of India that are revered as holy places by the people of 
different religious communities. 
Other examples of ecumenical pilgrimage centres are Darga of Pir (known in various names, 
such as Darga Sharif and Ajmer Darga) in Ajmer, Rajasthan, and the shrine of Usman Raina 
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in Kashmir. The Darga of Pir is a tomb of thirteenth century Muslim Sufi saint, Khwaja 
Muin-ud-din Chisti (died in 1236), of Chisti Order36 The Darga Sharif is one of the oldest 
ecumenical pilgrimage centres in south-east Asia. For a long period both Muslims and 
Hindus37 of all walks of life have been visiting and seeking blessings together at this shrine. 
This sacred place has been one of the targets of both Islamic and Hindu terrorists because of 
its ecumenical character. In 2007 a bomb blast took place at the Dargah. Initially Islamic 
terrorists were blamed, but later on the Indian intelligence found out that it was the handy 
work of Hindu religious terrorists. The main intention of the Hindu terrorists behind the bomb 
blast was to distract Hindus from visiting the shrine. 
In the Kashmir Valley Pandits’ reverence for the popular Sufi shrines is well known case.38   
One of these shrines, which are venerated by both Muslims and Pandits, is the shrine of 
Usman Raina, popularly known as Rishi Baba. The shrine is located at Panewa, in the district 
of Bodgam. “Not long ago,” says Ishaq Khan, the residents (Pandits and Muslims) of the 
Panewa village “used to celebrate the anniversary of the Sufi saint by distributing cooked rice 
coloured with turmeric (tahar) among the poor.”39 The veneration of saints by both Hindus 
and Muslims of Kashmir seemed to have supported the Kashmiri social structure from being 
shaken by communalism or fundamentalism, in-spite of the presence of varied religio-cultural 
dimensions, for centuries. Evidently after the rise of Islamic religious terrorism in Kashmir 
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this shared social construction has been upset to a great degree and a sharp communal divide 
has been nourished between the conflicting communities in the wider circle. 
Besides, there are several other Sufi shrines (dargas) scattered all over India. Although those 
shrines may not be nationally or internationally popular as the Darga Sharif, many of them 
attract devotees, from both Muslim and Hindu communities, of the surrounding areas. Besides 
Sufi tombs, living Sufi saints too are respected by both Muslims and Hindus in some parts of 
India – particularly in Cachar, Karimganj and Hailakandi districts of Assam (in North-east 
India). 
Furthermore, the close social relationship between the Assamese Hindus and Assamese 
Muslims in Assam is worth mentioning here – both the communities have common language 
and culture. The Assamese Muslims are closer to Assamese Hindus than to their Bengali 
Muslim brethren in Assam.40 On account of the close cultural tie between the two Assamese 
religious communities hardly any incidence of communal clash takes place between them, 
although there has been frequent violence against non-Assamese Muslims in Assam from the 
1970s. Acceptance, recognition and mutual respect seem to be the major underlying factors 
for the development of such close socio-cultural relationship between the two faith 
communities. Both the communities accept one another as Assamese brothers and sisters, and 
they recognize and respect each other’s religious beliefs and practices, therefore, communal 
issues do not come between their relationships. Consequently, the communal conflicts that 
occur outside their society have not been able to affect the bond between the two 
communities.  
                                                 
40 See B. P. Singh, “North-East India: Demography, Culture and Identity Crisis,” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 
21, No. 2 (1987), 276.  
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The above-given examples disclose some of the interconnecting strings that have helped 
different religious communities to co-exist together in many parts of India. These strands are 
acceptance, recognition, mutual respect and good will to each others’ culture, participation in 
others’ social and religious occasions and places, principle and practice of common 
brotherhood, and respect to others’ approach of religious beliefs and practice systems. These 
threads tie together different sections of the given society and make it one individual whole. 
Some of these societies (such as Malayali and Assamese societies) appear to be shock-proof 
because of their close socio-cultural connectedness with one another for a long period of time, 
and this close relationship seems to have attained its maturity for which no outside factors can 
easily breach even a small gap between them – even if a gap is created they can quickly fill it 
up. Such maturity, besides the afore-mentioned underlying threads, involves open-mindedness 
and non-judgmental attitude – the first one makes people always considerate to other people 
no matter what, and second one avoids destructive criticism of other religious 
groups/communities. Open-mindedness and non-judgemental attitude help these societies 
scrutinize and say no to any kind of communal factor or rumour. In India communal forces 
often attempt to circulate rumour against, so-called, “Others,” and such rumour may take the 
form of a wild fire and create communal frenzy and destroy or weaken those interconnecting 
social strands (e.g. Gujarat riot separated the two co-existing communities wide apart). 
Nevertheless, the Malayali and Assamese societies have not been affected by any kind of 
communal propagandists’ method to create division in those societies so long. These mature 
co-existing pluralistic societies could be the best model of “unity in the midst of diversity,” 
common political slogan in India.  
Besides, the Indian history (which strictly excludes conceived and reconstructed Hindu 
history) might supply additional materials for re-establishment of confidence and brotherhood 
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among the conflicting communities. Before the present religious/communal violence took 
birth (in the latter half of the 19th century) diverse religious groups existed-together for many 
centuries in various parts of the Indian soil. In this area further research needs to be done to 
discover valid historical-elements that facilitated peaceful co-existence of different religious 
groups, communities and factions for centuries. 
However, religious terrorism, through spreading radical religious ideologies and religious 
violence, is trying to utterly destroy the above-given interconnecting strands to create deeper 
and wider gap among different religious communities of the Indian society. The evil design of 
religious terrorism threatens both the foundation and integration of the secular Indian state 
and Indian society. But, recent Indian Parliament and State Legislative Assembly elections (in 
Assam, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerela and Uttar Pradesh) proved that large majority of the 
Indian public is against religious terrorism, therefore, they voted secular parties to power. If 
this large chunk of the Indian society (which opposes and counters religious nationalism and 
religious terrorism through political procedure) and the secular political parties work 
collectively they can exploit and preserve these valuable socio-religious aspects for 
restoration of trust among the conflicting communities in the wider circle. To re-establish 
harmonious and better Indian society and to safeguard the Indian secular democracy all 
secular minded political leaders and positive and constructive thinking intellectuals of all 
religious communities and regional societies might need to work in one accord. 
If mutual trust between majority and minority religious communities is rebuilt, religious 
terrorism will lose its support base and may gradually die a natural death. Unless its roots are 




VII.4. Framework for Reconciliation and Resolution 
On the basis of the case studies (including the study in this chapter) I make the following 
suggestions as a framework for reconciliation and conflict resolution: 
1. The present religious antagonism and communal/religious violence among the 
conflicting communities is recent development, compared to the period of time these different 
religious groups had lived together as one society. Therefore, the socio-historical facts – on 
how the various faith groups could live together for a long period of time without any serious 
problem – could provide credible material for reconciliation and restoration of trust among the 
conflicting communities. In this regard it is imperative to do unbiased research on the 
historical facts applying authentic socio-historical methods. Hence, the Indian government 
(without any delay) has to entrust the responsibility (to do the research) on unbiased or 
unprejudiced scholars.  
2.  A relentless effort has to be made (by the Indian government, secular political parties 
and non-communal public or private agencies) to constantly update the Indian public (the 
findings of the scholars) through various means and methods – such as education (in 
educational institutions), organized public speeches, public awareness campaign and public 
debates.  The general awareness of the socio-historical facts might be effective in rebuilding 
trust among the conflicting communities. 
3.  The Indian government has to introduce  religious education as a compulsory subject 
(in all educational institutions – beginning from the primary to higher level – all-over India) 
to teach good moral values of all world religions to cultivate positive thinking in the minds of 
all young people. Religious education might implant love for all religious faiths among the 
young generation Indian mass, and they might not be mislead by communal elements. 
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4.  Secular political parties (both leaders and members) have to take a strict measure to 
stop using religion or religious imageries for their political end. Apparently use of religion for 
political purpose by secular party/parties only widens the gap among the conflicting 
communities and further boosts the moral of communal forces. Therefore, all secular parties 
should have to adopt strict guidelines, for every member of each party, to totally restrict use 
of religion or religious imagery for political gain.  
5. The Indian state has to adopt and implement a stringent legal system to contain any 
form of communal violence and communal propaganda (such as constructed Hindu history) 
that threatens to jeopardize communal harmony or widen the gap between the conflicting 
communities in India. Meanwhile, all (past and present) perpetrators of communal violence be 
prosecuted and be punished severely.  
6. The Indian state, secular political parties and all non-communal intellectuals and 
people of India have to work together to launch a concrete scheme for regular social 
interaction between conflicting communities (in different levels – village, local, district, 
regional and national), mainly in those areas where communal forces are strong – in social 
interactions importance and value of socio-historical factors and the above-discussed 
interconnecting social facts be given more emphasis.    
VII.5. Conclusion 
The preceding chapters have explained that religious terrorism in India is the by-product of 
deep religious antagonism on account of unfavourable socio-historical factors and political 
situation. This religious force, in-spite of various preventive measures employed by the Indian 
state, is expanding its support-base by applying various religio-political tactics and communal 
schemes to widen relationship-gap among the conflicting communities. Moreover, religious 
and political environment, in the post-independent period, became more promising ground for 
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radical religious specialists to inspire and mobilize their religious constituencies to achieve 
their set religio-political goals. The main religio-political goal of each concerned party seems 
to be reassertion of absolute supremacy of Hindu, Islamic, Sikh or Christian religious 
tradition within the specific geo-political territory. 
Therefore, the problem of religious terrorism is a grave concern not only for Indian state, but 
for whole of South Asia. More than three decades of terrorist violence has made it evident that 
this force cannot be vanquished by military machineries or political or economic strategies. 
To root out this problem it is necessary to destroy its support-base, and to demolish its 
support-base trust between the conflicting communities needs to be re-established. Therefore, 
an effort is made in this chapter to propose a practicable model based on the examples of 
several co-existing pluralist societies – some of them are assessed above. Meanwhile, 
unadulterated historical factors, if explored with valid and unbiased historical methods and 
intentions, could provide additional help in rebuilding confidence among various religious 
societies in India. As it is not intended to do a comprehensive study on the co-existing 
pluralist societies and their underlying historical factors in this thesis, the subject requires an 





Each conflicting religion is an embodiment of both violent and non-violent symbols. These 
contradictory aspects portray double phases – love and violence – of each religion. Because of 
these dual characteristics it is evident that Sikhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity can 
motivate extreme love or extreme hostility –either inspire people, like Mahatma Gandhi and 
Mother Teresa, to “perform the greatest acts of love and compassion” and resist violence with 
non-violence no matter what; or, instigate, so-called, faithful ones to massacre and terrorise 
people “in the name of God or justice” or the holy.1 Furthermore, non-violent symbols 
provide constructive ground for peace-building in any hostile environment, whereas violent 
symbols can be manipulated by radical teachers and preachers to justify acts of violence in the 
name of divinity.  
Both phases of religion are fully exhibited by the devotees of each conflicting religious faith. 
From antiquity these religions have produced millions of diehard devotees who cross any 
extremity to establish peace, love, justice and brotherhood among all Indians, excluding none. 
Works of such good religious extremists are clearly noticeable in every nook and corner of 
India. At the same time, there are many radical devotees who display violent face of religion 
to go beyond other extremity. Radical religious followers and practitioners of the conflicting 
religious communities stage-manage violent phase of each religion to justify religious 
violence or motivate religious terror against, so-called, enemies of dharma or religion. These 
religious extremists threaten to utterly destroy the existing communal harmony by disturbing 
age-old peace, mutual-love and brotherhood between the Hindu majority and Muslim-
Christian-Sikh minorities. They constantly teach and propagate the message of hatred, 
                                                          
1 See Susanne Heine, “Love or Violence? The Double Face of Religion”, Paper presented in Birmingham 
Symposium in honour of Frances Young (22 September, 2005). 
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violence and intolerance through various means and methods. Religious violence/terrorism 
appears to be one of the essential religious obligations for these radical religious extremists. 
Hence, religious terrorism is not only the medium of demonstration of their religiosity, but it 
is a mandatory part of religion for the religious radicals of each conflicting communities. This 
might be the reason why religious actors of the conflicting communities explicitly and 
actively manoeuvre religious texts and symbols to motivate ruthless religious violence against 
innocent people, women, children, disabled, old and even dead bodies (incidents of religious 
violence in Haryana, Gujarat and Orissa confirm this view).   
Evidently primary objective of Sikh, Hindu and Islamic religious terrorism is reaffirmation 
and reestablishment of absolute supremacy of the concerned religious tradition within the 
given geographical boundaries that is considered to be divine bestowed land for the given 
(e.g. Punjab for Sikhs, Kashmir for Muslims, and India for Hindus) religious community. 
Apparently it is not possible to achieve this goal without eliminating or fully subjugating the 
“Others” who do not conform or surrender to set religious norms of the, so-called, superior or 
only true religion. These “Others” are conceived as forces of evil that aim to destroy the 
(claimed) divine-revealed truth; therefore, time and again the slogan 
Sikhism/Islam/Hinduism/Christianity in danger is raised to mobilize the concerned religious 
constituency for dharma yudh or holy war.  Meanwhile, in the holy battle against the 
conceived enemies any form of violence is sanctioned religious justification; because the 
enemies, according to the religious understanding of the radicals, have forfeited the right of 
existence within the given holy territory.  Moreover, religious terrorism demonizes entire 
religious community/communities that do not agree with the given religious principles; 
therefore, it attempts to vilify, humiliate, terrorise and systematically annihilate the whole 
religious community applying various religio-political tactics. Since the entire religious 
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community represents forces of evil, every individual member of the community becomes 
evil; for which no mercy is shown to even disabled, pregnant women or small children. The 
religious concept that “Other” is evil (and after the destruction of divine truth) makes 
religious terrorism more ruthless than any other terrorism; therefore, it crosses any human 
limits in its terrorist activities. In the meantime, the so-called holy warriors/terrorists are 
assured honour in this life and eternal happiness afterlife for their participation in the religious 
war, for which they seem to feel no remorse for their inhuman violent activities.  
In India religious terrorism utilizes various strategies to achieve its goal. Some of its tactics 
are: blending of sacred and secular together and giving religious connotation to the secular 
aspects to activate and mobilize its religious constituency for holy war; taking part in political 
process to capture political power in states and national levels; employing crude method of 
religious violence as well as modern arms and technology to terrorise and destroy the targeted 
enemies; and instigation of communal violence to destroy the socio-religious strands that bind 
together different religious communities in the Indian society. Besides enemy religious 
communities, these schemes are applied to attack the very foundation of Indian secular 
democracy. This is why religious terrorism is a serious threat to the unity and integrity of the 
Indian nation.  
However, it seems that only a fraction of followers of each conflicting community are 
involved in the acts of religious terrorism. This is why – in-spite of almost three decades of 
violent activities of religious terrorism – the Indian secular democracy is functioning (in more 
or less normal way or far better than any of India’s contemporaries) till now. In the meantime, 
it appears that the larger section of the Indian society has not yet been affected by the 
religious terror so far. Evidently there are enumerable societies (in various parts of the 
country) that have been coexisting as one community for decades (or for centuries) in-spite of 
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their religious differences. Nevertheless, the destructive power of religious terrorism cannot 
be underestimated (although only a fraction of the people are involved in it) because, the 
terrorism is not declining but it is gradually expanding its support base in many parts of the 
country. If the destructive force continues to enlarge its support base, then, in the near future it 
might create a total chaos not only in the subcontinent, but in the whole of South Asia.   
The problem of religious terrorism is like a cancerous tumour that needs to be operated 
without delay. Therefore, to safeguard social harmony, secular and democratic values and 
integrity of Indian nation, it is an urgent obligation for all the leaders of secular political 
parties, constructive thinking leaders of all religions and regions to work together from all 
levels to restore trust of the minorities in the secular Indian state and to create neighbourly 
ethos among conflicting religious communities by inspiring mutual respect to each other.  





1. Since the 1970s a religious revival has taken place not only in Islam, but also in other 
religions – Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity and Sikhism – all through the world. According 
to Harvey Cox, Pope John Paul II’s visit to Mexico City, one of the most secular cities, on 26 
January 1979, marked the “resurgence of traditional religion in the world,” and “this 
resurgence has an undeniable – if still indeterminate – political significance.” (Cox, Harvey. 
Religion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
Inc., 1984), 14). 
“The global resurgence of religious ideas and social movements,” observes Scott M. Thomas, 
“is one of the most unexpected events at the end of the Twentieth Century” (Scott Thomas, 
“Religion and International Society,” in Religion, Globalisation and Political Culture in 
Third World, edited by Jeff Haynes (New Yourk: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 28).  
Worldwide religious resurgence is clearly visible picture of religion’s entry into politics of 
different countries of the world. It is happening in countries with different religious traditions 
and different stage of economic, social and educational developments. According to Scott 
Thomas there are two reasons for the global revival of religion: firstly, the “resurgence of 
religion is part of the larger crisis of modernity”; and secondly, it “is the result of the failure 
of the modernising, secular state to produce both democracy and development in the Third 
World (Thomas, “Religion and International Society,” 28). On the one hand rapid 
modernisation has caused social and personal dislocation in a traditional society and on the 
other hand the Third World secular states are unable to provide employment or other financial 
benefits to large and growing number of educated youths and, at the same time, the political 
institutions are misused by some political leaders for their own political gain. The dislocation 
increased the human needs (social, political, religious, economic, etc.), which the Third World 
II 
 
secular states drastically failed to meet. In such situation religious fundamentalism would 
reinforce and redefine communal identity that was shaken or destroyed by the dislocation 
(Jonathan Fox, “Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-religious Conflict,” in Nations and 
Nationalism Vol. 5, No. 4 (1999), 437). 
2. Islamic revolution in Iran was one of the most unexpected phenomena to happen to the 
Western world. The most shocking aspect of the Iranian Revolution was that the Islamic 
government, led by Islamic cleric Ayatollah Khomeini, took over the administrative authority 
of the country by overthrowing the Western-backed secular minded Shah who “was supported 
by a powerful, loyal army and by a network of secret police” (Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of 
the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 1). 
Before the fall of the Shah’s Regime, Western governments and intellectuals regarded Iran 
“‘an Island of stability’ in a most violent and volatile region” (Mohamed Heikal, The Return 
of the Ayatolla: The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Khomeini (London: Andre Deutsch 
Limited, 1981), 9). Since it was one of the most rapidly industrialized countries in the Third 
World, it gave the impression that the Shah’s Regime, through the process of 
industrialization, had brought prosperity to the citizens (Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian 
Revolution, 2); hence, Westerners supposed that the nation “would become increasingly 
secular in outlook and would begin to restrict any remaining religious beliefs to their personal 
lives” (Richard T. Antoun and Mary Eliane Hegland (eds), Religious Resurgence: 
Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism, 1st edition (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999), 1). Yet all the efforts of Shah to secularize and modernize Iran through 
industrialization could not save him and his government from the sudden downfall at the hand 
of religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the Iranian Revolution. Since the fall of 
Shah, Iranian politics has been dominated by Islam. Though the Iranian Revolution was a 
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political one, it was Shiism that provided the required unity, sustenance of the revolution, and 
hope to accomplish the political aspiration of the people although they had different 
ideologies and belonged to different religious groups (beside Shia Muslims there were other 
religious minority groups). Shia ideology “was all the more effective as a revolutionary 
ideology and ethos because it does not recognize a distinction between political and religious 
effort, nor does it regard political as outside the realm of religious concern” (Mary Eliane 
Hegland, “Islamic Revival or Political and Cultural Revolution: An Iranian Case Study,” in 
the Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism (1987), 194). The Shia religious 
symbols and their theological interpretation are some of the most important aspects of Shia 
revolutionary ideology.  
Martyrdom of the rightful heirs of Prophet Muhammad and return of hidden Imam are the two 
most important revolutionary symbols of Shiism.  In the opinion of Misagh Parsa, particularly  
“the story of Husayn’s willing martyrdom in the just cause of resisting the usurper caliph, 
Yazid, inspired devout Shiites to continue their opposition against the Shah in the face of 
repression and death” (Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, 9). According to the 
teachings of the Shia Islam Ali, cousin brother and son-in-law of the prophet, and Ali’s son 
Hussein were the true successors or khalifas of Muhammad, and other khalifas were the 
usurpers. 
At the same time the Islamic clerics played an important role in the mobilization of 
revolutionary activists against the Shah regime and in carrying out of their collective actions. 
The clerics could provide “leadership, networks, and symbols of communication” for the 
revolution.   Thus, “a segment of the Islamic clergy gained ascendancy within the opposition 
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and was eventually able to establish a theocracy” (Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian 
Revolution, 2) in Iran.  
Although the Iranian Revolution was entirely restricted within the borders of Iran, it struck a 
hard blow to the secularization process that had been considered unbeatable and irreversible, 
and disproved the hypothesis of the social scientists that religion would die out or pass into 
oblivion gradually with the advent of industrial society. Instead the Shiite-led Iranian 
Revolution has demonstrated that the resurgence of political Islam is to be reckoned by the 
world as a potent religious force. 
The religio-political resurgence of Islamism was not restricted to Iran alone, but it has swept 
across the Sunni Muslim world too. Even the most secular Muslim majority nation, Turkey, is 
not left untouched by Islamic resurgence. Due to this resurgence, “powerful Islamist parties 
foment revolution or threaten political stability” David Little and Scott Appleby, “A Moment 
of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious Peacebuilding in an Era of Religious and Ethnic 
Conflict,” in Religion and Peacebuilding, edited by Harold and Gordon Smith (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2004), 1) of some Muslim majority nations, like Algeria, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt and Indonesia. To the orthodox Islamist parties 
“in any country where the majority of the population is Muslim, politics means Islamic 
politics: if the politics are secular then the country cannot be called truly Muslim” (G.H. 
Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pn Books Ltd., 1979), 18). According to the orthodox Islamic 
teaching the sharia law must govern the Muslim community (the community of Allah and his 
apostle), and the nation which has Muslim majority (using majority might) must establish the 
Islamic law as its governing principles – in such a case other religious minorities have no 
other choice but to accept and abide by the sharia law.  
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The resurgence of Islam has given rise to radical Islam, which arguably threatens not only the 
stability of Muslim nations, but the whole world. This form of Islam breeds an Islamic 
nationalism that is anti-West, hostile to secular ideologies and culture, and also opposed to 
non-Islamic cultures and traditions. Islamic militants, the so-called army of God/Allah, get 
inspiration and nourishment from radical Islam and its theological ideologies. 
3. The Damdami Taksal was founded, in around 1757, by Baba Deep Singh, one of the 
greatest Sikh heroes (a scholar and a martyr) during the time the Afghan Ahmad Shah Abdali 
ruled the Punjab. Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was sent to Damdami Taksal at the age of seven 
by his father to learn the profession of preaching. Later on Bhindranwale became a dominant 
figure in the institution, and became the favourite of Kartar Singh, the head of the institution. 
After the death of Kartar Singh he, at the age thirty, became the 14th head of the Damdami 
Taksal. 
4. Originally invented relationship is defined by Tremblay in the following way: 
“Accommodating a distinct Kashmiri identity was the Indian Constituent Assembly’s guiding 
principle in 1950 when it approved Jammu and Kashmir’s unique and asymmetric 
constitutional relationship with India through Article 370 of the Constitution. This 
Constitutional provision created a special status for the state, unlike any other state in the 
Indian federation. In addition, the provision reaffirmed the ‘state-subject requirements’ 
whereby state employment and ownership of property were to remain the exclusive 
prerogatives of citizens of Jammu & Kashmir.” “Through various constitutional categories,” 
writes Tremblay, “the Indian state simultaneously both embraced and denied its differences 
from Kashmiri society. Although India recognized the Kashmiri people’s distinct cultural 
identity in the form of Kashmiriyat, it also asserted that the similarities between Kashmir and 
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the Indian state were based on their common secular, socialist, and democratic agendas.” [See 
Tremblay, “Kashmir’s Secessionist Movement Resurfaces,” 928-930.] 
5. Globalization is a process of integration and development of global economy through 
global trade and commerce. Though the early history of globalization could be traced back to 
the beginning of modern colonialism, the present process of globalization is recent global 
phenomenon. According to Fahrang Rajaee, it is a “new creation,” the beginning of which 
was heralded by the collapse of Soviet Union, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, indicating 
end of exclusive religiosity and theocracy, and birth of the World Wide Web introducing new 
information mode of production. Together these changes represent the inner change of 
ideology and material that establish the process of globalization (See Fahrang Rajaee, 
Globalization on Trial: The Human Condition and the Information Civilization [Ottowa: 
International Development Centre, 2000]). The most noticeable aspect of the globalization is 
“the control of culture” and its production (See “Globalization,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica 
2008 Ultimate Reference Suite [Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008]). The global 
popular culture can infiltrate through any geographical boundary, and any effort by a nation to 
exclude this culture makes the prohibited objects of the culture more irresistible. The products 
of the global pop culture are pop music, videos, films, fast food, entertainment items, 
beverages, decoration items, fashion, comics and equipments for exercises (“Globalization,” 
in Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008 Ultimate Reference). These commodities are related to life 
style experienced by the young people, and are obtainable through the internet system by 
breaching the import restriction and the computer security system of any nation. 
Globalization poses a serious threat to traditional cultures and socio-historical set-up by 
spreading “Western imagery and culture as a new form of imperialism, cultural imperialism, 
which was more insidious and more effective in cementing the dependency of the post-
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colonial periphery than the fiscal crudities of earlier decades,” through “late modernity, 
cultural flow and information technology.” (Peter Golding and Phil Harris, eds., Beyond 
Cultural Imperialism: Globalization, Communication and the New International Order 
[London: Sage Publications, 1997], 4). Hans Opschoor says, “Globalisation and 
modernisation may pose threats to ethnic and religious diversity and thus also to social 
cohesion and stability.”  (Thomas Pogge, “Recognized and Violated by International Law: 
The Human Rights of the Global Poor,” in Religion, International Relations and Development 
Cooperation, edited by Berma Klein Goldewijk [Wageningen: Wageningen Academic 
Publishers, 2007], 88). Western culture has invaded the international electronic media 
threatening to influence the minds of   information-hungry multitudes. 
Furthermore, globalization undermines “the principle of territoriality at various” levels (Jose 
Casanova, “Religion, the New Millennium, and Globalization,” in Sociology of Religion, vol. 
62, no. 4 [Winter, 2001], 424-425) and it universalizes and globalizes human rights by de-
territorializing state or region-based “jurisdiction,” that means an individual human being “is 
the carrier of inalienable rights, and freedom of conscience is the most sacred of these 
personal rights” (Casanova, “Religion, the New Millennium, and Globalization,” 424-425). 
So, one of the most important effects of globalization is “de-territorialization,” meaning “the 
disembededness of cultural phenomena from their natural territories” (Casanova, “Religion, 
the New Millennium, and Globalization,” 424-425). 
6. Sati “came to be used to denote a practice of self immolation that is quite dissimilar to that 
embarked upon by the Sati of Daksha/Shiva legend. One of the earliest versions of the story 
in which Sati self-destructs (she does not die in the Mahabharata version) contained in the 
Vayu Purana (30:38-47), the bulk of which was composed sometimes during the fourth and 
fifth centuries A.D. The Purana leaves vague the exact manner of Sati’s self-destruction 
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(broken heart? Yoga?), but the poet Kalidasa specifies in his Kumarasambhava that she threw 
herself into fire.” 
7. Puranas are the religious texts “that treat in encyclopaedic manner the myths, legends, and 
genealogies of gods, heroes, and saints.” There are traditionally eighteen major (and eighteen 
minor) puranas. The puranas are closely connected with the epics (the Ramayana and the 
Mahabharata), and together “became the scriptures of the common people; they were 
available to everybody, including women and members of the lowest order of society 
(sudras), and were not, like the Vedas, restricted to initiated men of the three higher orders 
[Brahman, Kshtriya and Vaishya]. The origin of much of their contents may be non-
Brahmanic, but they were accepted and adapted by the Brahmans, who thus brought new 
elements into their orthodox religion.” 
 “The tendency toward pantheism increased in Puranic Hinduism and led to a kind of theism 
that exalted several supreme gods who were not prominently represented in the Vedic corpus, 
while many of the Vedic gods disappeared or were greatly diminished in stature.” In the 
meantime, the Puranic Hinduism gave importance to idol worship, bhakti (personal devotion 
to Istha [family or personal] deity) and pilgrimage. 
8. Originally, the purification ritual of Shuddhi served to restore to their status persons of high 
castes who had been polluted. It was reinterpreted by Dayananda as a method of reconversion 
of those Hindus who were converted to other religions. Shuddhi could now be projected not 
only as a strategy of conversion but also as a kind of pre-emptive strike against the threat of 
Christian missionary conversions of low cast groups.  
9. Prabhakara writes: “The undeniable historical fact underlying this idea of ‘restoration of 
sovereignty’ as against the ‘demand for sovereignty’ is that beginning with the British 
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annexation of Assam following the defeat of Burma in 1826 in the First Anglo-Burmese War, 
the colonial government had embarked on consolidating the boundary of these newly acquired 
vast territories. The annexation process was neither painless nor fair; nor even conclusive, the 
last most evident in the description of some of the ‘new’ territories in the old maps as 
‘excluded,’ ‘partially excluded,’ and ‘unadministered’ areas.” 
10. The following statements affirm the good works of the Christian Missionaries among the 
Nagas: “The propagation of Christianity by the American Missionaries along with the 
imparting of education by opening missionary schools gave the greatest contribution to the 
rising of the Naga society. It was through them that the heathen Nagas learned of the 
existence of the Absolute Reality and the better way of living. Nagas could comprehend 
meaning life has and they won’t anymore part with it. They now felt blessed though endless 
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